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(/■ / 



PRINCIPLES 



OF THE 



ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



AND thp:ir 



APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE, 



WITH 



KEMARKS ON THE HANDLING OF TROOrS ON THE 



FIELD OF BATTLE, 



1^' 



-^ AS AT PRESENT PRACTICED, 



BY 



FRANK H. EDMUNDS, 
♦» 

First Lieutenant First Infantry, Instructor at thi 

United States Infantry and Cavalry School, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 




VOm LEAVENWORTH. KAN: 

KECIMENTAI. PRINTLNfi OFFICE. TWENTIETH C. S. INKANTIIV 

188a. 



V 



COPYRIGHT BY 

FRANK H. EDMUNDS. 

1 S83. 



PREFACE. 



The idea of preparing this work occurred to me during tlie course 
of instruction in Mahan^a Outpost at this school last fall. The above 
text-book having been published before the introduction of breech- 
loading weapons, and previous to the modifications in tactics made 
necessary by their introduction, as exemplified in recent wars, it is 
desirable that some of the principles developed during the progress 
of these wars should be embraced in a preliminary study of the Art 
of War. 

It is hoped that this result will to some extent be accomplished by 
this volume, which is a compilation from the best works bearing on 
these subjects, embodying the principles deduced from a study of the 
history of these wars, and the opinions of many active participants 
in them who are considered to be authorities on the questions they 
have considered. 

The language of many of these authors has been retained; particu- 
larly is this the case with the works of Boguslawski, Von Schellen- 
dorf, and Home, the latter embracing in his Precis of Modern Tactics a 
clear and explicit review of modern tactics as recognized by the best 
military writers of recent date. The object has been to prepare these 
principles in a form suitable for study by the students of this school, 
and they are to be considered, not as positively established facts in 
all cases, but as opinions of experts, which can be studied, discussed, 
modified, and possibly improved upon. 

If this object is attained, the author will be fully repaid for the 
time, labor and study devoted to the preparation of this work. 

Acknowledgements are due Colonel Otis, 20th Infantry, Comman- 
dant of the (School, Colonel Poland, 18th Infantry, and Lieutenant 
Murray, 4th Cavalry, Secretary of the School, for many valuable sug- 
gestions, and for their kindness in allowing me access to many of the 
works consulted. 

F. H. E. 
r. 8. Infantky and Cavalry School, 

Fort Lkavexworth, Kansas, August 20th, 188H. 

[Tir] 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



ClIAPTKK III. Oppo.<ile 

page. 
FfG. 1.— Oblique Base, 84 

" 2. — Union Lin^ of Operations, Gettysburg Campaign, 1863,... 34 

" 3. — Double f^ines of Operations. 34 

" 4. — Double Lines of Operations, 34 

CHAPTER YI. 

Fro. 1. — Advanced guard of One Hundred and Fifty Men, 76 

" 2. — Marches, Campaign of 1805, 76 

" 3.— Jack.son's Flank March, 1863, 76 

CHAPTER VII. 

Fig. 1. — Outposts of an Army, . 82 

" 2.— The Union Lines at Gettysburg, 1863, 90 

" 3.— Passage of the r»ouro, 1809, 94 

CHAPTER YIII. 

Fig. 1. — Strategical and Tactical Points of Attack, 122 

" 2. — Strategical and Tactical Points of Attack, 122 

" 3.— Combined Attacks, 122 

" 4.— Mars-la-Tour, 1870-71, 122 

CHAPTER IX. 

Fig. 1.— Soult's Retreat in Portugal, 1809, 126 

CHAPTER XL 

Fig. 1. — Surprise of the Hessians at Trenton, 1776, 136 

" 2.— The Storm of Kars, 1877-78 136 

CHAPTER XIIL 

Fig. 1. — Formation of Infantry, First Stage of the Attack, 162 

" 2. — Formation of Infantry, Second Stage of tlie Attack, 162 

" 3. — Formation of Infantry, Third Stage of the Attack, 162 

" 4.— Formation of Infantry, Fourth Stage of the Attack, 162 

" 5.— Formation of Infantry, Fifth Stage of the Attack, 162 

[IV] 



LIST OF WORKS, 

FROM WHICH SELECTIONS AND EXTKACTS HAVE BEEN MADE. 



1. Annies of Asia and Europe, Uptox. 

2. Art and Science of War, Wheeler- 

3. Art of War, Jomtni. 

4. Battles of ihe Revolution, Cakkikgton. 

o. Campaign in Germany, 1866, Prussian Staff, 

6. Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, Swinton. 

7. Consulate and the Empire, Thiers. 

8. Frederick the Great, Carlyi.e. 

9. French Revolution, Thiers. 

10. Frontal Attack of Infantry, Laymann. 

11. Grand Military Operations, Jomini. 

12. Great Campaigns, King. 

13. History of the Peninsula War, Napier. 

14. Lessons of War from the Great Masters, Soady, 

15. Life of Napoleon, Jomini. 

16. Life of the Duke of Marlborough, Coxe. 

17. Memoirs, Sherman, 

18. Military Sketching and ) „ j Tvf r^ 

T?«.>^»,\,„; „ r Hutchison and MacGrp:gor. 

Keconnaissance, / 

19. Military Telegraph during the Civil War) r> 

in the United Slates, / ^ ^^^^• 

20. Operations of War, Hamley. 

21. Outposts, Hamley. 

22. Ontpost, Mahan. 

[V] 



VI LIST or WORKS. 

28. Precis of Modern Tactics, Home. 

24. Russian Campaigns in Turkey, 1877-78, Greexk. 

25. Strategy and Tactics, Dufolr. 

26. Studies in Tactics of Infantry, Von Scherkf. 

27. Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71, Boguslawski. 

28. Tile Duties of tiie General Staff, Von Schellendorf. 

29. The Elements of Military Art and History, Duparcq. 

30. The Elements of Modern Tactics, Shaw. 

81. The Soldiers' l^ocket Book, Wot-SELEY. 



COJS TENTS. 

Paqe. 
CHAPTER I. 

Sketch of the History of Tactks, ] 

CHAPTER 11. 
The Art of War, 10 

CHAPTER III. 
Principles of Strategy, 14 

CHAPTER IV. 
Army Organization, 35 

CHAPTER V. 
Reconnaissances, 38 

CHAPTER VI. 
Advanced-guards and Marches, GO 

CHAPTER VII. 
Outposts and Positions, 77 

CHAPTER VIII. 
Battles, 112 

CHAPTER IX. 
Retreats and Pursuits, 123 

CHAPTER X. 
Diversions, 132 

CHAPTER XI. 
Surprises and Ambuscades, 134 

CHAPTER XII. 
Detachments and Convoys, 144 

CHAPTER XIII. 

ExMPLOYMENT OF THE DIFFERENT ArMS, 148 

CPIAPTER XIV. 
Causes which have Influenced Moi^ern Warfare, 214 

CHAPTER XV. 

CoN(."LUSIONS, 221 

[vir] 



PRINCIPLES 

(JF THE 

ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

AND THKIK 

APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE, 



REMARKS ON THE HANDLING OF TROOPS ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE, 
AS AT PRESENT PRACTICED- 



CHAPTEK I. 

A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF TACTICS. 

1. " It is repeatedly said that tactics have been altered, that the [Home.) 
use of rifles and breech-loaders, supported by rifled artillery, have but not t'othPex- 
completely changed the system of fighting, and that a new leaf must suppofe'cf.''* " 
be turned over. In one sense this is true; in another it is an error, 
and a mischievous error. 

" It is quite true that the introduction of improved arms has pro- improved arms 
duced very considerable modifications in the method of fighting; but oci°of fightfn'g.^'^ ^' 
those modifications are not so much changes, as the growth and 
development of principles that have been known for hundreds of 
years. And it is a most dangerous thing to ignore all experience 
obtained prior to the introduction of improved arms, for it is only 
by a careful study of the development of tactics, that the true direc- 
tion in which improvement is possible can be determined. 

" There has been no period when it could be justly said, 'Those are improvements in 
old, these are new tactics.' The improvements have followed natur- p'lovemoitrin''"" 
ally on each succeeding improvement in fire-arms. The flint-lock, **''"**• 
percussion-cap, rifle and breech-loader have each necessitated changes. 
And as the breech-loading rifle is but a development of the flint-lock 
musket, so tactics, as existing now, are but a development of what Great changes in 

^1 11-1 r • ■ 11 tactics coincide 

they were one hundred years ago. It is quite true that there are cer- with great wars, 
tain periods when great changes seem to take place, but the.><e are 
really periods coincident with great wars, when the minds of people 
in general are turned to military subjects, and many startling dijcov- 
eries appear then to be made, which were well known, di.^cus.scd, and 

1 



2 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

practiced years beforehand, but which have escaped notice until 
peculiar events have forced them into prominence. * * * 

Inx Jndlhi'R^o- ^- " <J^oi»g ^ack to the history of Greece and KoDie, we find that 

man legion. tjj^ Same causcs that produce alterations in tactics now, were at work 

then^ We find the undisciplined armies of Persia composed of nations 
and tribes of warriors, chiefly mounted, overcome by the steady dis- 
cipline and firmness of the Greek phalanx. The same phalanx was 
overcome by the Roman legion, which was more mobile, employed a 
greater number of missile weapons, and could work over rough ground 
with far greater ease than the phalanx, which very quickly got dis- 
organized on uneven ground." 

G^eciaiiarmV*^ ^ ^' ^^ Grecian army was composed of infantry and cavalry. The 
infantry was divided into three classes; the first wore a complete 
defensive armor, the second a lighter armor, and the third none at 
all. The first class was armed with the Macedonian pike, twenty-four 
feet long, the second class with a shorter pike, and the third carried 
the javelin, bow and sling. 

The cavalry was divided into two classes; one class was armed with 
a lance and sabre, and horse and rider were provided with a complete 
defensive armor; the other class consisted of archers and lancers, who 
also carried tlie sword and javelin, but had no armor. 

Composition and The armv corps consisted of about thirty thousand men ; the heavv 

formation of the . , * ^ .... , . 

army corps. infantry was drawn up m line sixteen deep, and when this line ad- 

vanced it had six tiers of spear-points in front, and was irresistible, 
as the first six ranks were pressed on by those in rear. The heavy 
armed infantry was flanked by the light infantry, which was formed 
in a similar manner, but only eight deep; the cavalry was formed 
four deep, and was placed on the flanks of the infantry. The phalanx 
corresponded to our division. There was a sub-division consisting of 
two hundred and fifty -six men, which coi'responded to our battalion, 
also a sub-division of sixty-four men similar to the company. 

Composition and 4, Jn the case of the Romans a consular armv was also composed 

formation of a Eg- , . '. . , 

man army. of infantry and cavalry. The infantry was divided into infantry of 

the line and light infantry; the former wore a complete defensive 
armor, and was armed with a short sword, a javelin seven feet in 
length, and a pike. The light infantry was armed with the short 
sword and a short javelin. The heavy cavalry was armed with a 
sword, javelin and lance; the light cavalry with a sword, javelin, 
bow and sling. The infantry was drawn up in three lines in quincunx 
order, intervals being left between the units of each line. The first 
and second line were each ten files deep, and the third six ; the cav- 
alry, ])laced on the wings, was drawn up four deep. 



AND THEIR APPLH ATION IX MODERN WARTARE. li 

The unit, corresponding to a company in our day, was composed of 
one hundred and twenty men; the sub-division, similar to a battalion, 
consisted of three units, or three hundred and sixty men. 

5. "The order of battle of the Romans did not apparently include (Honu-.) 

1 •! i' 1 /--i 1 • • 11' 111 ^^^ "* "^ le.servo 

a regular reserve until after the Carthaginian wars had taught the les- by the Romans, 
son that victory often fell to the general who could bring up a reserve 
at the last moment. Subsequently the Romans invariably employed 
strong reserves of both horse and foot. 

(). "After the fall of the Roman Empire, u^avalry became about The feudal p<ii- 
the only force used; this arose chiefly from the political and social 
state of Europe at that time, armies being to a great extent formed of 
the retainers and followers of great feudal chiefs, and the infantry 
being composed of the poorest people, of little account and badly 
armed. 

7. "The English at this period were remarkable for gaining sev- 1346— Hif). 

• • r, T^ . • 1 » . 7, • 1 1 Influence of the 

eral great victories. Lressy, I'oitiers and Agincourt — ail gained by English. 
tactical arrangements in consonance with the arms used. The long- 
bow, the weapon the English infantry used, being superior both in 
range, accuracy and rapidity of lire to the cros-s-bow, the usual weapon 
of foreign armies. The tactics of the English were simple, and con- 
sisted in taking up a position where the enemy had to attack them, 
discharging great flights of arrows on him as he charged with heavy 
masses of cavalry, and charging him when in disorder, on the flank, 
with cavalry posted on the wings for that purpose. 

8. "Subsequently the Swiss infantry, by its victories at Morgarten, influence of the 
Sempach and Noefels, raised the estimation in wiiich infantry was ^"''^*'- 

held in Europe, and all armies soon had companies of Swiss infantry, 
usually employed as the guard of the sovereign, 

9. "The general introduction of fire-arms showed that armies, to Eticci of the in- 
be successful, must be composed of large bodies of men so armed, and arms. i 
that they must be mobile. From this resulted a gradual preponderance 

of infantry and the reduction of the defensive armor men carried. 

10. "Gustavus Adolphus was the first general who grasped these Gustavus Adoi- 
facts, and who also saw that mobility must be dependent on dis- ujii. 
cipline. 

"The changes introduced by Gustavus Adolphus were very similar changes made by 
in their tendency to those consequent on the u.se of breech-loaders. 
They were increased mobility and development of fire. 

" The usual formation of the Swedish troops was in six ranks, but in Formatiou of the 

"^ . Swedish troops. 

action they deployed so as to form three ranks. '•■ "The 

cavalry was formed three deep, and although furnished with fire- 
arms, its instructions were to charge, and not to trust to fire. 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Effect of the ta 
tics adopted by 
Gu8tavus Adol- 
phus. 



Improvements 
made by GustavUfi 
Adolphus. 



To what his 
cess was due. 



Frederick the 
Great. 

1749. . 



Formation of the 
Prussian troops. 



Order of battle. 



11. "The tactics adoyjted by Gustavus Adolphus conduced greatly 
to his many victories, his opponents, adhering to the heavy, deep col- 
umns at that time in use, were compelled to guard against being 
outflanked by the formation of their opponents, to place all their 
troops in one line, while the Swedes were enabled to form their troops 
in several lines. Consequently, when the line of the imperialists was 
forced at any part they could never bring up fresh troops to support 
the decisive point. 

12. "Many improvements in soldiers' equipment were introduced 
by Gustavus Adolphus, such, as lightening the musket, dispensing 
with the rest, introducing the wheel-lock in place of slow-match, and 
also cartridges, thus enabling the soldier not only to tire, but also to 
load more rapidly. He also made artillery more mobile, and added 
regimental guns, which fired case shot, to the battalions of infantry. 

" The tactics of the great Swedish king were largely dependent on 
his improvements in arras. And it was to the clear conception he had 
of the effect of fire-arms on the movement of troops, that muc*h of 
his success was due. Few leaders have ever equalled or surpassed 
him in handling troops. 

13. " After the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the art of tactics 
remained stationary for many years, although numerous improve- 
ments, both in arms and organization, were made by Turenne and 
Saxe. But no general appears to have taken up the question of 
tactics, organization and arms, as a whole, until Frederick the Great, 
following in the footsteps of- Gustavus Adolphus, showed that victory 
would fall to the general who distinctly understood the bearing of 
these subjects on one another, and again we find improvements taking 
the same direction — development of fire and mobility. The troops 
were formed in three ranks, the battalion being composed of ten com- 
panies, and the greatest care being taken to preserve correct distances 
and alignments, so as to enable every man to fire. The movements 
were always in open column, which wheeled into line to the pivot 
flank and advanced on the enemy. There were no skirmishers of any 
kind. 

''The cavalry was formed two deep, and trusted entirely to the effect 
of its charge and not to fire-arms. 

"The Prussian order of battle was at that time invariably in two 
lines, cavalry on the wings and infantry in the centre. 

"The battalions of the first line were deployed, with six paces inter- 
val between them. The battalions of the second line were also 
deployed, but as the first line was usually stronger than the second, 
the intervals between battalions of the second line varied and were 



AND THEIR APrLICATION IN MODKKN WAKI ARK. O 

greater tluin those of the iirst line. Tlie cavalry was also formed into 
two lines on the flanks, a few hussars being detached beyond the Hank 
of the general line to cover it. The artillery was usually placed in 
heavy batteries on the front. 

14. " Frederick's battles mav be divided into two distinct phases — I'tuisesoi Fierk-r- 

" _ ^ ' ^ ick'.s battiots. 

"1st. The movement, termed his oblique order of battle, by which 
he sought to place himself obliquely on the fiank of his opponent. 

"2d. The action of the troops after they became engaged. 

"The very short range of weapons at the period to which we refer 
enabled troops to get personally engaged after passing over short 
spaces. Frederick's tactics consisted, once the troops were engaged, in 
rapid firing and repeated bayonet charges. 

15. "The system followed by Frederick had many disadvantages. Disadvantages of ^ 
Among these were the slight depth of his line of battle, the want of tom. 

reserves, the want of skirmishers, the impossibility of properly com- 
manding the troops when spread out in such long lines and columns. 
General officers in command had their troops scattered over a long 
front, which they could neither overlook nor direct; but the admir- 
able drill, steadiness and manoeuvring powers of the Prussian army 
gave it, when opposed to troops who were not posvsessed of those qual- 
ities, such a pre-eminence, that Frederick's successes were dne to these 
qualities rather than his tactics. 

"The Prussian army formed for many years the model of other Linear tactics. . 
armies, and the tactics of Frederick are the basis of what are termed 
'Linear tactics.' 

16. "In 1774, Mesnil Durand proposed a system which exercised System ofMesnii 
great influence over the tactics of the wars of the Eepublic and Em- 
pire. 

" He proposed to form battalions in close columns of grand divisions 
of doable companies, and that all deployments should be on the leading 
double company; he recommended battalions in ten compani(^s, two 
of which were invariably to skirmish. 

" When several battalions worked together, they were to be formed 
in line of double column at deploying intervals, covered by the whole 
of the flank companies as skirmishers. Columns, said Mesnil Durand, 
mass the greatest amount of force in the smallest space, and alone 
can, on account of the narrowness of the front and the greatness of 
the intervals between them, give free movement to cavalry and 
artillery, but these columns must be linked together by thick 
chains of skirmishers. Infantry has two weapons to fight with, 
and it should have two distinct formations ; line is the best for 
firing, columns for manoeuvre and attack. In every case, without 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Tactics of tl 
French. 

1776—1791 



Com pan 
umiis. 



The French gov- 
erned bv this svp 



exception, that formation should be used which is the most suitable 
at the moment. * * * * 

17. *'The views here given were those in vogue at the French mili- 
tary schools when Napoleon was a student. They fell in with the 
peculiar character of the French revolutionary armies. Small bat- 
talion columns, covered by clouds of skirmishers, was the basis of 
these tactics; the long and difficult drill necessary to acquire the 
exactness of movement required by the linear tactics was needless, 
more depended on the courage and skill of individuals than accurate 
drill. * * * - * 

''The same writer advocated the formation of company columns, 
for exactly the same reason as he advocated battalion columns, viz: 
that the formation could be changed more readily from line to column 
when requisite. These company columns have since become cele- 
brated. ^- * i-; ft -: 

18. *' These tactics were those which were, more or less, the basis 
tem in 'the cam- of the movements of the French armv in Italv in 1796. Thev were 

paign in Italy in "'.,.*'. 

17%. by no means reduced to a system. Much Avas left to the individual 

enthusiasm of the soldier, and to the effect produced by the large 
number of educated men the revolution and consequent universal 
service had placed in the ranks, which of course greatly increased the 
moral power of the Eepublican armies. * * * 

^'^"^'- 19. " At the battle of Rivoli, the French worked entirely by bat- 

talion columns, covered with skirmishers, and when on the defensive, 
as during the course of that celebrated battle they often were, these 
battalion columns were deployed into line three deep. * 

Demi-hrigades. "Up to this time there were really no regiments in the French 

Revolutionary army; what were termed demi-brigades took their 
place, and consisted of three battalions. The whole of the arrange- 
nijents w^ere of that irregular character that must characterize armies 
hastily put together. 

Napoleon's action 20. "After the assumption of the Imperial title, Napoleon pre- 

after becoming j £ .r • • e ^ ^ j j • ^i i . i- 

Emperor. pared icr the invasion of l^ngland, and in the large standing camps 

formed at Boulogne and elsewhere on the coast of the English 
Channel many improvements and alterations were made, both in 
organization and tactics; conscription with substitution w^as intro- 
duced in lieu of universal service, and the more settled state of 
the country and government, causing many openings in civil life, 
drew off much of the intelligence that had been previously forced 
into the army for want of a vent elsewhere. The army formed 
at Boulogne still, however, possessed many of the old elements that 
gave the early Eepublican armies such great moral power; it pos- 



AST) THKIR ArPMCATION IN MODKIlN WARFARE. / 

sessed also that fii'iiiness and steadiness whicli it takes many niuntlis 
to give troops. 

21. "Formed for a most difficult enterprise, (the invasion of Ens- cii'tnvctor of the 

, \ trench army. 

land), trained with the greatest care and skill, it undoubtedly was the is'>'>- 

finest army the Emperor Napoleon ever commanded. One of the 
changes, perhaps not an improvement, was the alteration of the old 
three-battalion demi-brigade into a regiment of two battalions. It 
was this army that fought the battle of Austerlitz. ■■' 

22. "Some davs bsfore the battle the Emperor had ordered a new ^''^'^".s^,. m«^d« *" 

^ the infantry for- 

formation for the infantry. Each brigade was to have its first mation before 

-^ , , *' .■ Austerlitz . 

regiment deployed, the second formed in close column of double com- 
panies on the flanks. * If the division had five regiments, 
the fifth regiment was to bs plac3d one hundred yards in rear of 
centre; the artillery in the intervals between the brigades and on the 
flanks. 

The Emperor Napoleon, writing to Soult and Bernadotte on the 
'26th December, 1805, says: 'You will, by observing this formation, 
be able to oppose a line of fire to the enemy, and yet have close col- 
umns ready to attack him if requisite.' 

23. "These dispositions are a further instance of the fundamental ponnecHon be- 

^ ^ _ tweeu first and 

rule in infantry fights, that the second line must not be independent second lines in 

..... . . infantry fights. 

of the first line, of which it is the support and immediate stay. The 
order of linked brigades was thus conformable to what history shows 
as having occurred in every battle. The ground on a battle-field is 
generally so cut up by obstacles, and so formed, that each brigade has 
usually a distinct object to attain. The second line can rarely, if 
ever, support the first line without forcing it again into action, for the 
passage of lines, as laid down in books, can rarely, if ever, be carried 
out. These formations are also a condemnation of the system of de- 
ploying an entire division in front line, and entire division in second 
line. * * ■■• '•■ 

24. "At Jena, the tactics of Frederick the Great came into actual Tactics of Freder- 

' ick and Napoleon 

contact with those of Napoleon, and although that battle was decided at Jena. 

. ... isotj- 

by circumstances other than the actual fighting, yet the formation of 

the French troops presents some points of interest. The French troops 
were usually drawn up in line of battalion double company columns 
at deploying distance, and attacked in that order, covered by skirm- 
ishers. •■• V « * 

The tactics of the French armv had now established their superi- French tactics .''u- 
. ' . -r. • perior to Prussian 

ority over the Prussian or linear tactics. But tactics, such as have tactics. 

been described, require for their complete development thoroughly 

trained and well-educated (officers in the position of eomi)any and 



8 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

battalion leaders, thoroughly trained and well-disciplined troops, zeal, 
enthusiasm, skill and activity on the part of individual men. 

Eflfeet of long 25. '' Long wars sap discipline, trained men, who fall from wounds 

or disease, are replaced by untrained or partially trained recruits, 
officers of experience are killed or wounded, and their places taken 
by men of less experience and intelligence, and the more ignorant 
and undisciplined the men are the more must the officers exert them- 
selves, and consequently the more they suffer. 

Eff-cf on thp "These causes began to tell on the French army, and .though two 

Fronch aim v. . ° . • ' ° 

great powers of Europe — Austria and Prussia — had been overturned, 
yet war was not popular in France, the vast number of substitutes 
purchased deteriorated the morale of the raw material composing the 
armies, and siiowed that the mass of the French nation did not desire 
war. •■■ ^ -•■ ^ 

Influence of those 26. "Cjusequent on, and following from, these changes in the com- 
tics. position 01 the army, changes in tactics took place, changes which 

are worthy of notice. These changes were chiefly the concentration 
of great masses of artillery to crush a portion of the enemy's troops 
in position, the advance of heavy columns composed of entire divis- 
ions formed in mass of battalion columns. Such formations were 
adopted chiefly to keep the troops under the eye and control of 
superior officers, and partly to produce that feeling of confidence 
which the thronging together of masses of men in such columns is 
supposed to give. * ■■ •■■ 

French and Eng- 27. " In Spain, whenever the French and English came into con- 

lish tactics in , iii ii- !• • i ^ 

vSpain and at Wat- tact, and also . at VVaterloo, the deployed line met and invariably 
overcame the heavy columns of the French infantry. The tactics 
adopted by the English were perfectly natural, and invariably suc- 
ceeded; selecting a good position, they withdrew their infantry, 
deployed a little behind the crest, covered the front with skirmishers, 
and waited the attack. The French advanced to the attack in mass 
of columns, sometimes a whole division so formed, each company 
three deep, and company behind company; these columns, covered by 
skirmishers, advanced, suffering severely from the English artillery; 
as they came near the infantry line, the latter fired into them, the flank 
companies lapped round the flanks of the columns, charged them 
in front and on both flanks, and invariably beat them back. The bat- 
tle of Busaco is an admirable instance of these tactics. '■■ 

Effect of the use 28. '' When rifles began to take the place of smooth-bore arms, 

of rifles. . o f > 

many proposals were made for altering tactical formations, and the 
effect of these weapons was much discussed. It became apparent that 
infantry fire had become of much more importance than formerly. 



AM> rilElR API'I.ICATION IN MODKKN WARFARE. 'J 

and that as the valiu' ot lire increased, So the formation of troops 
must be altered, to give greater development of lire than formerly on 
one hand, and greater protection to the men when advancing on the 
other." * ^ ■■■ * 

29. The following deductions are made by Von Moltke, from re- vo',''MoUke'''^ 
suits obtained in the Crimean war, the first war in which rifles were 
used: "From these experiences, we infer that now, as heretofore, the 
column formation aflbrds the best means of handling troops both in an 
attack and in an actual fight. Although the fire of artillery at long 
ranges forces a column into an early deployment, yet it does not pre- 
vent the approach of a line of columns so small as to be- able frequently 
to obtain cover from the inequalities of the ground, and to advance 
with great rapidity. 

" On the other hand, that portion of an army which is to sustain 
the immediate attack of an enemy should receive that attack in line, 
for the success of the defen.ce depends on the fire of the deployed 
battalions, and it is only by fully employing the fire that the possibil- 
ity at last arises of deciding the issue with the bayonet. Our system 
of company columns, and the instruction given in our schools of 
musketry, are adapted to meet all these contingencies." 

The modifications of tactics to meet the requirements of improved 
weapons will be noticed later. 



to 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAIl 



CHAPTER II. 



War defined. 



Kind of wars. 



Offensive and de- 
fensive wars. 



Science and art of 
war defined. 



Divisions of the 
art of war. 



Organization of 
armies another 
branch of the art 
of war. 



THE ART OF WAR. 

1. War, as usually defined, is "a contest between nations, states, 
or parts of states, carried on by force." 

2. Wars, from the causes for vrhich they are waged, or which have 
produced them, are called wars of opinion, wars of conquest, civil 
wars, wars of rebellion or insurrection, etc. 

3. In a military point of view wars are usually classed as defen- 
sive or offensive wars. The armies of a nation entering the domains 
of another for the purpose of making war upon it, carry on an offen- 
sive war, while for the latter nation the war is defensive. 

4. To the ScFENC^E of War belongs a study of those principles 
which govern all the operations of war, and which are deduced from a 
study of the history of wars conducted by great military commanders. 

The Art of War is the practical application of these principles by 
a general in command of an army. 

5. The Art of War is divided into branches, which by most mil- 
itary authorities are classed as follows: 

a. Statesmanship in relation to war. 

6. Strategy. 

c. Grand Tactics. 

d. Logistics. 

e. Engineering. 
/. Minor Tactics. 

The first subject belongs purely to the political questions involved 
in the war, which clearly do not come witiiin the scope of a military 
work. 

6. There is a subject which most clearly is a branch of the Art of 
War, and which of late years has become of the first importance, 
owing to the short duration of recent wars, viz: The Organization 
OF Armies. 

We have lately seen that power which has developed the system 
of organization to the greatest extent and most highly perfected 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IX MODERN AVAUEARE. 11 

it, conquer in two wiir.s of great magnitude in a wonderfully short 
period. 

That nation w4iich adopts the most perfect plan of organizing its why a porfect 
armies will have a great advantage in future wars; tor, as lime is the zation is import- 
most important element in military operations, the country which "''^" 
first places a superior number of disciplined troops in the field, is 
enabled to assume the offensive at once, and to advance against an 
enemy unprepared to meet it. 

How pressing the need of a proper system of organization at the ii';^'">i'-<>i "'"i ih""- 
outbreak of our civil war, and how fully was the effect of a thorough 
system demonstrated in favor of the Germans in 1870-71! 

It is, therefore, a subject which will in future demand the first con- tonciu.sions. 
sideration and the most thorough study; for, owing to the facility with 
which armies are now moved to the place of contest, that nation 
which is more fully prepared has great odds in its favor at the begin- 
ing of the war, and a few decisive actions at this time will usually be 
favorable to it and go far toward ending the conflict. 

7. For these reasons, then, the Art of 11 «r should more properly m ore m.-dcni .Ji- 
be sub-divided into the following branches, viz: orwai-.' 

a. The Organization of Armies. 

h. Logistics. 

c. Strategy. 

d. Engineering. 

e. Tactics. 

The Organization of Armies is the building up necessary for the organization. 
application of the principles of strategy to them. 

Logistics is the art of moving and supplying armies. Logistics. 

Strategy is the art of directing armies upon the theatre of war. strategy. 

Engineering, the art of disposing troops and making arrangements Engineering. 
of obstacles by means of which an inferior force may successfully 
resist the attacks of a superior force; and also the art of overcoming 
and removing all obstacles placed in the way by an opposing force. 

The following are the duties of engineers of an armv: the con- Duties of en- 

. , ' . "ineers. 

struction and maintenance of field telegraphs, tiie construction of '^ 
fortifications, the conduct of engineering operations at sieges, mining, 
bridging, surveying, reconnoitering, opening and making roads, choos- 
ing positions, sketching ground, etc. The details of these duties will 
be found in the different manuals and text-books of engineering. 

Tactics is the art of putting into execution the projects of strategy. Tartins. 

An intimate knowledge of all these branches is absolutely necessary 
in order to be a great and successful general. Distinction be- 

8. The formation of a plan, that is, deciding the nature of the war and tlctlc^. * "' 



12 rEINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

that will be waged ; determining the objects to be attained, and the 
best manner and means of attaining them ; or, in other words, outlin- 
ing the general features of a campaign, belong to Strategy. The exe- 
cution of the plan decided upon belongs to Tactics. 

The country in which the opposing armies can come into collision 
is the province of Strategy. 

The province of Tactics is the field of battle, 
win a study of 9. The principles of war cannot be violated with impunity. These 
iT'impmtaiu.'''°'^ principles are fixed and are determined from the narrative of opera- 
tions conducted by successful generals. 

A study of military history is then necessary for a proper under- 
standing of the principles of war; and as in all other professions, so 
in war, he who is most proficient in the lessons as taught by the masters 
of the art, will be most successful. 
(Home.) 10. "The duties of each arm of the service overlap and blend into 

au arms *^of^the ^"^ another, and the higher the grade an officer attains, the more 
for a ^ood^glne^ai Tsquisite it is that he should be acquainted generally with the duties 
officer. ^f those arms of the service to which he himself does not belong. By 

this means alone can we hope to obtain that intelligent co-operation, 
that harmonious working of all branches of the service together, 
which makes a perfect machine out of the various elements compris- 
ing an array, and at the same time gives the surest guarantee of 
success. In armies, as elsewhere, thei^ is a tendency for everyone to 
think his own branch, that which he has .studied most and knows best, 
the most important. Such feelings are very natural, and in the lower 
grades often do much good; but as men rise in the .service it is desir- 
able that they should know something of the duties of other branches, 
and tlie difficulties others have to contend with. Such knowledge 
tends to produce cordiality and forbearance. Cavalry officers falling 
into command of mixed forces will not then expect their infantry to 
gallop, infantry officers will not seek to bind the cavalry to the pace 
of their infantry. A knowledge of the capabilities of other arms will en- 
able officers to use those arms to the best advantage as occasion offers. 
Fixed rules of ac- " "'^^ should, however, be borne in mind that it is impos-sible to lay 
tion not possible. Jown fixed rules of action. Nearly every military regulation .should 
be followed by the words 'according to the ground and according to 
circumstances.' Eules are but guides, which njust be intelligently, not 
blindly, followed. 

Practice and ex- ' "Practice and experience alone can decide manv points; practice 
perience neces- , .. , . ^, t> ' i • i i . 

sary. and experience alone can give the power ot applying rules; but 

theory, by which is really meant the experience obtained by others, 
is not the less important and valuable. 



AND Til Kill APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 13 

"Principles are but guides, which must be revised, examined and Principles me but 
verified after each war, after each discovery that may be brought to m^ust^br revised, 
bear on the military art. The great success of Gustavus Adolphus, 
Frederick, Marlborough, Napoleon, Wellington, Von Moltke, are but 
due to careful consideration and appreciation of the effects of various 
discoveries on the art of war. There is notinalitv in the art of war." 



14 



princtpi.es of the art and science of war 



CHAPTER III. 



Campaign defin- 
ed. 



Theatre of opera- 
tions detined. 



The object of 
strategy. 



Distinction be- 
tween stiategj- 



Minor tactics. 



Grand tactics. 



When strategy 
and tactics con- 
flict. 



Manner of apply- 
ing the principles 
of strategy. 



PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

1. A Campaign is the time that an army carrying on a war re- 
mains in the field to accomplish a certain object. 

2. The Theatre of Operations is that part of the country in which 
the army acts for the attainment of a certain object. 

3. " The object of Strategy is to so direct the movements of an 
army that, when it meets the enemy, the army will have the advant- 
age." Its province then is that part of a country in which two oppos- 
ing armies may be operating for the purpose of giving battle. 

With a knowledge of its principles a general is enabled to lay out 
his plan of campaign ; that is, to decide what is to be accomplished, 
and to trace out the general measures requisite to obtain this end. 

4. It is necessary to understand the difference between Strategy and 
Tactics, which in some respects apparently resemble, or merge into 
each other. 

Tactics is that branch of the art of war which treats of the methods 
of drawing up and moving troops systematically. It has two modifi- 
cations. 

a. Minor or drill tactics, which embraces that setting up and pre- 
liminary drilling of soldiers essential to discipline, expertness in 
handling their weapons, and facility of movement preparatory to 
their employment on the field of battle. 

b. Grand tactics, or the art of combining, disposing, and handling 
troops on the field of battle. It is this latter branch of tactics that 
supplements strategy. 

In case the principles of both branches cannot be carried out at the 
same time, it is recommended to adhere to the rules of Strategy at 
the expense of Tactics, for some means may generally be found to 
modify bad tactical dispositions; as a change in the formation of the 
troops, the use of entrenchments, etc. 

5. Directing an army in such a manner, that when it reaches a cer- 
tain point, it will iiave a decided advantage over the enemy, as regards 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 15 

position or numbers, thus forcing him to tight at a disadvantage or to 
retire; operating to separate his forces while your own are iield to- 
gether; getting in his rear, thus forcing him to make new and unfore- 
seen dispositions for the safety or supply of his army, while your own 
communications are secure. Such are some of the illustrations of the 
applications of the principles of strategy. 

Meade took position at Gettysburg (m Lee's line of retreat, thus ^^ftJ^sbm'^^'isk^^ 
forcing the latter to attack him with inferior numbers in a stroiig 
position. Lee did not consider it safe to continue his movement north 
without first crippling Meade, and he turned back for this purpose 
with a result that is familiar to all. This battle is considered by many 
to be the turning point of the war. 

In 1866, Prussia, by a prompt initiative, overthrew the allies of Prussia in ikgo. 
Austria in Germany, brought^ superior forces on the field of Ktiniggratz, 
and ended the war by one battle. 

Skillfully marking his designs, Bonaparte, in 1800, witii the army Bonaparte in igoo. 
of the reserve, unexpectedly debouched through the pass of St. Bernard 
into the plains of Italy, in rear of the Austrians, and gained the de- 
cisive battle of Marengo, which "decided the fate of the Peninsula and 
changed the face of Europe." 

Comparing the operations of an army at the present time in these y^'^t i8 leam.'d 

t^ o f J f f,.Q^ military 

respects, with those of armies of the past, we find that they closely re- history. 
semble each other. On this account the study of military history is 
most important and useful, as fixing in the mind of a general in com- 
mand of an army those unchanging principles which are necessary for 
the .successful employment of his troops. In this study it will also be 
found that the "tactics," or the manner of drawing up and handling 
troops on the field of battle, have been constantly changing, so that 
these principles of the past cannot be relied upon to give decisive re- 
sults in the operations of a campaign. For these reasons then, we find 
that wars are waged on certain fixed principles; those which should be 
followed on any occasion will depend upon the peculiar circumstances 
attending each case. 

In making the comparisons referred to above, it is also found that 
the operations of war are now left less to chance than formerly, and 
consequently the combinations are less extensive and intricate. This 
fact is due to the great improvements maae in weapojis and the great 
discoveries which aid in carrying on war. Breech-loading arms, rail- 
roads, the magnetic telegraph, etc., are some of these agents. 

6. The principles of Strategy are influenced by the natural features causes which 
of the country in which the army is operating, and by which a gen- "^d tactics^ ^^^ 
eral must be governed. Tactics are modified by the nature of the 



IT) PRIN^CFPLK-? OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

weapons with which tiie troop* are armed, and in which improve- 
ments are constantly made. 
Three points ooii- 7, Jn the case of an armv operatino: in the field, there are three 

sidereJ. . ' . 

points which are first to be considered : 

Baseofoperatious a. The place or places from which the army sets out on the cam- 
paign, termed the Base of Operation^. 

The objective. 6. The point which the army is to reach, or upon the possession of 

which the success of the campaign will depend, called the Objective 
Point, or simply the Objective. 

i/umi of opera- c. The Toads oT Hucs ovcr which the army marches from the Ba.'ie 
in order to reach the Objective, termed Lines of Operations. 

Lines of defe-.re The Bosc of Operations becomes the Line of Defense for an army oper- 

treat. " *^ ating on the Defensive; and Lines of Operations are termed Lines of Re- 
treat when the army makes a movement back towards its base. 

BASES OF OPERATIONS. 

Properties of a 8. A £a.se o/' O/je/'o^/ons should present the following features, wliicli 

base of operations , , , , . , , . , . , . 

should be considered m making a selection : 

a. A number of strong points forming a continuous line ; because it 
is the place where the supplies and re-enforcements for the army are 
concentrated, Avhich can be done more rapidly and would not be in 
such danger from any enterprise of the enemy, as might be the case if 
they were all collected at a single point. 

b. It should have several roads leading from it towards the enemy 
upon which the army can operate, thus permitting a move against the 
enemy's flank or center. Also in ca«!e of disaster, the army will not 
be limited to a single line of retreat, nor will it be cut oft" from its 
supplies and re-enforcements. 

c. The different pointy forming the base should be connected with 
each other by good roads, allowing the free movement of troops and 
supplies. 

d. It should be naturally strong in order to form a good line of de- 
fence; but as a long line of defence is weak, this fact will have due 
consideration in determining the extent. 

e. Good roads should lead from the interior of the country to differ- 
ent points of the base to favor the transportation of troops and supplies. 

A navi;^abie river A navigable river, with strongly fortified points along its banks, is 
the most favorable example of a good base, for it fulfils in every re- 
spect the conditions cited above. 
rsrndy.^ "The Potomac was an excellent base for the Union armies operating 

The Potomac. . ,^. . . t «> i , . • , • ,. • 

in \ irginia. it affords a choice of a number ot lines ol operations, 
and its extent previ'iited the armies from Ijcing cut from it when forc- 
ed to retreat." 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 17 

0. The selection of the Theatre of Operations iisuallv decides the '^'"^V ''vl'""''"'' 

' i^ ' l)y Hie theittrt' oJ 

Bme of Oi)erations, for the cases are rare where there will be presented a oiiemtions. 
choice of several bases; and even if suchshonld be the case, there will 
always be one that will have advantages superior to all the others. 
The base will usually be a part of the frontier between the army and 
the theatre of operations. 

10. The form of base assumed may have an important bearing on Form of base 

1 . 1 , 1 1 • 1 1 1 sometimes im- 

the campaign, and cases have occurred where its shape has so lent poitant. 
itself to the operations that the campaign has been decided by it. 

11. Bases will be either straight or curved. The simplest form is base-!'.'^''^*'"" "* 
the straight base. This form does not of itself present any advantages 

that would lead to its adoption, unless its direction is oblique to thatof 

the enemy. In this case decisive results might follow from its selection. 

An army D (Fig. 1), operating from the oblique base EF, would evi- Adynntage con- 

dently be enabled to strike the flank of the army C, with base AB, base. 

and force it from its line of retreat without exposing its own line of 

communication with its base. The army D would have a shorter line 

to reach its base than the army C could have to reach the same line. 

In this case the point F should obviously be naturally strong, or be 

.strengthened by every possible means. 

12. A curved base may be either concave or convex towards the 
enemy. 

Concave Base. A concave base protects the wings of the army as con'cave^Tff^e!*^ "^ 
it advances towards the enemy; it presents the choice of, and the pos- 
sibility of a change in, the line of operations and retreat, all of which 
are of about the same length, and this feature is particularly advan- 
tageous when the extremities of the base are strong points. The 
change in the line of ojaerations thus rendered possible may be very 
decisive when made just before a great battle; for it would probably 
entirely change the enemy's plans under most disadvantageous cir- 
cumstances. This is usually considered to be the most favorable form 
of base. 

In the campaign of 1800, against Prussia, Napoleon's base was the fjampaignof Jena 
line Rliine-Maine, forming a concave base. He was thus enabled to 
select lines of operations which resulted in cutting the Prussians from 
their base, and the campaign was decided in the single battle of Jena. 

13. Convex Base. A convex base presents favorable features at c^lnSS.*"^ " 
the outset of a campaign : for, if decidedly convex, the army can be 
assembled near the salient point, and thence operate from either side, 

thus compelling the enemy to separate his force to watch both sides. 
An active general might seize this opportunity to place his army be- 
tween the enemy's scattered forces and whip them in detail. 

3 



IS rrirNcipj.Es of thk art and scien'ce of war 

After the opening of a campaign this favorable feature disappears ; for 
the army will have but one point to fall back upon in case of repulse. 
For an army on the defensive, however, a convex base becomes very 
strong, as it enables the army to move to any point, to strengthen it, 
before the enemy on the exterior can. 

Secoudaiy ba.se^. 14. SECONDARY Bases. As the army advances, other bases, term- 
ed vSeoondary, are usually assumed, to enable the army to have its 
supplies at hand. These bases, Avhich should present the same quali- 
ties as the original base, are usually established by detached bodies of 
troops, or by the re-enforcements sent forward, so that the army will 
not be delayed in its onward movement. 

The importance of establishing secondary bases increases in propor- 
tion as the army re«nioves from its primitive base. 

Ciiiiipaigii <.( 1S12 Napoleon's long line of operations in the Kussian campaign, 1812, 

ill Knssia. • i i i • i c i i- ,• i • • i ■• 

re([uired such bases to provide lor the salety ot his army. A study ot 
this campaign cannot fail to be instructive as illustrating the immense 
difficulties to be overcome in conducting a campaign at a great dis- 
tance from the primitive source of supplies and re-enforcements. 
The Atiai.tii cam- The Tennessee rivcr, being navigable, formed a good secondarv base 

pai<;ii of \6M. . . f . 

tor General Sherman in his Atlanta campaign. Chattanooga — the 
principal point on this river, being also on the line of railroad from 
Louisville to Atlanta, the main source of supply for his large army of 
100,000 men — was the principal depot of supplies and the most im- 
portant point of this line or base. 

Base on the sea. 15. A power which is master of the sea, is enabled to assume a 
base at pleasure and still have a strong point of support. 

( ainjmigii of i8()2 This fact was illustrated during our late war, when General McClel- 
lan, in 1862, assumed his base at the Wliite House on York river. 

After his line of communication was cut by General Lee, McClellan 
changed his base to the James river without any risk of failing to find 
a strong support. 

oiant ill Virgil, i:,. Later, General Grant changed his base from the Potomac to the 
James river. 

Scou in isiexico. General Scott, from the same cause, was able to select Vera Cruz as 
his base during the Mexican war. 

Case of England. England, from her superiority on the sea, would have great advant- 
ages in this respect. 

Length of base. 1(). The length of the base of operations should be in pro[)ortion to 
the distance that an army may be required to operate from it. If the 
base is too contracted, the different roads leading to tlie objective point 
will be very much restricted, which would greatly facilitate any move- 
ment of the enemy to separate the army from its base. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 19 

The American 

Northern armies a great advantage. Not only had they a variety oi "^i- i«i>i-i35. 
lines of invasion to select from, but when defeated in Virginia it was 
almost hopeless to attempt to intercept them." 
LINES OF OPERATIONS. 

17. As a rule there will be several lines of operations leading from Selection of a line 

. ^ , ,. of operations. 

one base, and it will be the province of tiie commanding general to 
select the one which will best aid him in bringing his campaign to a 
successful issue. The points to be considered in making this selection 
are: The nature, both of his own troops and those of the enemy, and 
the nature of the country. If he be strong in cavalry or artillery he 
should select an open in preference to a broken country, as being best 
adapted for the operations of these arms. 

The most direct route may not be the most secure, or have as good 
roads as a longer one, a point of some importance to be considered in 
connection witii the transportation of supplies and ammunition. The 
large amount of ammunition now expended in battle, makes an ade- 
quate supply of it a serious matter, one requiring the best facilities of 
transport. The line should be v>'ell supported by the base, and this is 
a point the importance of which rapidly increases as^the army removes 
from its base. 

If the enemy's forces are scattered, or the ditlerent fractions of his 
army are not within supporting distance of each other, the line lead- 
ing towards his centre would offer good prospects of success, as facili- 
tating the separation of his forces by throwing the army between the 
fractions and defeating them in detail. 

This principle was well applied by Eoraparte in the campaign of Bonaparte in 
1790-97 in Italy, when, rapidly concentrating his army, he placed it 
between the Austrians and the Sardinians, defeating first the former 
and then the latter. The superiority of force of the allies was neutral- 
ized by this movement. 

In the contrary case, if the enemy's forces are con ^entrated, tl en 
that line which best lends itself to turning a flank, at the same time 
not risking separation from the base, would be the best to follow. 

18. Liiie!< of Openitious are simple or single, double or multiple. classes of lines of 

.,...,,.., . . operalioiiS. 

A line IS said to be simple when all the parts ot an army operating 
upon it can be concentrated on the field of battle on the same day. 

The most favorable case, then, of such a line would be. several paral- 
lel roads near enough together to allow the different corps of the army 
to march within mutual supporting distance. It is thus seen that a 
simple or single line is not confined to a single road: the condition of 
mutual support simply has to be satisfied. 



20 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Gettysburs cam- In the Gettvsburff carapaiffn, 1863, the Union arniv, concentrated in 

pai<;ii, IS(i:5. ...' &f&' ' ^> 

the vicinity of Frederick, Maryland, moved northward to meet the 
Confederalfe army, then threatening Harrisbnrg. The diffei'ent corps 
moved on sensibly parallel roads, all within supporting distance of 
each other. The march is indicated in Fig. 2, the numbers showing 
the route of each corps. The roads on the extreme right and left are 
about twenty-five miles apart. 

Double lilies. JO. A line of operations is said to be double, wlien all the parts of 

the army cannot be concentrated on the same field of battle on the 
same day. In this case the roads, upon which the different fractions 
of the army march, may be so far separated as to prevent mutual sup- 
port, or they may be very close together, with an obstacle between 
that would prevent the uniting of the different corps at the proper 
time. An army marching with its two wings on the opposite banks of 
an impassable river would be an example of this class of lines. 

When double Doublc liucs thcu are, as a rule, verv obiectionable. If, however, 

ling.^ may be ... 

selected. the roads over which the different corps of the army march converge 

to a point in front of the enemy, and meet before the probable chance 
of a conflict, the objection to such lines is in a great measure removed. 
Such lines might be selected to advantage when the subsistence of 
the army would be a difficult problem on a single line. All other 
things being equal the question of subsistence would decide the selec- 
tion of the line. 

The great objection to a double line is also in a great measure re- 
moved when the enemy is also operating on double lines, which are at 
the same time exterior to your own. 

Example. An army R, R, (Fig. 3), operating on the double line P, P, against an 

army S, 8, on the double line M, M, would have more than an even 
chance of success, provided the corps R, R, could give mutual support 
before the corps S, S, could. Even with this favorable condition, the 
line is objectionable, as either corps S might, by an unexpected attack 
neutralise the advantage of the interior lines. 

Case in whicii a The Only case in which an army can a.ssume a double line, when the 

double line may . « . . • i t • i i 

be assumed. " opposing forcc IS Operating ou a single line, is when the natural features 
of the country are such that a small force can hold a larger one in 
check for a considerable time. 

Example. If^ qu accouut of the stroug natural features of the country, the force 

R^, R^, (Fig. 4), can hold the enemy S in check, the main army R might 
operate to advantage against the flank of S without being exposed to 
much risk. The advantage in this case resulting from a successful 
flank-turning movement, might greatly outweigh the consequences of 
disaster in case the enemv succeeded in a counter-movement. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKltN WARFARK, 21 

20. If, from unforeseen causes, an army is forced to abandon its ;^jp).!j{'j" ',;),' "'"' ^'^ 
original line of operations and assume a different one, the latter is call- 
ed an accidental line of operations. Being forced to this alternative 

would, as a rule, operate to the disadvantage of the army making the 
change, in the same manner a.s any cause which tends to disarrange 
plans previously determined upon and expected to be successfully ac- 
complished. 

This change in the line of operations differs material! v from the i''"'?'^ """» -^ 

G L • new line. 

voluntary assumption of a different line from the original, which 
would be called a new line of operations. This latter might have been 
determined upon as a part of the original plan, or follow as a natural 
consecpience to the successes gained as the army advances. Such 
changes have led to the most favorable results. 

After the battle of Trenton, Washington made a change in his line }y'>li''"f^"".J**^»''" 

' °, ® . the battle otXreii- 

of operations which led to most decisive results. After the action, ton. 
Washington had taken post with his main army along the left bank of 
the Assanpink river, and was confronted by Cornwallison the opposite 
bank (Fig. 5). Washington's base was the Delaware river, above 
Philadelphia. Finding that Cornwallis would attack with a superior 
force, Washington decided to cut Cornwallis' line at Princeton and 
then march to Brunswick, where the British had a large supply of 
stores with a small guard. Washington, in thus exposing his line of 
communication, knew that very little risk of a counter-stroke was to 
be feared, as the British forces were scattered at different points 
throughout New^ Jersey, which would cause Cornwallis to immediately 
fall back to protect them, as soon as he found his rear threatened. 

Leaving his tires burning, Washington marched rapidly at night, 
striking and defeating a detachment of the British at Princeton, and 
then, finding Cornwallis close on his heels, gave up his intended raid 
on Brunswick, marched for Pluckamin, and subsequently to Morris- 
town for winter quarters: Cornwallis moving to Brunswick. 

By this movement Washington caused the enemy to almost entirely 
withdraw from New Jersey, which they had completely overrun. They 
had even threatened Philadelphia. At the close of this movement 
Washington opened communication with his forces along the Hudson. 

21. When, as the armv advances from its base, the two wings are Direction of iin« 

- , ' . 1 <*f operations. 

covered by natural obstacles, the line of operations may run towards 
cither flank. If one flank is exposed, the line should run towards the 
opposite flank; and, if both flanks are exposed, it should strike the 
centre. 

22. The point of concentration of the diflferent parts of an army on tiie selection 
should never be within striking distance of the enemv : for this en- concentraUon. 



22 rRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

ables the enemy to whip th3 frae'iDno in detail, or to prevent tlieir 
junction. 
isf>6 ''^'^^ °^ ^" 1830, tlie two German armies issued through two passes of the 

Sudetic mountains into Bohemia. During the passage of the moun- 
tains the armies weie separated for eight days, with an impassable 
barrier between tliem, which would haveen.abled the Austrians to con- 
centrate on either column as it debouched from the pass: but the at- 
tempt to do so was not made. The risk in this case was in a great 
measure reduced by the use of the magnetic telegraph: the two armies 
were in constant communication with the headquarters at Berlin, and 
consequently were under the direction of one head. 
Cunpaigiifl of 23. The great advantages resulting from the ure of interior lines 

when the enemy at the same time is operating on double lines, are 
fully illustrated by the campaigns of 1796-97 in Italy. '^• 

At the opening of the first campaign, Bonaparte, with about thirty- 
six thousand men, was able to overthrow nearly sixty thousand of the 
allies, by interposing his forces between the two armies of the Aus- 
trians and Sardinians, which were not within supporting distance of 
each other. 

Later, the same result was achieved when Wurmser divided his 
forces by .sending one column along the western shore of Lake Guarda, 
while he movel alon '; the Adige with the main body. In the next 
campaign "Wurmser committed the same mistake. He left a strong- 
detachment to hold the upper Adige and moved down the Brenta him- 
self with the main body. Bonaparte again overthrew the Austrians 
by defeating their army in detail. 

Alvinzy, who succeeded "Wurmser, repeated the hitter's mistakes. 
In his first campaign he sent one column down the Adige, and raarch- 
, ed his main force on Verona from the east. The same advantages were 
reaped by Bonaparte b}'^ the same methods. 

In the second campaign, Alvinzy moved by the upper Adige, send- 
ing a column at the same time to operate on the lower Adige, for the 
relief of Mantua. Bonaparte manoeuvred as he had previously, whip- 
ped the Austrians in detail and completely scattered their forces. 
(M.iiiaii.) "The results of these campaigns of le.-^sthan a year's duration were 

truly stupendous. The French, who entered upon them with about 
thirty thousand men, and in all, did not receive more than twenty-five 
thousand men as re-enforcejnents, had, at the close, defeated two hun- 
dred thousand Austrians; had taken eighty thousand prisoners; killed 
or wounded twenty thousand; had fought twelve pilched battles and 

♦Ilff.r ti. map oi norllif-rii Italy. 



AND TIIIOIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARKAUE. 28 

more than sixty combats. The simple principles of tiie military art 
* •:■:- j^y f^f the bottom of these great results. * ■•■ Attack- 

ing first disconnected, dispersed corps on their centre, and driving 
them on divergent lines of retreat. Selecting a strong defensive line 
on the Adige, and holding his corps well in hand, for concentration at 
the most favorable central point, wherever the enemy might strike, 
but still observing him closely. Wonderful activity, aided by those 
sudden inspirations of genius, as they are termed, and a coitj) iVml 
both for time and place never perhaps suri)assed. * * ■•' Such were 
the causes of success. 

"These were but too well intensified by the faults of the Austrian 
generals, repeated over and over again, with hardly a variation, either 
in their strategical or tactical combinations. Dispersing their corps, 
operating on double lines, and dividing their forces on the battle field, 
as at Eivoli, these men seemed .stultified by routine, and unable to 
profit by any lesson." 

STRATEGICAL POINTS. 

24. Closely allied to the objective point in a campaign are strate- strategical points 
ffical points. 

A point is said to be strategical when it is so situated that its pos- jj^ampies. 
session will be of decided advantage to an army. Cities at the junc- 
tion of large rivers, or controlling the crossing of a river or a pass 
through the mountains, or at the meeting of several important roads, 
are good examples of this class of points. It is evident that these 
places are more numerous and of more consequence in a broken than 
in a level country. In the latter case a point might become strategical 
by being strongly fortified. 

Owing to the extensive system of railroads now operated in nearly Kaihoad cent its. 
all countries, and to the great facility they offer for the movement of 
troops and supplies, a railroad centre is now a point which it may be 
very desirable to occupy. 

In our own country. New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, strategical points 

*' ' ' * J " ' 'in our own coun- 

Vandalia, Cinciniiati, etc., are all prominent illustrations of such ")• 
points, and there are many others whose position will not apparently 
have much influence on a campaign, but by being brought by its acci- 
dents within the sphere of operations of an array, must be held at all 
hazards. In every country there are always some places which are 
more important than others, the possession of which by an opposing 
force would usually be decisive. 

25. The following are some of the reasons why the occupation of Ri-asons for occu- 
great railroad centres in the theatre of operations would be advant- pointls. '^'" '" 
ii^eous to the general in command of an army. They enable hiiu to 



24 PJRINXIPI.ES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

draw his supplies and re-enforcements from a great extent of country, to 
separate his troops for subsistence, and to concentrate them for battle ; 
to gain rapid and early information of the enemy and his movements, 
for there are always telegraph lines along the railroads centering at a 
common point ; to move his forces rapidly to any point threatened by 
the enemy, etc. 
.siiat«'f;i<ai points 26. In a mouutainous country, the strategical points, although few 
country! " '*'"*'"" in number, are generally very prominent. The junction of several 
valleys, or of roads along the crests of several ridges, would naturally 
be of great value to an army occupying it, as the forces might operate 
in any one of the valleys or along any of the roads with equal facility, 
while the enemy, once committed to one line, could not change to 
anotber without great labor and loss of time, necessitated by the re- 
trograde movement resulting from the difFculty of crossing the inter- 
vening spurs or valleys. 
«:impaign of iT'.Mi- In the Campaign of 1796-97, in Italy, Bonaparte, by causing the re- 
■' ■ ■ doubt which closed the pass of the Montenotte to be occupied by one 

thousand two hundred men, was able to interpose his army between the 
armies of the allies — Austrians and Sardinians — and whip them in de- 
tail. At this time the allies, numbering about sixty thousjind men, were 
operating in three columns by three roads separated by difficult moun- 
tainous country. Bonaparte, with about thirty thousand men, holding 
the middle road, the pass of the Montenotte, successfully accomplished 
his plan of attacking in succession the columns of the enemy. The 
campaign was thus decided from its inception, and the redoubt of Mon- 
tenotte, seconded by a small and brave garrison had great influence 
upon the final result. 
The capital city of 27. The Capital citY of a country is usually a very important 
strategical poi.ft. strategical point. This may proceed, not from its influence on the 
military operations of a campaign or from its position, but from the 
fact that it is the seat of government, the occupation of which by the 
enemy may have a lasting and damaging effect in a political point of 
view. 
Riciiinoiid diirini,' DuHug OUT civil War great importance was attached to the capture 
of the city of Richmond, and all the campaigns of the Army of the 
Potomac were made with that city as the objective point, with the idea 
that its fall would put an end to the war. This was undoubtedly too 
much to expect; for the bulwark of the rebellion was not the city of 
Richmond, but the Confederate armies, and their capture or over- 
whelming defeat was necessary before the fall of the city would be a 
decisive cause of the close of the war. The supplies and re-enforce- 
ments of the Confederate armv were nearlv all drawn from the states 



hv first (iuly ol 
the coiiDiiaiKiiu" 



AND TIIEIU AriM.niATION IN MODERN WAKP'AKi:. ZO 

sdiitli of Virginia, and as long- as the avenues of supply remained in- 
tact the c'oliesion of the army was assured and it remained a men- 
acing force. 

TLAN OF CAiMPAlGN. 

28. War having heen decided upon, it then becomes the duty of 

the commanding general to determine and lay out apian of campaign, general". 

In forming this plan everything the enemy may do should be foreseen, 

and measures should be taken to prevent the accomplishment of his 

plans. ♦ 

In an offensive war I he planot campai<>n consists in the selection of Hian ofcanipaign 
' _ 1 o ^ ^ ^ 111 an offensive 

an objective, theatre of operations, base, and lines of operations. The wai-» 

determination of the objective usually decides the theatre of opera- 
tions; for it will necessarily be that part of the frontier which is near 
the objective. 

The principles of strategv alreadv laid down comprise all the con- The principles of 

., _^. I • 1 -11 11 ^ 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 strategy the main 

siderations which will usually govern a general in making his selec- aid. 
tions of these different objects. Sometimes, however, there may be 
political questions which cannot be overlooked by. the general when 
drawing up his plan. 

20. In choosing an objective, which is usuallv the point first deter- The enemy's oap- 

. 1 .• 1 1 " • n 1 ital first consider- 

mined in the plan, the capital ol the enemy s country is naturally the ed. 
subject taken into consideration on commencing the work. Its posses- 
sion will generally have such a decided effect, both upon the nation 
itself, and abroad, that its capture will become the primary object of 
the campaign. This statement is based on the fact that, when the cap- 
ture of the enemy's capital becomes a matter of such great importance, 
it is presumed that the hostile army will make every exertion and 
sacrifice to prevent the accomplishment of this purpose : that it must 
be fought and conquered before the capital itself is reached. 

In November, 1862, General Burnside assumed command of the General Bum- 

\ J. , x^ , . 1 , . T . , side's action in 

Army ot the Potomac, which at that time was concentrated m the 1862. 
neighborhood of Warren ton. General Lee's forces were scattered, one 
wing of his army being near Culpepper and the other in the Shenan- 
doah Valley, separated by two marches. It was possible for General 
Burnside, by a single march, to interpose his forces betAveen the two 
wings, and he was already in a position favorable to a decisive action. 
Instead of following this plan, which had been the purpose of General 
McClellan, his predecessor, he announced his intention of making a 
change of base to Fredericksburg and of making '*a movement upon 
Richmond from that point." Swinton remarks as follows : " It would 
be difficult to explain this determination on any sound military princi- 
ple ; for while the destruction of the hostile armv was, in the verv nature 



planning 



26 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

of tilings, the prime aim and object of the campaign, General Burnside 
turned his back on that army, and set out upon a seemingly aimless ad- 
venture to the Rappahannock, whither, in fact, Lee had to run in search 
of him. If it be said that Eichmond was General Burnside's objective 
point, and that, regarding this rather than the hostile force, he choose 
the Fredericksburg line as one representing fewer difficulties than that 
on which tlie army was moving (the line of the Orange and Alexandria 
railroad >, the reply is, that an advance against Kichmond was, at this 
season, impracticable by any line; but a single march would have put 
him in position to give decisive battle under circumstances eminently 
advantageous to him." 

30. The marches of the troops necessary for concentration, the 
points where they are to assemble, and the arrangements for the need- 
ed supplies of all kinds, will also be conddered in drawing up the 
plan. It is thus seen that it is only the general features that are set- 
tled upon in determining the plan of campaign; that the marches of 
each day, the places for camping, etc., are details which do not enter 
into this problem, but are decided upon ns the time comes for their 
accomplishment or selection. 

Maps employed ui lu drawing Up the plan the outline maps of the country are made 
use of; those that show only the boundaries, principal cities, rivers, 
mountains, and roads are the b^st for the purpose. The topographical 
maps are resorted to when indicating the minor details of the march 
and camp, and also in studying the natural features of positions where 
it is expected to deliver battle. 

31. A thorough know'ledge of the geography of a country is then 
indispensable, both in planning a campaign and in conducting the 
minor operations of the war. The Archduke Charles says : " It is 
by studying the theatre of war, that the objective points are learnt, 
and the means which the nature of the ground presents for taking 
possession of and maintaining them. By the aid of this knowledge 
operations are combined, that is to say, the way is examined by which 
it is possible to arrive more certainly at the proposed end, and the re- 
sult to be expected awaited." 

Frederick the Great fought the battle of Leuthen on ground with 
which he was thoroughly familiar, having previously hunted over it. 
It was thus possible for him to make dispositions by means of which, 
with a force (^f thirty thousand men, he disastrously defeated the 
Austrian army of eighty thousand men. 
(Soady.) " In 1796, Moreau's army, entering the Black Forest, expected to find 

terrible mountains, frightful defiles and forests, and was greatly sur- 
j)rised to discover, afte.i- climbing the declivities of tiie plateau that 



planning cam 
pa- 



Thoi 


run; 


till 


Icil. 


)\V- 


ledjre .. 


f :l 


Col 


iin- 


try ') 


iec( 


-SS, 


aiy. 




Aicl 


ulu 


kl> 


CI. 


.,,.. 


les 




til 


is s 


nb- 


.jeet. 











Moiean iii 1790. 



AND THIOIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. Z/ 

slojje to the Kliinc, that these, with their spurs, were the only moun- 
tains, and that the country, from the source of the Danube to Donau- 
wertli, was a rich and level plain. 

**In 1813, Napoleon and his whole army supposed the interior of Bo- Napoieon in isi3. 
hemia to be very mountainous, whereas there is no district in Europe 
more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding it has been 
crossed, which may be done in a single march." 

The Union armies labored under great disadvantages during the re- Disadvantages of 

1 !!• «. 1 . 1 1 1 > 1 • • 1 *''•- l'"'oii armies 

hellion from not having a proper knowledge of the statistics and topog- during the reboi- 
raphy of the Southern states, and ignorance of these subjects was a 
fruitful cause of grave errors and great loss. 

PLAN OF DEFENCE. 

32. The plan of campaign, in the case of an army carrying on a de- Plan of defence. 
fensive war, is called the plan of defence. 

The character of the war to be carried on by the defence will de- considerations in- 

'' fiuoncing the plan 

pend upon the national characteristics of the people, the nature of the of defence. 
country, the number and discipline of the troops, etc. All these points 
will receive attention when developing the plan of defence. 

33. The question whether an armv acting on the defensive will Advantages to the 

1 1 -1 i- • 1 • • ^ !■ • • defensive of 

await the hostile forces withm its own frontiers or carry the war into awaiting the 
the enemy's country, will also be decided. In the first case the army 
can take positions for receiving battle which have been selected, 
studied, and strongly fortified beforehand ; the enemy is obliged to 
make large detachments from his forces to hold places that it might be 
dangerous to leave unoccupied in his rear ; the people can be relied 
upon to give timely information of the enemy's movements; facilities 
are offered for obtaining guides and spies; the army can operate in any 
direction with the certainty of finding a base or strong points of sup- 
port. In case of disaster the difficulties and dangers of retreat are 
much lessened, while for the enemy, under adverse circumstances, the 
perils are greatly multiplied. The great objection to this system is 
that it makes the country sustain all the burdens of the Avar. 

In the second case these relative advantages and disadvantages wall Advantages of 
be reversed, but the consideration of making the enemy contribute the ' 
means of carrying on the w'ar may outw^eigh all others, and cause 
this system to be adopted. Particularly will this be the case when 
your forces, although not equal in numbers to the enemy, are well dis- 
ciplined, and not inferior in other respects. 

34. In the plan of defence it will be determined whether to meet O" the point to 

^ meet the enemy. 

the enemy on the frontier and dispute his advance, or to allow^ him to 
penetrate into the interior, and then concentrating all energies, make 
the results of a defeat overwhelming. 



])iffereiice be- 
tween the offen- 
sive and defen- 
sive in war. 



28 PRINCIPLKS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Napoleon in Rus- 111 tlie campaign of 1812, in Russia, Napoleon was drawn on to- 
wards Moscow, which place he found in flames, and then began the hor- 
rors of that terrible retreat, which deprived him of a large proportion 
of that magnificent army with which he had started out a few months 
before. 

Of iier points to ho 35. Positions that are to be held to the last extremity, or that are 

eiMifti eie . ^^^ j^^ abandoned after a certain amount of resistence; roads that are 

to be ke[)t ready for all emergencies; points on which to fall back in 
. case of disaster; jilaces where stores and supplies are to be accumu- 
lated; all these will be designated in the plan of defence. 

Th.. army to he 36. The army should be kept well together, ready to assume the 
offensive at the first favorable opportunity; for a passive defence sel- 
dom leads to decisive results. 

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE. 

(FroniSoady.) 37. " Movements in War, whether offensive or defensive, must al- 
ways be based upon a calculation of time and distance. But the appli- 
cations of this principle are easier in defensive than in offensive war. 
In the latter the operations are vaster, the conditions more variable, the 
elements of the calculation more uncertain. At any moment one may 
be forced to change his part, to abandon an attack in order to defend 
himself and to escape great perils. There is needed, therefore, a 
greater genius, to be always ready to vary his projects, to execute new 
combinations. In a defensive war, the theatre is more contracted ; the 
operations are upon familiar ground, the nature of which may be ex- 
actly appreciated. The combinations being less in number, it is easier 
to arrange for them and to confront them. In offensive war, genius 
must supply the want of experience, and guess at the character of the 
country in which the operations are made ; the points of support upon 
which we count, vary and sometimes disappear. In defensive war we 
act upon a field prepared and studied; we have fixed pivots of opera- 
tion; everything may be calculated with precision. A superior genius 
is then more necessary for offensive war, while a great knowledge of 
the profession, the talent to choose judiciously the points of support, 
an extreme foresight, with indefatigable activity, may suffice for the 
needs of defensive war. 

"Nevertheless this kind of war is far from being easy, because prop- 
erly speaking, a general is only reduced to act on the defensive wlien 
the means at his disposal are inferior to the enemy. Now, in modern 
wars, with equality of arms, instruction and experience, numbers are 
of chief avail. 
Takingtiie iuitia- 38. "In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its 
bad side. Strategically an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, 



AND TIIKIR AriM>ICATl()N IN MODKKN WAUFAKK. 29 

which are always (lan<2^er()us in a iioslilo countiy. All the obstacles 
in the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles and forts, are 
favorable for defence; while the inhabitants and authorities of the 
country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are 
generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck 
in a vital point; he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek 
a speedy termination of the contest. For a single operation, which 
we have called taking the inilkitive, the offensive is almost always ad- 
vantageous, particularly in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war con- 
sists in throwing the masses upon the decisive points, to do this it will 
be necessary to take the initiative. The attacking party knoAvs what 
he is doing and what he desires to do ; he leads his masses to the point 
where he desires to strike. He who awaits the attack, is everywhere 
anticipated ; the enemy falls with large forces upon fractions of his 
force ; he neither knows where his adversary proposes to attack him, 
nor in what manner to repel him. Tactically, the offensive also pos- 
sesses advantages, but they are less positive, since, the operations 
being upon a limited field, the party taking the initiative cannot con- 
ceal them from the enemy, w'ho may detect his designs, and by the aid 
of good reserves cause them to fail. The attacking party labors under 
the disadvantages arising from the obstacles to be crossed before reach- 
ing the enemy's line ; on which account the advantages and disad- 
vantages of the tactical offensive are about equally balanced. What- 
ever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically 
from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively 
throughout the war ; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may be- 
come defensive before it ends. 

39. " The offensive confers, at the outset, the power of concentrating Advantages con- 
on the flank or centre of the enemy's line of defence, and so turning offensive, 

or breaking it. The defender must either oppose the enemy with an 
inferior force at first, or abandon territory in order to assemble his 
forces at some point further back. On the other hand, offensive war 
demands great resources, and success itself, if not absolute and decis- 
ive, entails fresh difficulties on the invader. And when he has pene- 
trated far w^ithin the defender's territory, the situations of the antago- 
nists differ gi-eatly, inasmuch as the army on the offensive is bound to 
its base, be that base wide or narrow, while the defens-ive forces may 
base themselves on any part of their territory which will supply them 
and which their front protects. 

40. "It is evident, that when one belligerent power feels secure be- a strons frontior 



.K 



hind an unassailable frontier, and holds many issues into the enemv 
territory, either by conuuand of the sea or otherwise, it can assemble 



favors tlie orteii- 
ive. 



30 PlUNCIl'LKS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF AVAR 

it.s forces unknown to its antagonist upon some point selected by itself, 
• from whence to make an eruption into the theatre of war. And if the 
belligerents be divided only by a frontier line — a river such a.s the 
Rhine or Potomac, or a mountain range such as the Alps — the army 
that passes it will nearly always find itself immensely superior to the 
force that can immediately interpose. For the defender's army has 
by the conditions of the defensive been sjoread so as to guard all pos- 
sible avenues by which the attack might be made. Thus, in the 

Waterloo cam- Waterloo campaign, Wellington and Blucher, being on the defensive, 
were guarding all the roads from the French frontier into Belgium, 
along a front of a hundred miles. Napoleon suddenly assembled his 
whole army upon the centre of their line, and, on first entering Bel- 
gium, was greatly superior to any force which the opposing general 
could interpose between him and his o1)ject, Brussels. 

The Amerie\ii " In the American civil war, Eichmond being the point arrived at by 

the principal Xorthern army, the Federals could, behind the screen of 
the Potomac, concentrate their forces and advance either from the 
Upper Potomac down the Shenandoah valley ; from AVashington along 
the Orange railroad to theEaj3pahannock ; from Acquia Creek by the 
Fredericksburg and Eichmond railw ay ; by the peninsula between the 
York and James rivers, adopting either streams as a base ; or from the 
south side of James river by Petersburg. They used all of these lines, 
and frequently advanced at first with numbers greatly superior to 
those which the Confederates could assemble to oppose them. Thus, the 
great advantage conferred by the offensive, is the power of concentration. 

Active and passive "^1- A defensive War is not without its advantages when wisely con- 
ducted. It may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. 
The passive defence is always pernicious ; the active may accomplish 
great successes. The object of a defensive war being to protect as long 
as possible the country threatened by the enemy, all operations should 
be designed to retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by 
multiplying obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising 
one's own army. He who invades does so by reason of some super- 
iority; he will then seek to make the issues as promptly as possible; 
the defence, on the contrary, desires delay til! his adversary is weaken- 
ed by sending off detachments, by marches, and by the privations and 
fatigues incident to his progress. An army is reduced to the defen- 
sive only by reverses or b}' a positive inferiority. It then seeks in the 
support of forts, and in natural or artificial barriers, the means of re- 
storing equality by multiplying obstacles in the way of the enemy. 

sive.^ ' ' *"'^ '^" Tills plan when not carried to an extreme, promises many chances of 



AN1> TIIKIR Al'lMJCA riON IN MODKIIN WAKFARK. 81 

success, but only when the general has the good sense not to make the 
defensive passive ; he must not remain in his positions to receive 
whatever blows may be given by his adversary; he must, on the con- 
trary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon the alert to im- 
[)rove all opi)ortunities of assailing the weak points of the enemy. This 
plan of war may be called the defeimvc-offendve, and may have strate- 
gical as well as tactical advantages. It combines the advantages of 
both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a prepared field, 
with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all the advantages 
of being on his own ground, can with hope of success, take the initia- 
tive, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike." 

SOiME STRATEGICAL RULES. 

42. "At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to ad- (From soady.) 

. , . , ' ^ ^ . The offensive 

ranee, is a matter tor grave consideration, but when once the oiiensive should be sus- 
has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. 

"However skillful the manoeuvres, a retreat Avi 11 always weaken the Retreats demomi- 
morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last ''^"'°' 
are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats cost ahvays more men 
and materiel than the most bloody engagements ; with this difference, 
that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas 
in a retreat the loss is on your side only. 

43. " We will suppose an army taking the field ; the first care of the phduiing a cam- 
commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the i^'^'^"' 
character of the war; then he must carefully study the theatre of 

war, and select the most suitable bare of operations, taking into con- 
sideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies. The selec- 
tion of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone of 
operations. The general will take a first objective point; he will se- 
lect the line of operations leading to this point, either as a temporary 
or a permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction, namely, 
that which promises the greatest number of favorable opportunities 
with the least danger. An army marching on this line of operations Front of opera- 

• 11 1 ^ J. . , . ~ rni tioiiH and strate- 

wiJl have a front of operations and a strategic front. Ihe temporary gic front, 
positions which the cojyj.s d'armee w^ill occupy upon its front of oper- 
ations, or upon the line of defence, will be strategic positions. 

" When near its first objectis'e point, and when it begins to meet re- Operations wiien 

^, -11 ..1 ,11 ^ the enemvismet. 

sistance, the army will either attack the enemy or manoeuvre to com- 
pel him to retreat ; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic 
lines of mancpuvres, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain 
degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not 

be confounded. Lines of supply, 

"To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is madej ta^Unhed. 



32 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ^VAR 

lines of supply, depots, etc., will be established. Strategical points and 
lines are inseparable', and exist conjointly; a point is not decisive for 
military operations unless accessible for all armies, and a line is not con- 
sidered as being advanlageous, so much as the object to which it leads. 
Frontiers ofstates 44. " The frontiers of states are either large rivers or chains of 

are rivers, inouii- /-x • n , 

tains, etc. mountains, or d^serts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army 

the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and 
large rivers occupy the third place. 

Hijih mountain " 45. "Some autliors have represented that high ranges of mountains 
e'lsjfdirhiacce.s- ^re, in war, inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speak- 
sibietoanarmy. j^^^ ^^j ^j^^ Rhetian Alps, said that, 'An army could pass wherever a 
man could put his foot.' Generals no less experienced than himself 
in mountain warfare have united with him in this opinion, in ad- 
mitting the great difficulty of carrying on a defensive war in such 
localities, unless the advantages of partisan and regular warfare can 
be combined ; the first to guard the heights and to harass the enemy, 
the second to give battle at the decisive points — the junction of the 
large valleys.* 
Case jf the enemy 46. " AVheu vou are occupving a position which the enemv threatens 

threatening to i %i n % "" • t i i ' i • -^i 

irouud your to surround, collect all A'our lorce immediately, and menace him with 
an offensive movement. By this manoeuvre you will prevent him from 
detaching and annoying your flanks, in case you should judge it neces- 
sary to retire. 
A studied ticid to 47. " It is an approved maxim in war never to do what the enemv 

be avoided. 

wishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of 
battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, 
should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had 
time to fortify or intrench. One consequence deducible from this 
principle is, never to attack a position in front which you can gain by 
turning. 
Detachments 4H. " Previous to the battle of Austerlitz Napoleon put in practice 

should not be , . , i • i i i • m • • i • • < tt-i i 

made before a this rule, which he himself gives in his memoirs : When you have 
teriitz. "^ resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force, dispense with noth- 
ing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.' Napoleon, had 
carefully arranged for the concentration of forty thousand men at 
Vienna, or sixty-five thousand at Brunn, according as circumstances 
should permit. The Russians, on the contrary, attacked the French 

*Tl)e passage of tlie Alps by Bonaparte, in 1800, with an army of (\0,0(K) men, fully illus- 
trate > the ditliculties that can be overcome under such circumstances, v/lieii troops are led by 
a general who can rightly comprehtwid details, has great natural resources, is enterprising, 
is "ready for every eniergency, and possesses unchanging firmness of purpose. A comparison 
of this operation" witli the passage of the Balkans by the Russians, in December, 1877, shows 
that the same qualities are now necessary for the accomplishment of difficult enterprise:;. E. 



position. 



AND Til KIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 33 

witliout waiting- lor (ieneral Essen, who was only a low days' niaicli 
distant, and who was bringing witli him nearly ten thousand men. 
■■ ■'•■ The allies did exactly what Napoleon had wished. 

'' No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs 
may change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy or by 
the arrival of large re-enforcements to enable him to resume the offen- 
sive, and counteract your previous dispositions.* 

49. "With the purpose of dispersing the forces of the eneniv, we the onemy 

. , , , . . , , . " ' sliould be con- 

must harass him ])articularly upon those points essential to his safety, stantiy harassed. 

and promptly seize the moment in which he has yielded to our feints, 

to attack him upon a weak point with mperior numbers. This is just 

what is called a feint in fencing phrase, with the sword in hand, in 

single combat. Two or three slight partial advantages open the way 

for the more considerable ones which decide the fate of the campaign. 

'* It is thus seen how important it is for a general to assume the iaitia- importance of 
tive in movements; thus he overrules the design of his enemy, and a \^^y!^^^™f^ ^^"^ 
first success frequently gives an ascendancy which is never lost. But 
the favorable moment must be clearly discerned. Too great a dispro- 
portion in force and in the various means, would be an insurmount- 
able obstacle. We should wait until the confidence of the enemy leads 
him into error. 

'* Profiting diligently by the occasion when offered, the skilful general 
may thus obtain an advantage which will permit him to turn the 
tables on his adversary, and to pass from defensive to offensive. 

" This is what happened, remarkably, in 1796, in the immortal cam- Campaign otiTW, 
paign of Italy. The French array, having arrived at the frontiers of 
the Tyrol, and in a defensive position, found itself much inferior to 
the Austrian army, augmented as it was by the re-enforcements led 
by W^urmser in person. The enemy's general, in attacking, had divid- 
ed his force; the French general reunited his own, and soon a first suc- 
cess enabled him to assume the offensive in turn. Afterwards a series 
of victories succeeded in combats where the French army was almost 
always superior in numbers on the field of battle. To sum up, in one Conciusif.n reach- 
word, this division of the art of w^ar which a])plies to the general 
movements of armies, it should be observed, that it is always founded 
upon a calculation of time, distance, and celerity of movement. 

"During the late civil war in North America, General Jackson was General Jackson 
quartered in the Shenandoah valley with about fifteen thousand or doah valley. 

*The violation of this, his own maxim, nearly cost Napoleon the battle of Marengo. On 
the eve of the battle, he detached Desaix, with two divisif>ns, for the purpose of watching 
some anticipated rnovemoni of the Anstrians. During the absence of Desaix, the French 
were unexpectedly attacked and defeated. Desaix returned before the Austrians had com- 
pleted their dispositions for following up their victory, the latter were themselves unex- 
I'ectedly assaulted by these fresh troops, and tlie battle regained. E. 



34 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

twenty thousand men. Opposite to him was a Northern array entering 
the valley from Harper's Ferry, under General Banks; another army 
under General Fremont, on the west side; and another army, under 
General Siegel, just on the east side of Manassas Gap. 

" General Jackson, descending the valley rapidly, first encountered 
the heads of General Fremont's column near this point. * ••' 

General Jackson retreated rapidly for a day or two, until he had 
drawn the head of Fremont's army away from the main body, and 
then he fell on that and defeated it. The two generals, Milroy and 
Schenck, were beaten and fell back on Fremont, who had just sent 
ofi' despatches to Washington announcing a victory, but who was very 
glad to get over the mountains and make his escape. He was dispos- 
ed of for a few days. 

"Jackson proceeded down the valley, and moving rapidly on Ma- 
nasses Gap, fell on a detachment of General Bank's troops, and defeat- 
ed them. 

" General Banks, who was down at Winchester, hearing of what had 
happened, came up speedily, and tried to support his unfortunate de- 
tachment. He met with Jackson under disadvantageous circum- 
stances, and was beaten on the two days following, "-■• * * and 
w^as driven right over the Potomac into Washington. 

"During the Continental war, in 1866, *' * ""•• like the two 
invading armies in Bohemia, so the two foes of Austria — Prussia and 
Italy — on a great scale, were assailing her on a double "line. In all cir- 
cumstances the rule must hold, that the defender in :uch a case ought 
not, except with forces superior to both, to attempt to make head against 
both attacks. The policy of retarding the advance of one enemy, and 
operating in force against the other, is the only decisive mode of opera- 
tion. For this reason Colonel Hamley maintained, before hostilities 
began, that Austria should at first have taken that step which circum- 
stances afterwards forcfed on her, and, withdrawing all the forces dis- 
posable for the field, should have held only the fortresses and moun- 
tain passes, secure that, when once she had crushed her German 
foe, she could always, by Verona, issue upon the Italian army in Yen- 
etia and drive it over the Po." 



f^ 




T»M 



':^i^ 



.0 



nt(i4xp(£/nAwcua/. 




XJOv'iMvctauM/. 






AND THKIR ArPl.ICATION IN MODKRN U'AKFAIfK. H-") 



CHAPTER IV. 

ARMY ORGANIZATJON.-' 

1. An army is an assemblage of armed men, subject to the orders Army cU-fined. 
of a commander, who is charged with the movements necessary for 

the attainment of a specified object. 

2. For the purpose of supply, discipline, rapidity and precision of .sub-divi.sions of 
movement, an army is divided into corps; corps into divisions; divis- ' 

ions into brigades ; brigades into regiments ; regiments into battalions, 
and battalions into companies. 

3. For the purpose of employing to advantage the different weapons Arms of the scr- 
and of providing for that mutual support and aid so essential to suc- 
cess, an army is organized into different arms of service, viz.: Infan- 
try, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. These four arms of the ser- 
vice are called troops of the line. 

4. A battalion is the tactical unit of infantry, but the company The unit. 
should undoubtedly be considered the fighting unit, for it is the only 
organization that will in future wars fulfill all the requirements of a 

unit, viz.: All the men be known to, overlooked by, and within reach 
of the voice of the officer commanding it. The squadron of two troops 
is the unit of cavalry. The battery of six giins is the unit of artillery. 

5. An army corps usually consists of about thirty thousand men, Organization of a 
divided into two or more divisions, depending upon the strength of 

the corps. Each division is generally composed of the four arms of 
the service — infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers — the artillery 
being assigned to the corps by battery, and the engineers by company. 

The corps is, as a rule, provided with a reserve of artillery, which, Eeserve of ar- 
with the artillery assigned to the different divisions, is under the 
orders of one commander. 

The organization of an army into corps was introduced by Napo- corps organiza- 
leon about the year 1804, while preparing his army for the contem- by Napoleon. 
plated invasion of England. 

*The organization of the army of the United States is given in the Revised StatuteH, also 
in the Revised Army Regulations of 1881. 



36 



PRIXCIPJ.es of the art and science of AVAR 



Eacli corps com 
plete ill itself. 



Compositiun of 
divisions, brig- 
ades, etc. 



The idea is to make each corps a complete army in itself, in order 
that it may be detached at any time from the main army, when the 
necessity arises, and be ready to act as an independent force. 

6. The division is composed of two or more brigades ; rarely of 
more than four. Brigades are composed of two or more regiments, 
and regiments of two or more battalions, each consisting of two or 
more companies, usually four. The battalion organization is for ad- 
ministrative purposes, and for instruction in the movements prescrib- 
ed in tactics. 



Necessity for i 
staff. 



Duties 
olficer.s 



The staff of di vis 
ions, brigades, 
etc. 



Necessity foi 
general staff. 



NVar duties. 



THE STAFF. 

7. As all the duties devolving upon the general in command of an 
army cannot well be performed by one man, he is assisted in his duties 
by the officers who compose his staff. 

The duties of staff-officers are : to transmit the general's orders ; to 
procure information, both of the enemy, and of the condition of his 
own forces ; to prepare reports, obtain guides, spies, etc.; to inspect the 
troops to see that they are properly supplied and in good condition of 
drill and discipline ; to preserve the correspondence and records ; in 
fact, to perform all those duties required of the general in command, 
which will enable him to have his army at all times prepared in every 
respect to meet the enemy. 

The principle of staff organization is also extended to the divisions, 
brigades, and regiments, composing the army ; the duties being less 
important and arduous as the body of troops is smaller. 

GENERAL STAFF. 

8. The necessity for a body of officers specially trained in staff 
duties has been greatly increased in consequence of the fact that wars 
are now waged by much larger armies than formerly. Therefore every 
army should be provided with a body of officers who in time of peace 
should be thoroughly instructed in all duties pertaining to the staff, so 
when war is declared they will be fully competent to enter upon the 
active and efficient discharge of their duties. Nearly all European 
armies have such an organization, which is known as the General Staff. 

9. The duties of officers of the General Staff in time of war are 
classed by Von Schellendorf as follows : 

" 1. Working out all arrangements for the quartering, security, 
marching, and fighting of troops, according to the varying conditions 
of the military situation. 

'* 2. Communicating the necessary orders, eitlier verbally or in writ- 
ing, at the right time and in sufficient detail. 

" 3. Obtaining, collecting, and working out in order all materials 



AND THKIR ArPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 37 

wliicli ooneern the nature and the military features of the theatre of 
war. Proeuring maps. 

"4. Collecting and estimating the value of information received 
concerning the enemy's forces, and reporting on the same to the higher 
military authorities. 

" 5. • Keeping up the fighting condition of the troops, and being 
constantly informed of their condition in every respect. 

" 6. Charge of day-books, publishing reports on engagements and col- 
lection of important materials, to afterwards form a history of the war. 

"7. Special duties, viz.: reconnaissances. 

" The peace duties of the General Staff should prepare it for the 
duties of wartime; consequently the General Staff officers belonging to 
the command of troops have to work out all matters of mobilisation, 
marching, stationing, manoeuvres, railways and telegraphs." 

RELATIVE PROPORTFONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 

10. With respect to the proportions of the different arms of the infantry placed 
service of which every army is compof?ed, regard is had to the relative tunce andTium- 
imjjortance of each. Infantry is placed first in order, and usually 
comprises ahont four-fifthi^ of the entire strength. 

11. The proportion of cavalry depends upon the nature of the cavaUy. 
country in which the army is to operate, being larger in an open coun- 
try, which is favorable for its action, than in a broken or wooded 
country. It generally forms about one-fifth the entire force. 

12. Artillery, ranked third in the order of importance, is in the Artillery. 
proportion of about three guns to one thousand men. An army, there- 
fore, of one hundred thousand men, would consist of eighty thousand 
infantry, twenty thousand cavalry, and three hundred guns. 

13. The proportion of artillery depends upon the character of the Proportion of ar- 
troops, and the nature of the country in which they are to be employ- upon natural fea- 

^ ' . -^ ' ^ '' tares of country, 

ed. The greater the efficiency of the troops, the /ess may be the num- etc. 
her of guns. The proportion would aLso be less in a wooded or broken, 
than in an open or level country; the former being less advantageous 
for the efficacy of the artillery. 

The proportion of light to heavy guns is also regulated by similar 
causes. When operating in a country with but few good roads, the 
former should predominate, otherwise, the heavy guns will vary in 
number from one-third to one-half the total. 

In the campaign in Bohemia, in 186C, the Prussian army was consti- 
tuted as follows : Elbe army, forty thousand men and one hundred and 
thirty-five guns ; first army, eight^'-one thousand men and two hundred 
and seventy guns ; second army, one hundred thousand men and three 
hundred and sixty guns. 



Prussian army ii 
186t). 



?>^ PRTNCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF AVAR 



CHAPTER V. 

RECONNAISSANCES.* 

Classed. 1, Reconnai'-sances are either ^e??era/ or special. 

GENERAL RECONNAISSANCES. 

i^efined. 2. A general reconnaissance has for its object the obtaining of de- 

tailed and accurate information of countries and their armies that 
will be of assistance in case of war. 

What it com- It Comprises within its scope our own as well as other countries, for the 

prises. ^ ' ^ ^ !• • •-!' T 1 

data obtained may be used in prosecuting military studies, and as an aid 
to a general in di'^wing up his plan of operations, which includes the 
movements of troops necessary for concentration as Avell as their employ- 
ment after this has been accomplished and they are ready to meet the 
enemy. 
Aids to compiling 3. Tables of statistics, giving population, manufactures, industries 

the report. , i -i , i . . • 

and concerning the roads, railroads, canals, rivers, important improve- 
ments, head of cattle, and the sections of country where they are most 
numerous, etc.; geographies, general and military ; reports of all kinds, 
etc., will all be found of great assistance in compiling the required in- 
formation. But, however complete and exhaustive these sources of 
information may be, officers of the army should frequently be sent to 
oflicers should be different countries to examine and report, not only upon their mili- 

seiit abroad. , . ^ . i • i • i i ' • 

tary systems, but upon any subject which may become important m a 
military point of view. 

Advantages of this This method not only serves to obtain possession of much that might 
be of great utility in planning military operations, but it enables offi- 
cers to gain personal experiences of peoples and their customs, which 
might be invaluable to them and to their country, in the event of war. 
In a reconnaissance of this nature great care should be taken to 

noUced!'"^' particularly notice those subjects which cannot be found in published 

reports, statistics, etc., and to make the examination and report most 
thorough in these respects. 

A course of study The course of study preparatorv to those journevs necessarilv im- 

thus imposed on 



sj'stem. 



What should be 



ofHcers. 



*See Revised Army Regulations of 1881. 



AND THi;iR APPLICATION IN MODKRN WARFARE. 39 

posed upon officers to lit them for the duty, would also be of great 
assistance in the training proper for their profession. 

4. Canada and Mexico being contiguous to our frontiers, we niiglit <'iiiiada and iVUx- 
derive great benefits from a thorough knowledge of these countries, 

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCES. 

5. /Special reconnaissances are made with reference to tlie actual Huw luude. 
military situation at the time, and a report of them is usually made 

at once, frequently upon the spot. 

They are divided into two classes, viz: topo(/raphical and armed. ('i:i«s«d. 

TOPOGRAPHICAL RECONNAISSANCES. 

6. Topographical reconnaissances are undertaken for the purpose of object. 
obtaining accurate and detailed knowledge of the theatre of opera- 
tions. 

This knowledge obtained, the general in command is enabled to ar- ManiuT of appiy- 

1 • .1 1 •,! ,1 !• • !• ,1 , iiiK the knowl- 

range his troops on the march with tlie condition oi mutual support edge gained. 
fulfilled ; to select positions for giving or receiving battle, Avhen acting 
on the oflensive or defensive ; to select suitable camping places; and 
to prepare the means for passing or avoiding those obstacles which are 
always to be found on the line of march of an army, as rivers, 
marshes, etc. 

7. It is important that officers should follow a regular system in a resuim- system 
preparing reports of reconnaissances, otherwise, what would be per- ports should be 
fectly clear and intelligible to them at the time, might mislead the 

person who is to depend upon them for information. For this reason 
the following definitions are given: 

"1. Ground. By the word ground is meant the surface of the (Von scheiien- 

, .. , ' , . ... , « . . doif. ) 

ground, as tar as its nature or character in a military point oi view is what is meant by 

T the term ground. 

concerned. 

"Ground maybe divided into the following kinds: Even ground, jivew gioimd. 
the nature of which offers no obstacle whatever to any kind of forma- 
tion or movement of troops ; cut up ground would be precisely the re- 
verse of this. 

'' Open ground, the nature of which offers no obstacle to the vision open ground. 
in any direction; concealed ground is the reverse of this. Passable ground. Passable ground. 
or ground the nature or character of which offers no obstacle to the 
passage of troops ; impassable ground is the reverse of this. 

'*It is evident that these definitions have not only an absolute but a These terms have 
relative meaning as well, when applied exclusively to the different "'^ "'P'^"!"gs- 
arms. 

^' Level ground, in a mathematical sense, does not exist at all ; the ex- Level ground. 
pression, however, is used to designate ground in which there appears 
to the eye to be no perceptible change from rise to fall, which does not 



40 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAR 



Hill. 

H'.-ighty 

Mn.juta 



Dei)re.ssion.s. 



Effect of mnnii- 
tainou.s country 
nil military opera- 



Manner of de- 
scribiiig the nat- 
ure of the surface 
of the ground. 



Soft or wet 
ground. 



affect the action of the three arm.-^, and which prevents the formation 
or movement of troops under cover. 

" A hill, an isolated elevation of ground, with slight slopes. 

" Heights, or ridge of heights, extensive elevations, with slight slopes. 

" A mountain, an isolated elevation of considerable height over the 
surrounding country. 

'^ A plateau, an extensive elevation of the ground, having a summit 
with a nearly flat surface. 

"In reconnaissance reports it is desirable that either absolute or rel- 
ative altitudes should be given. 

" Depressions in the ground are the reverse of elevations, and may 
be classed as a depresdon, gorge, ravine, and valley, and should be espe- 
cially described both as regards their dimensions and steepness of slope. 

^^ Hilly ground belongs to a flat country or where a flat country 
merges into a mountainous one; the elevations in the ground are 
slight both as regards height and steepness of slope, and affect, the 
movements of troops only to a very small extent, but at the same time 
enable troops to be formed up and moved under cover. The action of 
the three arms is similarly affected, inasmuch as by choosing certain 
elevated points a greater field for the action of firearms may be ob- 
tained. 

" MounUtinous country affects the movements and action of troops to 
a very great extent by high elevations on the ground, steep slopes, and 
the rugged character of the surface, and very often restricts troops to 
the roads or to the patches of passable ground found here and there in 
the valleys. There is also great difficulty in housing and feeding 
troops on the country, and in very high mountains (over three thou- 
sand metres"-'-) it is only possible in the case of small detachments. 
Large bodies of troops would have to depend almost entirely on sup- 
plies brought from a distance, especially as regards ff)od. 

"As regards the nature of the surface of the ground, it is usually 
described as having a rocky, clayey, loamy, or sandy sub-soil, which is 
generally covered with a layer of mould of variable thickness, on 
which vegetation takes place. Ground is described as rocky when the 
rocks protrude beyond the surface uncovered with earth or soil, and as 
stony when the surface is covered with a layer of loose stones. 

" Soft or wet ground may be described as ground not liaving a firm 
surface. '■■ ■•■ The marsh, bog, or swamp, are to be ct)nsidered 

as tracts of ground left in their natural state; they may 

generally be looked upon as tracts of wet country that are impassable." 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 41 

" 2. Slopes. Slopes may be either gentle up to 5°, steep over 20°, slopes. 
and very steep over 30°. Slopes are best given in degrees. 

" Gentle slopes offer no obstacle to the movement of troops. A slope The movements 

^ "^ *■ of troops as af- 

of 10° has a considerable effect on the movements of infantry in close *'ected by slopes. 
formation ; cavalry cannot charge downhill, and only with difficulty 
uphill; artillery can only move uphill with difficulty, and the drag 
or brake has to be applied going downhill. The movements of cavalry 
and artillery cannot be carried out in an orderly manner on a slope of 
20°, except as single horsemen. Slopes of 30° may be considered as 
impassable for the infantry in close formation ; on steeper slopes, i. e., 
up to 45°, single men can only climb with difficulty. 

"3. Water. Water as belonging to the natural features of a coun- Watei. 
try, is also important in a military point of view. 

" Water may be either running or still. Running water may be class- Water cias-ied. 
ed according to the size and importance of the stream, as iiver, rivulet, 
.stream or hrook. Still water may be classed as sea, ocean, hay, lake, pcnd, 
or pool, and as parts of the sea, as gulf, hay, harbor or roadatead. 

'* 4. Roads, etc. Among the artificial features of a country land Koads, etc. 
communications are of special importance, especially railways, which 
may be classed as railways or tram-ways. The military importance of 
the latter is almost nil; bat, on the other hand, the former are of the 
very highest importance. 

" Next come the high-roads of a country, i. e., the roads that have High-roads, etc. 
been scientifically constructed and regularly kept in repair. * •' 

The expressions, country road, or cross-road, forest road, and meadow road, 
convey their own meaning, inasmuch as they serve for some particular 
purpose which their names indicate, and do not directly join two im- 
portant towns or villages. Paths or tracts, that can only be used by 
foot passengers, may be i^XY\ed foot-paths. 

" A hollow road is a road, the level of which is sunk below that of the hoIIow roads. 
adjoining ground. 

''A pass may be considered as the road over a chain of mountains Pass, 
joining the two countries or tracts of country divided by such chain. 

'*A dejile, as generally accepted, means the contraction or narrowing Defile. 
of passable ground, such as a mountain defile, the defile over a dam, 
over a bridge, etc. 

" Rivers, etc., are crossed by means of bri'lges, ferries, or fords. Rivers. 

"The former may be classed as permanent or floating ; and again. Bridges. 
according to the materials they are constructed of, and the plan of 
construction. 

" Ferries vary according to the nature of the floating means of con- Ferries. 
veyance and method of transit from one bank to the other. 



O.I tl 
tainanibi 



42 PRIXCTPLES OF THE ART A:SD SCIENCE OF WAR 

" Land may be cla?;sed as park, garden, meadow, plough, grazing, or 
uncultivated land, and woods or forests. 

"Woods that have been regularly planted and laid out are called 
forests. 

'^Habitations may be classed as towns, market towns, villages, ham- 
lets, and single houses. * "■=■ " 

" Fortifications may be classed according to the size and particular 
object of the work, as battery (intended for guns only), redoubt (afield- 
work intended chiefly for infantry), fort, a closed permanent work of 
small dimensions, /or^ress (a permanently fortified town). * "■• * 
"1- " The expressions before, behind, this side of, that side of, etc., should 
xpressio'iis. • always, if possible, be avoided, as the meaning they convey almost in- 
variably depends on the position of the observer at the time. In by 
far the greater number of cases it is advisable to use geographical 
expressions (such as north, south, etc.) instead. 

"But on the other hand, in the case of a water-course running, for 
instance, from east to west, the expressions north bank and south bank 
should never be used, but invariably the words right and left bank, as 
well as the expressions above and below. Similarly, in speaking of a 
ravine, the expressions right side and left side of the ravine should be 
used. In this case the observer should invariably fancy himself at the 
highest point of the stream or valley, and facing towards the mouth or 
opening, when using these expressions." 

8. The following are the main points which should be considered 
by officers making recotmaissances for the guidance of a general in 
command of an armv: 



Fuiiiistu 1..' iioud Their classification and length; their breadth, which will regulate 
roads. '^'^ '^ the front of the column of march, and any contraction, or enlarge- 
ment of the road should be noted ; the nature of the roadbed, stating 
whether the necessary materials for repairs can be found in the vicin- 
ity ; the inclines, stating the gradient and whether difficult parts of 
the roads can be avoided; the defiles, tiieir nature, length, breadth, 
etc., and in the case of bridges, the materials of which they are con- 
structed, the weight they will safely bear, the nature of the stream 
they cross, etc.; v.'hether bordered by fences — stone or wood — ditches, 
hedges, etc.; the nature of the country on either side of the road, 
whether open, wooded or cultivated, and the nature of the crops; the 
distance between prominent points, both in miles and the time requir- 
ed ou the march ; good positions for the defensive, and the probable 
number of troops that can be placed in them to advantage; towns. 



Xy;j) THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKUN WAIIKARE. 43 

etc., throiigli which the road passes; points where other roads cross or 
join, their direction and condition, etc. 

RAILWAYS. 

"• 1. The line. Whether single or double tliroughout, or double for i^'<>'^ scueiien- 
certain distances; the location and length of the sidings; general con- The line. 
dition of the roadbed, class of rails used, and length of time con- 
structed and worked, which will determine the weight of the trains 
that can be safely run ; the bridges, tunnels, and crossings on the line, 
giving the materials of which they are constructed, tlie M'idth and 
height of each in the clear. The construction of important bridges 
and tunnels on the line should be considered in connection with the 
question of how long their destruction, either intentionally or by the 
enemy, would interfere with the working of the road. 

"The^fm^e. Whether broad or narrow. The Gauge. 

" Gradients. State the length and difference of level of each. The Gradients. 
gradients will affect the size of the trains that can be safely run over 
the road, and the traction power required to haul them. 

" Curves. The radius of each curve shouhl be given. The number of Ciuves. 
sharp curves on the line will influence to some extent the speed of trains. 

" Distance between stations. On single lines only those stations will Distance between 
require attention which are provided with sidings where trains can 
pass. On double lines the distance between telegraphic stations will 
regulate the intervals between consecutive trains. 

" 2. S'utions. Number of tracks from which cars may be loaded or stations. 
unloaded at each station; number and location of turn-tables and 
switches; platforms available for loading or unloading supplies and 
troops of all arms, or facilities for making platforms, and spaces suit- 
able for forming troops while loading ; number and capacity of store- 
houses, and their location with respect to the lines of the road ; extent 
and location of water supply, and whether available for men and 
animals; places where refreshments can be procured, etc. 

" 3. il/ean.s of carrying on the traffic. The watering stations, with the Means otcaiiying 
means and (quantity of supply ; fuel stations, with kind and quantity of 
fuel usually kept on hand; number and location of construction and 
repair shops ; location and capacity of the engine houses ; vsystem of tel- 
egraphs and signals, with the number of lines available for military 
purposes. 

" 4. Rolling stock. Number, condition and ])ower of engines; num- Rolling stock. 
ber and condition of cars of all kinds suitable for carrying troops of 
all arms, supplies and animals; materials for repairs, etc. 

"5. Administration. Personnel of thestations, lines, engines and trains. Administration. 

lie T\- • • r jj J- r^' xi i ^ ^\ • Division of the 

t). Dinsion of the line. Give the usual runs of the engines, une. 



44 



PRINCrPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Management of 
roads for military 
purposes. 



(Von Schellen- 
dorf.) 
Length, etc. 



Depth. 



Bed. 



Islands. 
Current. 



Navigable, etc. 



Artificial arrange- 
ments in the 
rivei'. 



The valley of the 
river described. 



stations where the personnel of the engines, and trains is changed, and 
where the trains pass under the control of other lines. 

" 7. Dutie^i. The personnel of day and night service ; the roster, 
and length of the tours of duty; order of duties and extra duty ; ordi- 
nary and extra traffic, etc. 

"When railroad lines are to be used for military purposes, it is very 
desirable that the personnel of the roads should be continued in ser- 
vice ; that the management of the lines should not be changed, except 
Avhen absolutely necessary ; for in this way will the assistance of those 
who are accustomed to the duties.be secured to the best advantage." 

RIVERS. 

" 1. Length of the portion of the river to be reconnoitred, the gen- 
eral direction, and any very great deviations from it. 

" 2. Breadth, viz., the average breadth and the breadth at passages 
over the river and at towns or villages of importance. '■^ * 

" 3. Depth in deepest places in the stream, average depth, as well 
as the depth at points of special importance (as mentioned under 2). 

" 4. The banks, height above mean level of the river, slope and 
peculiar character, embankments or artificial banks. 

"5. Bed and character of the bottom, whether rocky, stony, gravel 
or mud. Periodical changes in the bed. 

"6. Islands, whether cultivated or passable. 

" 7. Fall and rapidity of the current per second. The fall is slight 
if the rapidity of the current is from 11.8 to 27.5 inches, moderate if 
from 2.2 to 3.2 feet, rapid if from 3.2 to 6.5 feet, and very rapid if 9.8 
feet or more per second. 

"8. Whether navigable for ships or boats, together with data on 
the waterfaring population, boats, ferries, and ships, especially 
steamers, and purposes for which used. Any alteration in the volume 
of water according to the time of year should be noted and given. 

"9. Artificial arrangements such as sluices, dams, weirs, etc., giv- 
ing their position and construction and tlie effect they have on regu- 
lating the volume of water in the river. 

"10. Tributaries should, if necessary, be similarly described. 

" 11. The valley of the river. The depressitm and extent, whetlicr 
passable or crossed byroads; cultivated towns and villages, especially 
those situated on the banks of the river, stagnant pools or creeks, and 
marshy places ; elevations on the ground, dams and dykes, should be 
especially noted. 

" Sides of the valley, distance from the river and from each other, 
relative heights, nature of the ground, wliether steep or passable; 
roads and cultivation. 



AND THEIR APPLTCATION FN MODERN WARl AUE. 45 

"12. Permanent b rid yes. Materials (wood, stone, brick or iron ; permanent 
construction, on piles, arches, girders, etc.); breadth, length, and " °*^'''' 
iieight of roadway above mean water-level; whether any part can be 
temporarily drawn up or removed; the weight the bridge can sup- 
port, and whether passable for the diflferent arms ; the approaches on 
either bank, whether easily destroyed and restored. 

" 13. Floating bridges. Such as bridges of boats, pontoons, or rafts, Floating bridges. 
giving size, construction, and weight the bridge is capable of support- 
ing, the number of boats, etc., the bridge is formed of, and the time 
taken in opening and closing the bridge. 

" 14. Ferries and ftmng bridges. Weight the ferry or bridge can sup- Ferries and flying 
port, giving the time taken in crossing, together with the number oi 
men, horses and guns that can be taken over at a trip. 

"15. Fo7'ds. Giving position, direction, depth, bottom. A ford Fords. 
3.28 feet deep is passable for infantry, 4.71 feet deep by cavalry, and 
2.85 feet deep by artillery. 

"16. Favorable positions for throivinq military bridges. Giving ap- Positions tjr mi i- 

• 111 -111- '^^^^^' bridges. 

proaches on either bank, construction, and whether assistance could 
be obtained on the spot in the way of bridging materials, workmen or 
transport." 

* CITIES, TOWNS, VILLAGES, ETC. 

" Inhabited places are of importance as points d^appui in fighting, (Von ^cheUen- 
and as places where troops may be housed, fed, or equipped. Large importance of 

.,, . -11 1 11 cities, towns, 

towns or villages are important in the latter sense, wiiereas small etc., in amiiitary 
places are more so for fighting purposes, because the latter only are so ^'"" 
situated (though rarely it is true) as to command the surrounding 
country. Large places are generally situated in valleys, and more- 
over, require a large force to be effectually held. It should be also 
stated in a reconnaissance of a place whether it is suited for defence, 
and more especially independent defence; i.e., if the intended garri- 
son could hold out unassisted for any considerable time against a 
superior enemy. As regards the latter question, the following points 
should be considered : 

" 1. Buildings (stone, wood, mud). Ob.je-*s to be 

"2. How^ enclosed (walls, hedges, banks and ditches). connai^sancp of a 

" 3. Entrances (number and description). citj.town, 

" 4. Streets and squares (extent and position as regards each other; 
any obstacles to communication). 

"5. Large solidly constructed buildings, well adapted for reduits, 
such as churches, etc. 

"6. Weak points in the defence, and how far capable of being 
remedied. 



46 PRINC IPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

" 7. The surrounding country, whether favorable to the attack or 
defence. 

"The number of troops considered necessary for an obstinate de- 
fence of the place, or the distribution of the troops for the same, 
would not be given unless required by special order. 

" As regards giving the troops the use or benefit of the place, the fol- 
lowing points should be considerad : 

" 1. Number of houses, with the number of men, etc., they would 
contain. 

" 2. Number, occupation, and trades of the inhabitants. 

" 3. Stores, depots, factories, bakeries, mills. 

" 4. Facilities of transport by rail, river, road, or canal." 

AVOODS. 

(Von Scheiiea- "The following points should be considered in making a reconnais- 

sance of woods : 
Points to be con- "1. Position and extent. 

sidered in the re- 

oonnaisance of "2. Nature and Configuration of edges. 

woods. , -r^ , , , , . 

3. Koads, paths, tracks, and vistas. 

" 4. The kinds of trees and undergrowth, with thick and clear 
spaces, clearings, 

"5. Nature of the soil with reference to the ground being passtible 
off the roads, etc. 

" 6. Obstacles to movements, such as streams, water, marshy 
places, etc. 

" 7. Villages, etc., in the woods, with any clear spaces round them." 

VALLEYS, AND LOW ].YING GROUND. 

(Von scheUen- " A rccounaissancc report on the above should give information as 

dorf.) ^ ^ 

Reconnaisance of regards : 

vaUeys and low o-^ *• j ^ * 

lying ground. 1. feituation and extent. 

" 2. Nature or character of the ground, whether cultivated ; i^eat- 
bogs, marshes, ditches, etc. 

" 3. Roads, paths and tracks. 

" 4. Whether the ground off the road, etc , is passable for the dif- 
ferent arms, and how far the state of the ground varies at different 
seasons of the year." 

MOUNTAINS. 

(Von Sciieiien- "The reconuaissancc of mountains is a verv difficult undertaking, 

dorf.) . ... ' . 

The leconnais- inasmuch as the vision is generallv much obscured, especiallv when 

sance of moun- . i i /-^ i i • "t 

tains a difficult the mountains are wooded, (jood maps are consequently mdispen- 
opera ion. gable. Very particular attention should be paid to places where troops 

Good maps a ne- can to a certain extent deplov for acti(m: otherwise the chief points 

CeSSlty. ^ r . 7 Mr 

to be considered are whether or to what extent troops can be moved, 



ANT) THKIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARK. 4/ 

housed and fed. The reconnaissaiico report should furnish informa- 
tion on the following points : 

" 1. Position, extent, shape and relative iieierhts. Main and seeon- Points to be t-in- 

' ' ^ ^ braced 111 s\ ir^'oii- 

dary ridges or spurs, plateaus, chief and secondary valleys should all naissancc lepoit. 
be considered, giving the steepness of tlie various slopes. 

''2. Surface. The actual surface or covering of the mountains 
(rock, stones, debris, earth, etc.), marshy or rocky places, cultivation 
(forests, ploughland, meadows), towns, villages, etc., with the resources 
they contain. 

" 3. Water, lakes, rivers, streams, etc. 

"4. Roads, tracts, paths and passable ground, especially noting 
ground where troops in formation could move oflP the roads, etc., i gen- 
erally only found in valleys, or on ridges). 

"5. Special military considerations, such as positions, places for 
bivouacing, or where defiles, passes, etc., could be blocked, etc." 

FORTRESSES. 

"1, The past historv of the fortress should first be thoroughly (Von scheiieu- 
studied, especiallv that of its construction, and of anv sieges that it History of the 

' , " . ,. , . - * -1 £ I • 1 I'oi'ti-ess first 

may have undergone, certain of the most important details oi which considered. 
should be given in the reconnaissance report. 

" 2. Next, general o-eographical and strategical questions should be Geograpiiicai ami 

' * o o I ^ ^ o 1 ^ strategical que.s- 

ffone into and examined. This entails a reconnaissance of the sur- tions as relating 

'^ . . , to the fortress. 

rounding country, which should be made from an intending besieger s 
point of view; this is the best way of obtaining a correct insight into 
the defensive properties of the place, at least as regards how far an 
enemy's approach can be best observed, the ground round the fortress 
commanded, and an investment prevented or obstructed. 

"3. Next, in the reconnaissance of the interior of the place, the interior arrange- 
general system of defence, the enceinte with its ditches, outworks, ad- 
vanced works, detached forts, and covered communications, should all 
be considered, both as regards plan, section, and system of fortifica- 
tion, Ca.semated cover, caponnieres, powder magazines, reduits, case- 
mates for the garrison, bomb-proof hospitals, arsenals, and stores for 
l)rovisions, have of late years gained much in importance. 

" 4. Next the sluices belonging to the place regulating the level of Arrangements 

.,■.., -. , ■ , , i- exterior to the 

the water in the ditches and ground near the works, the system of conn- worlds. 
ter-mines if any, the entrenched camp, whether partially formed or 
projected, together witli any works of defence that would be under- 
taken to give additional strength to the place were a siege expected, 
should be gone into and described, giving the time thelatter would re- 
quire with the labor and materials available on the spot. Similarly 
the artillery armament of the i>lace should be examined and described. 



48 PRINCirLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

The town enoios- " 5. Finally, the town itself surrounded by the fortifications should 
be examined separately by itself as a place of habitation, and any 
considerations which might affect the defence of the place, either ad- 
vantageously or disadvantageously, should be studied and described; 
also, whether with due reference to all the above considerations^ the 
proposed garrison of the place appears sufficiently strong. 

General points "6. In Conclusion, a general r^'i?/??2e' should be made, showing the 

for consideraiion. i t i ^ i i i i - i i ^ 

advantages and disadvantages presented by the works ot the place, and 
the neighborhood of the fortress, in the case of investment or blockade, 
attack " de viveforce,^^ by surprise or escalade, bombardment, artillery 
attack, or regular siege with breaches and assault, with special refer- 
ence to the weak fronts of the fortress." 

LARGE TRACTS OF COUNTRY. 

(Von Scheiien- "1. In the rcconnaissancc of large tracts of country, the first ob- 

First consideia- ject should be to examine and describe the general character of the 

tions. ^ i -x'^ 

country tor military purposes. 
Country divided "2, For this purpose a country has verv often to be divided into 

into sections for . ,. , , - , ,' , . ... 

examination. scctious according as the latter are favorable or otherwise to military 
requirements, as regards the marching, fighting, quartering, feeding, 
etc , of troops. The country should be considered both as regards its 
orography and hydrography, paying special attention to important 
rivers, etc., and the general character and configuration of the ground 
(mountainous, hilly, and flat country). 

Communications, "3. Next, the Communications both by land and water should be 

cultivation, and <• n • i • m i • i i i • i i • ^ 

inhabitants to bo careiully examined, i e., railways, higli-roads and navigable rivers and 
lepoi e on. canals. The state of cultivation of a country' is also of importance 

and large tracts of forests orAvoods, valleys and low-lying ground, etc., 
should be specially reported on. Finally, the inhabitants (numbers, 
nationalities, religion, occupation, characteristics, etc.) should be con- 
sidered, together with the towns, villages, etc., with population of 
each, paying of course, special attention to fortified places or points 
otherwise of military importance." 

STATISTICAL RECONNAISSANCES. 

(Von Scheiien- " 1. Statistical recormaissanoes complete the detailed series of re- 

caretui prepara- connaissances just given. Rut it would be a mistake to fancy that the 
n°ecessary. ^^'^^ ueccssary information for the same could be collected during a tour 
from observation only. Consequently a preparatory study, going 
thoroughly into the question by collecting information from every 
kind of book and printed matter, must first of all be undertaken. 
Works on statis- "2. Work of this description is nowadays rendered comparative- 
ly easy by the publication of certain works on statistics, but as a rule, 
the information thus obtained has generally to be difterently grouped 



AND THFIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 49 

to be of value for militarv purposes. The following points should 
then be considered. 

"3. Quarters and camps. Number and description of the towns, Number of towns, 
villages, etc., giving the number of inhabitants and the number of bo gi" on'. ' 
fireplaces in each ; the public buildings and supplies of wood and 
straw should be noted in each separate place. 

"4. Provi^iorvt. Produce of cultivation and meadows, head of cat- I'lovi.sions, etc. 
tie, stores, mills, industries and trades, especially bakeries, breweries, 
distilleries, wine and tobacco produce. 

"5. Clothiiuj and equipment. Linen, cotton, cloth, and leather fac- ciotiiiii-,'. 
tories. 

*'6. Sanitari/ establishments. Hospitals, infirmaries, and baths. HHhment.r'*^'' 

" 7. MeauH of transport. R:)lling stock of railways, horses, mules, and Mt^ans of tranw- 
yoke oxen ; description of carts and carriages with draught ; navigation. '"" ' 

"8. Arms and warlike stores. Small-arm factories, iron foundries, Arms, etc. 
stores of metal and timber, powder-mills. 

"9. Money. Monetary system, duties and taxes. Money. 

" 10. Inhabitants. Military system and organization, any special Military system, 
organization for the defence of the country, such as national guards or 
local rifle clubs; degree of education and political feelings. 

"11. Reconnaissances made without preparatory' work can onlv be Local documents 
useful as a means oi verifying military considerations of high ira- times of great as- 
portance, or completing our existing stock of information. ' As regards 
the latter, it is worthy of remark that documents and maps, made 
for local use only, and consequently but little known elsewhere, are 
often to be obtained on the spot itself, and afford much valuable in- 
formation." 

REPORT. 

"As regards the general form of making a reconnaissance report, it (V<>n scheiien- 
is generally advisable to make it in as abstract or even tabulated form The report should 
as possible. For instance, it should not be necessary when seeking for the point. " 
information on a given point, to have to wade through the Avhole re- 
])ort to the end; a short index of the contents as well as a logical 
arrangement of the subjects facilitates the work of rapidly examining 
the report, 

"It is, moreover, desirable to have a great deal of important data or Data given witii- 

• P . . , . , , , , out reasons. 

intormation without arguments or reasoning, as the latter can only be 
made on definite suppositions. 

"A report which is not definite in its information is but little better Keport must be 
than none at all; to make an incorrect or false report amounts to a ^^^j^^t and truth- 
military crime; and a report which is larger or more voluminous than 
is necessary, often fails to fulfil the object desired. 



50 PRIXC'IPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

/ . 

"A report should be as brief as possible when it accompanies a map 
or sketch as ' explanations.' 
OflBcer reaponsi- "Further, it should always be borne' in mind that every reconnais- 
<.f*h:s'repoii/" ' sance report is an official report, and that, consequently, the officer 
making the reconnaissance is responsible for the accuracy and truth 
of his personal observations. The latter should therefore be kept 
quite distinct from that part of the report which has been compiled 
from the information and observation of others." 

ROUTE SKETCHING. 

Abrarichoftopog- 9. There is a branch of topography, which, from the importance 

'"^^^' sometimes assumed by it, should be mentioned under the subject of 

topographical reconnaissance, in connection with which it is frequent- 
ly used, viz., route sketching. 

De.'iupd. The object of route sketching is to represent the route passed over by 

an observer, together ^with so much of the country in the immediate 
vicinity and within view, as may in any way affect military operations. 

Rk.'tch accom- The skctch is usuallv accompanied bv notes giving explanations of 

panied by explan- , _" ' '. ... 

atoiy notes. any features that strike the observer as being of particular importance. 

When impcrta;it. Information gained in this manner may frequenth' be found of great 

assistance in arranging the details of a campaign or of a battle. 

It is not proposed to treat of the subject in this work, but the details 

of the duty, as well as those pertaining to reconnaissances, will be 

found in a book entitled 'Military Sketching and Eeconnaissance,' by 

Lieut. -Col. Hutchison and Captain jNlacGregor, of the British service. 

Qualities requir- JQ. The officcr Selected for the dutv of conducting a reconnaissance, 

ed in an orncer - ^ _ ^ 

making a recon- should be one who has been speciallv instructed for the purpose. The 

naissanco. _ ^ ^ ^ ^ 

duty requires an officer who has a particularly good military judg- 
ment, and who has previously made a thorough study of the subject. 
He should have a mind that can readily grasp details and retain them ; 
he should be familiar with the different arms of tlie service, their 
placing for mutual support, and their adaptability for action under 
the varying features of ground. The faculty of correctly estimating' 
distances by the eye will be of great assistance to an officer in per- 
forming this duty. This faculty, although natural to some, may by 
practice be acquired by all. 

^Y^"L^' officer The officer should be provided with all the materials necessarv for 

should be piovid- .... 

ed with when making and recording his observations: good maps of the countrv to 

makijig a recon- *^ . , , , "^ 

naissance. be examined^ a field glass, writing materials, etc.; good guides — the 

best will usually be found among that class of people whose dutie.s 
take them about the countrv — a good escort, preferably cavalry, as 
offering the necessary essential of moving quickly, and of furnishing 
tlie means of forwarding rapidly the information ()I)tained. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODIUN WARl-ARi:, 51 

11. An oHicer familiar witlithe duties pref-cribed should tjc able to ("uunuy can bo 

1 1 1 • 1 • • 1 1 •! -11 laijidlvskelche'l. 

make a general sketch ot the country, giving the details set torth, dur- 
ing the temporary halts ne(;essarily made on the march for the pur- 
pose of resting his escort and obtaining information. 

12. The great value to an army, of ofhcers who are thoroughly imporiaiK-e to an 
conversant with these duties, and the great assistance to the general in oliiceis shown by 
command tiiat the intormation gaintd by them is in carrying out his 

plan of campaign, are fully illustrated by the events of the wars of 
18G(), and of 1870-71. The Prussian staff was most thoroughly organ- 
ized, and the influence the officers composing it, exerted in bringing 
the campaign to a successful issue, is readily apparent after a careful 
.study of the detailed operations of these wars has been made. 

ARMED llECONNAISSANCEy. 

18. Armed reconnaissances are divided into two classes, vi/., .^ecrel. Two classes. 
reconn(iiss(uices, and reconnaisscuiees in force. 

SECRET RECONNAISSANCES. 

14. An armed reconnaissance, when made with a small force be- Defined. 
yond the outlaying sentinels of an army, for the purpose of obtaining 
information of the enemy, is usually termed a pat7'ol, scout, or secret re- 
connaissdnce. 

15. The best hour for the troops t(^ ?et out on this duty is about xiie most tavom- 

1 I .,.,., ,,,, 1 • • " '^ ''It- time to start. 

dusk, or sometime during the night. 1 hoy can at this time more easily 
pass between the outposts of the enemy, and when daylight comes they 
will then be on the ground which it is desirable to examine. Again, 
if the departure of the detachment is discovered by the enemy, another 
route can be taken during the night. 

16. The officer selected for this duty should be daring, courageous, Quaiificat 
and capable of enduring great fatigue; he should be a good horseman, 
have good eyesight, a mind quick togiasp all details, be promt to act, 

and he should have a retentive memory. He should be familiar with 
.sketching, so as to be able to represent any portion of the enemy's 
works or position, or to convey a good and intelligent idea of th« 
ground which it may be the intention to occupy. He should be pro- Means proyided to 

.- - . " . ^'. \ fulfill the duty. 

vided With a good field glass, with maps, and with all the materials 
necessary to record the information gained. A good guide is also in- 
dispensable, one who is thoroughly acquainted with the country, the 
byw^ays, short cuts, etc. The officer should be given full instructions, 
in writing, if necessary, of the object of his scout, and he should en- 
tirely understand them before starting out on his mission. He should 
know the distance taken up in column by the sub-divisions of the dif- 
ferent arms of the service, so he can readily estimate the strength of 
.any force of the enemv which mav come under his observation. He 



ions re- 
uired forth is 



52 PRIXOTPLES OP^ THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

should be furnished with a detail suitable for the work required of 

Composition of him. If the country is openflhe escort should be composed of cavalry; 
if it is broken or rugged, infantry should be taken. The men should 
be selected from the best material the army aflbrds, their qualifica- 
tions being similar to those of the officer in charge of the party. As 

Fize of escort. a general rule, the detachment should be small, as a few men can con- 
ceal their march and presence from the enemy much better than a 
trooj) or company under similar circumstances. 

Preouitions on 17. Great care should be exercised when approaching any place 
fav'Orable for an ambuscade. Such points should be carefully examin- 
ed by one or more men, detached for the purpose, before closing in on 
them with the party. 

Eucouiittis with All rencontres with the enemv should be carefully avoided, as the 

the ejieiiiv to he .... . , i . ' i- i • .• •" • i 

:iv.,idici. main object is to gam knowleage of his icrces, positions, and move- 

ments, without exposing the presence of the party making the scout. 
Even very small parties of the enemy should be allowed to pass, as the 
main object of the scout might be lost by an attempt to capture them, 
by the escape of some one member of the party, out of sight or over- 
looked for the moment. 

Precautions 18. The detachment should avoid the travelled roads, keeping near 

taken to guard . , , , i i i V i 

against discovery, tlicm, however, by moving along the byways, through the woods and 
fields. It should be very careful about making any noise, should not 
be allowed to build fires or the men even to smoke at night, when in 
the immediate vicinity of the enemy. It keeps well together, depend- 
ing upon a few men in advance, marching in dispersed order, to give 
timely notice of anything suspicious in the vicinity. 

Report made If any considerable force of the enemy is discovered, the detachment 

is fcAiut! in force.' should be entirely concealed from \ie\v, but in such a position that all 
the enemy's movements may be seen, and his exact composition, direc- 
tion of march, and numbers determined, when a detailed statement of 
the information obtained should be made in writing and sent to the 
commanding general by two of the most reliable men of the party. 

incideia of Gen- 19. General Pope, during his campaign in northern Virginia, re- 
ceived very accurate information in regard to the celebrated flank 
march of General Jackson, from Colonel J. S. Clark, of the staff of 
General Banks. That officer remained all day, in a perilous position, 
within sight of Jackson's moving column, and counted its force, which 
he found to bs thirty-six regiments of infantry, with the proi)er pro- 
portion of batteries, and a considerable cavalry force. 

Manner of gain- 20. If the object be to gain information of the enemy's presence or 

iiig information. ., ire iii'iii- 

strength at a certain place, the oincer, when lie has readied the im- 
mediate vicinity, will conceal his detachment in tlie best manner pos- 



eral Pope's carr 

paign in Virginia 

(See Swill ton.") 



it t( 



AND THIIR AVPI.ICATION IN jMODIHN WAHKAKE. 53 

sible, and, taking two or three of his best men, will approach as near 
as he can without discovery, to gain the desired end. 

21. If essential to send information speedily, a few men may be M"' 

^ ' ' waruiiiL' iiiiDiinii- 

left at intervals along the line of march, to in turn take the message tion. 
and forward it. Upon the return of the officer to his station, he should 
make a report in writing of his scout. 

RECONNAISSANCES IN FORCE. 

22. A reconnaissance in force is generally made just before a bat- wiun uiiide iin.i 

. 1,1. '"'■ ^^li'it purpose. 

tie, tor the purpose of forcing the enemy to develop his strength and 
dispositions. The time selected is usually late in the day, in order 
that night may be depended upon to put an end to the fighting, and 
to give the commanding general an opportunity to make any change 
in the arrangement of his troops which the facts gathered from the re- 
connaissance may have rendered necessary. 

"The enemy should be threatened in such a manner as to lead him How iondivc'ted 
to suppose that a real attack is intended, and to force him to discover 
his strength and position. During the advance reconnoitring officers 
should be well to the front, seizing upon every point of advantage lor 
a good lookout, noting the details of the enemy's position, marking 
where his troops and guns are placed, and estimating distances. The 
reports and notes (rapid outline landscape sketches sometimes added) 
of these officers, when put together on return, will afford valuable in- 
formation to the general commanding. "-■• "•• "■'■ Care must be 
taken that the movement does not lead to a general action for which 
the force is not prepared. By advancing for the reconnaissance late 
in the day, even should it be difficult to withdraw, darkness will en- 
able the commander to put a stop to the fight." 

23. A reconnaii'mrice in force may be made under the immediate By whom made. 
supervision of the general-in-chief, or by a detachment of troops of all 

arms, selected for the purpose, and under the direction of a subor- 
dinate commander. 

In the first case, there would be a general advance of the whole line. Manner of con- 
as if for the purpose of bringing on a general engagement, showing a tion o? the first 
strong line of skirmishers in front. The forward movement may be 
preceded by a charge of cavalry for the capture of some of the 
enemy's outposts or sentinels, from whom information of a very valu- 
able character may sometimes be obtained, especially when they are 
from different fracticms of the enemy's forces. The artillery sliould be 
brought into action in order to cause the enemy to open fire with his 
own, thus revealing the general disposition of his forces, key points, 
etc. The general follows the movement, taking station where he can 



54 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

most readily overlook the enemy's line, and, having gained his object, 

causes the troops to be withdrawn to their position. 

Care tobe exei- 24. Care should be exercised that any .success obtained at any point 

movement. '^ of the line, be not so closely followed up as to prevent the withdrawal 

of the troops at the proper time. Or, if during the movement, it is 

found that an important position has been gained, owing to the failure 

of the enemy to properly guard it, and which it may be desirable to 

hold, dispositions should at once be made for that purpose, by sending 

re-enforcements forward, causing the troops to entrench, etc. 

Manner of con- 25. An operation of the second class is more difficult, requiring 

dnctiiior an opera- t i • i i >' i ,r> • ^ 

tion of the sec- great tact and good judgment on the part oi the oincer in command. 
Depending upon the nature of the country and the object to be gained, 
the detachment will be formed of one or more arms of the service. 
The troops selected, usually a division, or perhaps the advanced guard 
of an army, will be handled as in thefir.st case, the additional precau- 
tion being taken to see that the line of retreat to the main body of 
the army is in no way compromised. To render this secure, the flanks 
of the attacking body of troops should be \yell protected by patrols of 
cavalry and by skirmishers. 

Patrols. 2G. Minor operations made by small parties and usually called 

patrok, are continually carried on, both within and beyond the line of 
advanced sentinels of an army. In the first case, to examine well the 
ground between the sentinels, also the ground between the line of sen- 
tinels and their respective outposts. In the second case, to examine 
the country between the lines of sentinels of the two armies, to ascer- 
tain what changes may have been made during the night. In this 
way small affairs of detached parties are brought on, the object being 
to take prisoners and thus gain information. 

Objection to a re- 27. The great objection to a reconnaUsance in force is that, as the 

connaissance in i i i • i i i • • 

force. troops are used to unmask the enemy and make him develop his posi- 

tion and forces and then withdraw, the operation partakes of the 
nature of a retreat, and is liable to have a somewhat demoralizing 
effect upon them. 
(Soady.; 28. "From commanding ground, or before an enemv who is negli- 

An attack not al- . . , . , , , ' . , 

gent in covering his front, much may be learnt by a practical general 



wavs necessary 



without makinsf an actual attack. 



Napoleon before " Napoleou sjDent part of the day before Austerlitz at the outposts, 
while in his front, the valley of the Goldbach, and the opposite slopes, 
were covered with cavalry skirmishers, amidst whom rode experienced 
officers, from whose observations, joined to his own, the Emperor de- 
ciphered accurately the n)ovements and designs of the adversary." 

Marmont."' 29. Marmoutsavs: "Nothing should be neglected bv which we 



AND TIIETR APriJCATIOX IN MODEIJN -WARFARE. 00 

may obtain exact information ; and the surest method is aiwjiys to be 
in contact with the enemy by means of light troops, frequently to liave 
small engagements, and to make prisoners, whose answers are almost 
always simple and sincere. More is learned through them tlian by 
means of the most faithful spies. The latter often confound the names 
of corps and of generals, and form very inexact estimates of the 
strength of the troops, concerning whom they report." 

30. "Two Prussian officers of the stafl'of Prince Frederick Charles, (King.) 
the afternoon before the battle of Koniggratz, boldly approached the war of i86C). 
Austrian lines, observed the positions of the Austrian troops, and, 
though both pursued and assaulted by cavalry, got safe home, and 
brought to their general certain intelligence, which allowed him to 

frame the combinations which resulted in the morrow's victory." 

31. "The. eves of the Austrian arniy on more than one occasion (King.) 

. ' p . ri^, . Auatriaiisaiiil 

during the campaign (18G6) failed. Their patrol system was very Prus.sians in 18B6. 

much inferior to that of the Prussians. Its inferiority seems to have 

been due to the want of military education among the officers to whom 

pat^rols were entrusted. In the Prussian army special officers of high 

intelligence were always chosen to reconnoitre. * The 

Prussian system never failed, never allowed a surprise. The Austrians 

Avere repeatedly surprised and taken unprepared." 

SCREENING AND RECONNOITRING DUTIES OK CAVALRY IN ADVANCE OF 
THE ARMY. 

32. "When an enemy is at a distance and his movements are un- (Shaw.) 
known, he is often more to be feared than when close at hand and necessary, 
under observation. He must not therefore be lost sight of because he 

is some way off; but on the contrary he must be watched, in such a 
manner as to observe his movements closely with a view to estimating 
his designs, and at the same time to prevent his attempts at reconnais- 
sance with like intentions. 

33. " A fatal mistake is too often made by cavalry, in supposing that a mistake often 
it is sufficient to reconnoitre the enemy and return with a report, or 

even to reconnoitre in a certain direction and report that no enemy is 
seen. =■ It is not only necessary to find the enemy, but when found, 
to keep him under constant observation. 

"For this purpose detached bodies of cavalry should be advanced to Method of foim- 
the front of an army, interposing between their own troops and the " " '' *^ 
enemy a veil or screen, behind which there is immunity from surprise, 
and in the extreme front of which feelers or reconnoitrers are actively 
employed, collecting intelligence for transmission to the rear. 

*This habit of the French cavalry led to many surprises of the other arms heiii<; made hv 
the Germans i;i 1870. 



56 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Troops used for 84. " Tliese duties would be either performed by the ' divisional cav- 

tlie screen. 1,11/ ,,..., ,. ,, 

alryj or by the 'cavalry division, according as the operations are on a 
small or on a large scale. By the former is meant the cavalry attach- 
ed to a division. If several divisions are acting together, the cavalry 
of each would cover the immediate head of its own column on the 
march, reconnoitre the country to its front and flanks, and link the 
column to others; just as in action it would fight on the flanks of its 
own division, crown its success or cover its retreat. By the latter is 
.meant the division or brigade of cavalry, which is an independent tac- 
tical body, having relations to the whole army of a similar nature to 
those borne by the divisional cavalry to its own division. It therefore 
furnishes the advanced cavalry for screening and reconnoitring duties, 
when several columns are moving forward in combination. Should a 
division or smaller column of the three arms be acting by itself, a por- 
tion of its cavalry would generally be detached to the extreme front 
for a similar purpose. 
Principle ot the 3o. " A forcc of Considerable strength is usuallv emploved on this 

formation of tlie . . ^, , . ,^- , . , ^ , .' . 

screen. important service. The principle adopted is that of retaining a sup- 

port in rear, from which smaller parties are detached to the front and 
to the flanks, these parties in their turn sending out smaller fractions, 
until the whole assumes the form of an open fan, upon the outer edge 
of which the patrols are reduced to a strength of some eight or ten 
men, which in their turn may be covered in extreme advance by 
groups of scouts of two or three men together. This action of the cav- 
alry may perhaps be best appreciated by its being described as a mov- 
ing outpost chain. 

36. " A regiment of cavalry may thus be sent out to a distance, vary- 
ing, acctn'ding to circumstances, from ten miles to one or two day's 
march, in advance of the army it serves to cover. One squadron moves 
still farther to the front, one to each flank, while the remaining squad- 
ron acts as a reserve to the others. 

" Each of these squadrons now in extreme advance sends patrols to 
its front and flanks, as required by the nature of the ground and sup- 
posed position of the enemy. A support, consisting of from one-third 
to one-half the squadron, remains in each case in rear, moving along 
a central route. The patrols in their turn detach scouts so that every 
part of the ground may be thoroughly examined. 

Distances and in- " The distances to wliich the advanced squadrons should proceed 

tervals between i- ^ ^ • ii.. ,1 1 

the squadrons, from the squadrons in reserve, and also the intervals to be preserved 
between the squadron in advance, must depend so much upon the 
nature of the country and upon the position of the enemy, that it 
would be hard to frame any absolute rule on the subject. 



The duty as per 
formed by a regi 
nient of cavalry. 



Patrols sent from 
each squadron. 



AND THEIR ArPL'.CATlON IN MODERN WARIAI!E. -)/ 

" It is, liowever, suggested tliat, while the advance should be extended Bupports should 

, ., , . , . , , . be near at hand. 

as much as possible in order to avoid employing too many men upon 
tlie service, care should invariably be taken that all the bodies in 
front be able to fall back securely upon their supports, in case of the 
enemv being met in force. It is recommended that the distance to Four oifnc miit-s 

..." , 1 • ii- • • • T 1 f'"' iiiaxiinuMi 

which each patrol may detach it.selr from its immediate support be re- distance. 
stricted to four or five miles, or as much ground as can be passed over 
in one hour in ordinary country. On occasion, however, a patrol may 
be despatched on independent service for much longer distances, rely- 
ing entirely upon its own resources. * 

" It frequentlv becomes necessary for scouts to be sent to considerable The case of scouts 

.*,. -I'li 1 11 £ sent long dis- 

distances from their supporting body ; but each group, though out oi tances. 
sight and hearing of the next, should always know the general posi- 
tion of the groups on either flank of its own patrol, and of the squad- 
ron from which the patrol is detached." 

CONNECTING POSTS. 

37. *' In proportion as a reconnaissance is pushed further to the front ^. ('^.\i'^^^';) 

^ r 1 _ ^ Necessity for 

the necessity for maintaining some system of constant communication tiiese j.osts. 
with the rear becomes more apparent. 

" It must be regarded as a first essential condition, that the intelli- 
gence procured by a reconnoitring party be transmitted at once to the 
main body. It is also needful that a detached patrol should be in a 
position to receive orders from the rear as quickly as possible. Hence 
arises the necessity for connecting posts, when reconnaissances are being 
carried on at some distance in advance of the main body. 

"The posts are placed on the main routes, generally at positions Manner of piac- 

1-1 u r J -1 1 1-1 1 1.1 11 i"g the posts. 

wliich can be found easily, such as bridges or remarkable or well- 
known buildings, and they are established by each advanced party as it 
proceeds to the front. 

"The posts should be two or three miles apart, or the distance an Distance apart. 
orderly could, in case of necessity, pass over at a gallop without pull- 
ing up. 

"A post should not consist of less than three men, one of whom Htrengtii of the 
must always be ready to mount at an instant's warning, whenever a ^' " ' 
messenger is seen approaching, for the purpose of carrying on the des- 
patch to the next post. 

"The orderly who brings in a message returns to his post after a orderly returns 
.short rest, and takes back with him any orders for the advanced party. ° "** ^°^ ' 

" The pace at which an orderly should ride, the exact place, and His pace, etc. 
hour of despatch, should be written on the outside of the message." 

STRONG RECONNOITRING PARTIES. 

38. "A strong reconnoitring party would be detached, either from the force taken. 



58 rilENCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

the main body, or from the reserve ot\the advanced covering detach- 
ments, i. c, from the reserve of the advanced-guard on the march, or 
from the reserve of the outposts at the halt. 

Instructions t<j "The Commander would receive before starting the most precise in- 

le toinman ei . j^jj.y(.j-JQjj^ ^jg ^q ^[jg object to be effected. He might be ordered, for in- 
stance, to search for the position taken up bv the enemy, and to ascer- 
tain the numbers of his troops by such indications as may come under 
observation without disclosing his own proximity; or he might be 
. directed to feel for the enemy in a particular quarter until he should 
hit upon liim. Or else he might be directed to report on the resources 
of the country, the facilities and obstacles it presents for advance, and 
the general lines of communication. 

The T sphere, 39. " Stroug reconuoitriug parties may push their reconnaissance 

force and Cum po- ^ , , , j. , ,, ' . . i mi 

.sitioii. tar beyond the zone of tlie smaller reconnoitring patrols, Ihey are 

generally ordered out by the general or brigadier, their force and com- 
position depending much on the nature of their mission and of the 
country, and on the necessity or non-necessity of concealing the march 
of the party. 

u.se of cavalry 40. "A troop of cavalrv is often sent on such a duty, a staff-officer 

and infa:itrv on . i ,^ t>» i • i i 'n' i ^ ^ 

this duty. " accompanying the force, it the country is close, hilly, and wooded, 

infantry may be selected in preference, a few mounted men being at- 
tached as orderlies; but more usually still in a varied country, infan- 
try is joined to cavalrv as its support. The infantry would accompany 
t!ie cavalry to certain points, past which the horse must fall back in 
retiring. These points the infantry would hold to secure the retreat 
of the cavalry, which latter would then advance rapidly to the front to 
complete the reconnaissance. The cavalry in its turn would cover the 
retreat of the infantry across any open ground. 

Influence of i)i- 41. "The addition of infantry gives to such reconnoitring parties a 

fantrv and , , i- • ' i • i i • i 

artillery. strength an1 power of resistance which cavalry can never attain by 

itself. The employment of artillery tends towards a similar end, and 
the especial mobility of horse-artillery renders it most appropriate for 
such service. Artillery is nevertheless seldom added to an ordinary 
reconnoitring party, its use being generally confined to a reconnais- 
sance in force, or a special reconnaissance. But although guns are not 
much employed upon this kind of duty, there may still be occasions 
where artillery would prove a useful addition to the other arms, as, by 
its assistance, woods or other suspicious places, within range, could be 
effectively examined or cleared of the enemy's presence, without the 
necessity of a close approach. Guns can also cause the withdrawal of 
parties of the enemy from small defensive positions by acting on their 
Hank. 



AND THEIU APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. .")<) 

42. ''Whenever the vseveral arms are combined in a strong recon- XrHuu 
iioitring party, cavalry is always well to the front in the advance, so faniry! 
long as the ground permits. The infantry in rear takes up successive 
j)()sitions favorable for defence, as it advances, so that if at any 
moment the cavalry is driven back it will be protected in its retreat by 
the infantry. 

" In the return march the infantry takes the lead, unless hardly 
pressed in a close country, when the cavalry is sent on in front." 



60 



PRINX'II'LES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF AVAR 



CHAPTER VI. 

ADVANCED-GUARDS AND MARCHES. 



Defined and ob- 
ject .stated. 



(Shaw.) 
The cavalry 
screen . 



An advanced- 
giiard also form- 
ed. 



Also outposts. 



How the safety of 
troops on the 
march is secured. 



Incident of the 
French revolu- 
tion. 



Duties of the ad- 
vanced-guard. 



ADVANCED-GUARDS. 

1. An advanced-guard is a body of troops covering the front of an 
army on the march. Its object is to thoroughly examine the country 
in front and on the flanks, and to observe the movements of the enemy 
so the army cannot be taken by surprise or unprepared, 

" The advanced cavalry, detached for screening and reconnoitring 
duties, spread a veil round the force of which they form a part, and 
contribute to its security by the information which they obtain of the 
country, the scene of operations, and of the numbers, position, and 
probable intentions of the enemy. 

" Behind the screen or veil thus formed by the cavalry, the main 
body on the march is also protected by its advanced-guard, flanking 
parties, and rear-guard, the duties of which are carried out strictly as 
if the cavalry were not in front, reconnoitring parties being despatched 
from the advanced-guard, rear-guard, or main body to examine special 
points, wherever thought necessary. 

"Similarly, at the halt, a chain of outposts is immediately formed 
in front of the army, with the same regularity and care as if the veil 
of cavalry in front did not exist. 

" On the march, the safety of a column of troops is secured by an ad- 
vanced-guard preceding it, by flanking parties on the flanks, and by a 
rear-guard following it." "■=■' "•■' * 

During the French revolution a Republican general marched his 
army along a road bordered by hedges, and without taking the precau- 
tion of throwing out an advanced -guard or flankers. Charette, the 
Vendea chief, took the army entirely by surprise, fell upon its flanks, 
cut it in two, and entirely disper.'^ed it. 

2. The advanced-guard should, if attacked by the enemy, delay 
him in his advance until the main body of the army has taken posi- 
tion, or made all the necessarv arrangements to receive him. If in a 



AND THEIR APrLICATION IN MOt)ERN WARFARE. 01 

strong position, it should hold on as long as possible, without, however, 
compromising its own safety. If forced back, it should retire slowly, 
disputing the ground inch by inch. 

3. The strength of the advanced-guard will depend upon the nature Conditions regn- 

• -1 1 1- 1 -111 T i" 1 latinj^ till! 

ot the country, the strength oi the main body, the quality oi the troops, strength of the 
the season of the year, and upon the duty required of it. If an attack " ^"^ ^ ""'' • 
is expected, or it is required to take or hold a certain positioff, it will 
be stronger than under the ordinary conditions of march. As a rule 
its strength will vary from onc-ffth to one-third the total force. The 
fact that, when very strong, the duty would recur so often as to greatly 
fatigue the men, and if too weak, it might become an object to the 
enemy to make an attempt to cut it off from the main body and cap- 
ture or destroy it, should also be considered when determining the 
strength of the advanced-guard. 

4. The duty should be so regulated that it will fall in turn to all Manner of regu- 
tlie different divisions of the army, in this way simplifying the details vice." 

of the service, familiarizing all the troops with the duty, and keeping 
them under the command of their proper ofKcers, which will have a 
good effect on the discipline of the command. 

The plan of making details for this duty from the different reg- 
iments tends to relax discipline by bringing men under officers with 
whom they are not accustomed to serve. 

5. The composition of an advanced-guard is usually the same as composition of 
that of the body of troops which it is designed to cover and protect. gnard.^'^"^^ " 

The advanced-guard of an army i?, generally composed of the three 
arms, viz.: infantry, cavalry and artillery; the relative proportion of 
each depending upon the nature of the country and the resistance it 
may be required to make. Following the general rule, the cavalry use of cavahvin 
will predominate in an open country ; in fact,, in such country, nearly "" op*"" country. 
all the cavalry of an army on the march should be thrown well to the 
front and on the flanks, thus affording the best protection from a sur- 
prise, gaining information of the enemy's movements and designs, and 
covering those of its own army, enabling the general to make any de- 
sirable dispositions without the enemy's knowledge. 

6. In a broken or rugged country the main force will consist of in- Advanced-guard 
fantry, such ground being best adapted to the movements and methods try 

of fighting of this branch of the service. The cavalry in this case 
should be employed in scouting, and in conveying information to the 
rear. 

7. "The principle of the formation of an advanced-guard is that {nhnv.-.) 

... J p irixi x' • •!• Principle of the 

It IS made up of a number of detachments, increasing progressively in formation of an 
strength from the front to the rear. The object of each of these de- ' ' 



62 PRINCIPLES OF* THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ^VAR 

tachments is to guard against surprise the stronger body which fol- 
lows immediately in rear, and to give the latter time to prepare for 
attack. This consideration regulates the distances to be preserved be- 
tween strong detachments. When the detachments are small, the dis- 
tances need only to be sufficiently great to prevent the possibility of 
the rear detachment being suddenly brought under fire without notice. 

Disposition of an 8. " The ad vanccd guard sliould be divided into the adi'ttwcerf par^i/, 
with its support and the reserve of the advanced-guard. 

" The strength of the reserve should be from one-third to one-half ot the 
whole advanced-guard. The remainder forms the advanced party and 
its support, in the proportion of about one-third for the advanced party to 
two-thirds for the support. 

"The extreme front of the advanced-guard will always consist of a 
leading group, or point, of three or four men, under a non-commission- 
ed officer if possible, sent forward from the advanced party." 

The dispositions 9. To illustratB the general dispositions of an advanced-guard— 

of an advanced- ,., -, , i-ni !• i ^ 

guard of 150 men . which are about the same for all, whatever their strength and purpose 
— tiie manner of arranging a guard of one hundred and fifty men, in- 
fantry, will be taken. 
(Siiaw.i " Fii;st, — Fig. 1. — a leading group of four men under a corporal, 

flanked by two groups of three or four men each to the right and left 
rear, not more thanone hundred and fifty yards off the main route. 
The remainder of the advanced party follows at one hundred .yards 
from the point. 

"At one hundred and fifty yards, a connecting file between, the sup- 
port follows, detaching, when required, tAvo small flanking groups, to 
support and keep in sight the flankers of the advanced party. At two. 
hundred and fifty yards, connecting files being between, the reserve fol- 
lows, consisting of half the force. It may detach to either flank, when 
desirable, one group of men thrown forward, and another group thrown 
rather back supporting the former. None of these flanking groups 
should extend their distance laterally from the main route over four 
hundred yards, under ordinary conditioUvS. 

"A distance of three hundred yards separates the reserve from the 
main body, which is thus eight hundred yards, or nearly half a mile, 
from the leading group of the advanced-guard." 

Case of an ad- 10. In the case of an advanced-guard of cavalry of about the same 
strength as the foregoing, the lateral distances would be increased to 
two hundred, three hundred, or even a greater number of yards, de- 
pending upon the nature of the country ; and the distances between 
the difterent portions of the guard would be increased in proportion, 
until the total distance from the point of the advanced-guard to the 



vaiiced-cruard of 



AND the:r app].ication in modern warfare. ()'5 

main column would be one thousand live hundred or two thousand 
yards, or even more in a very open country. 

11. " The commander of the advanced-guard remains witii the re- (.simw.j 

. .11 Hcscrve, and 

serve. It marches on the mam route, always ready to move quickly tianking patrols. 

to the front or flank if required. When possible, flanking patrols from 

the reserve move on each flank. They are to examine houses, farms, 

etc., standing back from the route, and preserve connection with any 

columns that may be advancing on other roads to right and left. 

Should there be any fighting it is done by the reserve. 

"The advanced parties feel, observe, and reconnoitre, but when it Duiiosof advaijc- 

... 1 , 1 1 1 *^d parties and 

comes to pushing home an attack the reserve must be brought up as mode of action. 

quickly as possible. This does not mean that the advanced parties 

will not usually be able to sweep back the enemy's feelers and scouts 

if they are encountered. So much they will doubtless be able to effect, 

but should more serious resistance be met with, it is their duty, even 

at the cost of delay, to obtain re-enforcements, or to fall back on the 

larger body in their rear, so as either to ensure the advance being 

pushed successfully, or that such obstacle to the enemy's nearer 

approach be offered, as shall give the main body time to prepare for 

action. The principle on which such rules for action are based is 

that it is the essence of the duty of an advanced-guard to be ,smcc6s.s/m/ 

in repulsing the enemy or in holding him back a sufficient time. 

12. " The distance of the head of an advanced-guard from the main On regulating tiie 

. .» 1 T 1 1 distance from the 

column varies according to circumstances, and cannot be dictated by head of the ad- 

, _ , 1 £ • 1 ^ 1 'J.^ £ X xi, • vanced-guard to 

rule. It may, however, be fairly remarked with reference to the prin- themaincoUimn. 
cipal duty of the advanced-guard, that if the main body requires to be 
affi)rded a long time to prepare for the engagement — in other words, if 
the column of the main body is deep, and would take much time to 
form up — the distance of the head of the advanced guard must be a 
long way in advance. But if the country is difficult to traverse, and 
the enemy's advance can be easily retarded, the head of the advanced- 
guard need not be so far in front as if the country is open, and the 
advances of the enemy would be uninterrupted. Or, if the advanced- 
guard is strong, and can hold the enemy, it need not be so far in ad- 
vance as if it is weak, and liable to be driven rapidly back. Again in 
thick or foggy weather, or at night, the distance in front of the head 
of the advanced-guard, would be reduced, as would also the breadth of 
f.iont of the scouts, or flanking parties. Under such circumstances a 
long extended advanced-guard would be useless, and the proper direc- 
tion of march might be lost. The enemy could also easily pass through 
a widely extended front, undetected, in a dark or foggy state of the 
atmosphere. 



64 



PRIXCiri.ES OF TH1-: ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Rule for dete i- 
niiriiiig distance 
from head of an 
advanced-guard 
to head of main 
column. 



Division of the 
advanced-guard' 
admits of asnb- 
divisiou of dutie?. 



Reasons for plac- 
ing cavalry at the 
head. 



Engineers with 
(he support. 



Composition of 
the reserve. 



Position of the 
artillery in the 
advanced-guard. 



Usually with tht 
reserve. 



13. " A very rough rule is sometimes followed of ascertaining ap- 
proximateh' what the distance should be from the head of tlie advanced- 
guard to the head of the main column. The distance is to be equal to 
the length of the column of the main body en route, on the assumption, 
that the rear of the column would then have time to form up for 
action, before the enemy could pass from where he encountered the 
head of the advanced-guard, to the position taken up by the c(dumn to 
receive the attack. 

14. ''The division of the advanced-guard into advanced party, sup- 
port, and reserve, admits of a sub-division of duties which is very de- 
sirable. The nature of these duties leads us naturally to fix the position 
in the advanced-guard, of the several arms when combined. 

" Mobility is undoubtedly necessary for the advanced files, and recon- 
noitring their duty, cavalry must therefore be at the head ; and not 
only at the head but to reconnoitre to the flanks, for infantry employ- 
ed on this service, to any distance, would delay the advance, and the 
men be soon exhausted by the extra fatigue. 

" The advanced party, and also the leading portion of the support, 
would therefore be mvalry. But cavalry should not compose the whole 
of the support, as cavalry meeting hostile infantry would naturally be 
checked. The support, then, to fulfil its complete mission, should in- 
clude infantry. A few engineers would accompany the support, in 
order to be near at hand when required to repair a broken bridge, or 
assist in removing an obstacle to the advance. The pioneers of infan- 
try would also march with the support, to render like service. 

15. "The reserve would be composed of all the three arms, in order to 
Avithstand the enemy and fight him. Infantry at the head, followed 
by the artillery, then by more infantry, and finally by the remainder 
of the cavalry not employed in the advance. The engineers not with 
the support, would bring up the rear of the advanced-guard. 

16. " The circumstances under which guns would require to take a 
more forward place in the march of an advanced-guard are of rare 
occurrence. In a mountainous or hilly country, much enclosed, a 
few guns might perhaps accompany the support. In such a country 
they would be comparatively safe from sudden attack or reverse, the 
enemy being hampered in his movements by the ground, and they 
would be close at hand when required for any special service, such for 
instance as silencing the enemy's guns brought to bear on points which 
must be passed by the advanced-guard. A couple of guns are also 
sometimes of use with the support, in order to clear the road in front 
without loss to the infantry, 

" As a general rule, however, they would be close enough to the front 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WAKFAllK. G5 

Avhen witli the reserve. Guns cannot come into action, without serious 
risk to themselves, under the effective fire of infantry. If marching 
with the support, their distance from the extreme front would prob- 
ably not exceed eight hundred yards, except in the case of a very large 
advanced-guard. Hence, on meeting the enemy the guns would be in- 
convenienced by the close proximity of the hostile infantry. But 
slight delay in coming into action would be caused by their marching 
with the reserve, and they would undoubtedly have a greater choice 
of positions, all within artillery range but beyond infantry range, as 
they came up, than if they had occupied a more forward place in the 
column of ro'ite. Their place in the reserve would be near its head, 
only covered by sufficient infantry to prevent surprise." 

17. All ground that affords facilities for concealing an enemy must Precautions 

be thoroughly examined, as also all villages near the line of march; ^°^""' ^'"'Pi's®- 
all lateral roads should also be well explored by flanking parties sent 
out for the purpose. 

The importance of these precautions is well illustrated by an inci- Vendome in 1702. 
dent which happened to the Duke of Yendome, in 1702, at Luzara. 
His advanced-guard had reached its camping place, and, without 
thoroughly examining the neighborhood, had begun to pitch the tents. 
An aide-de-camp, whose duty it was to establish the camp guard, 
deemed it advisable to post a sentinel on a dike in the immediate 
vicinity of the camp. Having reached the top of the dike, he discov- 
ered the army of Prince Eugene drawn up ready for battle, and await- 
ing the signal of attack. He immediately gave the alarm, and Ven- 
dome's troops were able to repulse the attack. 

18. With good cavalry covering the front of an army at a dis- office of good 
tance from it of from five to fifteen miles, the advanced-guard may be ^^^ " " 
marched as a single body, formed in the manner best suited for coming 

into action as rapidly as possible. 

19. Patrols, or small parties of mounted men, are kept continually Use made of 
on the move, in advance, on the flanks, and between the different marcif#"" 
divisions of the advanced-guard and the main army. These detach- 
ments are for the purpose of conveying information of the movements 

of the enemy, as well as to keep up the connection between different 
parts of their own forces. 

20. As a general rule, the country for a day's march at least in ad- conntry under 
vance of an army should be under the control of its advanced-guard, the advanced- 
thus securing the time necessary to bring up, deploy, and place in °"'^' 
position, the component parts of the army. 

21. In the case of the several corps of an armv, advancing bv dif- Each corps to 

c ^ 1 ,. ,11, . , , i"i-i ^^^'■'^ '*^ advanc- 

lerent roads, each corps should have its own advanced-guard, winch ed-guard. 
1) 



66 PRIXCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

should cover, not only its proper front, but extend half-way towards 
the corp?; on its immediate right and left. 

REAR-GUARDS. 

Defined. 22. A rear-guurd is a body of troops formed to protect the rear of 

an army when on the retreat; it corresponds to the advanced-guard in 
a forward movement. A small rear-guard also follows an army on the 
advance, its duty being to pick up stragglers and prevent small bodies 
of the enemy's cavalry from making raids on the rear of the army to 
capture the baggage, etc. 
(Shaw.) 23. " As regards its order of march, a rear-guard is described as an 

advanced-guard reversed. The principles of formation are identical in 
both, and the same rules generally guide both ; with this difference, 
that the rear-guard retires before the enemy, while the advanced-guard 
pushes against him. Consequently, although the distribution is the 
same as with the advanced-guard, the strength of the fractions of the 
rear-guard decreases instead of increases from front to rear. The re- 
serve is nearest the main body. The support is farther to the rear, in 
support of the rear party, which moves in several groups or in consol- 
idated formations according to the country it passes over. In a fairly 
open country, where the pursuit is not immediate, the extreme rear 
will be formed of reconnoitrers, moving in a line thrown back at each 
endi towards the flankers, until it assumes the semi-circular form in a 
manner more marked than it would in the advance. 

How the nature of 24. "If the pursuit is active and attack imminent the rear-guard 

the conntiv af- ^ ° 

fects the rear- must manoeuvre; and here we may remark that the nature of the 
country afl'ects not only the composition of the rear-guard, but the 
kind of action it must take with the troops at its command. 

Duties of the 25. "A change of base or position mav have caused an armv tem- 

r ear-guard. ' ^ i- i ' 

porarily to make a retrograde movement, or the lorce may be retreat- 
ing. In either case the mission of the rear-guard is to retard the pur- 
suit of the enemy, and to interpose between him and the maiu body 
on the march. In carrying out this duty the rear-guard must often 
maintain a struggle at a disadvantage, and even, if necessary, sacrifice 
itself in order to enable the main force lo get away in safety. No 
more honorable post can be assigned to an officer than that of com- 
manding or serving with a rear-guard in such a case. The very best 
officers and the freshest troops should be selected for this service, espec- 
ially if covering the retreat of a beaten army. In the latter case the 
position of the rear-guard is one of much difficulty, the enemy nearly 
always pursuing with activity, and also endeavoring by flank attacks 
to cut off the retreat, 
rear -guard. 26. " As regards the strength of the rear-guard in a retreat, it 



AND THEIR APPT-ICATION IN MODERN WAKFAKE. 07 

would take tlie same proportion as would be allotted to the advanced- 
guard in a forward march. This proportion would commonly be 
about one-mxlh of the whole marching strength. In exceptional eases 
it might even amount to one-fourth of the whole. It is not without re- 
luctance on the part of a Commander that so large a rear-guard is de- 
tailed, as his first anxiety and care must naturally be to withdraw and 
place in safety the greatest number possible of his men. But if he 
neglects to cover his retreat by a sufficiently strong force the result 
will probably be that the rear-guard, unable to withstand the assaults 
of the enemy, will constantly be driven back upon the main column, 
and throw it into disorder. The demoralizing effect upon troops of 
the mere knowledge that they are in retreat is in itself very great. 
Should the rear-guard not be strong enough to enable the column to 
retire with due regularity, the feeling of depression will increase, the 
retreat will turn to a rout, and disaster will result. 

27. "A skilful rear-guard commander will endeavor bv eveiv t^uuiu advantage.s 

" . " sliouW be turned 

means to obtain even small advantfiges over the enemy, in order to en- to good account. 
courage his men and to maintain their morale, thus enabling tlrem to 
endure with better spirit a harassing pursuit. With this view it ap- 
pears desirable that the extreme rear and flanking detachments of the 
rear-guard should be sufficiently strong, to take all possible advantage 
of any imprudence on the part of the enemy's advanced troops. 

" In the event of a retreat after an engagement something may also one manner of 

, , . , . . , T , selecting troop i 

be done towards this end, by selecting lor the rear-guard such troops tor this duty. 
as have not only suffered least during the day, but have themselves 
perhaps obtained some local advantage, which, insufficient to affect the 
general result, may yet be enough to prevent the men feeling down- 
hearted, and with little further stomach for action. 

28. " The distance that a rear-guard should be from the main body on the distance of 
depends upon the nature of the country, its numbers, and the manner from the main 
in which the pursuit is conducted. If the pursuit is slack it can safely ° • " 

be a march in rear. Under all circumstances, however, constant com- 
munication should be maintained between it and the main body. It 
is difficult to prescribe any definite distance for the rear-guard to take 
up from the main body. The latter, as is natural in retreat, proceeds 
as fast as is convenient in the desired direction. The rear-guard has; 
to interpose between the main body and the enemy, to check the ad- 
vance of the pursuer, and to observe and reconnoitre him, in order to 
discover at the earliest moment any intention, on his part, of a flank 
or turning movement. Hence it happens that the distance of the rear- 
guard from the main column, in two or more cases, may vary con- 
siderablv, in accordance with circumstances; but under ordinarv con- 



68 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

ditions the distances laid down for the advanced-guard in a forward 
movement would be approximately suitable for the rear-guard in 
retreat. 
On the duty of re- 29. "A rear-guard does not require to reconnoitre in advance of 
the rear-guard. ^ its march, for the enemy cannot be there, and since the main column 
goes first over the ground, and investigates it thoroughly, reports and 
sketches of roads, bridges, and positions suitable for making a stand 
against the enemy, can be sent back to the rear-guard whenever it is 
likely to need them. In most cases the enemy, if following, is easily 
reconnoitred in the rear, as in the eagerness of pursuit he has little 
heed for concealment. On the flanks alone there is difficult and deli- 
cate work, of this particular nature, to be done. The most serious 
danger for a rear-guard is undoubtedly that of being turned or cut off, 
and not only is its own safety imperilled in such event, but its protec- 
tive character as a guard to the rear of its own main column ceases 
to have effect. To be attacked upon its flanks is almost as dangerous 
as to be cut off, and against both of these contingencies the best pre- 
cautionary measure is accurate and extensive reconnaissance to the 
flanks. The parties sent out upon this duty should in all possible 
cases be composed of cavalry. 
Composition of 30. '" As regards the composition of the rear-guard, in an open 

the rear-guard. ^'=. ,,^ ,,*= ..^ 

country cavalry is certainly necessary, not only tor reconnoitring on 
the flanks, but also to meet the enemy's cavalry. But infantry is in- 
dispensable in more or less strength under all circumstances, in order 
to make a stand at suitable positions for defence, to form rallying 
points and protection for the cavalry if driven in, and to check the 
eager pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. If the force is of any magni- 
tude, its rear-guard should be com])osed of the three arms, in propor- 
tions suited to the ground that is to be passed over. Cavalry, to meet 
and ward off the enemy's cavalry, which in open ground can hover 
round the rear and flanks, artillery, to take up favorable positions in 
retreat to bear on the heads of pursuing columns, and infantry, to bear 
the brunt of the enemy's attack and retard his advance at the chosen 
points of resistance. If guns are used with skill in a retreat they can 
often save deployment of their own infantry, by obliging the enemy, 
as he presses on in pursuit, to halt and deploy; the guns retreating rap- 
idly as the enemy forms up. Artillery is thus of special value when 
added to a rear-guard. 
Manner of hand- 31. " As regards the action of the rear-guard generally, since the 
guard during'a great object which it has to effect is to keep back the enemy without 
compromising the safety or delaying the retreat of the main body, it 
is evident that its duties can be best performed, by frequently occupy- 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. GO 

ingsuch natural positions as the country may afford, forcing tlie enemy 
not only to deploy but even to attack, and then getting safely away 
without serious fighting. The great art of rear-guards is that of being 
constantly able, without risk, and with but little trouble, to force an 
enemy to deploy for attack, and then to get safely away yourself with- 
out serious fighting; in other words, the rear-guard should, by fre- 
quent occupation of strong positions, be continually threatening to 
fight, as it is by so doing, and not by actual conflict, that it best fulfils 
its purpose. 

"In a long retreat, when this course has been followed for a num- When it may turn 

. -, , T 1 . . on the enemy. 

ber of successive days, the general commanding the pursuit is apt to 
become reckless, and, neglecting to take all necessary precautions, 
may push on to attack with an insufficient force at hand, or in an 
irregular manner; it will then be for the rear-guard to pounce sudden- 
ly upon him, with all his available force, and having struck him a 
severe blow, at once resume the retreat. The officer commanding must 
not allow himself to be carried away by any partial success of this 
nature so as to forget his primary duty, for he should bear in mind 
that he cannot stop, except to retard the pursuit, and that every suc- 
ceeding quarter of an hour brings his enemy re-enforcements. The 
length of time that a rear-guard can remain with safety in a position 
dejiends on its intrinsic strength, and the obstacles in the way of an 
enemy's turning it. 

32. " In the details of conflict the knowledge which it has of the comparative ad- 

1 • i»i vantages of ad- 

ground is much to the advantage of the rear-guard, as it can decide vancedandrear- 

, . Ill TIT guard actions. 

what points to make a stand at, what to pass over as untenable. In 
this respect its position seems better than that of the advanced-guard 
in the forward march, but the apparent superiority is fleeting, for the 
conditions under which the rear-guard and advanced-guard fight are 
widely different. Tlie advanced-guard can push on with the confi- 
dence fairly engendered by knowing its supports to be approaching 
from the rear in any required force ; the rear-guard on the other hand, 
cannot but feel that the longer the conflict is protracted the farther it 
gets from its main body. The rear-guard, therefore, has to consider a 
danger w^hich does not exist for the advanced-guard, that of being cut 
off from its column should it remain too long in position and be suc- 
cessfully outflanked. If the rear-guard, however, can hold its ground 
long enough to cause the enemy first to reconnoitre, and tlien to form 
up for attack, its purpose and object as a delaying force will have 
been effected for the moment, and the commander, on his flanks being 
threatened, may well retire, again tooccupy a farther selected position, 
and again to retard the progress of his pursuers. In close country 



70 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



The case of an 
active pursuit 
suddenly termin- 
ated. 



Kear-gunrd of an 
army retiiinw by 
parallel roads. 



L>estruction (jf 
material, vil- 
lages, etc. 



"Wolseley on the 
qualities of a 
rear-guard com- 
mander. 



every check thus given to the enemy obliges him to incur a consider- 
able delay ; but the commander of the rear-guard must not forget that 
he may be pursued by a column marching on a road to his flank, in 
addition to that immediately behind him. This is perhaps the greatest 
of all dangers against which he has to guard. 

33. " If the pursuit of a rear-guard, which has been actively car- 
ried on by the enemy up to a certain point, suddenly appears to cease, 
the commander should send out strong cavalry patrols to ascertain the 
cause. The enemy, it will be found, has either stopped in his pursuit 
on the main route, or he has taken a different direction and is still ad- 
vancing. In the latter case active reconnaissance by cavalry patrols 
should immediately be undertaken by the rear-guard, the main col- 
umn being also advised of the route taken by the enemy, that it may 
send out Hanking detachments to feel for him. 

34. "An army retiring by more than one road, whose directions 
are generally parallel, would usually have a rear-guard upon each 
road under a separate commander, the rearmost groups being con- 
tinued across the whole rear, and flankers only upon the outer flanks 
of the outer columns. The whole of these rear-guards would be in- 
cluded in one high command. The army would thus retire in as many 
columns as might be necessary, connection being kept up between the 
different main columns, and also between those of the rear-guard%at 
every cross road, and wherever the country may allow of communica- 
tion. 

35. " No war material that could be useful to the enemy should be 
allowed in a retreat to fall into his hands. The rear-guard must des- 
troy it if it cannot be removed. If hardly pressed everything that 
could assist the enemy, such as standing corn and provisions, must be 
burnt, horses and wagons pressed and sent on to the main body. As 
an extreme measure, villages on the line of route must even be fired, 
if necessary to retard the pursuit." 

36. General Wolseley says : ''The great object to be attained is 
to retard the enemy, which, with a Avell disciplined army that has not 
yet engaged, is comparatively easy, but with a beaten and demoraliz- 
ed army, is the most trying of all operations. The officer command- 
ing such a rear-guard should be the best in the army; it may not be 
necessary that he should be so ru.se as the commander of an advanced- 
guard, but he must be one for whom danger has at least no horrors; 
he must posse.ss dogged determination, courage of the highest order, 
and untiring energy. Feeling the responsibility of his position, he must 
be at all times prepared to sacrifice himself and those under him to the 
necessity of the time, and for the safety of the army which he is pro- 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODEKN WAKFAKK. 71 

tecting. No man who has not had some experience of war can com- 
mand a rear-guard efficiently; without it he is apt to relinquish his " 
vantage ground too soon, or remain there too long — both serious errors, 
the last a fatal one." 

Ney's handling of the rear-guard during Napoleon's celebrated re- Xey after Mos- 
treat from Moscow may be studied to great advantage. He displayed ^"^^' 
in the highest degree all those qualities which usually distinguish suc- 
cessful rear-guard commanders, and to his personal exertions was due 
the safety of the handful of men which finally reached France. 

MARCJHES.'' 

37. Movements of troops from point to point are called marches. Defined. 
Marches are of two kinds. 1, Those made beyond striking dis- classified. 

tance of an enemy, called route marches. 2. Those made in the im- 
mediate vicinity of the enemy, called .sfrategical and tactical marches; 
the latter being in sight of the enemy. 

Marches of the second class are termed strategical because they are 
usually made in connection with some .strategical combination. 

38. In marches of the first class the comfort of the men is an object considerations to 
of the first importance, unless there is some urgent reason for rapid both classes of 
concentration, when every other consideration must give way to it. In 

the second case comfort must give way to security. In both cases the 
marches should be so conducted that the troops will arrive at their 
destination with as little fatigue as possible. Great care should con- 
sequently be exercised to see that the troops are not obliged to make 
any unnecessary movements. Particularly discouraging is a counter- 
march without any object accomplished, as when caused by false in- 
formation : it is fatigue endured without return. 

39. Success in war will depend in a great degree upon the manner Upon what suc- 
in which the marches are conducted. The general, who at a given pends. 
time, can have the greatest number of troops at a given point and in 

the best condition for fighting, is bound to be successful. 

General Wolseley says: " Let me see two armies on the march, and General Woise- 

TiT X 11 n*^ 1 • n -x • ^ f mi lev's opinion. 

1 believe 1 could tell you the respective fighting value oi each. The 
fitness of troops for the great final struggle, when they at last meet 
their enemy, must ever depend greatly upon the manner in which 
their marches have been arranged. Men overmarched, or whose health 
and comforts have not been duly attended to whilst on the march, can 
never be expected to go in at an enemy whose men have been well 
cared for by an able staff administration." 

40. One general principle should be followed in all marches, viz.. 



*The rules resulatins marches in the United States service will be found in the Revised 
Army Regulations of 1S81. 



72 PRINCIPLES OK THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

ciut"te\hemarc\i ^^^ li^ve as many columns as possible and marcli them upon the great- 
otaii army. • g^f possible front. This will be decided by the number and nature of 
the roads leading in the desired direction. The greater the distance 
from the enemy the more closely may the above rule be followed ; as 
the enemy is approached, the more nearly should the marching ap- 
proach the battle front. Several roads, sensibly parallel, and but a few 
miles apart, fulfil this condition most favorably. 
(Soady.) 41. The following general rules should be observed in all marches : 

(ieueral rule.-j 

regulating "1. The Several branches of the service should afibrd each other 

mutual protection, and their position on the line of march should de- 
pend on the nature of the country. 

"2. The order of march should be such, that by short, simple, and 
rapid movements, it can become the order of battle. 

" 3. That at no time, and under no pretext whatever, should the 
slightest deviation from the strictest discipline be permitted." 

March of an army 42. The march of an army corps over a single road is a very tedi- 

road^ "" ' "' ^ ous and fatiguing operation. The march of the several divisions 
should be so regulated that they will not interfere, and so the short de- 
lay of one will not affect the others. 

Case of an arniv Let US suppose the case of an armv corrjs of thirtv-five thousand 

corps of .35,()()(l , . . - - * , * 1 1 1 1 

men ou a- single men, marcliing on a single road, and see what sjDace would be taken 
up by it. The advanced-guard — consisting of a brigade of cavalry, 
four regiments of infantry, two batteries of horse artillery, a company 
of engineers, and a pontoon train — from the extreme front to the ex- 
treme rear, would cover about four miles of road; the main column 
about thirteen miles; the train four miles. Allowing an interval of one 
mile between ihe advanced-guard and the main column, and twenty 
per cent, for opening out on the march, and the corps will cover about 
tiventij-five miles of road. The rear-guard would have to make a forced 
march in order to reach the extreme head of the column in one day. 

General McClellan, referring to the disadvantages arising from the 
use of a single road for the march of a large army, says: 

General Mcciei- "If I had marched the entire armv (about one hundred thousand 

Ian on the Pen- . • ^ 

insula. men) in one column along tne banks of the river instead of upon five 

different parallel roads, the column with its trains would have extend- 
ed about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the advance 
before the rear could have reached the scene of action." 

Forced marches. 43, A march is said to be forced when it is longer than the ordinary 
marches, and is made for the attainment of some particular object. 
Forced marches are very fatiguing, and they should therefore be re- 
sorted to only in cases of urgent necessity, and then but few such 
marches should be made in succession. On the eve of a battle thev are 



AND THEIR Al PLICATION IN MODERN WAKFAI.'K. 7o 

frequently necessary in order to facilitate the concentration of troops. 
Especially will this be the case with the large armies of the present 
day, which cover a great extent of country while on the march. 

Depending upon the condition of the roads and weather, and the size Rate of marching 

. . .,, ... I I ,/• •! "* infaiitrv. 

oi the column, iniantry will march irom one to two and one half miles 
an hour. Allowing ten hours as the limit of the greatest ordinary 
march, and time for the necessary halts — which should be made for at 
least five or ten minutes each hour — infantry can march from ten to 
twenty miles a day. The latter distance will therefore be the longest 
ordinary march for troops of this branch of the service; a longer march 
than twenty miles will then be a forced march. 

Cavalry at a walk will usually march three miles an hour; moving Rate of marching 

• 1 ,. •! i-* i- 1 T-< 1 1 of cavalry. 

at a trot it can make Are miles lor a tew hours. J^orced marches, con- 
tinued for several days, are more severe for cavalry than for infantry. 

44. " When it is possible, cavalrv and horse artillerv should march (Woiseiev.) 

' _ • _ _ I ^ ( aval ry and horse 

bv a different road from the infantrv, as it is verv fatiguing to horses artiiieiy to march 

T« 1 • 1 'i 1 • on a different road 

to keep pace with men on foot. It this cannot be done, large intervals from the infan- 
should be allowed between the mounted and dismounted branches of 
the service when on the march. Unless the country is deep or very 
much cut up by canals, cavalry can generally make its way across the 
fields, having a detachment of mounted sappers with tools carried on 
pack-horses for the purpose of opening ways through and over ob- 
stacles." 

45. The pace at which the troops at the head of a long column Troops at tiie 
march is far from being a matter of indifference; it should be uniform march of the 
and slow. If the rate of marching of the head of the column is not ^^ ^ ^ ^^ "™"- 
uniform, the troops in rear will be unnecessarily fatigued, as they will 

be obliged to go alternately fast and slow in order to keep the proper 
distances. If the rate is too fast, the column will be drawn out and the 
number of stragglers greatly increased. 

46. Route marches become marches of concentration when made for Marches of con- 
the purpose of bringing different bodies of troops together at a speci- centration. 
fied place or places at a time fixed upon beforehand. 

47. Strategiad marches become marches oi manoeuvre when so made Marches of man- 
that they render untenable the position occupied by the enemy, fore- '®"^''^- 

ing him either to abandon it or to accept battle under adverse circum- 
stances. In this class of marches secrecy, celerity, and good order are 
the first essentials of success. 

The campaign of 1805 furnishes a most notable example of these campaign of isos. 
two classes of marches. At the opening of the campaign — Fig. 2 — 
Napoleon's army was distributed from the Texel to Brest along a front 
of about five hundred miles. By most admirably planned marches of 

10 



74 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

concentration, he brought the first and second corps — tliirty-seven thou- 
sand men — from Hanover and Holland to Wurtzbnrg, between Sep- 
tember 18th and 20th ; the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth corps and the 
reserve — one hundred and thirty-eight thousand men — from France to 
the Rhine, between Manheim and Strasburg, between September 21st 
and 24th. The seventh corps was to reach the Rhine at Strasburg 
after the others. With the corps in these positions the marches of 
concentration were completed. Each corps moved in three divisions on 
three consecutive days. The Austrians, at Ulm, expected Napoleon to 
make a front attack, by passing through the defiles of the Black 
Forest. Their grounds for this belief were based upon the operations 
of previous campaigns. But Napoleon's plan of campaign was entirely 
different from any that had previously been followed. The main body 
of the French force being on the right helped to fix AFack, the Austrian 
commander, in his error. 

Napoleon, making a strong demonstration in front of the Austrian 
position, pivoted on his right, and concentrated his entire force on the 
Danube, between Donauwerth and Ingolstadt, in the rear of Ulm, thus 
separating the Austrians from the Russians who were coming up the 
Danube to their relief. Ulm was thus rendered untenable and Mack 
was compelled to capitulate. 

The marches of the French army from the Rhine andAVurtzburg were 
marches of ?fta/Kr^uiTe, aidingby their direction a strategical combination. 
Flank march de- 48. A jlank march is one whose direction is parallel,- or nearly so, 
to the enemy's position. Such a march, when made in the immediate 
presence of the enemy, is usually a very delicate operation to success- 
fully accomplish, and should rarely be resorted to. 

As the distance from the enemy is increased the difficulties of a 
flank march diminish, and when they are made at a distance of several 
marches from him, with good protection for the exposed flank, they 
will not differ from ordinary marches. 
General Jack- One of the most brilliant examples of a successful flank march in 

h?"i8t;3?" ™'^'^^ the presence of the enemy, was that of the rebel general Stonewall 
Jackson, made during the battle of Chancellorsville, May 2d, 1863 
(Fig. 3). General Hooker determined to fight a defensive battle and 
strengthened his position for this purpose. General Lee, Hooker's 
opponent, finding a front attack on his position impracticable, sent 
(leneral Jackson with about twenty-two thousand men to attack 
Hooker's right and rear. The position of the Union forces is shown on 
Fig. 3, also the direction of Jackson's flank march. The column on 
the march was at no time more than two miles from the Union lines, 
but was concealed from them by intervening timber. It is said that 



fined. 



Wl e:i flank 
marcliRscan 
safelv be made 



AND THEiR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. i -) 

General Lee, previous to the biittle, had a road cut through the timber 
from Jackson's position to the Brock road, with a view of making this 
manoeuvre. 

The full effect expected from this flank movement was not realized, 
owing to the loss of Cieneral Jackson, who was mortally wounded and 
taken from the field just as he was about to follow up the advantage 
given by his new position in the line of battle. 

This march and the subsequent attat^k had, however, a decided in- 
fluence on the fight, and, in connection with other events, determined 
General Hooker to withdraw his forces across the Rappahannock river. 

The Union force controlled by General Hooker numbered about one 
hundred and twenty thousand men ; the Confederates had about fifty- 
five thousand men. 

49. Combined marches are those made for the purpose of attacking cotuhined 

. • ^ i.- ii ) '^' X ii i' ii marches defined. 

two or more ponits or the enemy k position at the same time; or, they 
may be undertaken in order to have several corps, marching from dif- 
ferent directions, reach a certain point at a fixed time. The nearer 
this point is to the enemy the more diflBcult will be the operation, 
owing to the opportunities offered of attacking the separated corps in 
detail. The.«e operations are open to the same objections as diversions, 
their object frequently being defeated by similar causes. 

50. Marches through obstructed country depend for success upon Marches in ..h- 
the manner in which they are conducted. The difficulties to be en- ''*'"^*'' countiy. 
countered by the advanced-guard will in this case be increased, and 

upon its efficiency will depend the safety of the army. Forests, streams 
and mountains will have to be crossed and defiles traversed. The dis- 
positions to be made for the accomplishment of these objects will de- 
pend upon the circumstances in each particular case ; whether the 
enemy is present in strength, is strongly posted, and the opposition that 
he will probably make. Tt is the province of the advanced-guard to 
develop all these facts, so that suitable arrangements may at all times 
be made by the commanding general. 

The general rule is not to compromise the safety of any considerable Euie to be ob- 
body of troops in such positions, and therefore they should not be en- of this nature. 
tered until the country has been thoroughly scouted in every direction. 
Each division should act as a support to the one that precedes, and 
the march should not be resumed until all the troops have traversed 
the dangerous zone. 

51. The safety of the trains pertaining to an army on the march is Manner of march- 

• J J.' J! j^j 11 , • . X e \ ^ ^1 ing the trains of 

a consideration oi the first importance. In a forward movement they an army, 
follow the columns of march, and if the flanks of the array are protect- 
ed they may follow either indifferently, or both. lender other circum- 



re 



PRINCIPI.KS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Night marches. 



(Wolsc-ley.) 
Orders for a 



(Home.) 
Success depends 
upon the 
marches. 



Marches an im- 
portant branch o 
the science of 
war. 



Modern weapor.n 
niodity marches. 



stances they should follow the flank which affords the best protection, 
otherwise they should be placed in rear of the centre. On a retreat 
the trains will be in advance of the army. 

52. Night marches with large forces are very difficult operations for 
obvious reasons. They are, however, a necessity in certain cases, as on 
the retreat in order to gain a march on the enemy, when making diver- 
sions, etc. 

53. "In moving an army it is desirable, if possible, that only one 
division should march by each road. The largest unit that can at all 
conveniently march by one road in a continuous column is an army 
corps; but its pace will be very slow, and great fatigue will be entail- 
ed upon men and horses. Orders for a march should contain : 

"1st. General direction and object of the march. 

"2nd. Date, hour, and order of the march, and the roads to be fol- 
lowed by each division, etc., etc. 

"3rd. Formation of advanced- or rear-guards, and special instruc- 
tions for flanking parties and detachments of all sorts. 

"4th. Instructions for field hospitals, reserve ammunition, engi- 
neers, pontoons, and military portion of the train generally. 

" 5th. Instructions for supply of troops and orders for baggage and 
provision columns. 

" 6th. Position of general on the march, and of headquarters for the 
night." 

54. " It is quite evident that as the success of strategy is mainly de- 
pendent on accurate calculation of the powers of marching, the mo.st 
brilliant conceptions, and the most profound combinations, must fail 
if the troops do not move over the distances calculated on, and do not 
occupy the prescribed relative positions to each other. 

"Similarly, when the head of a column is attacked, the most skil- 
ful tactics will not help it, if the artillery, cavalry or infantry that are 
required for any particular action cannot be found, if the roads are 
blocked, and re-enforcements cannot be brought up, or ammunition be 
got at; consequently the art of marcliing forms a most important por- 
tion of the science of war. 

"The increased power of weapons enables a small body of men, who 
know they will be supported, to hold a position longer than formerly, 
this enables an advanced-guard to check an enemy, compel him to de- 
ploy, and bring up his artillery before he can make an impression ; con- 
sequently the distance apart of columns on the march, or the front of an 
army moving in proximity to an enemy, may now be enlarged to an ex- 
tent that formerly would have been unsafe. It is a matter of no little im- 
portance as affecting ra|iidity of marching and punctuality of supply." 



, • , (/(rc-yit/ 



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AND THKIR APrLIOATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 



CHAPTEK VII. 

OUTPOSTS AND POSITIONS. 
OUTPOSTS.* 

1. Outposts are tn)ops arranged for the purpose of protecting an army Defined. 
in position. 

Their functions are to hold an attacking enemy in check until the Functions of out- 
array is prepared for action and is ready to receive him; to enable the ^"* ^' 
army to rest by securing it from surprise by tlie enemy; and to pre- 
vent the enemy's reconnoitrii.g parties from approaching sufficiently 
near the position of the army to gain any information concerning it. 

'* Armies in actttal presence of each other form order of battle, and (Hamiey.) 
in this case outposts cease their function. Armies at a distance from 
each other, when the nature of the country and tlieir means admit of 
it, cover their front and flanks with cavalry, one or two or more 
marches in advance ; and in this cavse, since these troops would give 
notice of the enemv's movements and time for preparation, the other when functions 

f f y of outposts are 

outposts behind these would, for the moment, find their uses limited i'n»"ted. 
to preventing the passage of deserters on the one side, spies on the 
other, and to giving protection from sudden raids of parties of the 
enemy which might break through the cavalry cordon. 

"It is when the cavalry lir.e does not exist, or has been withdrawn, case of armies 

1 ., -11 . • 1 • •! • !• 1 within striking 

while armies, though not in presence, are within striking distance, that distance of eacli 
outposts assume their full value. The withdrawal of the cavalry may 
follow either from the force of that arm on one side being overmatch- 
ed, or because one army awaits the other in position. In this last case, 
when the opposing lines of cavalry covering their respective armies 
come into collision, the cavalry of the army which takes position, even 
thougli for the moment victorious, must in the end give way; because 
the advancing army will push on troops of all arms, while the station- 
ary army cannot do so, seeing it intends to fight elsewhere, and cav- 
alry alone cannot oppose a combination of arms. The army in posi- 
tion, therefore, places its outposts, and its cavalry retires through 
them. The enemy's cavalry is ch^^cked by the outposts. The enemy 



*^ee Uiiitffl Stales Army lU^yulaliuns, 18.><l 



/» PRINCIPl.ES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

thereupon either proceeds at once to reconnoitre and attack tlie 
position, or himself takes position, covered bv A/.s outposts, with the 
intention of attacking next day, or at a more convenient time, or of 
manoeuvring. * * * 
Theii tiuefunc- " To observe his (the enemy's) approach from a distance, and to 
recognize, if possible, its true character; to'resist up to a certain prac- 
ticable point, and then fall back in concert and good order, continuing 
to retard the enemy, — such are the functions which are demanded from 
a line of posts extending across valleys and over ridges, sometimes in 
wooded ground, sometimes in enclosures, sometimes in an open coun- 
try, sometimes along a front the issues of which are close defiles — each 
variety of the conditions calling for an appropriate disposition ; while 
the whole attenuated line, which thus opposes itself to the onset of an 
army, is to maintain concentrated action tliroughout." ""•• "■•■ "■•■ 
Outpost duties 2. The arrangement of the diflferent component parts of the out- 

of"ad'vaiH-ei-"'*^ posts is similar to that of the advanced-guard, and their duties have 
""'^^ ■ much the same character, differing, however, essentially in matters of 

detail and mode of execution. 

Combined action lu order to perform these duties properly, efficiently, and with the 

cavaiiT I'e^es'- minimum amount of fatigue, the combined action of the two arms, in- 

**'^' fantry and cavalry, is absolutely necessary. The infantry is required 

to resist the enemy's advance, and the cavalry to watch him, obtain 

information of his movements, and to promptly transmit the knowledge 

gained to the rear. 

Relative propor- The relative proportion of these two arms in anv case will be de- 

tions of the two • i i • ■• • i • i i ' • • tj- 

arms regulated tcrmined by the nature oi country in ^hich the army is operating, it 

bs' the nature of, '-iii i' i i *ii ii 

the country. the country IS level and open the cavalry can be employed to the best 
advantage, and it would therefore be largely used, especially during 
the day, but at night it should be replaced by infantry as far as prac- 
ticable. In a rough, close, or broken country infantry would be prin- 
cipally employed at all times. 

The two arms Infautrv and cavalrv on this dutv should never be placed together 

should not be . , ' ,. ' . , % , . , 11 1 . 

placed in the in the same line, on account of tlie danger which would result from a 
flank attack on the former, rendered possible by the latter being forced 
back from its position. 

Advanced-guard 3. Owing to the similarity of the two duties — advanced-guard 

and outpost^ • • i • i i 'i • i 

should he simii- and outpost — it IS desirable that the names of the com[)onent parts 

arlv constituted. i i i i- • i i i i i- it • ^ 

should as tar as practicable be the same tor each. In many instances, 
after the day's march is finished, the advanced-guard, when not too 
much fatigued, is also required to perform the duties of outposts, in 
which case very little change would be necessary in its formation in 
order to adapt it to its new service. 



AND THKIIl APIM.ICATION IX MOHKItN WARKARE. 71) 

4. There are two systems of ()uti)()sts, viz., iha cordmi system and Two systems of 
the patrol system. In the first system a line of sentinels is so arranged 

that the enemy, either singly or in parties, cannot by any possibility 
pass it; in the second case constant patrols are made, which are expect- 
ed to detect parties of the enemy attempting to pass, without calcula- 
ting to entirely bar the way to individuals. 

When the weather is clear and the country comparatively open, Merits of i lie two 
the cordon system is very effective, but in a very broken country, or " 
when the weather is stormy or foggy, the large number of men requir- 
ed to properly perform the service makes the duty very arduous.. The 
patrol system under these circumstances would probably be preferred, 
sentinels being placed on all the avenues of a])proach, and a thorough 
system of patrols being employed to prevent the enemy from penetra- 
ting the lines. Under all conditions of country and weather, a com- 
bination embracing the best qualities of each system might be devised. 

5. To illustrate the manner of arrangii g ar.d placing outposts, let case of nn army 

,, , I - I -x- • i! • 1 corps in position. 

US suppose that an army corps has taken position m fairly t)pen 
ground, and the necessary arrangements are to be provided for its 
security. For this purpose the troops detailed for outpost duty will 
be posted in four lines, as follows: 1. Sentinels. 2. Pickets. 3. Supi;orts. 
4. Reserve. 

6. Seiitineh. "Each picket furnishes a chain of double s^'w/mc/.s to (Siiaw.) 

, , • r- I • 1 1 • 1 1 • Sent.nels, tlieir 

watch the country in trout, and to connect with the neighboring posts and duties. 
pickets. No more posts should be established than are absolutely 
necessary. In fairly open ground by day they may be from two hun- 
dred to four hundred yard-! apart for infantry, and up to six hundred 
yards for cavalry mounted sentries called vedettes. Sentries should not 
be more than four hundred yards in advance of their pickets. Vedettes 
may be as far as six hundred yards from their pickets. ■•■ ^ '■■' 

Sentries or vedettes should have clearly in view the men of the posts 
on each side of them, and no ground in front of two adjoining posts 
should be unseen by the sentries of both posts. * * * 

"At night, sentries should be placed so as, if possible, to bring any Sentries at night. 
advancing person against the skyline, they themselves remaining in 
shadow; but as it is impossible to continue the cordon system with 
strict effect at night, sentries would in general be only placed on the 
roads, and other lines of approach. Vedettes would be withdrawn 
altogether at night, unless there were no infantry available, in which 
case they would be placed on the roads or passages through which an 
enemy is most likely to advance." 

7. Pickets. " The strength of a picket will be determined by the num- pickets, their 
ber of posts for which it furnishes sentries or vedettes, in addition to niuuber. 



80 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

the men required for detached posts, and for patrolling duties. Tlie 
picket acts as a support, or sort of anchor, to the sentries, vedettes, or 
detached parties which it furnishes. It is therefore posted in their 

Where posted. rear, if possible centrally, and on a main route or thoroughfare. A 
mounted orderly or two should be attached to an infantry picket. 
Patrolling duties must always be allowed for, the number of men re- 
quired being determined by the commander of the outposts according 
to circumstances; with cavalry pickets the proportion would generally 
require to be large, about one-fourth to one-third of the whole picket. 
Detached parties are of a strength proportioned to the duty upon 
which they are sent, * * 

Distances. ''From two to four double sentries are quite sufficient for an in- 

fantry picket to furnish, and two to three double vedettes for a cav- 
alry picket. It follows that the infantry picket would observe from 
six hundred to eight hundred yards of front, whilst the cavalry picket 
would watch a front of one thousand to one thousand live hundred 
yards. The pickets themselves may be from four hundred to eight 
hundred yards from their supports in the case of infantry, and from 
one thousand two hundred to two thousand yards in the case of cav- 
alry. Infantry pickets would thus be from six hundred to eight hun- 
dred yards from one another, whilst cavalry pickets would be from one 
thousand to one thousand six hundred yards apart. 

Distance approxi- "These figures are of course purelv approximate, as the nature of 

mate only. , i , , • * . ^ nn , ^^ 

the ground and other circumstar.ces must immensely aitect the dispo- 
sitions in any particular case; in a perfectly open country, in clear 
weather, for instance, the distances and intervals would no doubt be 
much increased. The principles, however, by which they should be 

Position. calculated are simple, and ought to be borne in mind. The pickets, 

whilst being placed centrally as regards their sentries, should be close 
enough to aid and support one another in retreat, an efficient flanking 
fire being mutually provided for in the case of infantry. They should 
not be too close in front of their supports, as the latter might in such 
case be demoralized by the pickets being suddenly driven in upon them, 
nor, on the other hand, too far distant to prevent the sui)ports from ad- 
vancing in time, to aid the pickets when hardly pressed. 

strenj^th of each "From twentv-five to fifty men for infantry, and from twenty to 
thirty for cavalr}', are generally sufficient for ordinary pickets. Where 
large detached parties are furnished by a picket, its strengtii must be 
proportionately increased. 

Favorable ground "A picket should be. if possible, posted on the route bv which the 

tor CHVfilrv. ■ t i • 

enemy will probably advance, and a cavalry picket sliould have 
ground in advance of its position favorable for action, in case it may 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 81 

be necessary to take the offensive in order to check the eneniy. The 
position of the picket ought to be so far concealed that the enemy can 
only discover it by attacking ; but there must be free movements in all 
directions, and especially easy means of communication, both with the 
flanking pickets and with the supports in rear, 

"In all cooking, eating, feeding, and watering arrangements, two- 
thirds of a picket of either arm must always be ready for immediate 
action, and none of the men should stroll at a distance from the 
arms." * * * 

8. Supports. " The line of resistance — that is, the line where the Supports, their 

• . . , . . , positions. 

first important stand is to be made — having been decided upon in the 
first instance, the supports are placed at convenient positions thereon, 
as centrally as possible to their own group of pickets in front, and 
close to or on the main avenues of approach. 

"Supports should be of a strength equal to all in front of them, and strength. 
one support to every two or three pickets will be sufficient. 

" The strictness of routine laid down for the pickets may be some- Precautions. 
what relaxed in the case of the supports ; but they must be always 
ready to march, day or night, at a moment's notice, to any point re- 
quired, or to stand on the defensive." 

9. Meserve. "The reserve is intended as a general support to the Keserve, its office 

, ^ ' *^ . and strength. 

lines of pickets and supports. It consists generally of from one-third to 
one-half oi the whole strength of the outpost. This leaves, for the sup- 
ports and pickets, either two-thirds or one-kdfihe whole. The subdivis- 
ion, therefore, in the one case, would be, for the reserve one-third, for 
the support one-third, for the pickets one-third] in the other case, for the 
reserve one-half, for the support one-fourth, for the pickets one-fourth, of 
the whole strength. 

"The reserve ought to be placed out of sight of the enemy, occasion- Position. 
ally divided into two parts, on a principal route or routes of retreat to 
the main body. 

" Its functions are to move to the re-enforcement of the supports if Functions. 
necessary, or to occupy a good defensive position for the troops to fall 
back upon if required. 

"The distance from the line of supports must varv considerablv ac- Distance from 

J- • 11 1 'i t' supports. 

cording to circumstances, but would range under the more ordinary 
conditions from five hundred yards to one tliousand yards for infantry 
and from one thousand two hundred to two thousand yards for cavalry. 
"The reserve may bivouac, rest, cook, eat, and smoke, but should 
always be ready to act at the shortest notice." 

10. Fig. 1 represents the outposts arranged in accordance with the Diagram. 
foregoing principles. 

11 



82 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Distanc*- of the 11. Di<tancz of the oufposts from the army. "When the enemv is able 

outposts depe ids , , • , . .,, . . , , , . i '■■ , 

upon the range of to bring his artillery into action the attack may be considered to have 
commenced. As it is the duty of the supports to hold the enemy in 
check until the army is ready to receive him, it follows that they must 
be placed beyond efiective artillery range of the position, which may 
be taken as two thousand five hundred yards. The line of sentinels 
would then be from three thousand three hundred to three thousand 
seven hundred yards in the case of infantry, and from four thousand 
■ three hundred to five thousand one hundred yards in the case of cav- 
alry, in advance of the main body. No rule can be determined which 
will regulate these distances for all occasions and under all conditions. 
The distances in all cases will also depend upon the nature of the coun- 
try, the objects to be attained by the outposts, and other peculiar cir- 
cumstances always attending each particular case. 
(Shaw.) 12. The outposts at night. ''Changes in the po.sition of a portion of 

raiigefnents'made the outpost line will usually becomc necessary at night. They should 

'^' "'^ ^'" be carefully arranged before dark, and put into execution just as the 

light is failing so as not to be observed by the enemy. Bridges, main 
routes, and obligatory points (^f passage should be occupied by the 
pickets, the supports bsing pushed close up to them. Advanced sen- 

ciose country. tries being of little use during the dark hours, except on the roads, 
footpaths, and other avenues of approach, the number of double sen- 
tries in a close country can usually be reduced at night. If extra men 
are thus set free they should be employed on patrol duty, which must 
be more frequent in front of the line as the double sentries are fewer in 

opei country. number. On the other hand, in a c )mparatively open country, the 
number of approaches to be watched may even exceed the number of 
day posts. Here there would be no saving of sentries, but the patrol- 
ling would probably not require to be so incessant. In order to make 
these dispositions it may become necessary to contract the outpo.st 
line, but in such case the original posts would be resumed on the ap- 
proach of daybreak. This should, however, be effected with as much 
care and preliminary examination of the ground as at the previous oc- 
cupation. 

Mixed force, dis- "With a mixed force cavalry would usually be withdrawn from the 

cavair" " **^ front at night. This would be especially the case in a difficult or en- 
closed country. But should it ba necessary to retain them during the 
night on account of the absence of infantry to replace them, they must 
undergo a thorough change of position. The posts with wide extend- 
ed view suitable for the cavalry vedette by day are valueless at night, 
and stationary mounted men can only watch roads or defiles after 
dark. 



AND THEIR APri.ICATION IN MODKKN WAKI-AKE. 83 

" Cavalry pickets which liave been in open ground during tlie day Pickets. 
must now be placed on the roads, where they can have free movement 
from front to rear, double vedettes being immediately in front of the 
pickets advanced a short distance up each approach. Principal re- 
liance must be placed upon the watchfulness of the patrols, which are 
kept constantly in motion during the night. The enemy can only him- 
self move in any force upon the roads; and if these are vigilantly 
w^atched and examined for some distance to the front during the dark 
hours, a certain amount of security against surprise is thereby ob- 
tained." 

13. Patvobi. "Patrols from the outposts are of three kinds : (Simw.) 

" 1. Visiting patrols. ( lassitied. 

"2. Reconnoitring patrols. 

*'3. Strong patrols. 

" Vmtinq patrols consist of an officer, or a non-commissioned officer, Visiting patrols 
and one or two men. They are sent oat from each picket between 
reliefs, and their duties consist in keeping up the communication be- Duties. 
tween the picket and its neighboring pickets, as well as with its sup- 
port in rear, and with its detached parties in advance. ■■■ * 

"Visiting patrols are especially necessary in a close country and in 
bad weather. In an open country, with clear weather, they may be 
much less often sent out during the day. 

'^ Heconnoitring patrol^are sent forward a limited distance, not exceed- Functions of re- 

1 ij- •-, ., J. . . . , . connoitring pa- 

ing from halt a mile to a mile tor intantry, in advance, to examine trois. 
ground which cannot be watched by the sentries, and to give notice of 
the enemy's approach. They commonly consist of an officer or non- 
commissioned officer, and two to four men. Cavalry ma^-^ be safely des- 
patched to a much greater distance than infantry. The Germans and 
French call the smaller of these patrols by names which signify crawl- 
ing or creeping in the case of infantry, and secrecy in the case of cav- 
alry. * ••'" * 

^^ Strong patrols are of the same character as the last, but of larger strength and 

.. 1 ., Tc !■ Ill duties of Strong 

lorce and not necessarily secret. If of greater strength than a dozen patrols. 
men they would be furnished from the supports or reserve. Sometimes 
a company or troop, or even a larger body, would be despatched on 
such duty. They should not proceed farther than about a mile for in- 
fantry, from the line of sentries, and even then with mounted orderlies 
attached, for the purpose of conveving information rapidly to the rear. 
The object of strong patrols would generally be to obtain early infor- 
mation of the enemy's movements when he is at a distance, to ward off 
his patrols, and to prevent surprise; sometimes to engage a post, in 



84 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OP^ WAR 

order to ascertain the enemy's strength, tlius acting on the offensive. 

Firing to be Above all things, strong patrols should avoid unnecessary firing. 

Firing signifies, to those in rear, that the patrol has not only seen the 
enemy, but that the enemy has seen the patrol, and is advancing. An 
incessant fire, kept up in retiring, intimates that the enemy is in force 
and pressing the pursuit, but this signal should be abstained from un- 
less it is necessary to arouse the. troops in rear ; the outpost line must 
be most careful not to occasion false alarms, which are hurtful to the 
morale of the army. 

Rule for retiring. " As a general rule, it would be best to retire steadily, if possible un- 
perceived, as soon as the enemy is touched upon; but sometimes, if 
opportunity serves, a prisoner or two may be captured, in order to ob- 
tain information." 

Position ^oVarti I- ^^' "Artillery with outposts. ''Artillery, if added, would usually be 

^^^'^- with the reserve, when the guns should be posted so as to cover the re- 

treat of the advanced portion of the outposts, or else be held in readi- 
ness close to a main route to proceed at once to any required point as 
the attack of the enemy develops itself. Guns are, however, occasion- 
ally more to the front, when, without unduly risking their safety, they 
can be placed so as to command ground which must be passed by the 
enemy^- in his advance. The enemy may thus be forced to lose time 
by deploying when still at a considerable distance. The guns posted 
near the front line should be safe from surprise, and either out of 
range of the enemy's effective rifle fire, or protected from it by skir- 
mishers thrown out in advance of the guns. With proper precautions 
an artillery outpost may often be placed in an advanced position, prob- 
ably on a flank, where, being well covered by the guns of the main 
body, it need not retire until it has accomplished its object, supporting 
the infantry as they fall back from point to point. For this and other 
purposes of delaying the enemy, however, advanced guns mu.st avoid 
taking position within artillery range of ground which the enemy's 

Horse-artillery, batteries could reach and take post on unperceived. Horse-artillery 
acting with cavalry may sometimes, if well supported, be pushed still 
farther to the front, for the purpose of making the enemy develop his 
attack early in the day." 

Extent of out- 15. The chain of outposts should cover not only the front of an 

^°^ *■ army, but should also extend well around the flanks, in order to guard 

every avenue by which the enemy might by any possibility approach. 

Useofabattis, etc. When the army remains in one place for any length of time it is ad- 
visable to strengthen the outposts by means of abattis, slashings, etc. 



AND THEIR ATPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 85 

All the heights from wiiich the enemy could obtain a commanding ((ninnaiidiiig 
view of the country in the vicinity of the army should be included <iucied\vithin the 
within the chain of outposts, and if this is not practicable, then should '"^ ^ °" "^"^ *" 
such heights be occupied by detached bodies of troops to prevent the 
enemy from making use of them for the purpose of reconnoitring. 

IG. When an armv has to withdraw at night from the presence of withdrawal of an 

lumy at night. 

the enemy it becomes an object to conceal the movement as long as 
possible, and for this purpose the outposts are usually left in position 
until daylight. Under these circumstances the sentinels should be par- 
ticularly on the alert, and patrols should frequently be made to pre- 
vent spies or deserters from giving the enemy information of the move- 
ment. The troops should constantly be prepared for an attack, which 
would certainly follow should the departure of the army be discover- 
ed. It also becomes a part of the duty of the outposts to keep the fires 
burning as usual so that the suspicions of the enemy may not be 
aroused. 

17. Manner of Bostinq the ou/po.s^s- of an army. "The commander (Phaw.) 

J r J f J ^ , rv. 1 1 1 I^'"^ of resistance 

having been informed of the general object to be eftected by the out- first determined. 
posts, and the extent of ground to be covered, determines how far the 
line of resistance should be in front of the army. Even in the absence 
of a personal inspection of the ground he can decide this approximate- 
ly by reference to his map, and by knowing the time necessary for the 
main force to prepare for action. A line of observation in advance of i'i»e of observa- 
the line of resistance would next be looked for on the map, a ridge of 
hills, the bank of a river, or some marked features of ground being 
usually selected. Should the force be a strong one, the position for Position of the 
the reserve, in rear of the line of resistance or supports, would then be 
chosen, and the officers in command of the supports would be shown the 
general dispositions thus arranged. The strength and composition of 
the reserve would also be determined, and the supports marched off in 
the general direction of the ground they are to occupy. The number Supports. 
of the supports would depend chiefly upon the number of main ap- 
proaches to be watched, and each support would be strong enough to 
furnish the pickets necessary to guard its own front. The reserve 
would be finally marched by the commander of the outposts to the 
spot selected. Both the supports and the reserve would advance 
with great caution, preceded by scouts. 

"The commanders of the supports, having proceeded a sufficient dis- Placing the sup- 

. . , . J J ports. 

tance to the front, would select positions for their supports, and send 
forward therefrom the pickets intended to cover the front. 

" The commanders of the pickets would advance to their ground with placing the pick- 
still greater care, the enemy being possibly close at hand. Having 



ets. 



86 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIE>X'E OF WAR 

halted their pickets, in rear of the line of observation, they post their 
line of sentries, tentatively at first, with a view to cover the front rap- 
idly and establish communication at once from one flank to another of 
the line. ' The line itself can be altered or corrected subsequently by 
the commander of the outposts, if it be necessary, and the picket com- 
manders should then conform thereto and make final corrections of the 
position of their sentries. It is laid down that the whole of the out- 
posts should remain near their arms on the alert until the arrange- 
ments are completed." 
(Swinton.| 18^ The rout suffered by the Union forces early in the morning of 

Battle near A\ in- -' , 

Chester, Va., in October 19th, 1864, in the Shenandoah vallev, near Winchester, was 

]8t")4. ' ' . " , 

caused by the careless manner in which the outpost duty was perform- 
formed. The Confederates succeeded in moving a force around the 
left flank of the Union army, and also in massing a strong column for 
a direct attack on the left flank. This manoeuvre could not have been 
performed with a good system of cavalry patrols pushed well out be- 
yond the front and flanks of the position occupied by the Union forces. 
Such a disposition was possible, owing to the large cavalry force 
present with the army. The Confederates on this occasion gained 
some portions of the Union camp before the men were awakened. 

POSITIONS. 
Defined. 19. The ground occupied by an army when it is prepared to make 

or receive an attack, is termed a })Osifio7i. 
Qualifications re- An officer, to be able to select a suitable position for an army, 
ing a position .'^ should know the distances taken up by troops in order of battle; the 
tactical combinations of the different arms, and their placing for 
mutual support to derive the greatest advantages from their respective 
action in battle, the qualifications of each for the defensive and offen- 
sive, and the nature of the ground best adapted to their manoeuvres. 
All ground in the In Selecting a position for an army, regard must be had not only to 
studied. the ground in the immediate vicinity of the field of battle, but also to 

the nature of the surrounding country in its relation to the position to 
be chosen ; whether the latter lends itself in evejy respect to advantage 
to the particular ground in question. 

20. The following are the principal points to be held in view in 
selecting a position : 
Manner of deter- Ist. Extent. This should be in proportion to the number of troops in 

miningthe extent i j ^ .^ • i j- ^' i_ • i ^ 

ofa position. hand to occupy It; its general direction being such as to present an un- 
broken front throughout, from which a strong direct fire may be brought 
to bear upon all the approaches leading to it. If too extended, weak 
points will have to be left in the line ; if too contracted, all the troops 
available cannot be placed to bring their fire to bear on the enemy 



AND THEIR AlTlJCATloN IN .-MODKRN WARFARK. 8/ 

An allowance of one thousand yards for every five thousand to six 
thousand men of all arms will generally be made. This provides for 
two lines and a reserve. Cavalry in line requires one yard to each 
file, infantry two feet, and artillery from eighty to one hundred and 
ten yards for each battery of six pieces, depending upon the intervals. 

Every position should have a depth of at least five hundred to one Depth. 
thousand yards, to permit the free movements of troops of all arms. 
No position should be taken up which does not present ample means Means of retreat. 
for retreat, allowing the troops to be marched off' the field without con- 
fusion from crowding. 

2nd. Coiiimunications. (iood communications should exist through- Necessity for good 

. . coniimiiiicatioiis. 

out the whole extent of the position, permitting the troops to move 
freely from point to point to re-enforce the line where necessary; good 
debouches to the front, to allow the offensive to be promptly assumed; 
good roads leading to the rear, to facilitate the safe withdrawal of the 
troops in case of disaster. 

As a passive defence will never lead to any decisive results, a posi- An active defence 

should be provid- 

tion should always present every facility necessary for the army to edfor. 
assume the offensive at any favorable period of the battle. 

3rd. Good command over the ground bv which the enemv must ap- command over 

, , . ,. ^ T. ",. ,,..,.'. , , the guard and 

proach, thus providing tor a strong direct nre, and facilitating shelter shelter essential. 
for the troops, which, if not afforded by the natural features of the 
ground, should be supplied by the construction of the best protections 
possible under the circumstances. 

4th. There should be natural obstructions along the front of the obstacles assist 
position within effective rifle range, as a marsh or a stream. These serve 
to break the enemy's line and delay him in his advance at a time when 
the most damage may be inflicted. If these obstacles do not exist, the 
weak points of the line should be strengthened by abattis, slashed tim- 
ber, entanglements, etc. 

The obstacles should not, however, be of a nature to afford vshelter to Obstacles should 
the enemy, but simply cause a delay in his advance. A pond, marsh, enemy, 
or a narrow deep stream, are good examples of what is most favorable 
to fulfil this condition. 

An obstruction parallel to the front and between one hundred and obstructions par- 
three hundred yards from it, is very favorable and adds to the strength 
of a position, provided always that it does not afford shelter to the 
enemy's troops. 

Any position with obstacles perpendicular to the front, as hills, obstacles perpen- 
wooded ground, etc., should be avoided, as they afford shelter for the front. 
enemy and conceal his movements. If, however, these obstructions 
cease some distance in advance of the line, thev are not so unfavorable. 



88 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Position along a A Dosition alono^ a small stream flowinor into the sea or a large 

stream. . ^ ' . . ,r ,• ^ 

river, would be a aesirable one, as it presents the features of an obstruc- 
tion in the front, and at the same time a strong support for one 
flank. 
The flanks to be 5th. Strong on the flanks. This point is particularly important at the 

well supported. . .,,. , ." i-n 

present time, as, with the improved weapons, a front attack will not 

offer many chances of success without severe losses. Measures must 

then be taken to turn a flank and thus render the po.sition untenable, 

at the same time having a strong force in front to prevent the enemy 

from re-enforcing the flank attacked, or extending his line to meet the 

turning movement. 

When there are If the flauks do iiot rcst ou some natural obstacles, as a village, ex- 

stacies on the tended marsh, an unfordable river, etc., they must be strengthened by 

*°^' all the means at hand, as fortifications, accumulations of troops, etc. 

Commanding The flanks should not be commanded by any ground in the vicinity, 

ia'i'ik". °^ nor should there be facilities of any kind in the neighborhood which 

would allow th,e enemy to approach unseen. 
i,ocation should 6th. The location should be health v, and the requisite wood and 

te healthy. . i u i i j j " x 

water should be near at hand and easy of access. 

On conditions 2 7th. Conditions two and four cannot be satisfied at one and the same 
time. In case an active defence is intended, condition two will govern, 
in order to have good debouches by which to fall upon the enemy at 
the proper time. For a passive defence, which is generally imposed 
when the forces are much inferior to tlie enemy in numbers or discip- 
line, the third condition should be fulfilled. 

Concave and con- 21. In a defensive position, if tlie flanks are well protected, the con- 
cave front is the strongest ; for the enemy while moving forward to the 
attack exposes both his flanks to a strong fire of artillery posted at the 
extremities of the line. If, lioAvever, the flanks are not strong natural- 
ly, or are liable to be turned, a convex front is desirable; for it gives 
short lines of communications, allowing supports to be moved quickly 
to either wing when threatened. 

The general case will be a combination of the two above-mentioned, 
presenting alternately salients, re-entering angles and straight lines 
joining them. 

22. Depositions in a defensive position. Having selected a position in 
accordance with the foregoing principles, it now becomes the question 
to place the different arms in the most advantageous manner for de- 
fending it. 

Arrangement of For this purposc there should be an unbroken line of troops through- 

p'osifion? '^ out the wholc extent of the position, the different arms being posted on 
the ground best adapted for their mode of action, for mutual support, 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 89 

and in such a manner that the free movements ot" each will not be in- 
terfered with. 

The infantry will be placed along the whole line, as it is upon its tii<^ inirtrvtiy. 
fire that the main reliance is placed for holding the position. 

At those points, at intervals along the line, which are most favor- The aiUUeiy. 
able for its action, the artillery will be placed. The points selected 
for this arm will be those from which a good command over the enemy's 
approaeilmay be had ; from which the roads leading to the position, and 
over which the enemy must advance, may be swept, and from which a 
strong direct and cross fire may be brought upon the enemy as he ad- 
vances to the attack. 

The salient points of the position would naturallv be selected for the saiieiu points 

• 1 I'll" chosen. 

artillery: for a greater range is thus obtainable. 

The artillery having once been placed in position, it should not be shmiid not 
changed, except when absolutely necessary: for when limbered up for uon.'"' 
this purpose, it is out of action and useless. 

The artillerv should be concentrated as much as possible, without, should be con- 

/ li-' • ii'ii.i oentiated. 

how'ever, risking too great a number oi pieces m any place liable to be 
carried by the enemy. 

The fire of the artillerv should be mainly directed against the Directed against 

. , . ' the infantry. 

enemy s infantry as it advances to the attack. 

The main body of the cavalry will be placed on the flanks, where, cavahy. 
besides the good defensive qualities it developes when dismounted and 
used as infantry, it can, from its celerity of movement, best watch 
these weak points, gaining and conveying information of the enemy's 
efforts to turn them. 

23. Particular care should be taken not to post troops on any point care to be exer- 
from which they cannot reach the enemy with their fire, and from the troops. 
which they cannot move to the assistance of the troops at other points. 
Nor should troops be placed in advance of the general line where they 
might be liable to be cut off by the enemy, without providing for their 
safe retreat by holding with a strong force all the roads leading to the 
position. 

To illustrate the dangers almost certain to result from an improper (Jettysburg. 
arrangement of troops in position, reference is made to the battle-field 
of Gettysburg (Fig. 2). 

''The result of the Confederate reconnaissances was to fix upon the „ (Swinton.) 

^ Point of attack. 

ground opposite Longstreet — that is, the left and left centre held by 
Sickles' corps — as the most practicable point of attack. ^ ■'• '•• 
In the original ordainment of the line of battle. Sickles' corps (third) Position of sick- 
had been instructed to take position on the left of Hancock, on the 
same general line, which would draw it along the prolongation of Cem- 

12 



90 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

etery Ridge, towards the Round Top. Now, the ridge at this point is 
not very well defined, for the ground in front falls off into a consider- 
able hollow. But at the distance of some four or five hundred yards 
in advance, it rises into that intermediate crest along which runs the 
Emmetsburg road. 

"General Sickles, thinking it desirable to occupy this advanced posi- 
tion — which he conceived would, if held by the enemy, make his own 
ground untenable — assumed the responsibility of pushing his front 
forward to that point. 
Defects of the "The motive that prompted General Sickles to this course was laud- 

liositioiv. , ... "I'll /. • 1 

able enough, yet the step itself was faulty; for though to a superficial 
examination the aspect of this advanced position seems advantageous, 
it is not really so ; and prolonged to the left, it is seen to be positively dis- 
advantageous. It affords no resting place for the left flank, which can 
be protected only by refusing that wing, and throwing it back through 
low ground, towards Round Top; but this, in turn, presents the dan- 
ger of exposing a salient in a position which, if carried, would give 
the enemy the key -point to the whole line. General Sickles' disposi- 
tion of his troops had precisely this character. * '■=■ On this 
obtruding member, General Lee determined to make his attack; for, as 
he states: 'It appeared that if the position held by it could be car- 
ried, its possession would give facilities for assailing and carrying the 
more elevated ground and crest beyond.' 

"This eccentricity in the placing of Sickles' corps did not become 
known to General Meade until about four o'clock, when he arrived 
personally on the field; and though he then saw the danger to which 
that corps exposed itself, it was thought to be too late to correct the 
error; for just at that moment, Longstreet, under cover of a powerful 
artillery fire, opened his attack, and all that remained for General 
Meade was to support Sickles as far as could be done in the emer- 
gency." 
Result of the at- The final result of this attack was to carry the position occupied by 
General Sickles, after serious losses and a stubborn resistance on the 
part of the Union troops; but there then remained the line which 
should have been occupied in the first instance, and the effort to carry 
which resulted in Lee's defeat. 

POSITIONS NEAR RIVERS. 

(Ciansewitz.^ 24. " Rivers, like mountains, strengthen the relative defence; but 

Rivers in their re- ,. i . ,...., , ^^\ • ^ i- i i i 

latioii to the de- ouc of their peculiarities is, that they are like implements of hard and 
brittle metal, they either stand every blow without bending, or their 
defence breaks and then ends altogether. If the river is very large, 
and the other conditions are favorable, then the passage may be abso- 




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AXn THEIR APPLICATION IN ISIODiaiN WAlil AKIO, , 91 

lutely impossible. But if the defence of any river is forced at one 
point, then there cannot be, as in mountain warfare, a persistent de- 
fence afterwards; the affair is finished with that one act, unless that 
the river itself runs between mountains. 

"The other peculiarity of rivers in relation to war is, that in many 
cases they admit of very good, and in general of better combinations 
than mountains for a decisive battle. Both again have this property 
in common, that they are dangerous and seductive objects which have 
often led to false measures, and placed generals in awkward situations." 

25. "Positions mav be selected near rivers either for the defensive, (Mahan.) 

;, . c , rr- - i- ^'"'' ^^'^"* purpose 

to prevent an enemy from passing, or tor the oiiensive, to force a pas- selected, 
sage." 

In selecting a position to guard a river or an extended line of fron- Manner of guard- 

, 111 • .,1 11.11 !• • 1 '"K ^ river or ex- 

tier, when menaced by the enemy, it will not be advisable to divide tended frontier. 

the army into several equal portions and endeavor to watch each point 

suitable for crossing, or each pass by which the enemy may debouche; 

but, placing the main body in a central position, watch the different 

bridges and passes with strong detachments, and, when the enemy has 

developed his point of attack, advance with the main body to meet him 

and dispute his passage. 

"For example, let us suppose an armv of eighty thousand acting on (Maiian.) 

, . . . . 1 1 \ 1 1 1 Case of eighty 

the defensive against one of one hundred and tw^enty thousand separ- thousand men 

1 1 m against one hun- 

ated into three corps of forty thousand each, io oppose to the enemy dred and twenty 

, i-i 1 11111 •' thousand. 

three corps oi equal strength, we would have but about twenty -six 
thousand in each, and consequently w^ould find ourselves inferior in 
numbers on all poinds. If, instead of this, we opposed to each fraction 
of the enemy a corps of from twelve thousand to fifteen thousand, it 
would be sufficient to hold forty thousand in check, whilst our main 
body, consisting of from thirty-five thousand to forty thousand, hold- 
ing a central position, could move on the point first menaced, and, be- 
ing joined by the corps of observation, would offer to the enemy an 
effective force of fifty thousand combatants, which, all other things 
equal, should beat the enemy. The principle is not the less true, and The principle ex- 
the rule the less imperative, even when the disparity of force is far 
greater. It may happen that, with every^ eflfort, we may not succeed 
in obtaining the preponderance of numbers on any point; still the 
only chance orf success lies in concentrating all we can, and trusting to 
skill, promptitude, vigilance, and audacity, to do the rest. History 
furnishes brilliant examples of what a great general can accomplish, 
even under apparently the most dipcouraging state of things, by 
promptitude and rapidity of movement in throwing his reserves first 
on one and then on another of the enemv's fractions." 



92 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OE WAR 

Campaign iii Napoleoii's Campaign of 1814, in France, fully illustrates the appli- 

Champa^ne, 1814. ^' j- ,i • • ^ 

cation of these principles. 

Difficulty of fore- 26. The passage of an unfordable river in the presence of an active 

rh^er""" oi a e gj^gj^^^ j^ ^^^ operation of the most difficult nature. A crossing may be 
forced, or stratagem may be resorted to for the purpose of deceiving 
the enemy as to the point selected, and thus the undertaking may be 
successfully accomplished before the enemy can concentrate to vigor- 
ously oppose it. 

Manner of ettect- As ou the defensive, it is not best in this case to separate the army 

mg le passage. .^^^ several corps in order to force a passage at several points, but 
menacing several, to select one or two, and then by a rapid march to 
endeavor to reach them and effect the passage before the enemy is 
fully prepared to prevent it. 

Points to be con- In selecting a point to cross a river, it is well to bear in mind that 
in the bends the current is not so rapid as elsewhere ; also that small 
islands are generally located there, which may greatly aid the cross- 
ing and the construction of the bridge. 

27. The following general rules embrace nearly all the points to be 
observed in the passage of a river in the vicinity of the enemy : 
(Jomini.) "1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, 

ceived °. *^ ^' that he may not accumulate an Opposing force there. In addition to the 
strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be made near the real one, 
to divide the attention and means of the enemy. For this purpose 
half of the artillery should be employed to make a great deal of noise 
at the points where the passage is not to be made, whilst perfect 
silence should be preserved Avhere the real attempt is to be made. 

Protection of the "2. The Construction of the bridge should be covered as much as 

iifg\he bridge?' possible by troops sent over in boats, for the purpose of dislodging the 
enemy, who might interfere with the progress of the work; and these 
troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods, or other 
obstacles in the vicinity. 

Use of artillery. " 3. It is important also to arrange large batteries of heavy calibre, 
not only 1o sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any artillery the 
enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while building. For this 
purpose it is convenient to have the bank from which the passage is 
made somewhat higher than the other. 

Localities that aid "4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives 

e a ion. gj.g^t facilities for passing over troops in boats and for constructing the 

bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream emptying into the larger one 

near the point of passage, is a favorable place for collecting and con- 

A re-entering ccaling boats and materials for the bridge. 

be id a good posi- n - r^. • n ., i '^' i . i • i 

tion. o. it IS well to choose a |)osition where Ihe river makes a re-enter- 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MOUKKN WAHFAHK. 98 

ing bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can cross their tire in 
front of the point where the troops are to land from the boats, and 
where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus taking the enemy in front 
and flank when he attempts to o})pose the passage. 

'* 6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both banks, Good approaciies 
that the army may has^e good communications to the iront and rear 
on both banks of the river. For this reason those points where the 
banks are higli and steep should be carefully avoided. 

"The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course RnieH for pie- 

.. 'iici . veiitiDga C1088- 

from those for effecting it, as the duty ot the defenders is to counteract ing. 
the efforts of the assailants. The important thing is to have the course 
of the river watched, without attempting to make a defence at every 
point. ' Concentrate rapidly at the point threatened, in order to over- 
whelm the enemy, while a part only of his army shall have passed." 

28. A long line oi river cannot be successfully defended against the Army for the de- 
passage of an enemy who is provided with a sufficient pontoon train. weiTconcentrat- 
On this account the army defending the river should be well concen- ^ 

trated, with its line of retreat well secured, and inflict as much dam- 
age as possible on the enemy at the point of crossing. 

29. The passage of a large river by an army on the retreat, when Passage of a river 

, ,, 111 • ,* 1 iTr> 1 • bv ai) armv on the 

hardly pressed by the enemy, is one ot the most difficult operations to retreat. 
be performed in war. The points selected for the passage should pre- 
sent the most favorable features to enable a small body of troops to 
hold a larger body in cheek for a considerable time, so the enemy can- 
not press too hard upon the troops that have to pass last. 

Every precaution should be taken to deceive the enemy as to the Precautions 
point of crossing, which, when once selected, should be reached as soon 
as possible. The march should be so arranged that there shall be no 
crowding at the crossing, each body of troops reaching the designated 
place when the bridge is clear. 

30. The passage of the Douro, by Wellington, May 12th, 1809, illus- pou?(?Va^'i2^ 
trates the details of such an operation, and shows with what small isoit. 
means it can be successfully accomplished. (See Fig. 3.) 

"The passage of the Douro, by Sir A-rthur Wellesley, 12th of May, . (Napier.) 
1809, was immediately after the river had been passed by the French, 
under vSoult, continuing their retreat, and destroying the bridge across 
it from Villa Nova to Oporto. 

"Soult, at Salamanca, would be more formidable than Soult at Necessity of ti^e 
Oporto, and hence the ultimate object of the campaign, and the im- " ^ 
mediate safety of Beresford's corps, alike demanded that the Douro 
should be quickly passed. 

"But, how force the passage of a river, deep, swift, and more than 



94 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OK WAR 

three hundred yards Avide, while ten thousand veterans guarded the 
opposite bank ? * * * 
Wellington re- "From the summit of the heiarht of Sarea, the English general 

coniioitres the _ ^ 7 o c3 

French. searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. He 

observed horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the 
dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body of troops was to be 
seen under arms near the river. 

The Seminary. "The French guards were few, and distant from each other, and the 

patrols were neither many nor vigilant ; but a large unfinished build- 
ing standing alone, yet with a short and easy access to it from the 
river, soon fixed Sir Arthur's attention. This building, called the 
Seminary, was surrounded by a high stone wall, which coming down 
to the water on either side, enclosed an area sufficient to contain at 
least two battalions in order of battle ; the only egress being by an iron 
gate opening on the Vallonga road. 

Determines tiie "The Structure itsclf commanded everything in its neighborhood, 

pom o passage, g^^^gp^ r^ mound, within cannon shot, but too pointed to hold a gun. 
There were no French posts near, and the direct line of passage from 
the height of Sarea, across the river to the building, being to the right 
hand, was of course hidden from the troops in the town. 

" Here, then, witli a marvelous hardihood, Sir Arthur resolved, if 
he could find but one boat, to make his way, in the face of a veteran 
army aud a renowned general. A boat was soon obtained; for a poor 
barber of Oporto, evading the French patrols, had, during the night, 
come over the wat^r in a small skiff; this being discovered by Colonel 
Waters, a staff officer of a quick and daring temper, he and the bar- 
ber, and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his aid, crossed 
the river, and in half an hour returned, unperceived, with three or 
four large barges. 

The artillery " Meanwhile, eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery were got up to 

the^passagel ^^ the convent of Sarea; and Major-General John Murray, with the Ger- 
man brigade, some squadrons, and two guns, reached the Barca de 
^vintas, three miles higher up the river, his order.s being to search for 
boats, and to effect a passage there also, if possible. Some of the 
British troops were now sent towards Avintas, to support Murray; 
while others came cautiously forward to the brink of the river. It was 
ten o'clock; the enemy were tranquil and unsuspicious; and an officer 
reported to Sir Arthur Wellesle}" that one boat was brought u\) to the 
point of passage. ' Well, let the men cross,' Avas the reply; and upon 
this simple order an officer and twenty-five soldiers entered the vessel 
and in a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the French army. 

g;,i„',.ii. '' "'The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm being given 



p 




^ 



i 



i 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 95 

and evervthiiig was still (juiet in Oporto; not a movement was to be 

seen; not a hostile sound was to be heard. A second boat followed the 

first, and then a third passed a little higher up the river; but scarcely tiih i-iemii 

had the men from the last boat been landed, when a tumultuous noise ' 

of drums and shouts arose in the city ; confused masses of the enemy 

were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out clouds of 

skirmishers, who came furiously down on the Seminary. 

"The citizens were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making 
signals from their houses; and the British troops instantly crowded to 
the bank of the river; Paget's and Hill's divisions at the point of em- 
barkation, and Sherbrooke's, where the old boat bridge had been cut 
away from Villa Nova. 

" Paget himself passed in the third boat, and mounting the roof of 
the Seminary, was immediately struck down, severely wounded. Hill 
took Paget's place; the musketry was sharp, voluble and increasing 
every moment as the number accumulated on both sides. 

"The enemy's attack was fierce and constant; his fire augmented The French at- 
faster than that of the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on 
the building. But the English guns, from the convent of Sarea, com- 
manded the whole enclosure around the Seminary, and swept the left 
of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault to the 
side of the iron gate. 

"Murray, however, did not appear; and the struggle was so violent, Non-aniviii of 
and the moment so critical, that Sir Arthur would himself have cross- 
ed, but for the earnest representations of those about him, and the just 
confidence he had in General Hill. Some of the citizens now pushed 
over to Villa Nova with several great boats ; Sherbrooke's people be- 
gan to cross in large bodies; and, at the same moment, a loud shout in 
the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave 
notice that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city; and 
now, also, Murray's troops were seen descending the right bank from 
Avintas. 

"By this time three battalions were in the Seminary; and Hill, ad- 
vancing to the enclosure wall, opened a fire upon the French columns 
as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga road. ■' * 

"To the left. General Sherbrooke, with the brigade of the guards, sherbrooke's 
and the Twenty-ninth regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear '"■^''^'"S- 
of the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre General Hill, hold- 
ing the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, *' 
sent a damaging fire into the masses as they passed him ; and his line . 
was prolonged to the right, although with a considerable interval, by 
General Murray's Germans, and two squadrons of the Fourteenth 



96 rRixcrpLES of the art and science of war 

dragoons. The remainder of the army kept passing at different points; 
and the artillery, from the height of Sarea, still searched the enemy's 
columns as they hurried along the line of retreat. 

Comments. "The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, seem a 

rash undertaking ; but, when examined closely, it proves to be an ex- 
ample of consummate generalship, both in the conception and the e::e- 

The passage as a cution. The careless watch maintained bv the French may, indeed, be 

militarv opera- n i ■• . . , ' . 

tion. " called fortunate, because it permitted the English general to get a few 

men over unperceived ; but it was not twenty -five, nor twenty -five hun- 
dred soldiers that could have maintained themselves, if heedles.sly 
cast on the other side. 

"Sir Arthur, when he so coolly said, ' Let them pass,' was prepared 
to protect them when they had passed. He did not give the order until 
he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry over a con- 
siderable number of troops, and, consequently that that general, 
descending the Douro, could cover the right flank of the Seminary, 
while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea could sweep the left 
flank and search all the ground enclosed by the wall around the build- 
ing. 

Why the double " Xf General Murrav's troops onlv had passed, thev would have' been 

passage was sue- . . , ' jt . i ' . 

cessfui. . compromised ; if the whole army had made the attempt at Aviutas, its 

march would have been discovered ; but in the double passage all was 
secured ; the men in the Seminary by the guns, by the strength of the 
building, and by Murray's troops; the latter by the surprise on the 
town, which drew the enemy's attention away from them. Hence, it 
was only necessary to throw a few brave men into the Seminary un- 
perceived, and then the success was almost certain ; because, w'hile that 
building was maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither 
be prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by 
simple means is the highest effort of genius." 
other examples of 31, Other Celebrated examples of the successful passage of rivers in 
nfth^^enemy's^" the presence of the enemy are given below. It is the details of these 
pieseiice. operations which should be particularly studied, in order to render the 

lessons derived from them instructive and useful. Passage of the 
Ehine at Tholhuys, by Louis XIV, in 1672; the Rhine at Kehl, and 
the Danube at Hochstadt, in 1800; the Danube at Essling and Wagram 
in 1809, by Napoleon; the Beresina at Borisov in 1812, by Napoleon; 
the Danube at Satonnovo, by the Russian army, in 1828; the Rappa- 
hannock at Fredericksburg, by Burnside, in 1862 ; the Rapidan by 
•Grant, in 1864, etc., etc. 

POSITIONS IN mountains. 

32. For the defensive in a mountainous country, the best plan is to 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKUN WARKAUK. >)/ 

concentrate the forces at some central point — as at the head ol" several tiu- ijetensive in 

1 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 u '^ inniiiiiainous 

valleys where the roads naturally meet, the heights on either side be- couniiy. 
ing strongly occupied to prevent the enemy from taking possession of 
them — and then send forward strong detachments on all the roads by 
which the enemy can advance, to observe his movements, and when the 
point of attack has been developed, the main body can be sent forward 
to check him. The enemy having developed his plan of attack, every 
opportunity shotild be seized to turn his flanks, when there are lateral 
roads suitable for this manoeuvre. 

33. On the ofTensive in a mountainous countrv, it will not generally The oflrensivc in a 

' _ ^ -^ mountftinoiis 

be judicious to send strong columns against several points, but, menac- conntiy. 
ing the enemy along his whole front, induce him to extend his line of 
defence, and holding the main body well in hand, by a rapid move- 
ment endeavor to pierce his line before he can concentrate to oppose 
it, thus compelling the abandonment of the entire position. 

34. Owing to the strong defence which may be made in positions of Flank attacks 

,., 1. , 111 i-ii •! should be resoit- 

this character, direct attacks can seldom be successfully carried out; ed to. 
and even when practicable, they always entail severe losses. The more 
favorable plan then is to resort to flank attacks, selecting positions 
from which the enemy's communications may be menaced, thus fre- 
quently compelling him to abandon a strong post, from which it might 
be impossible to force him. 

35. In a mountainous country particular precautions should be Precautions 

, , . . " . ,...,.. 1 . , 1 against surprise. 

taken to guard against surprise, owing to the tacilities which are usual- 
ly presented for a sudden attack. 

VILLAGES. 

36. Farm houses, villages, or walled enclosures, when within the Usual lystrength- 

. , . , -. en a po.sitiun. 

limits of a position taken up by an army, can be made strong adjuncts 
to it, owing to the ease with which they can be converted into strong 
posts, and the short time required for this purpose. Their importance 
will, however, depend upon the materials of which they are construct- 
ed. When of wood, they will not be well adapted for defence, because importance de- 

' •' * pends on nature, 

they can readily be fired; those built of stone, with stone enclosures, etc., of construc- 
are the best. When commanded by high ground within cannon range, 
which may be occupied by the enemy, their value as an accessory 
means of defence is also greatly reduced. 

37. " Villages have at all times played a very important point in bat- (Home.) 
ties. The histi)ry of war is full of the accounts of sanguinary struggles villages ",s shown 
for the possession of villages. The villages of Aspern and Essling, with ^^ ''s'o'y- 

the trench connecting them, saved Napoleon from destruction in 1809. 
The neglect of the villages in front of Leipsic, undoubtedly helped to 
bring about the great defeat he sustained there. In more recent wars 

13 



98 



PRINCTPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Method of placing 
a villngeiu a state 
of defeiicp. 



Position of the 
artiUeiv. 



the struggles round the villages of Solferino, Woerth, Vionville, may 
be quoted. 

38. "The whole village, or such portion of it as may be deemed ad- 
vantageous, must be used as the reduit or redoubt, and must bs loop- 
holed and put in defence. The streets being barricaded, traverses, etc., 
made. But while this done, arrangements must be made for placing 
the first or shooting line outside the villag^^. A village is usually sur- 
rounded more or less with enclosures, such as hedges, walls and fences, 
when these can be taken advantage of, they should be used, and an en- 
ceinte formed round the villages by their use combined with that of 
shelter-trenches; in the selection of fences for this purpose, and in the 
construction of shelter-trenches, care should be taken to place them 
sufficiently far from the houses of the village to prevent the troops 
lining them being struck by splinters. A distance of forty yards will 
suffice for this. But it is also desirable that when the defences form- 
ing the outer line are carried, the defenders should be able to fire into 
it from the houses, consequently it will be better to place the outer 
line at one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards from the houses; 
if such an arrangement does not give too great an extension to the 
front ; if such be found to be the case, the distance between the outer 
and iimer lines may be reduced one-half. The form which the outer 
line takes must always be an irregular one. If f)ossible, a closed re- 
doubt, even of the weakest profile, should be jjlaced at the angles. 
Artillery may be placed in these redoubts, but it is much better in 
most cases not to do so, but to put the guns under epaulments in rear 
of the village in such places as will enable them to flank it and cross 
fire in front. In the defence of villages and woods mitrailleuses will 
be of great advantage, their lightness enabling them to be readily 
moved by hand from place to place, and the very efficacious fire they 
give over a limited area renders them suitable for such purposes. It 
has always been laid down as a rule that obstacles which detain an 
enemy under fire are of importance. ' But obstacles for such a purpose 
are very apt to give an attacker shelter where he may establish himself, 
and should be very carefully considered before being used. The most 
dangerous and difficult ground for troops to advance over is undoubt- 
edly a gentle slope completely seen and perfectly open, and in placing 
a village in a state of defence, the more open the ground is in front and 
to the flanks the better. Obstacles may be viewed as opposing the 
enemy's advance, hampering the defenders if they take the offensive, 
and furnishing cover to the attackers. The position of obstacles must 
therefore be carefully considered; perhaps the most efficacious kind of 
obstacle is a wire entanglement, as it affiirds no shelter and is not 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODEKN WARFARE. DD 

affected by artillery fire. But a wire entanglement conipletely for- 
bids the action of cavalry ; a few men armed with breech-loaders, 
and surrounded by wire, would be perfectly safe from a cavalry at- 
tack. 

39. " In examining a village prior to putting it in a state of defence, KoconnaisHaiices 

" r> r r o ' of ft village for 

the following points should be chiefly considered: defensive pui- 

" a. The nature of the ground round the village, the amount of cover 
offered to an attack, the nature of the fences, and whether suitable for (Tionnd, etc. 
defensive purposes or not. 

" 6. The line to form the outer enceinte should be carefully examin- Points to be 
ed, and such walls, hedges or fences, as may be available for forming a ' 
portion of the line, should be selected, and the places where shelter- 
trenches or earthworks are required should be marked. 

" c. The houses forming the inner enceinte should be selected, those Tiie inner de- 

fences. 

with timber out-buildings being avoided if the woodwork cannot be 
pulled down. The roads leading through the village should be ex- 
amined, the places for barricades selected, and fresh openings and pas- 
sages niade where requisite. 

40. "It is essential that these points should be quickly determined Enoistobe 

. avoided. 

on. There are two errors w^hich officers are apt to fall into under such 
circumstances; one acting hastily and undertaking too much work for 
the time and means at their disposal, the other thinking too long of 
what they are going to do. The outer line should be begun first, and 
so soon as it is in a fair way of being completed in time, men may be 
set to work on the other portions. 

41. " If the village is held as a detached rpost it should be carefully viUage nsed as a 

- , , , . 1 1 . .1 1 J. detached post. 

surrounded, and everything done to make it as secure as possible, for 
the troops placed in it have, in such a case, nothing but their own ex- 
ertion to depend upon. When held as an advanced post, the village As an advanced 
gets support from the general line of battle, and should be made as 
strong as possible on three sides, bat on the side nearest the defender's 
position should be open, having a line of shelter-trench, about two 
hundred and fifty yards in rear of it, with epaulments for artillery, so 
that the enemy, when the village is captured, will not be able to use 
it as a p&int d^appui for further operations. Such a line of shelter- 
trench in rear of the village will effectually prevent the attacker's 
flank attack (which he is vsure to make) from getting into the rear of 
the village, and will further cover the retreat of the troops engaged in 
its defence. Any defensive work may be carried by surprisse, or by a reserve essen- 
some accident, such as thick weather, which enables the attackers to 
come close up; but the moment it is captured is always the very best 
time for driving out, the intruders, before they have time to get into 



100 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

order ; hence the garrison of all works, great or small, should have a 
reserve ready to act rapidly. 
Position of sup- "In defending a village the places where supports are to be placed 

ports should be , ,. , . ,, , , , .„ , • , , , . 

noted. should DC careiully selected, they will be safer Avhen placed in small 

bodies clear of the village, and immediately behind the troops they are 
to support. When time is available it will be judicious to cover them 
by shelter-trenches. 
Houses not occu- "Although the houses composing the village should be loopholed, 
lery attack"! troops should not be put into them until the last moment, the men to 

occupy the different places should be carefully told off, and when the 
attack gets sufficiently near, they should be taken into the village in 
small numbers, and carefully posted in the houses by officers. For this 
purpose a rough sketch of the village should be prepared, and the posi- 
tion of the different bodies intended to hold it should be noted. * * 
" At this stage of the attack the assailant's artillery will probably 
have moderated its fire, being partially masked by its own infantry, 
and hence the men, who should previously have been as much as pos- 
sible under shelter, will come up fresh and in good heart. 
Troops in tiie vii- 42. " So soon as the main body of the troops engaged in the defence 
b>^a secofid itue. of the village are taken into the village, their place in the rear should 
be supplied by troops from the second line, Avho should line the shelter- 
French in rear of the village, and throw forward a strong line of skir- 
mishers between the trench and the village. Feeding the fight in this 
manner invariably helps the defenders, who are much less likely to be 
demoralized, when they know fresh troops have come up to support 
them from the rear. It obtains thus for the defence, a part of the ad- 
vantage which the offensive always possesses, namely, the moral effect 
of a forward movement, and preserves the same general distribution of 
troops, both for attack and defence. 
Too much value 43. " Important as villages are, too much value must not be assigned 

should not be as- ^, • i i i c • > ^ • e 

signed to villages, to them. And here, as everywhere, a recurrence to first principles is oi 
importance. Fortification is the art of enabling a small body of men 
to resist a large force. If the fortification or village requires more 
men to defend it than would be assigned to a similar front of open 
ground, it really does more harm than good. Shutting up too many 
men in a village is a great error. The object of holding a village is 
twofold. 1st. To deny the cover it offers to the enemy. 2nd. To 
make a certain point secure, and thus liberate men, who otherwise 
would be employed at that point as defenders, for offensive action. 
This latter is the true principle on which all field fortification should 
be carried out. 

44. " If too many men are placed in a village, and the general line 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. lUl 

of battle is forced, the men garrisoning the village can do little or nbth- Eflt-ct o< placing 

,1 1 t • f ^ ^ ^' i i>-i ^ • '"o mniiy men in 

ing to restore the battle, and if the second line and reserve fail to drive a village. 
the enemy back it is likely that the defenders of the village will be cap- 
tured. Blenheim affords an example of this. The French General Blenheim. 
Tallard placed a large force of infantry in the village, situated in a 
loop of the Danube; when Marlborough forced the French line, the in- 
fantry in Blenheim were completely cut off", and had to surrender. 

45. ''Field fortification can never be a panacea for weakness. And a passive defen- 

, . . , . . . , , . sive can accom- 

it never ought to be viewed otlierwise than in its tactical relation to piish nothing. 
the general action of the troops fighting. By judiciously using it, it 
becomes an important and valuable auxiliary. The true key to all 
such questions is to be found by keeping steadily in view that the pas- 
sive defence of any position by an army is an absurdity. 

46. "When an inferior force finds itfelf in presence of a superior and An inferior force 

, protects itself by 

compelled to fight, it is in danger of having its flank turned by the ex- tieid works, etc. 
tension the larger army can afford to make. To obviate this danger 
the army acting on the defensive may, by a judicious use of villages 
and field works, seek to extend their line, and concentrate the mass of 
this force where it can strike an offensive blow ; the chief use of forti- 
fications should be to assist this by so strengthening a portion of the line 
of battle that it may be held by a reduced number of men. * 

47. "The attack of a village is a difficult and generallv a costly Attack of a vii- 

, , , , , , I , . . ■" -n / I'lge a difficult 

operation, and should be attempted only when the object justifies the and costly opera- 
loss. Many of the hardest fought actions have been those where the 
attack and defence of villages formed a prominent feature. At Ligny 
twenty Prussian battalions struggled for the whole day against thirty- 
two French battalions, and much of the loss both sides suffered was 
round the village of Ligny itself." •=■ -•■ * 
A direct attack upon the troops in a position of this nature will Manner of con- 

. f , ducting the at- 

rarely be successful. Kather seek elevated ground, preferably on the tack. 
flanks, from which a strong artiller}' fire may be brought to bear; or, 
direct the attack upon other points of the enemy's position, which, if 
carried, will cause the troops occupying the village to abandon it, or 
run the risk of being cut off and captured. 

That the farm and enclosures of La Haye Sainte, on the battle-field La Haye Sainte. 
of Waterloo, formed a strong and important post in the allied position, 
is made clear by the great efforts put forth and the severe losses sus- 
tained by the French, in their efforts to carry them. 

48. "The recent Franco-German war offers manv examples of vil- (Home.) 

1 I'li-iiii ' 1 Examples of the 

lages, woods, and posts, being defended, and advantageously made use Franco-German 
of by the Germans, especially in the blockades of Paris and Metz; in 
every case the principles on which these posts were held were identi- 



102 PRINCIPLES OK THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

cal, viz., the exterior of the wood or village was held strongly by a 
thick line of skirmishers, and an interior trench, or defence of some 
kind, was invariably provided. Thus, if the first line of defence was 
carried, the second helped the reserve in retaking the first; in every 
case such posts were used not as the defence itself, but as adjuncts to 
the defence, and as means of holding certain important points while 
the troops acted on the oflfensive. * * * 
Precautions in " Jn preparing defences of this nature it is essential that the line of 
ces of thif nature, retreat of the troops be marked out, so that when the men fall back 
they may not interfere with the fire of those in rear of them; and it is 
further essential that distinct notices be clearly put up detailing the 
names of the various di.stricts into which the defences are divided, and 
pointing out the nearest road to those districts. No amount of zeal, 
courage, devotion, or knowledge compensates for the neglect of such de- 
tails. 
Tiie attack on Le 49. " The attack on Le Bourget, at Paris, is a good example of the 

Bonrget, at Paris. , .,, ' o f 

attack on villages, 

" Le Bourget is a village of some length, the gardens of which are 

surrounded by long straight walls six feet in height, intersecting each 

other at right angles. These were prepared for defence by loop-holing 

and heaping up earth, and the entrance to the village was barricaded. 

The attack made "The attack was Undertaken from three sides, viz., from Blanc- 

from tlircG sides. 

Mesnil, Dugny, and along the road between them. The two flanking 
columns sent to the front clouds of skirmishers, which gained ground 
at the double, and then threw themselves do^vn. The supports and re- 
serves followed these, spread out in extended order, and also at the 
Formation for the doublc. As these latter threw themselves down to rest, the skirmishers 
^^^^'- again ran forward, and at the same time bore off towards the flanks. 

When they arrived within range, they again threw themselves down, 
and opened fire upon the enemy. The gaps which occurred from draw- 
ing off towards the flanks were filled up by extending subdivisions. 
In like manner the flanks were prolonged by single companies advanc- 
ing one after the other, but always in extended order, so that the con- 
centric attack wh?bh had moreover — as the enemy was approached — 
become denser in character, kept always assuming a more enclosing 
Cover. form. Each of the extended bodies of troops took advantage of what- 

ever cover offered, in order to rally behind it and collect together. 
Thus in front of the north-east flank a row of dung-heaps had been left 
upon the field, which afforded a rallying place for an entire company, 
which opened from behind these a destructive fire upon troops who 
came forward to attack. On the other flank the bed of the brook Le 
Moleret aflfordcd a slight protection and was at once turned to account 



AND THEIR ArrLU.ATION IN MUDKUN \V AliKAlJ K. lO.") 

by a few formed companies, in order to cover an ousel against a counter- 
attack delivered from Draucv. The mechanism of the attack consist- xiu' iiie(imiii.sm 
ed principally in the rapid c/tauyejrom open to done order directly the ma-t 
trijiing cover admitted of the rallying of a subdivision or company. On the 
other hand, every advance over open ground took place in widely extended skir- 
mishing iincH, which moved an like antK. 

"The right wing was left behind: the centre had not sufficiently ex- I'jiuit.s of tiu- a.s- 

, . . . sailaiits. 

tended itself, and had renounced old forms too little, and its losses were 
enormous; but the attacking left wing, under Lieutenant-Colonel Graf 
Waldersee, pressing forward in long thin lines, succeeded in making 
good an attack of skirmishers up to the garden walls, in silencing the 
fire from them, and in breaking into the long village, both from its 
flanks and rear. Its defenders now gave way. General Budritzky was 
able to enter from the front, and the right flank column to reach the 
rear entrance without very severe loss." 

WOODS. 

50. " Woods are of great importance in concealing the movemeiit of (Von scheiien- 
troops from the enemy; but in very dry weather the dust arising from conceal move- 
columns on the march often enables the enemy to detect the presence '"^" '^" •"°i^''- 
of troops, and even sometimes assists him to make a rough guess at 

their strength. As regards the part woods play in fighting, it may be 
accepted as a general rule that a large wood intersected with numerous 
good roads is advantageous when situated in rear of a position, but 
dangerous when close in front of it, or on the flanks. In the first case, 
a retreat, if necessary, is favored by the wood, and the retreating troops 
on entering it are soon screened from the fire of their pursuers." 

Wellington formed his lines at W^aterloo in advance of the forest of Wt4Mr)gtcn at 
Soignies, thus obtaining good cover for his troops in case of defeat. 
The wood could easily be traversed by fnfantry, for several good roads 
led through it from the rear of his position. 

" On the other hand, woods placed close in front, or on the flanks of a (Von scheiien- 
position, screen the advance of the enemy, afTord facilities for sudden pavoi the enemy 
attacks, or at least enable an enemy to deploy to attack more or less o^n UiVflank". 
under cover. 

"Fighting in large woods should, if possible, be avoided, for as there Fighting in large 

, -,. , . . , ^ , Y> woodstobeavoid- 

can be little or no supervision on the part of the officers, troops soon ed. 
get out of hand, and even under the most favorable circumstances, the 
scattering and mixing together of corps is always to be feared." 

51. " The method of dealing with woods, villages, etc., may be best (Home.) 

^ '^ ^ ' ©>»./ Principles of the 

examined by referring to first principles. To troops acting on the de- defensive. 
fensive it is of importance to see without being seen, and to be so plac- 
ed as to be able to use their weapons with freedom. 



104 



PRINCIPLES OK THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Principles of tlu 
offensive. 



The defensive 
must hold the 
outskirts of the 
wood. 



The assailiint 
should be denied 
the wood as long 
as possible. 



The offensive as 
intiuenced by 
words. 



The defensive as 
influenced by 
woods. 



Illustrate! by 
Hohenlinden. 



"Troops acting on the offensive must seek to overwhelm their 
enemies with tire, and by advancing in individual order, seek to draw 
off the fire from the main bodies in rear. 

" Now it is apparent that if both parties are in a wood, neither 
party will benefit, the shelter afforded by the trees being common to 
both sides. Consequently, if a wood is to be used for defensive pur- 
poses, the defenders must hold the outskirts of the wood in that portion 
nearest the enemy, and must seek to prevent the attackers penetrating 
into it ; if they once gain the wood, unless further arrangements are 
made for internal defence, the cover afforded by the trees become com- 
mon to both sides. "••■ -■■ "••■ 

52. " Long range weapons lose much of their value in a wood, conse- 
quently the object of the defenders should be as long as possible to deny 
the edge of the wood to the attackers, and keep them under fire. Once 
the latter get into the wood the fighting is on even terms physically, 
morally it is all in favor of the attackers who have gained the wood. 
Woods, as a rule, check, impede, and render the movements of cavalry 
and artillery difficult and dangerous, they further disorder infantry; but 
they at all times afford a useful position and protection to the latter arm. 

53. "Upon the offensive zone of a field of battle, woods, if of great 
extent, are injurious to the army taking the offensive, breaking up its 
formation, and producing crowding and disorder. Woods of small 
size, however, aid the offensive considerably, helping to mask bodies of 
troops, and concealing the positions of reserves. They are especially 
of value if they are of such a nature as will admit of cavalry being 
concealed behind them, which can be brought out at an opportune 
moment to act on the flanks of an attack. 

54. " Woods properly held on the defensive zone are of great value, 
enabling the front of the armV holding them to be extended. A wood 
of very great extent cannot be so treated, because its perimeter, which 
must be held, becomes too extensive, and the force acting on the de- 
fensive would become too much disseminated. In such cases the posi- 
tion taken up should be in rear of the wood, and sufficiently near to 
crush the heads of the hostile columns as they attempt to debouch. 

"The battle of Hohenlinden affords an example of this; Moreau met 
the Austrian columns as they debouched from the forest of Ebersburg, 
and sent Eichepanse to attack their flank through the woods from 
Ebersburg. The Austrians, unable to see in the woods what was going 
on on their flank, were broken in two, and the moment Moreau saw the 
wavering in his front produced by the attack on their rear, he assailed 
and drove them back. 

55. "The difficulty of defending a wood of any extent is that the 



AND THEIR APPMrATIOX IN MODKKN WARKAKK. 10") 

troops are apt to lose in a short time all tactical coivnection, and escape DiiiLuitit-j^ in 

,,,.,,• mi i'/r> 1 • « • 1 woods for tlu' na- 

out of the control oi their otticers. Ihe dimculty in attacking a wood saiinnt aii(ias«aii- 
is that the attackers are in entire ignorance of what the wood contains, 
how the defenders are disposed, and that the defenders are sheltered 
from fire, and can shoot down the attackers with all the more ease, be- 
cause they themselves suffer but little. 

56. "It is onlv by bearing clearly in mind the object in view that special precau- 

,„..,^ , 11* mii>i II tions to be taken 

any definite ideas can be worked out. lo defend a wood by troops, in woods. 
efforts should be made to increase the power of the breech-loader on 
the defensive by opposing obstacles to the enemy and covering the de- 
fenders from fire, rendering them as secure as possible, and thus en- 
abling them to pour in a well-directed fire on the attackers. These are 
the principles of all defences, but in addition, in a wood it is requisite 
to take special precautions that the troops actually firing, and on the 
outskirts of the wood, know where their supports are, and that eflfec- 
tive measures be taken to communicate between the skirmishing line, 
the supports, and the main body. 

57. "Before putting a wood in a state of defence, it should be care- Keconnaissance 

~ ,-, . , 1 1 ■• 11 . . 1 111 1 • /I 1 , of a wood for de- 

lully examined, and the lollowing points should be chieily kept in fensive purposes. 
view during the examination : 

" a. The size of the wood, its length and breadth. Points to be 

' o noted. 

"6. The nature of the wood, whether open or thick. 

"c. The nature of the edge of the wood, whether marked or indefi- 
nite, whether belts of underwood and straggling trees intervene be- 
tween the main wood and the open ground ; whether there are any out- 
lying clumps, or belts of trees, their size, and at what distance from 
the main road. 

" <L Whether there are many roads or paths in the wood, whether 
there are houses, clearings, or open spaces in the wood itself,* whether 
there are streams or wet places in the wood, and whether the ground 
is broken or smooth. 

" e. The nature of the position in rear of, and on the flanks of the 
wood. 

58. " In putting a wood in a state of defence the first thing to be at- Salients first at- 
tended to are the salients, and any small detached clumps of trees 

within five hundred or six hundred yards, should be either cut down 
or occupied, such small clumps are peculiarly dangerous, as affording 
a point d'appui for an attack. Trees round the salient portions should 
be cut so as to form a rough abattis. A little thought is requisite in Abattis. 
felling these trees, some trees will be better if felled with their heads 
out, some better if felled parallel to the front; some trees aid the de- 
fence and should be left standing, (renerally, large trees should not be 

It 



106 PRrN'f;iPi.ES of the art and science of war 

cut, they afford cover for two or three men, and take time and ex- 
perienced woodmen to cut. 

AbatUs and rifle *' It is far better to begin operations upon all the salients at once, 
and make them thoroughly strong than to attempt surrounding the 
whole wood with a belt of abattis. * * 

" Although trees afford good shelter from the front, it is desirable 
not to neglect making shallow rifle pits, which will protect the men on 

Cover in adva-.ice the flanks, while the trees afford cover in front. All cover should, as 

of the woods. , -111 1 e !• CI •• •!' 

tar as possible, be removed from the front of the position occupied tor 
six hundred to seven hundred yards. This is a very difflcult opera- 
tion, and one, although most desirable, that can rarely be performed. 
When a wood has an undefined edge, with brushwood, undergrowth, 
and tongues of trees running into the open ground, it becomes a very 
difficult question to decide how much shall be defended, how much 
given up to the enemy. 

"From one hundred to two hundred yards of abattis will usually be 
ample in each place, and the space between, which may be four hun- 
dred to five hundred yards, will afford openings through which an 
offensive attack may be made. 
The enemy must "In all Cases every nerve should be strained to prevent the enemy 
wood at .a'u haz-^^ getting into the wood, as he will see the abattis in front of the salients, 
and as such salients are usually on spurs, it is likely that he may seek 
to turn them and penetrate by the flanks ; to check this, each flank of 
the abattis shr)uld have a return behind it, prolonged into the wood, 
and should not terminate abruptly; if the enemy then penetrates he 
will be taken in flank as he tries to advance, and the flank of the de- 
fenders of the salients will be covered. 
u«e of artillery 59. " Great care should be taken in using artillery in a wood, if the 
wood is in front of a line of battle, and can be flanked from the main 
line, few guns should be put into it; if it forms a portion of the main 
line, and guns must be placed in the wood, they should never be plac- 
ed on the roads leading out of the wood where they offer marks to an 
enemy, but at slight distances to the right or left of the roads in places 
specially prepared ; they should be placed at considerable distances 
apart, as the splinters from trees do much damage; and, if possible, 
each gun should have two or more places from which it can fire, pre- 
viously prepared for, sufficiently near to allow it being moved by hand 
from place to place. 

Troops safer in 60. " Troops are really safer in a wood than in a village or in 
woods than in i i i i i -n /. • ^ 

villages or houses, the masonry knocked about by artillery fire is more danger- 

ous than the splinters from trees, which often stop splinters of shells; 
and above all the retreat is far more secure. 



bouseH. 



AND TIIKIR APPLICATION IN MODKRN WAIIKAKE. 107 

61. " Roads should never be blocked in the wood or at its entrance ; I'reptuinj; the 

... Ill s- 1 '"««« 'f '•»" J«!- 

unless lor special reasons, it is better to break itiein up at a larni-yard, feiic<;. 

a village, or some place seven hundred or eight hundred yards to the 
front, and form a small post there to cover the barricade. It is always 
desirable to prepare for disaster, although never desirable to parade 
that preparation. Consequently, although tlie edge of the wood is the 
place where the great struggle should take place, a second line should 
be provided somewhere within the wood; this may be at a clearing or 
barren spot, which often exists in a wood, or behind a watercourse or 
river; in every case it is desirable to make some line of abattis parallel 
to the line of retreat ; such an abattis held firmly, acts as a flank attack 
on the enemy, and may prevent him extending, when once he has pen- 
etrated the wood. 

62. "Woods in civilized countries are usually cut up by roads, ah road.s leading 
sometimes these are main roads, sometimes mere tracks used to haul shmUd be mark- 
timber out ; in a wood it is very easy for troops to lose themselves, and 

it is very advisable that marks should be made on the trees to denote 
the direction in which different phices are to be found. The principal 
roads may be marked by a staff officer with an axe and a paint pot; 
but it is requisite that each battalion commander should also mark 
the way from the skirmishers to the supports, and from the supports 
to the main body. A simple blow made on the trees with an axe will 
do this, and a few men should be left to pass orders back ; and it is de- 
sirable that the skirmishers should know that the supports are close 
behind them, for, of course, in a wood they cannot be seen. 

63. " In many woods there is a spot where all the roads converge, The place where 
at such points there is often a farm, a house, or a small village, such meet'an'import- 
a position should be put in a state of defence, and a strong reserve put *"' p°'"*" 
there, which should embrace a few cavalry. 

64. "Sometimes in a wood, when the edge has been lost, a skillful Employment of a 
use of a reserve will turn the attackers out. When troops have found 

their way in, there will always be some eager spirits who will push on, 
and others who won't like to hold back ; the main body may be dis- 
connected, the second line not yet up, and consequently, the hold on 
the woods a weak one. The front on which the attackers have enter- 
ed will in all probability be a narrow one, and a rapid advance, es- 
pecially on their flanks, will often restore the fight. True, everywhere, 
in a wood, especially, reserves properly held in hand and brought up 
steadily, will \isually turn the day. And this does not refer alone to 
either an army corps reserve or a divisional reserve, but to brigade, 
battalion, and even company reserves. 

6o. " In a wood the supports may be weaker than in the case of an sma.ier in woods. 



108 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF "WAR 



Woods modify 
skirmishing line. 



And pliicing of 
the supports. 



Comniaiider of 
the suppf.rtM and 
tlie main bod v. 



Employment of 
cavalrv in woods 



The attack of a 
wood a dilBcult 
operation. 



Several attacks 
better than one. 



attacking force ; because the skirmishing or firing line will suffer less, 
and the true function of the support being to fill up the gaps in the 
skirmishers' line, it will not be so much needed; hence, the skirmish- 
ing line may be longer or occupy more ground, and as there is less 
likelihood of the skirmishers being taken in flank, than there is if the 
ground be open, the supports may be distributed in smaller bodies 
along the rear, while at the same time they may be brought much 
nearer to the front; this is all the more requisite, as, to support effect- 
ually, the officer commanding the supports must be in front to watch 
the effect of the fire, and on a long line in a wood he cannot see what 
is going on, consequently the supports must be sufficiently near at 
hand for the subordinate ofl&cers to act on their own responsibility. 
All the commander of the supports can do is to try and find the most 
dangerous place, that where the enemy seems most disposed to direct 
the attack, and post himself there. The commander of the main body 
cannot watch the fight from the rear, but must do so from the front, 
and he has therefore to remain in front and send back orders to the 
main body, which consequently must not be too far off. 

66. "Cavalry should be posted on the flanks and in rear of the 
wood, if an opportunity offers, and they can circle out suddenly, they 
may produce a great effect. If a small body of cavalry can be con- 
cealed in the wood itself and pushed rapidly out, from the fact of 
cavalry not beir.g expected, it may effect much, but this mu.st be de- 
termined by the nature of the wood. If the wood be in front of a posi- 
tion, arrangements should be made to bring a heavy fire to bear on it, 
and a line of retreat for the defenders should be pointed out to the 
commanding officer, so that fire may be opened the moment the wood 
is abandoned, without interfering with the retiring troops. Whenever 
troops who have once attacked get into cover after heavy loss, there is 
some difficulty in inducing them to come out again, more especiallyif 
met by heavy fire on the other side when tltey try it. 

67. " The attack of a wood is one of the most difiicult and danger- 
OU.S operations in war. One of the great difficulties is to know how 
the wood is held, where the guns and infantry are, and which are the 
weak points. The reconnaissance of wood prior to its attack should 
embrace not only the ground in front and on the flanks, but informa- 
tion as to inside of the wood should be sought from country people and 
from maps. The position of the defenders can be best found out by 
some false attacks, which may induce the enemy to show his position. 

68. " It is better to make two or three distinct though simultane- 
ous attacks on a wood than to trust to one; the reason of this is, that 
the defenders, from the difficultv of intercninmunication offered bv the 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN IMOMERN WARFARK. lOD 

trees, have their supporis and reserves less under control than would 
be the case in open ground, a fact which the soldier very soon real- 
izes; and the demand for supports seiit back from the front, if not 
promptly responded to, tends to demoralize men who cannot be prop- 
erly supervised by their officers. The attackers in the open have the 
benefit not only of intercommunication, but of being completely under 
the supervision of their officers. Consequently several attacks^ if made 
at the same moment, will produce emulation among the men, while at 
the same time it will have the effect of disconcerting the defenders. 

69. '' It is desirable to bear in mind that the attack of troops armed Necessity of sim- 
with a breech-loader, ana holding an open position, is a dangerous and laok"!^""'' 
difficult operation, * but when troops armed with a 
breech-loader are covered by trees, shelter-trenches, wallsj etc., the at- 
tack becomes far more dangercnis, because the effective fire of the 

troops acting on the offensive is seriously interfered with, the defenders' 
fire becomes at the same time all the more accurate and deadly be- 
cause they suffer but little from the attackers' bullets; consequently 
the attack on troops occupying a wood or village, or an intrenchment, 
requires a longer preparation and a greater quantity of artillery fire 
than if the defenders had no cover. But although it is better to make 
several attacks, these attacks should not be separate and disconnected, 
but should work together, one or more being directed on the flanks, 

while one or more assail the front. The exact nature of the attack Nature of the at- 
tack depends 
can only be determined by the nature of the ground and the amount of upon the ground. 

cover in front of the wood. 

70. " In the attack on a wood, as in all other attacks, as manv guns Manner and 

. . ' nature of the ar- 

as possible should be got into position, and should be divided into as tiiiery .ittack. 

many divisions as there are attacks; if possible, these guns should be so 

placed as to fire on all the points selected for forcing an entrance. It is 

not likely that there will be many guns in the wood, and hence the 

artillery may push np to some one thousand four hundred or one thou- 

.sand five hundred yards; a very rapid fire should be begun on the 

wood, those guns that can support all the attacks firing for a short 

time in su])port of each in succession, the actual attack being made by 

the infantry. ■^• 

" Under fire of the artillery an attempt should be made to penetrate Manner of ad- 
into the wood, through the breach eflfected by the fire; once the edge of wood is gained. 
the wood is gained no great advance should be made until a sufficient- 
ly strong body of men is in hand, and then a careful steady advance 
.'^hould be made with the flanks well supported, as, if the enemy have 
not been demoralized by the artillery, they will seek to attack and 
drive nut the intruders by operating on their flanks. 



no 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



The danger in 
wood fignting. 



Fi^ht in the wood 
of Mas lowed at 
Koniggratz. 



Tile Prussians 
hold the wood 
against all at- 
tacks. 



Nature of the 
conflict. 



An Austrian bat- 
talion loses its 
wav. 



Decisive engage- 
ments can7iot be 
fought in defiles. 



Position of an 
army for dpfeiid- 
iug a defile. 



71. •* There is one special danger in all wood fighting, viz., the risk 
of the general line of attack or defence getting dislocated. Constant 
attention must be given by officers to this point, and the men should 
be urged to keep a connection with those on their right and left; 
should the line get dislocated, the enemy, finding no fire coming from 
one place, will push in, and by thus dividing it and acting on the flank, 
compel the retreat, perhaps the flight, of the whole line. 

72. "The most remarkable instance of wood fighting that has oc- 
cured of recent years was undoubtedly that at the wood of Maslowed 
at Koniggratz. The Austrians made little or no effort to hold the edge 
of the wood, but fell back and allowed the Prussians to get into the in- 
terior and take possession of a great part of the outskirts on their (the 
Austrian) side, but not of the whole, 'because of the great extent of 
wood, and the fierce struggle raging in parts of the interior. The Prus- 
sians got the whole of a division into the woods, and although they 
were repeatedly driven back, their line divided and cut in two by 
large Austrian forces, yet they never could be driven out. This was 
due to the very skillful way in which the Prussian officers made flank 
attacks on the Austrians with small bodies of men. The companies 
had all become mingled together as the fight swayed backwards and 
forwards in the dense wood. No unity of guidance was possible on 
ground where hills and woods shut out all view of the surround- 
ing country, and all that the commanders of the different detach- 
ments could do was to lead their men by their own personal ex- 
ample. In all parts the officers rallied round them whatever men 
were in their neighborhood, no matter to what regiment they be- 
longed.' 

" During some of these sanguinary struggles an Austrian battalion 
lost its way, as troops are very likely to do, and wandering out of the 
wood on the Prussian side, was charged by and surrendered to a Prus- 
sian Hussar regiment, placed behind the wood." 

DEFILES. 

73. Decisive engagements can hardly be looked for in defiles, as on 
account of the contracted positions there found, large armies cannot 
find the space necessary for deployment in line of battle. They offer 
positions favorable for small bodies of troops to hold larger bodies in 
check, in order to gain time for the main body of an army to make 
good its retreat, or take position for receiving battle ; they are also 
favorable for surprises and ambuscades, attacks on convoys, etc. 

74. A large army selected to defend a defile should therefore take 
position in rear of it, where there is space to draw up the troops with 
the proper front, and to afford facilities for the employment to the 



AND THKIK Al'PI/CATION IN MODERN WAHFAKK. Ill 

best advantage of the different arms of the service. Conunanding the 
mouth of the defile in this manner, the army can take the enemy at a 
great disadvantage as he debouches into the plain, and before his col- 
umns can be deployed. 

75. The advanced-guard should take post in the defile, occupying Office of the ad- 

, , . 1 • 1 '11 Ml ^ • n- • 1 vaiicerl-guaid. 

the heights on either side when possible, and innicting great damage 
on the enemy as it slowly withdraws before him. Great care should caie tobeexor- 
be exercised that a favorable position is not held so long as to compro- 
mise the safety of the advanced-guard, or to allow the enemy, by press- 
ing it closely, to debouche with it into the plain, and thus interfere with 
the action of the main body. 

76. The assailant should not enter the gorge of a defile when it is Assailant enter- 
commanded by surrounding heights which are in possession of the '"^ ** 
enemy; the latter should first be dislodged from his position. 

Whenever practicable, a defile should be turned by a flank move- Defile should be 
ment, rather than forced by a direct attack. 

A position should never be taken in front of a defile to defend it; Position for de- 
the choice of such a position would invite destruction for a large force. *^" '"^* 



112 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OK WAU 



CHAPTER VIII. 

BATTLES.* 

Defined. 1. A battle is, "A general action in which all the divisions of an 

army are, or may be engaged." 
War.' not usually As a rule a battle must be fought before an}' decided or permanent 

decisive without i • , 

battles. advantage can be gamed over an enemy, 

(jomini.) '< Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and de- 

ciding features of war. This assertion i.s not strictly true, as armies 
have been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of 
pitched battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also 
true that a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the 
same character when there have been no grand strategic combinations. 

Upon what the re- "The results of a battle generallv depend upon a union of causes 

suits of battles , . . , . , ., " \ , .,. . , 

depend. which are not always within the scope of the military art; the nature 

of the order of battle adopted, the great or less wisdom displayed in the 
plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details, the 
more or less loyal and enlighlenedt co-operation of the officers subor- 
dinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the propor- 
tions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm, super- 
iority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and the 
manner of handling these arms; but it is the morale of armies, as well 
a.s of nations, more than anything else, which makes victories and 
their results decisive." * * •• 

When a battle 2. When the march of an armv has been so conducted, that, when 

will be most de- . , i /• i i ',' i i • i i • i i i 

cisive. it meets the enemy on the field oi battle, it has a decided advantage 

over him, the battle which follows will usually be more decisive than 
in the contrary case. A single battle, well fought under the foregoing 



*^ee United States Army Regulations of 1881. 

tl have placed this word" in italics in order to draw attention to the great importance at the 
present time of having intelligent subordinate ofli-^ers in an army. The line of battle is 
now so extended that the troops cannot be under the com))lete control of one man ; much 
depends, therefore, upon the exertions of the subordinate oltlcers, who must be i^auable of 
RS.suming the responsibility of ordering and direr;ting minor movements on the fiela fifbat- 
flp, a« ihf>y l>^rom<» ne^e^^sary. E. 



AND THEIR ArPLICATlON IN MODERN WARFARK. 11.3 

condition, has frequently been decisive of the whole campaign, and 
even of the war. 

The battle of Jena gave Napoleon advantages, which, vigorously tik- bMtti.M.i.i.na 
followed up in the manner so peculiar to him, soon placed the king- 
dom of Prussia at his feet, and left him free to turn his attention to 
the Russians. 

3. Battles are classed as offensive, defen,nie, and as a combination of ch^sesurbnttUs. 
these two, viz.. offensive-defensive or defensive-offensive. 

a. In an offensive battle, the army moves to attack the enemy where- ortvusivc hatih-. 
ever found. 

"It must be admitted that the assailant generallv has a moral ad- iiumini.) 

., , 1 1 , " 1 1 I'lifc* «-*sail«iit has 

vantage over the assailed, and almost always acts more understand- a moiai advant- 
ingly than the latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncer- ''^' ' 
tainty." 

6. In a defensive battle, the army selects a position in which to re- i),.tvnsivt- i)attk'. 
ceive the enemy, and does not leave it. 

Gettysburg was, for the Union troops, a strictly c/e/c?jsire battle; for (iettysbm;;, Ksti:?. 
the Confederates, it was an offensive battle. 

c. When, in the first case, the army leaves its position at any time offensive-defeu- 
during the battle in order to attack the enemy, it then fights a defen- ^^'''^ battle. 
sive-off'ensive battle; while for the enemy, the battle is offensive-defensive. 

The battle of Chancellorsville was offensive- defertsive for the Union chanceiidisviiie, 
troops, and the reverse for the Confederates. ''^*''^' 

4. In the same manner that a nation may be restricted to a defen- iieasonsior figiit- 
sive war, a general may be required to fight a defensive battle. Owing baftre.^ ^" ' *^ 
to inferior numbers, having troops inferior in discipline to the enemy, 

or armed with an inferior weapon, a general may be constrained to 
take a position and await the attack of the enemy. By taking a strong 
position, this inferiority may be counterbalanced ; and, by assuming 
the offensive at the proper time, he may gain a great advantage over the 
enemy, which, properly follow'ed up, may give him the victory. 

The Austrians were restricted to the defensive at the battle of Kbnig- Koniggratz, iscc) 
gratz, because they were armed with a muzzle-loading rifle, and were 
inferior to the Prussians in numbers and discipline; the latter Avere 
armed with the breech-loading needle-gun. 

5. " A pure defence can never win a battle, it may perhaps enable (Home.) 
the troops acting on the defensive to preserve their position, but the cannexei^wiira 
most that can be hoped for from a pure defence is a drawn battle, not *^"""^- 

a victory. The improvemeiffs in modern arms have undoubtedly 
added much to the power of the defence, but the attack has benefitted 
also." • 

"At first sight, it would appear that the defence would gain more 

15 



114 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

(Von Moitke.) from the peculiarities of improved fire-arm?, than the attack. An 

The effect of im- . i j ^ • , . . . , , 

proved fire-arms, army acting on the detensive, may have it m its power to choose such 
a position, as to oblige the enemy to cross an open plain; it will also 
probably have time to ascertain the distance of certain fixed points, so 
as to produce the greatest eflPect from its fire. On the other hand, the 
advantages that an attacking force possesses are also very considerable. 
Ab its commander has only to consult his own judgment, he regulates 
his movements according to the dispositions of the enemy. He. bein^ 
the assailant, has a definite object before him, and chooses his own way 
of obtaining it; while the defender has first to find out his adversary's 
intentions, and then to make the be-t arrangements for frustrating 
them. On the one side, confidence and resolution, on the other, un- 
certainty and anxiety. The defender, if he wish to bring about a de- 
cisiA'e result, must eventually himself become the assailant ; but here 
the question arises, whether before advancing to attack, he should not 
exhaust all the material advantages to be gained from stationary fire, 
by employing it to the very la.«t moment."' 
(Home.) >• When two armies come in contact, the one that acts on the oflfen- 

Adva itagesi.f the 

assailant. ^ive or takes the initiative ha> the power of selecting the point for at- 

tack, and of arranging against that point a superior force. The de- 
fender does not know where he will be attacked, and has to provide for 
several possible, nay probable contingesicies. He is liable to be de- 
ceived, induced to disseminate his force, and seek to be strong at all 
the threatened points, while lhe a.'s.-ailant reed be strong at one and 
that the decisive point. 

''Increased range and accuracy in weapons have given the attacker 
the power of selecting far more advantageous positions for covering 
and supporting his attack than formerly. Ground which in the days 
of old artillery might be simply ignored must now be held by the de- 
fender, thus compelling him to extend and therefore weaken his whole 
line; or it must be abandoned to the enemy, who will quickly make 
use of it as a point (Tajipui for an attack ; and as tlie area operated 
over has thus increased at a much quicker rate than the actual efl^cc- 
tive range of the weapons, the a.«sailant benefits considerably. 
Difficulty of dis- ''Let any person examine a piece of ground and consider how he 
pos'iuon.' would occupy it with a given body of troops and he will find that a 

continued tendency exists in his own mind to occupy certain advan- 
tageous positions in front of what must be his main line. Let him 
imagine troops placed on the.se advantageous po.sitions and he will find 
certain places in front tempting him on to them too, and this without 
end, until he will find him.self compelled from the limited number of 
his troops to abandon all iiopeof holding many points, which he never- 



AXD THEIU ArrLICATION IN MODKKN WAKFAUK. 115 

tholess can distinctly see must be most beiieticial to an attacker. If 
this problem be worked out it will be found that the question will at 
last resolve itself into, not what is bcM to be held, but what it is possible 
to occupy. Further, the actual space, or neutral ground, between the Hpuce betwt-en 

' , . 1 . , 1 . , I ' 1 outposts of arin- 

outposts ot armies closing on one another, a space which acts as a kind it-s more extend- 
of curtain between them, through which neither can penetrate, must, '' ' 
from the increased range of arms, be now wider, and offer more con- 
cealment than formerly. This space is really more dependent on the 
action of musketry, than artillery, and the army acting on the offen- 
sive will usually, if not always, appropriate the greater portion of it. 

"There is a great moral power in the offensive; the assailants are Moral power of 
moving — doing something behind a mysterious curtain that the de- 
fenders know nothing of, there is something peculiarly demoralizing to 
men in waiting .anxiously with nerves at a high state of tension, for 
something they know not what, to begin somewhere. In these respects 
improved arms have not increased the power of the defence." 

6. It has been said that an army which stands strictly on the de- No great results 

r • ^^^ t i ' i • 11 follow a passive 

tensive will never accomplish any great results ; it may repulse the defence. 
enemy in his attack, in fact, use him up severely ; but, if the advan- 
tage gained is not followed up, the defeated army will soon be ready for 
active operations again. 

Therefore, " An army acting on the defensive should never give up (Von Moitke.) 
the idea of itself assuming the offensive." 

At the battle of Gettysburg, the Union army repulsed the main at- Gettysburg, i863. 
tack of the Confederates, with severe losses to the latter; but General 
Meade did not follow up the advantage gained, and General Lee with- 
drew in safety across the Potomac. Although his losses in this battle 
reached nearly thirty thousand men, General Lee soon had his army 
re-organized, and in about three months even initiated an offensive move- 
ment against General Meade. 

7. The general disposition of troops on the battle field for mutual Line of battle. 
support, is termed, the line of battle. An army under such circum- 
stances will have two wings and a centre. 

8. The combination which is made to attack one or more points of order of battle. 
an army in position, is called, the order of battle. 

The four principal orders of battle are, the parallel, oblique, concave, Four orders of 

J battle. 

and convex.^ 

9. The lines of battle of the opposing forces being sensibly parallel The ,P"i"aiiei 
to each other is an example of the parallel order of battle. 

This order of battle naturally results when a simultaneous attack How developed, 
ix made along the whole front of an enemy's position. The results 



116 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

will usually be very decisive for the army which gains the advantage, 
N but the price paid for success will also be very dear. 

Oblique order of 10. When the line of battle of the assailant makes an angle with 
that of the assailed, the order of battle is said to be oblique. This order 
of battle results when the attack is made with one wing, the other 
wing at the same time being held back, or refused. 

Concave and con- 11. When the attack is made by both wings, the centre being refus- 

vex orders of bat- ii-ii. 

tie. ed, the order oi battle is concave; and, when made by the centre, witli 



the wing.< refus 



convex. 



All points of the 
enemy's positioi 
not equally im- 
portant. 



How the attack 12. The Order of battle then results from the dispositions made to 

should be made. 

attack the enemy's position; so it naturally follows, that when the 

enemy is found, the first point to be decided is, horn to muke the attack 

with the greatest damage to the enemy and with the least to the attacking force. 

Attacks along Owing to the great loss which usuallv follows attacks along the whole 

the whole line. ,. , r-n, i,,",!! i , 

line, even when successful, they should seldom be made, except when the 
• chances of success and the probable results of victory are very great. 

13. Whatever the enemy's position, there will always be found some 
point or points, which, if carried, will carry with them greater advan- 
tages than the possession of others. 

Kecessity of a A study of the enemy's position then becomes a necessity, in order 

enemy's position, to determine where the attack will be made. Those points of the 
enemy's position will first be considered the loss of which will bring 
on him the most disastrous consequences; for instance, a point which 
commands the field of battle and the rest of the enemy's line, and the 
capture of which would require him to withdraw, or to make new dis- 

Key points. positions. Such points are called key points. 

Weak points. Points which are weak, either from the nature of the ground — it be- 

ing favorable for a close approach to the enemy's line, or not well 
swept by his fire — or where the disposition of the troops is not proper 
for their protection, will next receive attention. 

Points that flank the approaches, or are commanded by others which 
can be occupied, will also receive attention. 

General rule for 14. The general rule will be to make the attack on the enemy's 
»cving. centre when his forces are too extended for the position occupied, and 

on the wings when his forces are concentrated. 

Attacks on both Attacks ou both wings should only be made when the assailant is 

avoided. ^ greatly superior in numbers; otherwise such attacks necessitate a 

weakening of the centre, of which the enemy may take advantage to 
make a counter-attack at that point, thus separating the wings and 
causing disaster. 

Exception. This rulc do8s uot apply in the case of false attacks made on one wing 

of the enemv's line to cover the real attack on the other. 



AND THKIR Am.ICATIOX IN MODKRN WARFARK. 11/ 

15. When tlie eiieaiy's line is found to be eciually strong along the wiion no fHv..r- 

e 1 'a II • j^ x' ^ 1 ' 1 J? 11 able point ofnt- 

entire iront, so that no ravorable point oi attack can be lound the pos- tack can ha 
session of which will carry with it advantages propoitionate to the 
losses which would follow upon its capture, then the better plan would 
be to flank or turn the enemy, and compel him to abandon his position. 

16. The attack is seldom confined to one point, but, having selected Attaok seldom 

rt» -11 1 1 -111 confined to one 

the place where the great effort will be made, endeavor to mislead the point. 
enemy by one or more false or feint attacks, to keep him in doubt as to 
your real intentions, and to prevent him from concentrating his troo[)s 
to meet your forces making the main attack. 

17. Tactical and strategical considerations both enter the problem oonsideraiions 

, , . . , . ,, ,1 . 1 . 1 . 1 .1, wliich enter the 

of determining the point ot attack; the consideration which will govern problem of at- 
in any particular case will depend upon the results which are expected 
to follow the defeat of the enemy, or the risks to be run in attaining 
these results. The tactical considerations relate to the advantages 
which can be gained on the field of battle ; and the strategical to the 
consequences of victory. 

The strategical conditions are more important than the tactical, un- 8trate;^icai con- 
less the difficulties of the ground are too great, and the results expected iy more import- 
to follow do not justify the risks to be taken. 

18. Let the army P (Fig. 1) find the enemy in the position AB, Example. 
with one flank resting on a hill and the other on a river, with an im- 
passable marsh in front. The point A is both the strategical and tac- 
tical point of attack; for its capture would command the field of bat- 
tle, force the enemy from his line of retreat, XY, and throw him back 

on the impassable obstacle opposite the left flank. AC, with the right 
re-enforced, would be a better position for the assailed to assume, as in 
this case an attack at A would compel the assailant to fight with an 
obstacle at his back, and an attack at C would give the assailed the 
full benefit of the height. 

The position AC is also objectionable, as it presents a salient d, al- 
ways a weak point in a line, because it renders both faces liable to be 
enfiladed. 

19. Suppose an army, acting on the defensive, to have the position Example. 
XY (Fig. 2); its right uncovered, and its left resting on an impassable 
obstacle. The strategical point of attack is Y ; for, if the left is forced 

back, the line of retreat AB is exposed. But the selection of Y as the 
point of attack, forces the assailant to fight with his back to the ob- 
stacle Z, which would be very dangerous unless greatly superior to the 
enemy. Rather select X as the point of attack, and depend upon vig- 
orous fighting and pursuit for great results. 

20. Combined attacks, like combined marches, cannot be relied tacks. 



118 PRINCIPLES OK THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

upon for succesfs. They should only be undertaken when the natural 
features of the country are such that the enemy can easily be checked if 
he attempts to make a counter-attack, and when the preliminary move- 
ments of the troops are concealed from his view. 

Example. j,j ^ig. 3, when the features of the country are such that the detach- 

ments N', N" can, by taking up naturally strong positions, hold the 
enemy in check, the main body N can operate with safety against the 
flank of M ; for, in case of repulse, its line of retreat would not be com- 
promised. 

characier of the Much depends upou the character of the opposing general ; if he be 

opposing ge;ieial ^ ' it? , , 

to be considered, alert and always ready to act promptly and vigorously, any extended 
movement would be dangerous, although it might under other circum- 
stances be successfully carried out. Movements may be made with 
troops that are superior in numbers or discipline, which would be very 
rash when the opposing forces are nearly equal, or the commanders of 
the same capacity. 
(Home.) 21, "There are really only two ways in which a battle can arise. 

Two ways in '< a. When one armv is on the defensive, and occupies a strong posi- 

which a battle - > f fo f 

may arise. tiou, the Other moving forward to attack it. 

"6. When the two armies meet, both being in movement. 
The role of at- " Aucrstadt, Solfcriuo, Mars-La-Tour, are all examples of this latter 

tiick^r falhs to oijp 

side. kind of battle, but in every case the role of attacker or defender falls 

to one side, sometimes to each alternately, and it may tary in different 
portions of the tield, the same army being on the defensive in one place 
and on the offensive in another. 

Order of march to " However a battle may actually come about, the order of march of 

the'orSe"of bat- the troops forming the army must be intimately connected with the 
action of the troops in line of battle ; consequently the order of marclh 
must be invariably detailed so as to allow of the arms first required 
being near the head of the column. 

The way battles " Jf the Way in which battles begin is considered, it will be found 
that the cavalry of the advanced-guard usually find the enemy and re- 
port his position ; if he is in a defensive position, they report the cir- 
cumstance; if on the move, they report the force immediately in front 
of them. 

Duty of the ad- "In all probabilitv thev will be driven in on the main bodv of the 
vajiced-guard " " ci-i *ii 

commander. advanced-guard, the commander of which must then take up the best 

defensive position he can, to cover the deployment of the troops in his 

rear. 

When the enemy " If the enemy are holding a defensive position, he will not be much 

pos^tkin^ ensue ^j-^yj^^gj^ bccausc fcw generals will like to leave a carefully prepared 

position, and to give up too soon the advantage of acting on the defen- 



AND TFiEIIl AITLICATIOX IN iMOUKRN WAUl'AUK. ll'J 

sive, or to move until the plan.s of the attacker have declared them- 
selves. 

"In such a ease the commander of the advanced-guard, knowing outy of t)ii.< ad- 

II • 1 11 1 1 . . , , vanced-gnard 

that the enemy is to be attacked, must take up such a position that he coinmander in 
may protect and cover the advance of the main body to the attack. 

22. "If the enemy are not holding a defensive position, he will in Difficulties ot the 
all likelihood be hardly pressed, and have some difficulty in maintaining who" Uie ""lu'iny 
a point (Tappui on which the troops in rear are to form up to the right 

or left, such as Hassenhausen, held by Gudin at the battle of Auer- 
stadt. Consequently it follows that those arms of tiie service which 
can facilitate the formation, should be near the head of the column. 
Hence there is a very close connection between the tactical action of 
troops on a field of battle, and their order of march, and it is essential- 
ly requisite that the order of march be subordinated to the deploy- 
ment of the army into line of battle, •■ •■• and this be- 
comes all the more important as the troops appr(jach the actual point 
of collision. As they do so, the number of reads on which they are as the enemy is 
moving must be reduced, by the mere convergence of the columns, and !mriy'm»ist corT- 
hence, the order of the troops in those columns becomes of the utmost 
importance. It is further manifest that there should be no definite 
order of march, but the actual order in which the troops stand should 
be regulated by the work to be done, and the nature of the country. 

23. "It is manifestlv the obiect of the officer commanding the ad- Advanred-guard 

^ -, • . . , .,, 1 , , should take a 

vanced-guard to rind a position such as will compel the enemy to de- strong j.osition. 
velop a considerable force to attack him, and at the same time enable 
him to make head against such an attack. 

"Such a position can generallv be found ; it is often desirable to oc- Katme of the po- 

. Ill 1 •! T sition to be as- 

cupy a small village or town, loop-hole some houses or buildings, or sumed by the 
form some trenches, which will enable the advanced-guard to remain ^ ^^"'^^ ""'^' 
in possession of the ground. It is requisite in many cases to open pas- 
sages to the right and left for troops to move through and facilitate 
the formation; a strong body of engineers should therefore move with 
the advanced-guard. If the enemy is in position, and does not show 
any inclination to attack, a portion of the engineers may be detailed Engineers with 

,,, ni«T 1 *i • ^ tl'G advaiiced- 

to remove obstacles, form any small bridges that may be required) guard. 
such as those that were needed for the passage of the Bistritz'^- and 
Sauert, and facilitate the advance of the troops beyond the position 
taken up by the main body of the ad vanced-guard. But as the line 
of advance of an army acting on the offensive will, if defeated, be gen- 
erally its line of retreat, it will be always well lo strengthen some 

TlS7ft-71. 



120 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

points which in case of disaster may afford a rallying place to troops 
Xecessityof artii- that are Worsted. But no position can be properlv defended without 

lerv with advauc- i i> i i t 

*>d-"guard. artillery, consequently the commander of the advanced-guard should 

have a strong force of artillery with him, which he must use boldly, 
to search out the enemy's position, compel him to unmask his guns, 
and declare himself. 
j)uties of the " The Commander of the artillery of the advanced-guard has a very 

advanced-guard responsible officc throwu on him. He must not only find positions for 
'^'^" his own guns, but he should, from the fire of the enemy, be able to se- 

lect places for the corps batteries as they come up, and to facilitate 
this object he should place his batteries so as to leave room for others 
to come up in support of them. 
Miirs-La-Tour <' 24. The battle of Mars-La-Tour offers an excellent example of 

the action of an advanced-guard on a large scale, when meeting an 
.army on the move. The object of the Germans was to hold the French 
fast, and prevent their retreat on Verdun, while the remainder of their 
army came up. Thus the troops that first attacked the French were 
really acting like all other advanced-guards, they were covering the 
front and giving time for the deployment of the army. 
Aivensieben de- " The German general, Alvensleben, learning from his reconnoitring 
tack. oflBcers that the French Avere encamped between Vionville and Rezon- 

ville, determined to attack them with his own corps, the third, and 
<ta. m. what other troops were near. At nine a. m. the Germans established 

Compels the between Tronville and the I'oad by which the French were retreating, 
four horse-artillery batteries and three cavalry regiments, which sur- 
prised the French encampments, compelled the French to retire and 
deploy, facing west across, and at right angles to the Verdun road. 
11 a. m. "At eleven o'clock Vionville was taken by the Prussian infantry, 

Vionville taken, and immediately strengthened by two companies of engineers, and it 
at once became a point cVappui, round which the whole Prussian line 
pivoted throughout the day. 

"The four horse-artillery batteries were soon ^'^u'pported with four 
other batteries, which fired on the French infantry masses, causing 
them to suffer severely; soon, however, the German ammunition began 
to be exhausted, and the ammunition columns left at Gorge, although 
ordered up in time, could only come up the ravine with great difficulty 
Corps artillery and under a shower of French shells. Then the corps artillery came 
into action to the east of Tartleville. The operation was no easy one. 
Once in position it was received with a terrible infantry fire from 
Flavigny. But the batteries held their ground, being shortly support- 
ed by four more batteries, which extended the line of guuvS to the left 
towards Vionville. The fire of the French infantry, although at nine 



comes into 
action 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 121 

hundred to one thousand two hundred yards, caused great loss, cover- 
ing the batteries with a rain of bullets. 

"The eight batteries in position near Vionville, and the .seven near 12 m. 
Flavigny, now concentrated their fire on Flavigny and the Cistern Fiavigny takt-n. 
wood ; these fifteen batteries completely cleared that important posi- 
tion, which fell to the Germans about twelve o'clock without any 
.serious infantry fighting. The second French corps, shaken by the ter- 
rible artillery fire, called on its cavalry for support, and a sharp cav- 
alry action ensued, under cover of which nine of the fifteen German 
batteries advanced beyond the Flavigny road so as to embrace that 
place,in the German line of battle; three other batteries advanced al- 
most simultaneously along the main road between Rezonville and 
Vionville; but these movements were only executed at the cost of 
heavy losses; some batteries losing all their officers, others many of 
their horses. 

"It will be seen by this abridged account, tliat the German guns Mode of action of 

1 . .' T . , _!• n • • i- 1 • J- J the artillery. 

were not advancing in line with or lollowmg in rear of the infantry. 
But the movements of the artillery, far from being rigidly tied down 
to conform to those of the infantry, were tactically independent, that 
is to say, both arms were working each according to its own special 
peculiarities for the attainment of one object. Long before the Prus- 
sian infantry could come on the ground in any force, the artillery was 
in position, preparing the way for it, protected on its flanks by cavalry 
and a small force of infantry. The manner in which the German ar- 
tillery was used to extend the line of battle, fill up a great gap in its 
centre, and so not only occupy a longer front themselves, but attack 
their enemy over a larger front, is well worthy of notice; they were 
working tactically together with tlie cavalry and infantry to debar the 
French from the Verdun road, and give time for the deployment of the 
German army. The attack of the French cavalry on the German bat- 
teries was at once met by the German cav<ilry, and the fire of the guns 
being then masked, both as regards their own, and to a certain extent 
their opponent's fire by the cavalry fight, the batteries seized the op- 
portunity and dashed tq the front. At one o'clock the Prussians had 1 p- m. 
two cavalry divisions, one corps, and twenty-one batteries in action, 
the French had one cavalry division, two corps, and twenty-six bat- 
teries. The whole of the Prussian guns were really in three batteries, 
of nine, seven, and five guns respectively, while the French guns were 
scattered about. After one o'clock the French took the offensive, and 
drove back the Prussian wings; the centre, however, held fast to Vion- 
ville. 

"In this action the use made of artillery and engineers to check the 

16 



122 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Pmnts connected French and gain time, the action of the artillery especially, in seizing 
be spectaiiy " advantageous places, and rapidly bringing up fresh batteries, and in 
concentrating masses of fire on certain points, are well worthy of close 
examination. If the guns had not been with the advance, the same 
result could never have been obtained. It is worth noticing where the 
• guns marched. "■•' * The artillery had no special escorts, 

one battery inarching wirh the cavalry brigade forming the advanced- 
guard, and the other three with the main body of the division; the 
divisional artillery of the third corps marched between the brigades of 
the leading division, the corps artillery between the divisions. Al- 
though the eighth Prussian corps hardly came into action at .all, a 
large number of its batteries coming up towards the close of the day, 
supported the exhausted artillery of the tenth and third corps. 

Role of attacker 25. "We have said that no matter how a battle may begin, the role 

and defender lia- , , i i • i -n n .• 1 1 • i* i i 

bie to change. ot attacker and detender will usually tall to one side, and perhaps 
change several times during the course of the day, depending on the 
number of men engaged at one place, the strength of the positions, the 
mode of handling the reserves, and the number of men defending the 
position.'' 



J^AJ^.I. 




M" 




'UuyivcjriA. 



L<7>iy7rv//j;. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARP'ARE. 128 



CHAPTER IX. 

RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 
RETREATS. 

1. To conduct a retreat successfully in the presence of a victorious Difficulty of con- 

, T/v * 1 • • mi • • ducting a suc- 

or superior enemy is the most difncult operation in war. This is cessfui retreat. 
owing to a great extent to the effect produced on the morale of the 
troops as soon as their backs are turned on the enemy. 

2. "The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country (Jomini.) 

IV • /v> 1 1 I 1 1 Causes which de- 

to be traversed, the resources it oilers, the obstacles to be encountered, cide the fate of 

retreats. 

the attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority 
or inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances 
which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out 
of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may 
make for their execution." 

3. It is upon the rear-guard in retreats that the safety of the army important duties 

^ ^ " . . of the rear-guard. 

depends, and the efforts and sacrifices made by it should be unlimited 
when necessity calls for them. 

The officer to command the rear-guard should be selected with re- officer to com- 
gard to his coolness in emergencies, his prudence and judgment in ^Trd.*^ 
making dispositions. " He should be feared and respected by his 
enemies." 

4. A retreat is always a necessity after a lost battle or after an un- Manner of com- 

*^ ... mencing and eon- 

successful enterprise. When a retreat is inevitable, the troops engag- ducting a retreat. 

ed must first be withdrawn. This, when possible, should be done by . 
alternate lines, the movement being protected, as much as possible by 
the artillery, a portion of which remains with the line nearest the 
enemy for this purpose. A rear-guard of the freshest troops is organ- 
ized as soon as possible ; the pursuing enemy is checked or forced to 
deploy, when the retreat is stopped and the troops re-organized, and 
order restored. The army is then again in condition to confront the 
enemy. The sooner all this can be accomplished, the less will be the 
losses from the consequences of defeat. The losses in battle are small 
when compared to those of a disorganized, routed army on the retreat. 



124 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Nature of retreat 
depends on na- 
ture of pursuit. 



Forced marches 
on the retreat. 



(Jomini.) 
Five methods of 
conducting a re- 
treat . 



The five methods 
considered and 
compared. 



Two cases under 
the fifth method. 



(Jomini.) 



General rule for 
mtroats. 



5. The nature of the retreat will de})end entirely upon the nature 
of the pursuit. A vigorous enemy, following up his advantage with 
energy, will soon entirely disperse or capture a defeated army. 

6. At the commencement of a retreat it frequently becomes neces- 
sary to decide whether a forced march will be made, or whether the 
retreat will be conducted by regular marches. With a large army it 
may be set down as a general rule that short marches should be made, 
placing the main reliance for safety upon the rear-guard. A forced 
march with a large army is a very difficult operation under the most 
favorable circumstances, but when made by a beaten, dispirited, dis- 
organized army, it may lead to the most disastrous results. 

7. " There are five methods of arranging a retreat : The first is to 
march in a single mass and upon one road. The second consists in 
dividing the army into two or three corps, marching at the distance of 
a day's march from each other, in order to avoid confusion, especially 
in the materiel. The third consists in marching upon a single front 
by several roads, nearly parallel, and having a common point of ar- 
rival. The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads. 
The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along constantly diverg- 
ing roads." 

8. A retreat conducted in accordance with the first method would 
evidently be a dangerous operation with a very large force, and espec- 
ially so if the enemy should make a vigorous pursuit. The danger 
would arise from overcrowding, which might soon convert the retreat 
into a rout. 

The second method might be followed when the enemy does not 
push the retreating army too hard. 

When the roads are good the fourth method would be most excel- 
lent, for the army, as it marches onward in retreat, is constantly con- 
centrating, a very desirable object to attain. 

9. In regard to the fifth method there are only two cases in which 
divergent roads can be followed : 

"1st. When an army has experienced a great defeat in its own 
country, and the scattered fragments seek protection within the walls 
of fortified places. 

"2nd. In a war when the sympathies of the whole population are 
enlisted, each fraction of an array thus divided may serve as a nucleus 
of assembly in each province; but in a purely methodical war, with 
regular armies, carried on according to the principles of the art, diver- 
gent retreats are simply absurd." 

10. Usually a retreat should be regulated by the same rules as a 
forward movement, viz., the different corps of the army should move 



AND THEIR APPLrCATIOX IN MODKKN WAKFAUi:. 125 

on parallel roads within mutual supporting distances, Tliis is a point 
of the greatest importance, for the army should always be prepared to 
meet an enemy es'er on the alert for a favorable cliance to attack. 

11. The crossing of a large stream by an army on the retreat is PaHsaj^t-of a iai«e 
usually an operation of extreme difficulty. The trains should first be tieatiny army, 
crossed, and to cover their passage the army should take a strong posi- 
tion some distance in advance of tlie point selected for the crossing. 

The march of the rear-guard should be .so regulated that it will reach 
the point intended for it to cross ju.st after the last of the main body 
has passed. After the rear-guard has croesed, the bridge should be 
destroyed. 

12. A retreat conducted parallel to a frontier may often lead to Eetreat f.araiiei 

. . 11. . 11 n 1 to a frontier. 

very decisive results. As this operation usually exposes anank to the 
enemy, it can only be resorted to with safety when the natural features 
of the country greatly favor it. When the line of retreat is along a 
large river, or along a mountain, the bridges and defiles of which are 
under the control of the retreating army, the advantages are very 
great. When this line of retreat is through the enemy's country, the 
army can subsist at liis expense, and cause him to bear the full weight 
of the war ; and when the army's line of retreat is within its own fron- 
tier, the enemy is drawn on without gaining ground towards the in- 
terior, is forced to expose his flanks to attacks from those direction.s, 
and is forced to march through a hostile countr}', the inhabitants of 
which are always ready to assist his opponent. 

PURSUITS. 

13. "After a battle is gained the defeated armv should be pursued (NVoiseiey.) 

* Manner of con- 

Unceasingly. ducting a pur- 

" You have won a great battle, and the enemy are in full retreat ; 
run after him; hammer him with guns, charge with cavalry, above all 
things pass round his flanks, and keep pushing him and hitting him 
from morning until night. His forces will soon cease to be an army. 
The French after Waterloo, when well beaten by the English, and pur- >Vatcrioo. 
sued without intermission by the Prussians, flocked back across their 
frontier a disorganized mass without arms. The general who, in pur- 
suit, acts with precaution, who manoeuvres instead of charging, will 
never inflict much harm upon an enemy ; caution is out of place when 
you have a beaten army before you. This conduct, which by some may 
be termed reckless, may at times occasion losses to the pursuer, but 
unless it is practised, you can never expect to crush a retreating enemy. 
This is the time for cavalry and mounted infantry, if you have any of 
the latter." 

14. When the pursuit is vigorously made many risks may be taken. 



126 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Why risks may be for it IS Safe to presume that the enemy cannot in this case make a de- 
snit. cided stand, or turn on the offensive with very much prospect of suc- 

cess. 
The enemy's 15, The Communications of the defeated armv should be seized, if 

communications m i i • i i i i " ' 

should be seized, possible, because when they are gained the whole materiel of the enemy 
is at your mercy, and a position may be taken to bar his further re- 
treat or attack him in flank. TJie latter operation will usually be the 
safer one, because the efforts of a desperate foe may accomplish much 
in the former case. 

Effort made to 16. A great effort should be made to separate the forces of the re- 
separate the . ... , ,.,. 

forces, treating army, as m this case a larger fraction ot it may be destroyed or 



enemy' 

captured, Avhile in the contrary case little damage would be inflicted. 
Advantages of a A road parallel to that taken by the retreating forces offers manv ad- 

parallel road. '^ ^ '' _ ^ ^ ' ^ 

vantages to the pursuing army ; for, by following this road, opportuni- 
ties may be presented of making a flank attack. 
Moral effects of a 17. A retreat, from its moral effects, always gives certain advan- 
tages to the pursuing force, even when made by an army in good con- 
dition. 

SOULT's RETREAT IN PORTUGAL, 1809. 

18. A description of Soult's retreat, after leaving Oporto, is taken 
to illustrate the difficulties which may be surmounted in operations of 
this nature. 
(Kapler.) "The 15th, Sir Arthur reached Braga (Fig. 1). Murray was at 

British, under Guimaracns on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his 
ing o»- orders, was near Chaves, having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with 

instructions to occupy the passes of Kuivaens and Melgassy. But at 
Position of the this time Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having, by a sur- 
Souit. prising effort, extricated himself from one of the most dangerous situa- 

tions that a general ever escaped from. To understand this, it is nec- 
essary to describe the country through which his retreat was effected. 
Nature of the 19. "I have already observed that the Sierra de Cabirera and the 

iine"of retreaf . ^ Sierra de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega ; but, in approach- 
ing the Douro, the latter slants oft" towards Oporto, thus opening a 
rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads from 
Oporto to Amarante. Hence, the French in retreating to the latter 
town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de Catalina on 
their left. 
Importance to " Between Amarante and Braga, which is on the other side of the 

ante. ° "^^^ Catalina, a route practicable for artillery runs through Guimaraens, 
but it is necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this road. Thus, 
Soult, as he advanced along the narrow pass between the mountains 
and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison's hold- 



i 



AND THEIR APPMCATIOX IN MODKllN WAHKAinO. 127 

inoj Aniarante. Several days, however, had elapsed since that general 
had connnnnicated, and an aide-de-camp was sent on the morning of 
the r2th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel Tholose, the officer 
employed, found Loison at Aniarante, but neither his remonstrances, 
nor the after-coming intelligence that Oporto was evacuated, and the Loison abandons 
army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could induce that general to re- 
main there, and, as we have seen, he marched towards Guimaraens on 
the 13th, abandoning the bridge of Araarante without a blow, and leav- 
ing his commander and two-thirds of the army to what must have ap- 
peared inevitable destruction. 

20. "The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one Action orsouit on 
o'clock on the morning of the 13th., just as he had passed the rugged i^oison'Tiad left 
banks of the Souza river ; tlie weather was boisterous, the men were " "^''''■'"' *'• 
fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the whole 

army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the Duke of Dal- 
matia justified by his energy that fortune which had raised him to his 
high rank in the world. Being by a Spanish pedlar informed of a path 
that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de 
Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, silenced the murmurs of 
the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, destroyed the artillery, aban- 
doned the military chest and baggage, and loading the animals with 
sick men and musket ammunition, repassed the Souza, and followed 
the Spanish guide with a hardy resolution. 

21. "The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as The army united 

... 1 • 1 .11 • 1 1 1 1 *t Guimaraens. 

might be expected in tho.se wild regions, but the troops made good 
their passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, 
happily fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by 
Lorge's dragoons from Briiga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole 
army was concentrated. 

22. "If Soult's energy in command was conspicuous on this occa- Souit'sdetermin- 
sion, his sagacity and judgment were no less remarkably displayed in judgmentr 
what followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route 

ui)()n (luimaraens to Braga ; but he, with a long reach of mind, calcu- 
lated upon the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the 
bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be 
there before him; on that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat, 
lighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison's and 
Lorge's corps in the face of an enemy — a circumstance that might 
operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly give 
opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the generals (ap- 
l)arer:tly Loison) was recommending a convention like Cintra. 

23. " But, with n firmness worthv of the highest adiniriition, Soult 



128 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Destroys the 
guns, ammuni- 
tion and baggage. 



Carvalho d'Este. 
14th. 



Near Braga, 13th 



Soult re-organ - 
izeh the army, 
and commands 
the reiir-guard. 



Carvalho tc 
monde. 



Two linesi of 
treat. 



Extremity of 
Soult. 



destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and ammu- 
nition of Loison's and Lorge's divisions; then, leaving the high road 
to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the mountain paths, he 
made for Carvalho d'Este, where he arrived late in the evening of the 
14th, thus gaining a day's march in point of time. The morning of 
the 15th he drew up his troops in the position he had occupied just 
two months before at the battle of Braga ; and this spectacle, when 
twenty thousand men were collected upon the theatre of a former 
victory, and disposed so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all 
the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of 
generalship, an inspiration of real genius! 

24. " Soult now re-organized his army ; taking command of the rear- 
guard himself, and giving that of the advanced-guard to General 
Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says, 'The 
whole army was astonished'; as if it was not a stroke of consummate 
policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British, should be 
under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which was to fight its 
way through the native forces, should have a commander whose very 
name called up all the revengeful passions of the Portuguese. Manefa 
durst not .warren der ; and the Duke of Dalmatia dexterously forced those 
to act with most zeal who Avere least inclined to serve him ; and, in 
.sooth, such was his perilous situation, that all the resources of his mind 
and all the energies of his character were needed to save the army. 

25. " Fi'oni Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there 
were two lines of retreat. The one through Euivaens 

by which the army had marched when coming from Chaves two 
months before; the other, shorter, although moi'e impracticable, lead- 
ing by the Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road from Rui- 
vaens to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the 
bridge of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and 
defended by one thousand Iwo hundred Portuguese, with artillery ; and 
that another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte 
Nova on the Cavado river. 

26. "The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves ; 
the second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have 
cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the 
soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starvipig; the ammunition was 
damp with the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and which 
was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of wind. 
The British army would certainly fall upon tlie rear in the morning; 
and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to be weak, 
could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surelv arrived. 



AND THEIR APrLICATION IN MODERN WARKARK. 129 

27. "In this extremity, Soult sent for Major Dulong, an otiicer just- Major imion^sc- 
ly reputed for one of the most daring in tlie French ranks. Address- of Ponte Nova. 
ing himself to this brave man, he said, 'I have chosen you from the 

whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. 
Do you choose one hundred grenadiers and twenty -five horsemen ; en- 
deavor to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the bridge. If 
you succeed, say so, but send no other report ; your silence will suffice.' 
Thus exhorted, Dulong selected his men, and departed. 

"Favored by the storm, he readied the bridge unperceived of the 
Portuguese, killed the sentinel before any alarm was given, and then, 
followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow slip of 
masonry, which was the only part of the bridge undestroyed. The 
Cavado river was in full flood, and roaring in a deep channel; one of 
the grenadiers fell into the gulf, but the noise of the storm and the river 
was louder than his cry ; Dulong, with the eleven still creeping on- 
wards, reached the other side, and falling briskly on the first posts of the 
peasants, killed or dispersed the whole. At that moment, the remain- 
der of his men advanced close to the bridge ; and some crossing, others 
mounting the heights, shouting and firing, scared the Portuguese sup- 
porting posts, who imagined the whole army was upon them ; and thus 
the passage was gallantly won. 

28. " At four o'clock, the bridge being repaired, the advanced-guard Delay at the 
of the French commenced crossing; but as the column of march was dor."' ° 
long, and- the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly ; and 

beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more formid- 
able. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut in the 
side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at last came 
upon a torrent called the Miserella, which, breaking down a deep 
ravine, or rather gulf, was only to be crossed by a bridge, constructed 
with a single lofty arch, called the mltidor, or leaper; and so narrow 
that only three persons could pass abreast. Fortunately for the French, 
the saltidoi' was not cut, but entrenched and defended by a few hundred 
Portuguese peasants, who occupied the rocks on the further side; and 
here the good soldier Dulong again saved the army ; for, when a first 
and second attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried the en- 
trenchments by a third effort; but at the same instant fell deeply 
wounded himself. The head of the column now poured over, and it 
was full time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and 
the Ponte Nova was choked with dead. 

29. "Sir Arthur Wellesley, (juitting Braga on the morning of the Movement of the 
16th, had come, about four o'clock, upon Sonlt's rear-guard, which re- Bm^a! ifitii!'" 
mained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the bridges. 

17 



130 



PRTXCTrr.ES OF THE ART AND SCTEXCE OF WAR 



ri>ntiniiation of 
the pursuit. 



The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left occupied a steep 
hill; and a stout battle might have been made, but men thus circum- 
stanced, and momentarily expecting an order to retreat, will seldom 
stand firmly; and, on this occasion, when some light troops turned the 
left, and General Sherbrooke, with the guards, mounting the steep 
hill, attacked the front, the French made but one di?^charge, and fled 
in confusion to the Ponte Xova. ■" 

30. "Tlie French reached Montalegre on the 17th. 
Sir Arthur, with the main body of the army, halted that day at Rui- 
vaens. The ISth he renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry 
passed Montalegre, followed by tire guards; the enemy was, however, 
drawn up behind the Salas in force, and no action took place. Syl- 
veira, indeed, had entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before 
the British came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put 
his men into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who 
was despatched to Marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa 
Perdrices upon Villa del Bey, loitered on the road so long that all 
chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end ; for, 
though Beresford, on the 19th, pushed Colonel Talbot with the Four- 
teenth dragoons as far as Ginjo, Francheschi turned in force, and 
obliged that officer to retire, and thus the pursuit terminated. . 



Soult enters 
Oiense,19th. 



Soult, ^ *' on the 19th, entered Grense, but without 

guns, stores, ammunition, or baggage; his men exhausted with fatigue 
and misery, the greatest part being without shoes, many without ac- 
countrements, and in some instances even without muskets. * * *' 
He had carried fifty-eight pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he re- 
turned without a gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able 
soldier nowise diminished. * * * 

31. " When General Loison * '* abandoned Amar- 

ante, he relinquished all claims to military reputation, as a simple 
Abandonment of statement of facts will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to 
Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy's 
forces; yet he, although at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, in- 
fantry, and artillery, that night, and without another shot being fired, 
abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, tlie rest of 
the army could escape from its perilous situation with honcr. 



Observations. 



"The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were ex- 
cellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two vul- 
tures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, the other for 
triumph ; but there was evidently a failure in the operations of ]V[ar 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IX MODERN MAIJFARE. 131 

shal Rcrcsford. Soult did not reach Siilainonde until the eveuino^ of Hi'-'foi'i- 
the loth, and his rear-guard was still there on the eve ' .' : 
Beresford was in person at Chaves on the 16th, and his .... :. vi 

that place early on the morning of the 17th. Soult passed Montaiegre 
on the 18th, hut from Chaves to that place is only one march. 

"Again, Marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 
13th, and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, 
he must have known the importance of Salamonde, and that there were 
roads to it through Mondin and Cavez shorter than by Guimaraens 
and Chaves. It is true that Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens and 
Melgacy ; but he executed his orders slowly, and Miserella was neglect- 
ed. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal's stafT, endeavored, in- 
deed, to break down the bridge of Ponte Nova and Ruivaens; and it 
was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised at the former, had 
been collected; but he had only a single dragoon with him, and was 
without power to execute this important task. The peasantry, glad to 
be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop their retreat, and still 
more to destroy the bridge of Miserella, which was the key of all the 
coramunicatioUvS, and all the great markets of Entre Minho e Douro; 
and therefore sure to be built up again, in which case the people knew 
well that their labor and time would be called for without payment. 
It is undoubted that Soult owed his safetv to the failure in breaking Failure to break 

, , " ^ the bridges the 

those bridges; and it does appear that if Major Warre had been sup- cause ot.souit's 
plied with the necessary escort and materials he would have effectual- 
ly destroyed them. 

32. "Sylveira did not move either in the direction or with the ce- Failures of «yi- 
lerity required of him by Beresford ; there seems to have been a mis- 
understanding between them ; but allowance must be made for the num- 
erous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders by 

officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of moving 
troops not accustomed, or perfectly willing, to act together." 

33. Instructive lessons may also be learned from the following : other instructive 
Soult from Spain in 1814 (parallel retreat); Frederick the Great from ^'''""^P ®''- 
Moravia in 1758 (parallel retreat); Napoleon from Moscow in 1812 

(parallel pursuit); Grouchy after Ligny in 1815 (pursuit); retreat of 
the Austrian army after Kiiniggratz in 1866; retreat of the English 
army from Quatre Bras on Waterloo in 1815; Johnston's withdrawal 
before Sherman's advance through Georgia in 1864 ; Lee before Grant 
in Virginia the same year, etc., etc. 



132 PRINCIPJ.ES OF THE ART AND SCTENCE OF AA'AR 



CHAPTER X. 

DIVERSIONS. 

Jsature of a diver- 1. A diversion consists ill sending a part of an array to perform 

some enterprise which will assist the main army in its operations. A 

Essentials to sue- diversion once determined upon should be made with great secrecv and 

cess. ... . . r 

rapidity, as its success will mainly depend upon taking the enemy by 
surprise. If, as is usually the case, the co-operation of the main body 
of the army is required, the detachment should make every effort to 
reach the proper position at the appointed time. 
Influence of the 2. The nature of the country is a verv important factor in this class 

country on diver- . i ' i t i i i i i • i 

sions. 01 operations. 1 he country should be broken or wooded, in order to 

conceal the march of the detachment; and there should be good roads 
to facilitate its march. Country of this description will also interfere 
with the movements of the enemy to cut off the detachment if its ob- 
ject is discovered, or its manoeuvre unsuccessful. 

Diversion may 3. If the enemy occupies a strong position, a diversion mav succeed 

favor other opera- ... , * 

tions. in forcing him to move troops to meet it, thus causing him to weaken 

some part of his line, where an attack may be made to advantage. It 
may threaten his line of communications, or turn his flank, thus oblig- 
ing him to abandon a position which might occasion serious losses to 
carry. 

Objections to di- Diversions are objectionable because they weaken the main body; 
they should as a rule then only be undertaken when the army is con- 
siderably superior in strength to that of the enemy. They serve to di- 
vide the attention of the commanding general, necessarily distracting 
his attention from the main operation. Too much reliance may be 
placed by him upon the results expected to follow from- them, which, 
in case of failure, may cause serious disaster. Lastly, trivial causes, 
which cannot always be foreseen and provided against, may arise to 
make delays w'hich would be fatal to the success of the expedition. 

Lessons from our 5. Our civil war fumished many instances of the failure of opera- 
tions of this character. Very frequently large bodies of cavalry were 
sent to raid on tlie enemy's lines, as an aid to the operations of the 



versions 



war . 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN iMODKKN VVAIIFARM. \X> 

main army, and tlieir failure to accomplisli tlie results anticipated was 
often caused by bad roads, sudden freshets in the streams on the line 
of march, and incompetent or deceitful guides. 

The camiiaign of Chancellorsville affords an example. General cimpuijii) oi 

... - - 1 T > 1 r- ChancellorHviUo. 

Moneman was sent with ten thousand cavalry to pass around Lee s left 
flank and cut his communications with Richmond. At the very out- 
set, this strong column was so much delayed by a sudden rise in the 
Rappahannock river, tiiat it did not reach Lee's main line until the 
action of Chancellorsville had been decided in Lee's favor, and conse- 
quently the movement was entirely barren of any results affecting the 
main military operations of General Hooker. 

6. Similar to diversions are movements of an entire army into the Movements simi- 

. , , " lar to diversions. 

enemy's territory, to force him to leave your own country where he 
has been carrying on the war. Such operations are not subject to the 
same objections as those already described, for the army is not divided. 

Hannibal, with this object in view, left Africa, where the Romans Hannibal in 
were waging war, and invaded Italy, making one of the most remark- 
able campaigns in history. There are many other examples of opera- 
tions of the same nature which were entirely successful. 

7. Owing to the great difficulties to be encountered in making a Future impor- 
front attack upon an enemy in position, and the severe losses to be sus- siona. 
tained, diversiovs may no doubt form a prominent feature of future 
campaigns; and those will be most successful which are conducted 

most in accordance with established military principles. ^ 



m 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



CHAPTER XI. 



l>istinctioii be- 
tween surprises 
and ambuscades. 



When practi- 
cable 



Essentials of suc- 
cess. 



What is necessary 
to success. 



When infantry is 
taken. 



Secrecy essential 
to success. 



Night the best 
hour. 



Simultaneous at- 
tacks. 



SURPRISES AND AMBUSCADES. 

1. Siirprise^and ambu^Cddes are unexpected attacki^ made upon the 
enemy. 

The term imrpruHe is applied to an attack made upon troop.** in posi- 
tion, occupying a village, fort, etc., or upon the outposts of an army in 
position; while the term amhmcade is limited to an attack, made upon 
the enemy while on the march, by troops lying in wait for the purpose. 

From their nature, these operations are usually confined to compar- 
atively small bodies of troops, and are only practicable against an 
enemy who does not properly regulate the duties of advanced-guard, 
rear-guard, outposts, flankers, etc. 

The troops selected for these operations should be of the best mater- 
ial; great secrecy, and accurate knowledge of tlie ground where the en- 
terprise is to be attempted, are absolutely necessary. 

SURPRISES. 

2. In planning a surprise the first requisites are : a thorough knowl- 
edge of the position occupied by the enemy, the number and condi- 
tion of his forces, and the precautions that are usually taken by him 
to guard (igainst a surprhe. 

If the position held by the enemy is intrenched, the main body of 
the troops composing the expedition should consist of infantry ; but if 
the ground is open, cavalry might play an important part by charg- 
ing in order to create confusion. 

3. Secrecy being essential to success, the troops should be assembled 
at the shortest notice, and they should only be provided with their 
arms and ammunition that they may be able to move rapidly. 

Night is the best hour for the enterprise, for the troops can then per- 
form the duty required of them before dawn, and be favored with day- 
light to withdraw, if necessary. Cold or stormy weather is to be pre- 
ferred, as the precautions usually taken by the enemy are then gener- 
ally relaxed. 

Simultaneous attacks at several points will usually be more success- 



ANDTIIKIR APPLICATION IN MODEllN WAKKAKK. 130 

ful than a single attack, iov they tend to confuse the enemy and pre- 
vent him from concentrating to make an effectual resistance. 

4. The march should be conducted without the usual precautions Mhiukm oi con- 
of advanced-guard, flankers, etc., which would increase the chances of maicii? 
discovery; but the troops should be kept well together and on the alert, 

ready for every emergency. 

Great care should be exercised in determinii/ig when to withdraw; <">^'*' •" *^e <^-^«^"- 

^ _ ' cised. 

the safety of the troops should not be compromised by staying to ac- 
complish too much, when there is any danger of the enemy bringing up 
a superior force. i 

When a night attack is made, some mark should be put upon the Pieeantious to be 

T • • 1 1 J? I I- r taken. 

troops to distinguish them from the enemy. 

Points should be designated in advance at which the troops will 
rally in case of repulse. 

HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON, 1776. 

5. *'On the 25th dav of December, 1776, • * ^ -•• a total (Canington.) 

' . , Biitisli force at 

effective force of not quite one thousand five hundred and fifty men Trenton, 
constituted the garrison at Trenton (Fig, 1). The command had six 
pieces of artillery, * ■■• * but contrary to the previous ad- 
vice of Colonel Donop, there were neither field works nor defence of 
any kind before the ferry or at any of the approaches to the town. 
One such work on the summit, at the fork of King and Queen streets, 
and one on Front street would have f-eriously endangered the Ameri- 
can movement, especially under the circumstances of severe weather, 
which almost disarmed the assailants. •■■ *" * 

6. " It was Christmas dav, a holidav in great favor with the troops Disposition of the 

. ■ . * , , . American forces 

which composed the garfison. ■ " '•' It is enough to state for the attack. 

that military negligence was absolute. '•' "•• ^" The dispo- 
sition of the American army for the attack was eminently bold and 
judicious. Griffin was expected still to occupy the attention of Donop, 
as if the demonstrations across the river were but the feverish action 
of local militia. A small centre column under General Ewing, whose The centre, 
brigade reported but five hundred and forty-seven rank and file for 
duty, was to cross just below Trenton, to occupy the bridge across the 
Assanpink, and thus sever communication with Donop's corps at Bor- 
dentown. 

"Still further down the river, as a constraint upon the possible The right wing, 
movement of that corps to the support of Colonel Kahl (at Trenton), 
the right wing under Cadwallader, was ordered to cross at Bristol, be- 
low Bordentown, with view to a direct attack upon Donop from the 
south, and thus co-operate with the militia in that quarter. 

"General Washington reserved for himself the conduct of the left The left wing 



136 



TRINCIPJ.ES OK THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



General Putnam, 



Operations of the 
right wing. 



The centre. 
The left wine 



The crossing 



The march. 



Pickets attacked. 



Kars, 1877-78. 



(Greene.) 



The fort ificati 



wing, consisting of two thousand four hundred men, which was to 
cross nine miles above Trenton, at McConkey's ferry. Learning that 
Maidenhead was almost without garrison, except a troop of dragoons, 
it was the purpose of the American commander also to include that 
sub-post within his raid. Tt was also expected that General Putnam 
would cross from Philadelphia, early on the 26th, with at least one 
thousand men. The plan embraced the deliverance of the left bank of 
the Delaware. 

7. "The right wing landed a portion of its troops; but on account 
of the ice could not land the artillery, and returned to Bristol. ■•■ * * 
The centre of the column failed to effect a landing. * * ^' 

'' The left wing of the army under Washington, accompanied by 
Greene and Sullivan as division commanders, formed evening parade 
under cover of the high ground just back of McConkey's ferry. * * * 
It was designed to move as soon as darkness set in, so as to complete 
the crossing at midnight, and enter Trenton as early as five o'clock in 
the morning of the 26th. * * *" It was cold, snowy, and 
tempestuous. * -■• * The landing of the artillery was not 
eflFected until three o'clock, but the army did not march until four. 
Ketreat could not be made without discovery, annoyance, and conse- 
quent disheartening of his troops, and late as it was the advance was 
ordered. '■•■ * * 

" Sullivan's division moved by the river road. "•■■ * * Washing- 
ton with Greene, took direction to the left, *' *" * entered 
the Pennington road one mile from town. * ■•'' * The pickets on 
both roads behaved well, but were quickly swept away by the force 
which already hastened to its achievement. Washington moved di- 
rectly to the junction of King and Queen streets. * *' * Under his 
direction Colonel Knox placed Forrest's battery of six guns in position 
so as to command both streets. * * * The Hessians in 
vain attempted to rally, the surprise was complete, and finding retreat 
cut off in all directions, surrendered to the number of about one thou- 
sand. The Americans lost three killed and tliree wounded. A few 
skillfully handled guns determined the action." 

THE STORM OF KARS. 

8. The storm of Kars during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, 
is given as an example of the successful surprise and capture of a posi- 
tion defended by a large body of men. 

" We now come to ihe final act of the campaign in Armenia, one of 
the most remarkable exploits in military annals, viz., the storming of 
Kars. 

"The fortifications (Fig. 11 ) "•■■ consisted of a cita- 



•;• ;-v. ^ 




\oO (no^£o^Zx^ua<y 



CD Ci/yniAAJUi/nd . 



IO,y<nJ~ UrhQlU. 

fi . J'C\Ji 7/l/(rLuUU . 







'>T^^ /K_y /ivTi 



K 4MU-i^ 



JjiTJLqoU 



/J 



\f/r 



% M^ tan O'U't/mno, 



AND THEIR APPIJCATION IN MODEllN WARI ARK. 1 o7 

del in masonry, * ^' ancl of twelve detached forts. The 

various forts presented different traces and diflerent constructions." 
The forts ordered to be carried were t)ie following: 

"Fort Hufiz Pasha was a square redoubt, four hundred yards on a Fort Haii/. Pashn 
side, with bastions at the angles, * ■'' ditch twelve by six feet, 

and a casemated barrack in three tiers closing the gorge. ••■ 

Fort Kanly consisted of two small square redoubts about one hundred FoitKaniy. 
and fifty yards on a side, and in rear of them a lunette with faces in 
the form of a bastioned front and closed at tlie gorge with a casemated 
barrack. The ditch was twelve by six feet. The development of the 
line of fire was over two thousand one hundred yards." 

Fort Souvari was a simple lunette without ditches. Of the other Fort souvmi. 
forts, some had ditches, others not. 

"The counterscarp of all the works having ditches was arranged 
with a banquette for infantry fire over the glacis. 

" These works presented in general certain qualities advantageous i gfensivo quaii- 
to the defence, i. e., they were (partly) on commanding ground, they ^'''^ "*"*^® ^'o'"'^''- 
were so near together and so constructed that their artillery lent mutual 
support, and the rocky ground pi'ecluded all idea of mining against 
them. * ^^ 

9. "The total armament of the place is about two hundred guns Total annaiiieiit. 
(303 were captured at the assault, including a large proportion of field 

guns). The total development of the line of fire for infantry is about stiengtii of tin- 

I 11- •■ -An- 1 gaiTisoii. 

SIX thousand yards. Allowing two men to a yard 

and fifty per cent, in reserve, the proper garrison would be eighteen 

thousand infantry, and, with twenty-five men to a gun, five thousand 

artillery, or in all twenty-three thousand. This was almost exactly 

the strength of the garrison at the time of the assault. * *' "•■■ 

Thirty thousand infantry, with fifty-three squadrons and one hundred The army of in- 

and forty-four guns were constituted the army of investment of Kars. 

10. " The train of reasoning which induced the assault is thus ex- Reasons for mak- 

,. ,. . ^ i-r^i -»T'i n ing the assault. 

plained in the Grand Duke Michael's report: 

"Careful reconnaissances of the ground and of the defences of the Result of the re- 
place, and the information gathered concerning the effective strength 
and morale of the garrison, and concerning its provisions, proved each 
day more clearly that, although the defeat* of Moukhta Pasha's army 
may have had a certain demoralizing effect upon the defensive strengtii 
of Kars, yet the capture of this town was none the less an extremely 
diflScult exterprise. -- * * 



connaissances. 



At Alad.ja Da^'li 
IS 



lo8 



rRINCIPMvS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Influence of the 
armameiit of Mie 
place. 



Difficulties of a 
siei^e. 



Conchisioa 
reached. 



Choice of the ob- 
jective. 



Reasons for the 
choice. 



l?e Inction by 
boinbardmeiit 
impossible. 



Nature of the 
ground near the 
forts. 



Objections to an 
open assault. 



Kixht attack. 



Advantages of a 
moonlight night. 



Care observed by 
tlie Russians. 



Orders for the 
assault. 



Points to be gain 
ed. 



"Tlie excellent urnuinient of the fortifications of Kars, the resolution 
of the garrison to fight to the last extremity, the well known firmness 
of Turkish troops in sieges, and the difficult conditions in which the 
troops of investment were placed, hardly permitted the idea of sitting 
down to a siege of which it would have been difficult to foresee the end. 
5J s * The only way to put an end to this state of affairs was to gain 
po.sscssion of Kars in open a.ssault. * *' * The line of forts on the 
southeast, situated on the right bank of Kars river, Hafiz, Kanly, and 
Souvari, and the town itself, where all the depots and provisions of 
the gdrrison were concentrated, were chosen as the principal objective, 
partly on account of the conformation of the ground, and partly on ac- 
count of the situation and relative strength of the defenses command- 
ing the approaches of the place. *" * * It was at first thought that 
it might be possible to reduce the place by bombardment alone, but 
this was soon seen to be an illusion ; the Turks began constructing new 
batteries. * * * It was all the more necessary to hasten the end ; 
un assault was decided upon. It only remained to fix the place and 
the means. 

" In front of the line of the forts, which was to be the principal ob- 
jectiv^e of the attack, the ground afforded within musket range of the 
works hcirdly any shelter, and not a single favorable position for field 
artillery. The enormous extent of the line of fire, flanked by several 
bodies of troops, successive rows of trenches and artificial shelters, the 
almost incredible range and intensity of the Turkish infantry fire on 
the defensive, threatened enormous losses in case of an attack by day- 
light. * * * On the other hand, an attack in the darkness of a 
night without a moon might lead to a catastrophe. 

" It was necessary to await the time when the moon, remaining 
nearly all night above the horizon, would light up the field so that 
there would be no danger on the one hand of making a mistake in the 
road, and on the other hand of revealing our movement to the enemy 
from a distance, and thus giving time to take his own measures and to 
direct a murderous infantry fire upon us. * * * 

11. "The greatest secrecy was observed, and the Turks do not seem 
to have had the least suspicion of what was going on. They had in 
fact concentrated over fifteen thousand men — two-thirds of their whole 
force — in their forts on the Shorak mountains, on the left bank of the 
river. * * * 

12. "The orders * * * giving general direction for the assault, 
were as follows : 

"' 1. The troops investing Kars are to gain possession of Forts Sou- 
vari, Kanlv, and Hafiz Pasha. 



AN'l) THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKKN WAHKAKK. 1 .SO 

"'2. The attack must be made unexjx'cteflli/, and ettorts must be made sccni.nttack. 
to take prisoner or else destroy the garrisons of tliese forts, and to get 
possession of the guns in .them. . 

" ' 3. At the same time as the attack of these forts, demmistrations Demonstrations. 
will be made against other points of the enemy's line of defence, in 
order to distract his attention and his troops from the real point of at- 
tack. 

" '4. These demonstnttioim may be converted into real attacks, taking wiu-n made real 
advantage of the enemy's confusion or other favorable circumstances, " ^'- 
but only by small bodies, as experiments, in order to avoid great losses. 

*" 5. Such attempts may be made also by the troops charged with change in the 
the principal attack, after this latter has been executed'; Fort Teh im p""^'^'* 
and the wall of the town are specially indicated as the objects of tliese 
attempts. Under entirely exceptional circumstances, such for exam- 
ple as a case of complete panic on the part of the enemy, such an 
operation is authorized with reference to Karadagh, but without losing 
sight of the difKculties of its execution. 

'" 6. After having gained possession of Forts Souvari, Kanly, and in case the prin- 
Ilafiz, the first duty of the troops will be to establish themselves solid- cce'd.** 
ly there; they will not evacuate these works except in case it should 
be absolutely impossible to maintain themselves in them; and in this 
case they will bring away the prisoners and trophies, and will destroy, 
as far as possible, all the enemy's means of defence.' 

13. *' In order to carry out these instructions, five separate columns Five columns of 
of assault were formed and two columns of demonstration ; about five '^ 
thousand men being held in reserve. The artillery was not to follow The artillery. 
the troops, but was to remain, ready for action, near the reserves, 

until daylight or the receipt of further orders. The cavalry was to be The cavalry. 
stationed at important points "■•■ ■•■ and await orders. The con- Dark. 

centration of the troops was to commence at dark, the forward move- s p. m. 
ment at eight p. m. Profound silence was to be everywhere observed. Precautions. 
and no smoking allowed. 

"The 3rd engineer battalion was divided up into squads and dis- The engineers. 
tributed among the various columns, each squad carrying ladders, 
dynamite cartridges, and implerpents of various kinds. With each 
column was also a squad of artillerymen, with tools for spiking or dis- 
mounting the guns. ■■■ 

14, '"On the evening of the 17th all the troops assembled at the The attack, 
points indicated, and at 8.30 p. m. the columns moved forward. A 8..30 p. m. 
perfectly clear sky and the full moon which had just risen gave prom- 
ise of a clear and calm night. *' '■• * 

'■'A solemn and coldsilence reigned in the air, and the most atten- 



140 PRINCrPLFS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF AVAR 

live ear could not liave distinguished any noise in the least alarming. 

Order of advance. The dimly seen line of our skirmishers xs-as advancing prudently, step 
by step, followed by the troops for the assault, which at first marched 
in compact columns, then, as they approached the line of attack, form- 
ed in deployed order in company column. 

vp. in. lb. "• About nine o'clock some shots were heard at Turkish out- 

posts, and then, as ours did not reply, they ceased. Only our batteries 
at Djavra, as a signal, opened a cannonade against the heights of 
Tekmass, attracting the attention and forces of the enemy toward this 

<».3(ip.m. point. But not half an hour elapsed before a musketry fire of the 

Turks burst forth along the whole line of attack, and after a few min- 
utes the works and the trenches of the forts which had been attacked 
began a continuous firing.' 

'.t..«) p. m. 10. "The little column of Prince Melikoflf was the first to reach its 

c^ouvari taken. destination. Advancing without firing a shot and capturing the 
Turkish pickets, it rushed into Fort Souvari about half past nine p. m., 
almost before the Turks knew they were approaching; they then kill- 
ed the Turkish garrison with the bayonet, spiked or dismounted the 
guns, and in less than half an hour left the work, broke through some 
Turkish cavalry which came to attack them, and rushed on to the 
bridge over the Kars river in order to attack Fort Tchim on its left 
flank and rear. 

Assault of Kaaiy, 17. '" Couut Grabbe's two columns, assaulting Fort Kanly, liad 
^' "'■ more serious diflBculties. They arrived in front of the work about ten 

p. m., and crossed, with some difficulty and under a heavy fire, the ob- 
structions in the .shape of pits in front of the work. On the right 
■:::■ * V g^ fg^^ hundred volunteers * ""•■ '•■ swarmed over the par- 
apet of the eastern redoubt, and as quickly as possible killed all the 
defenders who remained in it ; they then rushed on the eastern flank 
of the main work, got possession of part of its parapet, and stayed 
there, awaiting the arrival of the rest of their column, but unable 
to get any further forward in face of the superior forces of the gar- 
rison. 

" The rest of the column, however, seeing the redoubt" occupied, in- 
clined to the right to attack the trenghes and a little lunette with four 
guns, situated between Kanly and Hafiz. •'■ Having gained 

possession of these trenches and the lunette, tliey then began to reform 
and advance to the relief of their comrades who still held on upon the 
parapet of the eastern face. 

Count Grabbe's 18. "Meanwhile, on the left. Count Grabbe, led iiis column in per- 

left. ^ °" ^ son and on horseback, and * passed around the flank of the 

western redoubt and attacked the main work, partly in front again.st 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKHN WAUFAUK. 141 

the western face, and partly by tnrning its extreme western flank and 
endeavoring to enter the work in rear. The troops with great 

difficulty gained possession of the covered way, reformed in the ditch, 
and at eleven o'clock portions of the 3rd grenadiers and the 75th n p- i"- 
regiment rnshed over the parapet at the same time that a part of 
the Kifle Battalion entered the work from the rear. A fierce hand-to- 
hand fight then took place in this angle of the work, the traces of 
which were found in five hundred Turkish dead which lay in a small 
place there the next day. But although a good portion, of the garrison 
was thus exterminated, the rest took refuge in the stone barracks at 
the gorge, which had two tiers of musketry fire, and several small 
mwrtars in barbette on top, and did great damage to the Russians at 
such close quarters. 

''Colonel Belinsky then took some volunteers, passed round to the 
rear of the barrack, and tried to break down its doors; but they were 
of iron, and he made no impression on them. "'■• Tliis attempt 

having failed, it became impossible for the troops to remain in the 
works under the rain of bullets which the Turks showered on them 
from the loopholes of the barrack, and they were therefore obliged to 
return to the ditch, leaving, however, a line of men lying down on the 
crest of the parapet, who gave the Turks a warm reception whenever 
they attempted a sortie from the barracks." * 

19. The barrack finally surrendered after the Russian commander Tiie f<.rt tinaiiy 

* Ctiptur€'d. 

was ready to blow it up with dynamite. Three hundred men were all 
that remained of the garrison of Fort Kanly. 

With about the same details all the works on the right bank of the ah the works 
Kars river finally passed into the hands of the Russians. 

20. " As daylight dawned about five a. m., the whole series of forti- r, a. m. 
fications on the right bank of the Kars river was in possession of the The right bank of 

-r. . 11 1- .. 1 . . . ■ • ■ the Kars held bv 

Russians; but the commanding forts on the heights yet tiie Russians. 

held out, and the Turks had still between twelve thousand and fifteen 
thousand men, somewhat demoralized, but still capable of fighting, on 
the left bank of the Kars. Massing these "••• '•■ the Pasha deter- Detennination of 

mined to make an effort to break through in the direction of the vil- 
lages of Samovat, Aravartan, and Bozgala, and thence winding through 
the mountains, gain the Erzeroum road. As the day dawned this Measures adopted 
movement became clearly defined, and Lieutenant-General Roop, com- '^ '»"^'''» ""P- 
manding on the left bank, took what measures he could to stop it, by 
disposing the cavalry, stationed near these villages, to take the col- 
umns in flank while his infantry retained them in front. 

"The principal column of the Turks, near Bozgala, seeing itself The main body of 

.,,.,, . , ^ , , the Turks sur- 

.surrounded, laia down its arms; but at Samovat and at Aravartan i.n.i.i-. 



142 



rKry( iPLEs of the art and scienck of wak 



The riemaiiii 
pursued by 



the 



Results of I 
fisbt. 



Upon wliat s 
cess depends 



they broke through the Russian infantry and continued their march 
towards the mountains. 

" The Cossacks were after them with the utmost energy, and attacked 
them vigorously in flank, causing a loss of several hundreds of men 
among the Turks, and delaying them while another portion got on 
their road in front and headed them off. They surrendered here and 
there by battalions, until finally there remained but one detachment 
of about one hundred and fifty mounted men, flying in the direction 
of the Olti road. The Cossacks put after them, sabred about a hun- 
dred of their number whose horses were exhausted, and chased the 
rest for about fifteen miles. Then their own horses gave out, and they 
had to give it up. s ^ ^ 

21. " Kars was wholly in possession of the Russians. 7 * ^ It 
was a good night's work — a fortified place of the first order captured 
in open assault, with seventeen thousand prisoners, three hundred and 
three guns of various calibres, twenty-five thousand or more small 
arms, and an immense quantity of provisions and material of all 
kinds. Two thousand five hundred Turkish bodies were found dead 
on the field. * * ^ The Ru&sian los-ses were two thousand two hun- 
dred and seventy-three.* ^ $ ^ 

22. *• The campaign in Armenia, begun by the Russians with in- 
suflScient forces, and checked for a while, finally ended in their com- 
plete victory and the overwhelming defeat and destruction of the 
Turkish forces. Its fate was decided by the battle of Aladja Dagh and 
the^storm of Kars, and these are among the most brilliant feats of arms 
in Russian military annals. The more the latter is studied, and the 
stubbornness of the defence is considered, the more certain it appears 
that those who lay down as a proved principle of modern tactical war- 
fare that fortifications defended by breech-loaders cannot be carried 
in open assault, have made a hasty judgment. ^ ^ ^ 

"Kars was stormed without any artillery preparation ^ ^ - at 
all; its success was due to the skillful dispositions made beforehand, 
and to the individual courage and endurance of the men. In both 
cases hand-to-hand fights finally decided the battle."' 

AMBrS< ADE-S. 

23. An ambusca'le can only be successfully carried out when the 
enemy is careless on the march, and neglects those precautions for his 
safety which every prudent officer never fails to observe. Therefore a 
knowledge of the enemy's force and the state of discipline shown by it 
are essential to success. 



*F<«nr hiindn-d and eiirlit.v-eiehl killed. 



AXD THEIR Al'PI.ICATlON IN IMODERN WARFARE. 143 

24w The point selected for carrying out the enterprise shoukl pre- SeU ction of a 
sent facilities for concealing the troops from the enemy's view, and 
when he is obliged to march in a long column and cannot deploy 
readily. 

A defile would usually be a very suitable place for the purpose; the a defile. 
troops taking position some distance from the entrance, so as to fall 
upon the enemy when he is well committed to it; or opposite the out- 
let when the defile is straight near that point and favorable for a 
.^iweeping artillery fire. 

25. The march of the troops should be so regulated that thev will Position should 

111- • 1 1 • • • 1 i- '*^ reached at 

reach the designated place at night, and take up their position before night, 
daylight. 

26. The success of the enterprise will mainly depend upon the conditions for 
^secrecy and celerity with which the operation is conducted. 

The troops once in position every precaution should be taken to Precautions nec- 
guard against discovery; silence should be strictly enforced, and the ^^^^^^' 
men should be forbidden to light fires, move around, or even to smoke. 

Great precautions should be taken to secure the retreat of the de- 
tachment, which through discovery, may become necessary before the 
object of the expedition has been accomplished. 



144 



PHIXcrrLKS OK THE ART AND SCIENCE OF '.VAR 



Defined. 
Object. 



Kind of troop.s 
employed. 



Composition ot 
large and small 
detachment."!.' 



An inspection 
necessary. 



Precaution.s on 
the'march. 



CHAPTER XII. 

DETACHMENTS AND CONVOYS.* 
DETACHMENTS, 

1. A detachment is a body of troop.s separated from the main body 
and sent to accomplisji some specified object; as, to occupy some post, 
seize a defile, capture a convoy, or to make a diversion in order to 
favor some operation of the main body, etc. 

The number and kind of troops composing a detachment will depend 
upon the nature of the country in which it may be required to operate, 
the nature of the duty and the time required to complete it, and also 
upon the kind of troops the enemy may possibly bring against it. 

2. Large detachments will usually be composed of troops from all 
branches of the service, as they are then best adapted for defensive 
action; while .S'»a// detachments should be from troops belonging to 
that arm of the service which is best adapted for the attainment of the 
particular object in view. If a raid on the enemy's line of communi- 
cations be intended, cavalry would be chosen, on account of its great 
facilities for celerity of movement; while if the object be to capture 
some post, where success would depend altogether upon the secrecy ob- 
served, infantry would be selected; a few pieces of light artillery 
should be taken when its employment is necessary. 

3. A thorough inspection of the detachment should be made before 
it starts out, for, once separated from the main body, it will have to 
depend upon its own resources, therefore it should be provided with 
everything necessary for the accomplishment of the particular object 
in view. 

All the usual precautions of advanced-guard, flankers, and rear- 
guard wall usually be observed upon the march, in order to guard 
against a surprise. The different arms siiould be so placed in the col- 
umn of march that line of battle may be formed at the shortest notice, 
and the conditions required for mutual support at the same time re- 
garded. 



>oe Revised United States Army Ke<;nlations i.f l)v>;i. 



vov. 



Ill of 



he escort. 



' ANDTHKIR APPI.ICATION IX MODKKN WARFARE. 145 

Defiles should be avoided if possible. The safety of the detachment ixflics sind pro- 
depending in a great measure upon its being held well in hand, the l.rok'en "country 
usual precautions observed in a broken country, where the enemy may 
take it at a disadvantage, cannot be followed out, as they require the 
force to be too much divided. Kather depend upon a small detach- 
ment of good cavalry to thoroughly scout the country in advance. 

CONVOYS. 

4. The term, convoi/, is applied to a train of wagons transporting Deiiued. 
supplies, a body of prisoners, an artillery train, etc., escorted by troops. 

Owing to the facilities ofi'ered to the enemy for a successful attack, Ditiicuity 
the duty of protecting a convoy becomes very important and difficult 
to perform. The danger and severity of this duty is greatly increased 
if the line of march of the convoy is through the enemy's country; for 
it is liable to be attacked by partisan troops, a service for which the 
latter are peculiarly adapted, on account of their celerity of movement 
and ease of subsistence. 

5. The escort of an important convoy will generally be composed of (^"'ii 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, because such a combination is best 
adapted for the defensive, to which all the actions will necessarily be 
limited. The first duty of the escort is to protect the convoy, there- 
fore when the enemy attacks, he should simply be driven off, but never 
pursued. Kestricting the escort to this mode of action enables a small 
force of the enemy to act with great audacity, and renders the attack 

of a convoy a comparatively safe operation by an inferior force. 

6. The troops composing the escort should not be placed along the Aniuigement of 
whole length of the convoy, as this arrangement would render every 

part of the line weak; but, after having made a suitable advanced- 
guard, the remainder of the troops should usually be divided into 
three bodies; one placed at the head of the train, another near the 
middle — half on either side— and the third in rear. As the leading 
detachment can readily be re-enforced by the advanced-guard, it need 
not be as strong as the others. 

7. Good order on the march being very essential, patrols of cavalry Patrols of cav- 
should be kept in continual motion along the whole train to maintain it. ' 

The middle detachment should send out small flanking parties to Flanking parties. 
thoroughly scour the country on the right and left, and to give timely 
warning of the approach of an enemy. 

The officer in charge of the leading detachment should be very par- Regulating the 
ticular to see that it marches at an uniform rate, as by it the march of 
the whole column is regulated. 

Short halts should be made at the end of each hour to rest the ani- Halts. 
inals, adjust and re]>air the harness, etc. 

11) 



146 pkincipi.es ok the art and science of war 

Pack animiiis. When there are pack animals with the train they should be placed 

at its head, as they will be found to drive better in this position. 
Convoy should 8. The more compact the convov the more readilv it can be defend- 

marcli in severnl ^ • ^ r ^ ■, c- ii- i-' 

lines. ed ; It should therefore be marched in as many lines a.s the roads will 

admit. 

To march in two lines requires a road wide enough for three wagons, 

to permit of the passage of carriages. 
Parking the In the enemv's country when a halt is made for anv length of time, 

train. . . .07 

as to repair a bridge, remove obstructions in the road, etc., the wagons 
should be parked, and all arrangements made necessary to guard 
against surprise. If the wagons are marching in two lines a good de- 
• fen.sive park may be quickly made by closing the wagons up and turn- 

ing the animals towards the middle of the road. 
Location of vaiu- 9_ The most Valuable articles should be placed in that part of the 

able articles. ^ ^ ... 

convoy which is best protected. If powder is carried, it should be 
Powder. watched with great care, and every precaution should be taken to 

secure it. 
Rations. When rations are transported the different component parts should 

l)e distributed throughout the train, so if a part of the convoy is cut 
off by the enemy there will be a portion of each article still secured. 
Management of a When the convoy is large, it should be divided into sections. The un- 
argecon\oy. parking and placing in march of a large convoy requiring consider- 
able time, the wagons should not all be ready to start out at once, but 
the teams should be hitched up by sections in order to avoid unneces- 
sary fatigue from standing a long time in harness. 
Parking at night. 10. A stroug positiou should be selected for the park at night, the 
precautions taken at this time being the same as on the march. 

A convoy should not enter a defile until the outlet has been secur- 
ed ; the precautions during the passage should be redoubled. 
Country should The nature of the country through which the convoy is to pass 
office r* Tn ^coni- should be thoroughly known to the officer in command, in order that 
'^^"'^" the marches may be properly regulated and suitable camping places 

selected. 
Points where the Places whcrc the cncmv would be likelv to make his attacks should 

enemv mav at- • i 'i i •' 1 • 1 • 

tack. also be known, in order that the precautions at those points may be in- 

creased. 
Attacks on con- 11. An attack may be made upon a convoy with a view to capture 
^°^^* the whole or a part of it, or simply to delay its march. In the first 

case it is necessary to defeat the escort and separate it from the train. 
In the second case false attacks may be made at several points, while 
a detachment takes advantage of the confusion to cut out a part of the 
train. In the third case the roads should be obstructed, bridges broken 



Passage of de- 
files. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WAIIKARK. 147 

down on the line of march, and frequent attacks made to force the 
train to park. 

An attack upon a convoy parked in* a strong position will rarelv be Attnck on a con- 

. /, . . . , .,." vov in a strong 

successful, unless the assailant is superior in numbers or has artillery, position. 

Flank attacks are most to be dreaded, and they require the greatest Flank attacks. 
efforts to be made in order to guard against them successfully. 

12. The convoy of prisoners is an operation presenting many diffi- convoy of prison- 
culties, owing to the fact that they are always ready and on the alert ^"' 
to aid any efforts made to recapture them. Under such circumstances, 
when the convoy is attacked, the prisoners should be made to lie down, 
and warned not to arise under penalty of being shot. 



148 PKfNCIPJ.ES OF THE AET ANO SCIEN'CE OK WAR 



CHAPTER XIII. 

EMPLOYMENT OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 

Two ways of form- 1, Formation of troops. Troops are usually drawn up, or formed 

ing troops. . . i i i • i*t • • i ^ 

. in two ways, viz., a. In column] the habitual disposition when on the 
march, and for facility of movement and manoeuvre. 6. In line; 
Use of doep col- which is now as a rule the order on the field of battle. The formation 
in deep columns of attack, formerly employed with such great effect on 
the battle field, will noAV very rarely be used. This change in the 
manner of handling troops is due entirely to the great improvement in 
fire-arms of the last twenty years. 

INFANRTY AND INFANTRY TACTICS. 

Importance of in- 2. It may be said of infantry that it is by far the most important 
factor of an army. Cavalry and artillery certainly render important 
and essential service at some period of every campaign, or during some 
phase of every battle ; but good infantry is absolutely necessary for the 
accomplishment of any great operation in war. 
(Home.) "Infantry is undoubtedly the main stay and the backbone of all 

Infantrv compar- . i ' i . i . i • i i i r- 

edwiththe action armies, whether It be viewed m the light of numbers, or its action on 
airy, and'engi- the field of battle. Its fire is more deadly than that of artillery, its 
action is sure, while that of cavalry is fitful. 

"On the infantry of an army the brunt of the figliting falls,* it 
suffers more in action and more on the line of march, and to it the 
action of all other arms is subordinate. Artillery fire but to pave the 
way for an infantry attack, or to check an infantry advance. Cavalry 
charge but to confirm an infantry victory or to check a pursuit, engi- 
neers open roads and make bridges, to allow infantry to pass ; they 
strengthen positions, and throw up earth-works, but to protect and 
cover the infantry, or to enable a small body to check a superior 

*The loss of the various arms of the service duriii^j therer-eit war is given for the fierman 
army as follows: Infantry, 4,458 officers, 112,02-1 nien, or 17. (i per cent, oftheivhole force. 
Cavalry, 279 otficer-;, 4,342 men, or ().3 per cent of the whole force. Artillery, 422 otHcers, 
5,597 men, or 6.5 per cent, of the whole force. Engineers, 4.S otflcers, 5.33 me.i, or 2.8 per 
C(Mit. of tho wholi- force. Train, 7 officers, 105 men, or 0.3 per cent, of the whole force. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKUN WARKARK. 14!) 

force. On infantry tactics the whole .superstructure of military opera- 
tions must be built. 

*'But it must be borne in mind that in any tactical action, one arm True function of 
of the service without the other is really incomplete, and the true 
function of tactics, is to so apply the action of each arm, that not only 
its special power shall be developed, but that it shall be developed at 
the time and place requisite for the support of the other arms." 

3. "The Austrian infantrv has always proved inferior to that of (^i^^^-) 

^ HcveiseH of Uu- 

Other powers with which it has recently been matched. The excellence Austnans rino lo 
of the other branches of the army has never been able to atone for this 
one fatal defect. The infantry of an army is its mainstay. A battle, 
it is true, may occasionally be decided by the vigorous action of cav- 
alry, as was the case at Marengo; sometimes be influenced by the happy 
concentration of artillery, as was seen at Wagram and Solferino; but 
success can never be confidently relied upon in war, unless the fighting 
powers of the infantry may be fully trusted." 

4. The infantry by its tire disables the enemy and prepares the way Action <>f the in- 
for the efficient operations of the cavalry and artillery ; the infantry by 

its charges w'ins battles, carries and defends |)ositions. 

Infantry has great powers of endurance, is capable of giving or receiv- 
ing battle in almost any position, and is peculiarly free from those cas- 
ualties, which in unforeseen emergencies frequently paralyze the other 
arms. 

The essential qualities of a good infantrvman arc: coolness under Ks^entiai quaii- 

,, . J, , I.' !• 'i • 1 1 • • ties of infantrv. 

all Circumstances of danger, self-reliance and independence in action, 
judgment in deciding when to take advantage of cover, and when to 
leave it in order to move forward again; he should be a good marks- 
man, as the main reliance of infantry is the efficacy of its lire; he 
should know when to husband his ammunition, and when to deliver 
his fire with the greatest rapidity ; for rapidity and accuracy of lire at 
the proper moment are now of supreme importance in the decisive 
pha.ce of a battle. 

The genius of the commanding general is the greatest aid in win- Mutual dep.-n- 

. ,. , rni 1 1 -n 1 denceofthi- tluee 

ning a victory, infantry ranks next. Ihe cavalry and ariillerv render arms. 
important service on the field of battle, and in the retreat and pursuit; 
the infantry often linds itself iji positions and under circumstances that 
would be most disastrous, if not supported by these arms; and by their 
aid successes gained by the infantry are often made comj)lete. Infan- 
try can win a battle, but cavalry and artillery are necessary to destroy 
the enemy by a vigorous pursuit. 

The history of all wars and of all nations confirms thc^e conclusions. 

•). Infantrv acts defensivelv bv its Hre and ofTensivelv bv its charges. 



150 



P21INCIPLKS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Tho two ways in 
which infantry 
acts. 



Infantry should 
lip down. 



Modifications of 
infiintrv tactics. 



(Home.) 
Individual action 
in battle. 



Battles be;?iii 
with corhbat.s of 
small bodies. 



Troops engaged 
move only for- 
ward and back- 
ward. 



On the field of battle it is invariably employed in one of these ways, 
or in both combined. On the field of battle two bodies of infantry will 
seldom come into actual contact. In making an attack the assailant 
will either be repulsed and driven back by the effect of the fire of the 
assailed, or, when the former reaches a certain point in its advance, 
the latter will abandon its position. 

Infantry on the field of battle, when stationary, should always lie 
down; it is thus always to a certain extent.concealedfrom the enemy's 
view and protected from his fire. 

The introduction of breech-loading rifled arms has radically modi- 
fied the tactical formations of infantry ; this being particularly true 
for offensive movements. Formerly, the fire from troops in a body 
was mainly relied upon to produce telling results; now, the main ob- 
ject is to develop to the fullest extent the independent action of each 
individual soldier and the fire from each rifle. 

" It appears, therefore, that both in defensive and offensive fighting 
tactic-, one great object is to develop the indisndual action of the man, 
whether in the use of hi^ weapons or as a unit. For officers this de- 
velopment of independent action is the power of leading and handling 
small groups or bodies of from ten to two hundred men ; but while this 
independence is developed, it must be held in hand and directed, it 
must be freedom, not license. It must be carefully watched by a com- 
mander who has reserves in hand to support it, either by completing 
the victory or checking defeat ; and above all it necessitates most care- 
ful training on the part of the soldier. * ■•" 

0. "The fir.st troops that come into contact with one another before 
battles are fought, are small detachments. Military history necessar- 
ily passes over much that is done by these small bodies; but there can 
be no doubt that the correct leading and handling of these small 
bodies, conduce greatl}' to bringing the action of larger bodies to a suc- 
cessful conclusion. At the beginning of any great battle, there are 
numerous struggles for important points, indeed great battles are often 
brought about by the necessity for supporting small detachments seek- 
ing thus to obtain some advantageous ground. 

7. " Now it is undoubtedly one of the consequences that flow from 
the use of modern arms, that troops once actually engaged can rarely, 
if ever, move to the right or left. Manoeuvring under fire, always 
difficult, may now be deemed almost impossible ; once troops are really 
engaged it would appear that their movements must be either forward 
or backward. Fresh troops may be brought up from the rear to feed 
the fight in front, but such movements as those made by Ma.ssena at 
Wagram, are at the present day impossible. * •' * 



AND THEIR APPMCATIOX IN MODERN WARFARE. 151 

"The actual success of operations in war must primarily rest on the .■^uoctss deptndo 
action of small bodies; good previous strategical movements, a correct handimgof rtmaii 
formation of the order of battle, a proper selection of the points to be '"''*'^'* "* '"*""• 
attacked, will make the success, when obtained, of far greater import- 
ance; but the actual success must ultimately depend on the correct 
handling of small bodies of men. The question how a small body of 
men should be handled in actual fighting^has now become of far 
greater importance than formerly. Important as affecting the indi- 
viduals concerned, perhaps more so, as reacting on larger bodies. 
This is one of the features of modern fighting, and one which must he 
carefully considered. A battle under existing circumstances is a series 
of small battles or fights in which bodies of troops, perhaps not greater 
than a brigade, are engaged, and each of these bodies must be tac- 
tically complete, must work for one object, and seek to carry one 
point. 

8. " It has been said that for the future no direct attack Flank- attacks 

. . . . 1 1 11 must be accom- 

can possibly be made on troops occupying a position, and that all at- panied by a front 
tacks must be made on the flanks; but experience shows that attacks ' 
on the flank, unless supported by a strong front attack, can always be 
met and defeated. The battle of Wagram, and perhaps still more, the 
counter-strokes delivered at Rossbach and Salamanca, show, that 
unless front attacks are made at the same time, flank attacks are un- 
likely to succeed ; consequently, however difficult and dangerous such 
attacks may be, yet it is requisite that they should be made, in order 
that the change of front, which any well-disciplined army can make 
if unopposed, may be prevented." 

"We said that on the German side the intention was generally evi- (Bogusiawski.) 
dent of attempting to turn the enemy. But the fight often developed frE^Prus^iiin* 
itself in such a manner that, after preparing the way by artillery fire, ""'^^ 
the Germans made a vigorous attack upon the French centre, without 
waiting for the effect of the movement on the flanks. This mode of 
action has often been criticised, and attention has been called to the 
enormous sacrifices which it has generally entailed ; but these critics 
forget that, when you wish to force the enemy to fight, a fairly sharp 
attack in front is necessary to hold him fast, otherwise he would avoid 
the turning movement which is meanwhile going on, either by a timely 
retreat, or by throwing himself upon the turning column and attack- 
ing it, whilst executing its movement." 

9. The offensive. " In order that a force on the offensive may be able (Von Scherff.) 
to develop with eflfect its maximum of attacking power, and make use the offWns"ive rc- 
of it to the utmost, it should adopt a formation favorable, as far a^ 'i""'*'- 
po.«.sible, to the following re(juircmonts: 



-152 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Conditions of the 
modern tactical 
problem. 



Lines of skir- 
mishers. 



(.Boijuslawski.) 
Deductions from 
the war of 1870-71, 



(.Greene.) 
Opinion of Gen- 
eral Skobeletr. 



Skirmishers 



The proper time 
to use the re- 
serves. 



(Home.) 
Objections to the 
expression 
"loose, order". 



"a. To the very greatest mobility. 

'^ b. To the greatest possible security from the effects of the enemy's 
fire. 

"c. To the greatest possible development of its own fire." 

For troops acting on the offensive, the great object to be attained is, 
to devise some means by which they can, with some degree of organi- 
zation remaining, reach a point sufficiently near the enemy's position, 
to enable them to carry it by a grand and concerted rush forward. To 
contend that this result can now be obtained by troops in the old for- 
mation in column, or even drawn up in two ranks, is contrary to all 
the teachings of the past few years; which leads us to conclude that 
such an operation would be attended with the most disastrous results. 

The results of recent wars teach that the proper formation for troops 
acting on the offensive is in successive liries of skirmishers. 

"The intensely effective and continuing rolling tire of the Chassepot 
made it clear to all our commanders that a strong deployment of skir- 
mishers was absolutely necessary, so as to answer the enemy's fire in 
an effective manner, not to expose too strong supports to its effects, and 
at the same time prepare the way for our attack." 

"In the course of a long conversation on this subject, General Sko- 
belelf expressed himself as follows : 

'" The only formation in which troops can successfully assault in- 
trenched positions is in successive lines of skirmijihevs. The division 
general must be perfectly thoughtless of his own comfort or safety, and 
put himself between the skirmishers and the reserves where he can feel 
the pulse of the battle and have his troops in his own hand, and judge 
himself of the moment when the successive battalions in reserve should 
be sent forward. There are in every command a small percentage of 
cowards who will slink away at the first opportunity, a certain num- 
ber of men of rash bravery who will go too far forward and get killed, 
and the great majority of men of ordinary courage, but liable to waver 
as the fight gets hot. The reserves must be sent in at the moment 
when the reasonably brave men have been long enough engaged and 
met with enough resistance to begin to feel nervous, but before they 
have actually begun to retreat; and it is in deciding upon the oppor- 
tune moment for sending forward his reserves tliat the art of a division 
commander consists.' 

"Such are the opinions of the general who made more open assaults 
than any other in this war, and who never failed in any one of them 
to carry the works which he was ordered to attack." 

10. "The expression 'loose order,' has been often employed to de- 
scribe this mode of attack, but the exj)ression is an inaccurate one. 



ANDTHKIU ArPl.UATlOX IN iMoDKKN \VAi;i AKi:. 1 .");) 

The attack is not loose, which raliier means a careless hapha/.ard 
action, but it is the indivu/iial action of the soldier fighting in extended 
lines; the real facts being that snch a method of fighting demands not 
only greater individual exertion and intelligence, but far higher and 
more complete instruction on the part both of officers and men. 

11. "It appears generally that troops formed for attack should be ^■f'Iln!^liull of tii(> 

. . . . fii«t line of at- 

formed in at least three bodies, and that these bodies should under one •!»ci<- 
direction work for one object, and be closely linked together, and be 
of such strength, that each shall be a considerable force. ■•• * We 
thus arrive at the formation of a skirmishing line, a supporting line, 
and a main body. Taken together these three form the first line. 

" It further appears that the men placed in the skirmisiiing line i-nnctions of 

1,11 11 ,...,,. , IlK'se three 

should be extended so as to diminish loss, increase accuracy and bodies. 
rapidity of fire, while at the same time a heavy and destructive fire is 
maintained. The functions of the skirmishing line being to crush and 
overwhelm the enemy with bullets. The object of the supports being 
to fill up gaps among the skirmishers, and so sustain the intensity 
of their fire. The duty of the main body being to advance the mo- 
ment the enemy is sufficiently shaken, and drive him out of his posi- 
tion. 

12. "The distance between these three bodies must be governed Distance between 

® these bodies. 

partly by the work they have to do, partly by the trajectory of the 

arms in use, partly bv the ground ; to effectively support the skir- sivirmishers to 

' ^ ♦ •■ o ' ' . , supports 2<I0 to 

mishers, that is to say, to be able to feed them with fresh men, the 2m yards. 
supports should be two hundred to two hundred and fifty yards in 
rear. The main body must be able to cross the interval that divides si^'|J."„l^rher.s'r)<)(i 
them from the skirmishers in about five minutes, or they must be five '<' woy^'fi^- 
hundred to six hundred yards off. And consistent with the due per- 
formance of these functions the supports and main bodv may be in anv Formation of sup- 

^'^ ' . ' ports and maui 

formation that from the shape of the ground, or other circumstances, n«>fiy- 
will protect them best from loss, whether that formation be extended 
order, line, or columns, and they must change from one formation to 
another as quickly as possible. The principles which govern the for- 
mation of troops for attack can only be given, their application must 
depend on the knowledge and ability of the commander in adjusting 
his formation to suit the ground he is working over. 

"Thus the more cover there is to take advantage of, naturally the infliunce of cover 
smaller will be the loss, and consequently the supporting body, whose 
functions are to supply the losses of the skirmishers, may be reduced, 
and the length of the skirmishing line increased, at the same time that 
the intervals between the lines may be diminished. But the original 

20 



154 PRINCIPLE? OF THE ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAR 

question embraced more than the formation of the troop?. It wa>, 
how shall the shot-swept zone be crossed? 
iMffereiit kind< of 13. " Putting irregularities of ground out of consideration, this zone 
is swept by tire of different kinds, in different places. 

" (/. The artillery fire, which may be said to begin at about two 
thousand five hundred yards. 

"6. The unaimed or random tire of the infantry, which may begin 
to tell at about one thousand one hundred yards. 

"c. The aimed tire of the infantry, which will begin to tell at 
about >ix hundred to seven hundred yards. 
Artillery fiPH may ''Artillery employed in defending a p<isition do not lire so much on 

bf disregarded. " , . ." . ". , , , , . .,, 

advancing mtantry in the early stage as on the attacking artillery, in 
addition to which the actual lo.ss by artillery lire in action is compar- 
atively .«5mall,>being from one twelfth to one fourteenth of the loss 
caused by the musketry tire.^ Hence it may. speaking in general 
terni.s be disregarded. 

UDaiiu*Ki infantry "The uuaimed infantry fire produces many losses, but it appears 
that the effects of such tire may be mitigated by observing where it 
falls most, and avoiding those places. 

Manner of cross- 14. '"The tire that causes heavv losses, and checks advancing 

ingthezoneof . i i n i • i * t j ^ ... t,, 

fire. troops, IS undoubtedly the aimed or directed tire ot mlantrv. The 

sooner and quicker the space between, where the deployment of the 
troop.s takes place, and the enemy's position is crossed, the better ; but 
if cro-ssed at the double, one of the objects of the skirmishing line, 
crushing the enemy with bullets, would not be accomplished, hence, 
such a method of advyice. even if it were possible to. run over the two 
thousand yards without stopping, would be undesirable. But it seems 
desirable that the first one thousand yards should be crossed without 
firing, and as rapidly as possible. It will be shown hereafter, that the 
attackers artillery usually fires on the enemy's infantry, not on his 
guns, hence, until the attacking troops reach the zone of dangerous in- 
fantry fire, or about one thousand one hundred yards from the posi- 
tion, if possible they should advance without firing, and as quickly as 
they can. without being disordered, once the dangerous zone of infan- 
try fire is reached, not only will they begin to suffer, but the power of 
inflicting loss on the enemy by means of their own fire l>egin.s, and 
about this stage of the advance the skirmishers must begin to fire. 

Manner of mak- How shoiild tlicv then advance? Bearing in mind that the function 

iug the advance. .,,..,.',.. , . ... , 

ot the skirmishing line is to keep up a continuous rain ol shot on the 

*At Gravelotte. where the French were in pi>>iti<in.M t>ercent. i.f th^- Prussian lass, kill- 
ed and wounded, was from infantry lire, 'y per cent, from nrfillerv, and I per cent, from 
bavonet. .«abre. and lance. At Frederickshnrs the Norths ru Ins* was about T"^ J er font, by 
iiifantrv fire. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION FN MODERN NVAItFARE. 155 

enemy, and expose themselves as little as possible, or to develop the 
offensive power of the breech-loader, while reducing the destructive 
effect it has when used on the defensive. Bearing this in mind, it ap- 
pears that the advance may be made in a succession of short rushes, 
lying down, firing rapidly, and again running on. This manauvre 
may be performed in several ways; the whole line may so act, or al- 
ternate men may so act, or alternate portiotis, sections, subdivisions, 
or companies may so act. The first method entails the disadvantage 
of there being a time, however short, yet a small appreciable time 
when the fire ceases. 

"The second method has this objection, that tiie partv in advance oi.)e(-tii.n lotiie 

. ■" second met liod. 

are sure to mask the nre oi tJiose in rear more or less, and that soldiers 
are peculiarly apt to be discouraged by losing men from their com- 
rades' fire, and that the men are apt to get out of hand, and the officers 
find their control reduced. 

" The rush forward of an extended line invariablv draws the enemv's Advantage of 

, , . ^ ' . 1 • • I rushing in por- 

attention, and consequently his iire on that portion ; this is the ti 



ions , 



moment for the other portion to seize and rush on too, hence there is 
an advantage in the alternate rush of portions, * •• 

15. "For what distance should these rushes be made? Thev should Determination of 

,. * the length of the 

be 01 such a length that the men should not be exhausted and out oi rushes. 
breath after making them, even when the distance is run over as rap- 
idly as possible ; for this reason, it would appear that these rushes 
should not exceed about sixty yards, but should be adjusted so as to 
obtain cover ; if cover exists, the rush should be from cover to cover. "1^% '"•''h should 

' ' be from cover to 

Before advancing, the officer commanding the body about to make the cover. 
rush should select the place he is going to. point it out to his subordin- 
ates, and at a given signal he should dash to the front, his subaltern Manner of mak- 

1 i- n • • • 1 • • • 1 -ii 1 • ing the rush. 

and men lollowing; on getting into his new position he will get his 
men under cover as quickly as possible, kneeling, lying down, or stand- 
ing, as may best cover them, and will open fire at once, and fire stead- 
ily and deliberately until the company on his flank is rushing, when 
he should fire a few rounds as quickly as he possibly can, to cover its 
advance. 

" It should be a standing rule that when any body of skirmishers is a standing rule, 
rushing to the front, those on its immediate flank should fire rapidly 
to cover its advance and reduce the effect produced by the cessation of 
its fire. * "■•■ * 

16. "It is the function of the suppoi'ts to fill up the gaps in the Mixing of com- 
skirmishing line, hence, companies must get mixed up together, it is skirmishing line, 
perfectly impossible to prevent it. But it is possible, by careful train- 
ing to obviate, or rather to mitigate, the evils that might ensue." 



156 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

(Bogusiawski.) " Meanwhile the German line of skirmishers was approaching the 

The Franco-Ger- , • i- i rrM • • i i i i • t 

man war, 1870-71. enemy Dv a succession or rushes, ihis was either done by taking ad- 
vantage of cover, or else they would advance about a hundred paces at 
a run, throw themselves down, and then run on again, * * * 

Advance of the "In this manner the line of skirmishers got part of it within four 

skirmish line. _ r> r 

hundred paces, part to within from one hundred and fifty to three hun- 
dred paces of the enemy, according to the nature of the ground, sel- 
dom without suffering great and inevitable loss. This advance would 
occasion separate strokes and counter-strokes, which naturally caused 
the tide of battle to roll backward and forward. At this period the 
fight would attain its highest pitch of intensity. The fire of the 
breech-loaders on both sides resounded unceasingly, and the work of 
commanding became more and more difficult. (The distances which 
we here give are modified of course by the nature of the ground and 
other circumstances). As a general rule the German infantry had 
their sharpest musketry fighting at from about five hundred to one 
hundred and fifty paces, under peculiar circumstances even at closer 
quarters. 
reasons ill favor " Thcsc Were doubtlcps the right tactics and suited to the present 

of this method. i rr • 

arms, because one should use the oiiensive power of the breech-loader 
before attacking an enemy in position. An immediate rush against 
such a position, even if made by strong lines of skirmishers, would as 
a rule fail. If fresh detachments come up from the rear during a 
stationary musketry fight, whether to strengthen the line of fire or to 
make an attack, it was necessary to double these up with the old skir- 
mishers, because closing the latter to a flank was usually not to be 
thought of; thus men of many difiPerent battalions and regiments were 
intermingled." 
(Home.) 17. " Companies M'iW get mixed up. Long ran^e weapons compel an 

Eeasons whv , . ^ , , , ^ , ^ f , , «> 

troops get mixed advance in extended order tor long distances, and do what oihcers may, 
men under such circumstances, exposed to a heavy fire, do get out of 
order. There is no use blinking this fact ; it is impossible that it can 
be otherwise, so long as human beings possess different physical and 
moral endowments. Some men will be eager and anxious for the 
work, others will hang back, and their courage gradually ooze away. 
Some can be influenced by example and encouragement, others can- 
not ; some are stronger and better able to keep up than others, conse- 
quently we must expect such a mixing up of companies amongst the 
skirmishing line. It is better to foresee and provide by training that 
an evil which icill take place may be as little of an evil as possible, than 
attempt to guard against what all experience shows cannot be guard- 
ed against. No army ever went into action with better drilled or 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. lO/ 

steadier troops than the Kiiglisli did at the Ahua ; they were the results Eiis<ii8iiat the 

.,,,,,, 11/^ 1 .• ' • • 1 bjittlc of the 

ot years ot careiul drill and the nnest and most perfect organization and Aima. 
system that any army ever had, and yet what was the force that first 
carried the battery at the Alma but a mob, composed of various regi- 
ments, brigades and divisions mixed up together, and such must ever 
be the case where a rapid advance under a heavy fire is made by a 
body of troops for any distance. The wisdom of introducing 

any complication, with the object of preventing companies being mix- 
ed, is at least questionable. 

18. "The principles on which troops should be formed, and which 
govern their advance, being such as have been described, it is desirable 
to endeavor to realize as clearly as possible the circumstances under 
w^hich, and the reasons why an attack is at the present day possible. 

" At a distance from the enemy's position, varying according to the Distance at which 

* troops must quit 

nature of the ground, and the state of the atmosphere, but perhaps the close order. 
lying within the limits of two thousand five hundred to three thousand 
yards, troops will have to deploy and quit the close order in which 
they have previously been formed. Now an attack on an enemy presup- a successful at- 
posefi a superiority of force at the place where the attack u niade.^ War, made by superior 
whether viewed tactically or strategically, is but the art of being the 
strongest at the right place at the right time. This superiority of force 
may be numerical, moral, or local, or it may be composed partly of 
all three, but for an attack to have a reasonable hope of success, the at- 
tackers at the point the attack takes place must be superior. 

19. " Now, when the first deployment takes place the attacker's in- Etiect of artillery 
fantry will suffer but slightly from artillery fire. But the assailant's range. 
artillery will shake down the walls of villages, farms, or houses in 

which the defenders are posted, thus driving the infantry out. Their 
artillery will consequently become the object for the defender's guns 
to fire at, as it will be stationary, or only advancing occasionally, and 
in masses of several batteries. 

" Hence the infantry will, in this first stage, suffier but little from infantry siiffers 
the direct or aimed fire, although a few losses may be occasioned by stage. 
stray shots. As the infantry advances, a large portion of the artillery 
will advance also, not together, but by alternate batteries, or brigades 
of batteries, so that a fire will be always kept up. It will probably ad- 
vance thus, until it gets near to the extreme range of the infantry fire, or 
about one thousand to one thousand four hundred yards from the 
enemy's position. The moment the first or skirmishing line of the in- 
fantry comes near enough to the enemy's position to become a mark 

*To obtain this superiority is one of tl.e <'hief objecis of the mai'xpuvres tliat precede the 
actual collision of arms. 



158 I'UINCII'LES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

for its aimed or direct fire, say about six hundred to seven hundred 
yards, the troops in rear, that is to say, the supports and main body, 
will suffer but little, except from the unaimed or random fire. The 
fire of the assailant's artillery and the fire of his skirmishing line will 
have the effect of drawing on them both the enemy's artillery and in- 
fantry fire, and hence it becomes po.^.tible to bnng up the main body, in a 
much closer formation than in often supposed. 
A strong point of " Now here is one of the strong points of the attack, and vice versa 

the attack. & f 

one of the weak points of the defence. The defenders, do what they 
will, instinctively fire on the troops that are doing them an injury, and 
consequently the main body of the attack escapes, or nearly escapes, 
from all but the unaimed or stray shots that have missed the skirmish- 
ing line. Hence in every attack the fire both of the artillery support- 
ing the attack, and of the infantry skirmishing line, must be continu- 
ous, carefully directed, and brought to bear on the portion of the 
enemy's position where an entrance is to be forced. 

" But no fire, however heavy, well-directed and continuous, will 
drive good troops out of a position. A heavy cross-fire of musketry 
Superior imm- and artillery may shake the morale, and disorganize the defenders, may 
carrya poJitioiu kill and wound many, may induce many of the less brave individuals 
to leave the position, but still the really brave men will remain to 
fight it out. So long as they have ammunition these men will hold 
their position, and it is only the advance of superior numbers that will 
finally compel them to retire. 
NatJire oftheat- "The attack of an enemy's position is based entirely on the science 
ac o aposiion. ^^ ^^^ attack of a fortress. A mass of artillery fire is C(jncentrated on 
certain points ; under cover of that fire the infantry advance until 
checked by infantry fire. Again the infantry fire is subdued by the 
infantry fire added to the artillery fire of the attackers, a breach is 
made in the enemy's position, and through that breach a formed body 
of men is pushed, who make a lodgment there. Such in general terms 
is the attack of a fortress, such in generiil terms is the attack of a posi- 
tion, with this difference, the former is the work of days, the latter 
that of hours. The necessity of bringing up a sufficiently strong body 
formed, in hand and under control, to drive out the defenders, occupy 
their positions, and reap the results of the fire is manifest and the 
question arises, how shall this body be brought up? It must conform 
more or less to the movement of the skirmishers; at what distance from 
them should it be, and in what formation? 
Zones of fire de- 2L "The three distinct zones of fire, through which troops must 
tion of main body, pass In moving to the attack, have been already described ; these zones 
must govern the formation of the main body. 



ANDTHKIR APPLICATION IN MODKKN WAKKAHK. 1")'J 

"When entering the zone of arlillerv tire which may be said to be- Foiiiiiiiion in 
gin at from two tliousand Hve hundred to three thousand yards from tii.-. 
the enemy's guns, the main bodies sliould be so formed as not to offer 
a mark suffi{;iently large to iiKfuce the enemy to turn his guns on 
them. ■•■ 

"The great object of the defence is to retard tlie attack, and as the The artinery of 

, . .,, .„ 1 • 1 i> ^ 1 1 • • the defence tire 

attacking artillery will at this, tlie first stage, be partly in action, on artillery of 
partly moving up with the skirmishing line, the defenders must, if * 
this force be, as it should be, a powerful one, direct all their attention 
to it and not to the main body. Formed in such a way, and kept at 
from five hundred and fifty to six hundred and fifty yards behind the 
skirmishers, the main body may advance and experience but little 
loss. On arriving at from one thousand two hundred to one thousand Formation ex- 
four hundred yards, the unaimed fire of the infantry will begin to tell, /.oi.c. 
and at tiiis point the formation of the main body may be again ex- 
tended. 

"The formation requires to be sucli as will enable the men to ad- smiUi columns in 
vance with speed without being demoralized ; and this appears to be 
more likely to be attained by small columns than by either a line or 
extended formation. 

22. "The action of the supports during the time that elapses from Action of the s.ip- 
the troops coming under tire should be now considered. , 

"The duty of the supports is essentially to keep up the tire of the Duties of sup- 
first line, and fill gaps. It is not so much for re-enforcing the skir- ^"" "" 
mishers that they are requisite, the skirmishing line should originally 
consist of a 'sufficient number,' their function is to keep that line up 
to 'the sufficient number,' feeding it to fill up the gaps caused by the 
enemv's bullets. Hence the officer commanding the supports, must <^f f>flicer com- 

® ^^ ' mandiiig the 

watch the front, or skirmishing line, and send up men when he sees supports. 
they are requisite. The nearer to the skirmishers the supports are the 
more they will suffer, but if too far off they will cease to act as sup- 
ports. 

■' It appears that the supports will suffer less, that is to say, thev supports advance 

• 11 1 1 n 1 • • 1 • 11 ' * in small groups; 

Will attract the enemy s tire less it they advance in small groups. 
:•:- :;: The distance at which the supports are from the skirmishers 
must be left chieflv to the officer commanding those supports, but it i-'rom supports to 

" '^'^ ' skirmishers .300 

should rarely exceed three hundred yards. As the skirmishing line yards. 

advances towards the enemy, and begins to get into the zone of aimed 

fire, or some six hundred to seven hundred yards from the enemy, the Action of the 

. 1 .< 1 11 1 1 " 1 • 1 .1 1 . supports in the 

supports must be freely pushed on, and take their places m the skir- third 
mishing line, and as the advance of the skirmishers will, from the fact 
of their moving in successive rushes, be somewhat slower than that of 



160 PRINC[PLF-S OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

the supports, tbe latter will close on them, and the main body will 
also close somewhat on the supports (as it will experience less loss, and 
consequently be less retarded). 
(Scherff.) '"The commander of the supports must durinsr his advance seek to 

Oil duties of com- _ ^'^ ^ ° 

mandei of sup- find out the places where his assistance mav be most usefullv sent. 
The best points for the attack may be found when about eighty to one 
hundred yards from the enemy.' 

When supports '" As the fire is kept up the main body will advance, and when it 

skinnishers. comcs near the line of supports the latter should rush to the front and 
join the skirmishers. 
(Sciieift.) "'The following rule should be absolute, the moment the main 

body arrives near what is left of the line of supports. They should dash 
to the front and join the line of skirmishers, in order to give the im- 
pulsion requisite to cross the last and most dangerous zone of all, and 
finally give the assault.' 

state of afiaiis at 23. " If an attempt be made to realize the state of affairs at this 

this staj;e ot the 

attack. period of the attack it will be seen that the skirmishers, re-enforced by 

the supports, are within two hundred and fifty to three hundred yards 
of the enemy ; that the main body is some three hundred yards in rear 
of the skirmishers ; the divisional artillery perhaps some one thousand 
two hundred to one thousand four hundred yards off, supported by a 
porti4)n of the corps artillery occupying advantageous places up to two 
thousand yards off, and all bringing a heavy cross-fire on the enemy's 
position; the second line of troops following up in rear of the main 
body of the first line, and perhaps some five hundred to six hundred 
yards in rear of it, a tremendous fire being maintained by the now 
thickened skirmishers, and the whole front covered with clouds of 
smoke. Such a state of things cannot last long; the skirmishers may 
get a hundred yards nearer, and the main body getting closer to them, 
must prepare to carry the position; gradually converging, the various 
portions of the main body must push rapidly to the front and drive the 
enemy out. While the second line, seeing the advance and hearing 
the cheers that accompany it, should push rapidly on also, ready to 
support the attack, meet the enemy's reserves, and confirm the success. 
Action of the 24. " What sliould the skirmishers do when the main body ad- 

the final assault, vauccs? The skirmishers, who have borne the heaviest part of the 
fighting, will undoubtedly have got much excited, and heated ; they will 
have been brought close up to the enemy's position, and by that time 
all the men whose heart is not in the work will hav«r disappeared, 
officers and men who have worked through the zones of fire that have 
been described, who have seen comrades and friends dropjiing, will be 
in such a state of nervous excitement that the cheer and advance of 



AND TIIKIR APl'LICATION IN MODERN WAKFAKK. 1(31 

the main body, will, no matter what orders are given, carry them to 
the front. * * * 

'"The idea of leaving skirmishers lying down is contrary to the (Scherti.) 

- , 1 • • 1 J- 1 1 1 • 1 • 1 1, 1 1.' *^" disposition of 

lundamental principle oi the attack, which is that all the disposable the skirmishing 
forces should be applied; leaving them behind really leads to nothing. 
This line left behind cannot fire effectively on the enemy, it cannot 
collect and reform the debris of the troops crushed by the enemy's fire, 
it will have done enough, and suffered too much already for that. 
Judging by all experience, what i,t must do, is to push on with the 
rest. To leave it lying down is in the most favorable case a useless 
theoretical course to pursue, generally it will be a dangerous one.' 

25. " The moment the position is carried every effort must be made Precautions 

to hold it. The troops should be reformed. A heavy fire should be tkm'is^can'ielf"'''" 
poured on the enemy as he retires, and the second line following rap- 
idly, must endeavor to occupy the ground, and coming up in regular 
order can do so far better than troops whose nerves have been wrought 
up to the highest pitch of excitement by a successful attack. 

26. "The nature of the attack described is illustrated by figures Use of figures as 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; but although such sketches are useful as giving ex- mation^of Ittack- 
pression to ideas, it should be clearly understood as regards the sup- '"° 

ports and main body, that there can bij no possibility be any definite or 
fixed formation. The formation to be adopted should be entirely suited 
to the ground, thus one company of the supports may be in column, 
another in line, and after advancing one hundred yards the formations 
may be entirely altered, the company in column being extended, and 
that formerly in line now in column ; similarly for the main bodies." 

27. Von Scherff divides the attack into three stages, and lays down Three stages of 

. . 1 1 i- 1 t'^6 attack . 

certain general rules to govern the formation and conduct of the troops 
during the progress of the attack. 

" Kvery attack has to go through three stages : (Scherft.) 

"a. The period of preparation. 

"6. The moment of accomplishment, and of the greatest strain on 
the faculties, and 

"c. The period of reaction and of recovery.. 

28. The preparatory stage. "This expression does not mean the ' Opening of the 
same as 'opening of the fight.' The latter implies the several acts of 
reconnoitring the enemy and the ground, of gaining time for deploy- 
ment, of coming to a determination upon the object to be fought for, 

and upon the means to be employed; that is to say, of making your 
dispositions and giving out your orders. 



passed 



In the observations whicb follow, we will look upon this period as 'Prej)aration' 
5ed by, and will treat of the 'preparation' simjjly as the first step 



162 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCK OK WAR 

of an attack, tlie direction of which, and tlie means to be employed in 
making which, have already been quite settled. 
Principles for the 29. "1. In order to prepare the wav effectively it is neces.sarv to 

preparation of the , ... * i i i i ' i' 

attack. bring up your skirmishing line to between two hundred and tour hun- 

dred paces of the enemy's position, and to overwhelm with a con- 
centrated and uninterrupted fire the particular part of it on which you 
intend to direct your assault. 

An advance anri a " 2. In order to do tliis, the attacking force should be divided into 

main body. i • 7 7 

an advance and mam body. 
strength of the "3. These two bodies should be in such proportion to one another 

advance. , , i i • • i 

that from one-fourth to one-halt of the total strength should be allot- 
ted to the advance. 
Division of the ad- "4. The advance is again divided into skijmishers and supports ; 

vance into skir- . ... .^ . j. i 

mishers and snp- the former bringing as many rifles into play as the nature of the 
ground will allow, the latter being intended to make good the losses 
of the former, must, on open ground, be of equal strength to them, but 
under favorable circumstances need only be lialf as strong. 

On the extension " 5_ The better the cover afforded bv the ground the greater mav 

of the skirmish _ ." . . ." 

i»"e. he the extension of the skirmishers during their advance. The limits 

to be assigned to this extension depend on the necessity which exists 
of ensuring unity of command throughout the attack, and of being able 
to concentrate the skirmishers' fire upon one point. The front of one- 
thousand men will range between three hundred and five hundred 
paces. 
Each battalion "6. For the sake of unity of command it will be advisable for 

mi^shlrs^lnd Tup- evcry battalion taking part in the attack to form its line of skirm- 
T^^^*'^- ishers with one company, and its supports with another. 

Manner of ad- " 7. The skirmishers should advance from the extreme range of the 

mish ime. artillery fire bearing upon them as far as the extreme effective range of 

the enemy's infantry fire in one body. Tlie company which furnishes 
them should always be extended in one line before it becomes a target 
for the enemy's fire, even if at first it had formed some supports. This 
advance from one thousand two hundred to eight hundred, if possible, 
to six hundred paces of the enemy, takes place as long as may be with- 
out opening fire, individual firing by word of command being only al- 
lowed when you can no longer dispense with its animating effect, or 
wdien special reasons for it arise (such as the necessits^ of driving in ad- 
vanced parties of the enemy, etc.). 
By rushes. " As soon as the line of skirmishers reaches the zone of loss from aim- 

ed infantry fire it changes its mode of progression to that of the alter- 
nate rushing foi'ward and lying down of separate fractions. 

'' As far as it is possible (the nature of the ground and the advantage 



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AND THKIR AITLICATION IX .^lODKHN W AKIA JM!. 1().'J 

taken of particularly favorable nu;ment.s forming exceptions), tlie.-e or Hom :)0 to .xo 
rushes are nirulc Ijy whole divisions, and not over more than from fifty to 
eighty paces ni a time; whether in succession from a flank or chequer- 
wise is immaterial. Each time, the divisions which are halted and 

Iving down cover bv a steadv, well-directed fire the advance of the -^ wiii-directi'd 
" ' . *. . . ti't^ '^I'pt "P by 

others. Only when the skirmishers have advanced to witliin the most divisions in rear. 
effective range of the enemy — say from four hundred to two hundred 
paces — will an unmistakable command or signal be given, upon which 
a rapid independent fire, as much concentrated as possible upon a point 
previously indicated, will be opened and will be maintained until the 
moment of the actual assault. 

"8. The distance of the supports from the skirmisliers ai-.d their in-^tanee of sup- 
mode of advance, will be regulated as provided for the portion of the mi.siurs. 
attacking force, which remains in close order. 

"9. The skirmishers will be re-enforced bv the supports, as far as lu-tntorting 

. i. . ' 1 ,. skirmishers from 

practicable, by doubling in separate tractions between separate trac- supports. 
tiona of the front line ; but the details of execution will always be sub- 
ordinate to producing the best possible effect npon the enemy. 

30. The diKje of execution. " Whilst it was the task of the prepara- object of this 
iion to pave the way for the attack, the work of breaking the enemy's ta'cic! ' 
power of resistance by employing the greatest possible amount of strik- 
ing power, devolve's upon the execution. 

" The conditions for successfully carrying out an attack, as far as 
they depend on the commander's dispositions, may be summed up as 
follows : 

" 1. Every independent bodv of troops intended to take part in an Every body of 

,,,',, ,..*,.. . , . , . troops given a 

attack should have a distinct objective assigned to it by superior speeiaitask. 
authority, and should direct its eflfbrts against this point, without ces- 
sation, with its whole strength, and in the most direct way. 

" 2. The troops must be deployed for the attack as soon as they come Troops divided 
within reach of the enemy's artillery. They should be divided into a ad °inced'bod"y. 
main and advanced body, the former keeping within five hundred 
paces of the advanced skirmishers; in open ground, and under favor- 
able circumstances, nearer to them. 

"3. The support of the advanced skirmishers should, as soon as it Formation of the 
becomes a mark for the enemy's guns, assume by degrees a more and 
more extended formation behind the skirmishers, first deploying from 
column into line, then spreading out so as to leave intervals between 
the divisions, and finally making each division expand into an open 
line. 

''The captain of the support will use his own discretion as to the Manner of feed- 

j. fii'-i 11-1 ^ • 1 1 '"K *'iP skirmish 

re-entorcement oi the skirmishers, both with regard to time, place, and ii„p. 



164 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

amount, eatablishing himself as close as possible behind them with 
whatever parts of his company remain in hand, and finally throwing 
himself with these remnants into the line of skirmishers to take part 
in the heavy firing, when the main body has approached within eighty 
or one hundred paces. 
Manner of ad- "4. The main bodv mav get over the ground from first coming into 

vance of the main , . - . cz> o^ <=> ^ 

Dody. action until reaching the zone of unaimed infantry fire, that is, until 

within one thousand five hundred or one thousand two hundred paces 
of the enemy, in little columns, if the attention of the defender's artil- 
lery is so much occupied by that of the assailant, or by his advanced 
skirmishers, that it cannot direct its fire on the main body. 

Formation of the " 5. Fi'om this point ouwards, when either the mass attracts the 

main body during , . ii../i,ti.ii-i 

the advance. tire of the enemy's guns or begins to catch his rme-balls, it should re- 
solve itself into company columns, with intervals of from forty to 
eighty paces, in which formation as near an approach as possible 
should be made to the advanced skirmishers, say to within from six 
hundred to four hundred paces of them. During this advance each 
company may, at the discretion of its captain, either deploy or else 
form open line from division columns. 

The final assault. "6. As soon as the main body has arrived within about fifty paces 
of the line of skirmishers, now re-enforced by the whole of the supports, 
the commanding officer gives the signal for the assault, which will be 
made by both advanced and main body together in double time, as 
lively a fire as possible being at the same time kept up by the advanc- 
ed troops during the movement, which continues thus to within about 
twenty or thirty paces of the enemy, then terminating in a rush at full 
speed with a cheer, and the position is carried. The advanced troops 
will generally make it their business to envelop the point of entry 
whilst the main body converges upon it and breaks in. 

Duty of the troops "7. The troops whlch force the positi(m must aim at gaining the 

as soon as the .iiij.. iiic 

position is car- further border of it, so as to be able from thence to pursue the retreat- 
ing enemy with their fire, and every portion of the attacking force will 
try to do this without regard to their original subdivision into ad- 
vanced and main body. It will not signify if at this stage porti(his of 
the main-body companies pass beyond or mingle with fractions of the 
advanced companies, which may yet be engaged with the enemy with- 
in the limits of the post which has been forced. 
A forward move- ** An immediate rush forward beyond the border of the position is 
able. altogether inadmissible. The assailant will do much better if he at 

once prepares the point which he has captured for defence. 
Order to be re- "As soon as the success of the attack may be considered complete, 

possible^ ^^^'^ *^ every officer must do his utmost to restore order as quickly as possible 



AND THKIR APPLICATION IN MOUERN AVAKFARp:, ICv') 

in hi.s iniiiiLdiate neighborhood, and by degrees throughout the whole 
mass, in spite of the over-excitement or reaction which will probably 
prevail. 

'M. The third Mage of the attack. "We hardly require theoreti- condition of the 

, . , . . , 1 • I 1 troops at the end 

cal argument or graphic description to prove that troops which have of the second 
made an attack, as it necessarily must be made, in tlie manner above ° 
described, will have expended almost all their power for a certain 
time, and require a period of repose which should, at least, last until 
the disorder which, as we have already asserted and still confidently 
maintain, is inseparable from such operations has been to some extent 
remedied. This third stage has at. all times been an extremely dan- 
gerous period for the assailant, a period in which the laurels which 
have just been won at the price of blood, have often been again torn 
from the victor by a counter-attack of the enemy. Hence it has always 
been the aim and the task of the commander when making his general 
dispositions for the attack to provide for this moment of depression, 
and in examining this part of the question we come to this difficult 
point, the subdivision of the force into separate lines of battle. 

32. "The following principles will be sufficient to regulate their 
general employment in the attack, with reference to its third stage now 
discussed. 

"1. An attacking force of more than two or three battalions must Necessity of mui- 
needs be formed in more than one line of battle, so as to be able to tie.*^ 
meet a counter-attack of the enemy, the possibility of which must al- 
ways be kept in view. 

" 2. A second line of battle becomes necessary when the front of at- When a second 

. .ii 1 ' . "^ 1 I'l 1'"® '*' necessary. 

tack IS so wide that a charge made against it cannot be met directly 
by the wings of the assailing force, namely, if the front exceeds the 
range of a rifle-ball, say from eight hundred to one thousand two hun- 
dred paces. A third line of battle is requisite to help the advanced w'henathird 
troops to tide over the weak moment of reaction through which sol- 
diers who have met with a stubborn resistance will naturally always 
pass, and of which the defender is likely to take advantage for making 
a counter-attack either on the flank of the stormers as they advance, or 
on the position which they have just carried. 

"Therefore, whilst a second line of battle is onlv necessary under a tiiird line can 

T- 1'iT hit' I'l never be dispens- 

certain conditions, a third line can never well be dispensed with; that ed with, 
is to say, we shall always find it advisable to keep back a certain por- 
tion of the first line to follow after the fashion of a third line. 

" 3. From a quarter to one-third of the total force will usuallv be strt^ngth of the 

' third line. 

sufficient for a third line, and the second may be much weaker. Ihe 
former will meet the enemy's counter-strokes by acting on his flanks, 



166 principj.es of the art and scienck of war 

Its functions. and, according to circumstances, will serve as an 'outer' reserve after 

the position has been carried, or will undertake the pursuit; the latter 

Functions of the will fill up accidental ffaps in the front line, oppose a purely defensive 

second line. . ^, ,^ ^ . , , , , 

action to the enemy's attempts to break through, or clear out his 
stragglers after the position is won. 

Distance apart of << 4, The usual distance of the second line of battle from the main 

. body of the first line will be three hundred paces, so that it may not 

share the losses of the latter, whilst the tliird line will follow at the 

distance of from eight hundred to five hundred paces, so regulated that 

Relative positions it may be at hand when its support is required. Whilst the corps com- 
posing the second line of battle will, in accordance with the duties re- 
quired of them, be disposed so as to cover the intervals of tlie first 
line, those of the third line will be most advantageously posted on the 
flanks with a view to the part assigned to them, which, however, does 
not prevent them from being at first kept together in the centre so as 
to be available for use on either side. But anyhow they must be drawn 
to a flank in the extreme case of having to cover the retreat of the first 
line after its repulse. 

ciombined action "5. The Combined action of the second and third lines of battle 

of the three lines. > ^ ^ n •^^ t ^ 

With the first will depend too much upon circumstances to become the 
subject of regulation. 
Command of .the " It will generallv be convenient to place the corps in second line, 

three lines. , , *= ' , , . .^ . . ^ ^. , . ' 

under the same command as those in front of them in first line, whilst 
the third line had better form an independent command; but the com- 
mander of the whole force must have full discretion in the matter." 
Influence of im- 38. The defensive. The improvements made in fire-arms during the 

proved arms on • i , , . . i i , 

tactics. past thirty years seem to carry with them the conviction that the <ie- 

fensive has greatly gained in strength thereby, and this too at the ex- 
pense of the offensive. 

Results of recent Theoretically this deduction seems natural enough, but the results 
of recent wars teach us conclusions entirely different. 

Result of im- Fire-arms and gunpowder first rendered the defensive possible for an 

provements in ,. • ^ ..i • . -r» • ' . xi 

the means of wag- army Operating against another in an open country. Previous to these 
iiig wai. inventions, the weaker party was forced to take refuge in walled cities 

and there await the enemy ; and the latter was then forced to resort to 
Necessity of as- sicge operations. In the open field both parties took the offensive; for, 
suming e offen- j^^^ either side concluded to stand on the defensive, it would have in- 
evitably been beaten. 
The Austrians in 34. In 1859, the Austriaus, provided with rifled small-arms, stood 

1859. . ' J. . 

on the defensive, and were beaten. It is true that in this war the French 
had rifled cannon, but their infantry was generally armed with the 
smooth-bore musket. 



AND THEIR Ari'LKATION IN MODKRN WAUKAHK. Kx 

The French have usuully foHowcd the dcfendvcuffeiD-ive systein ; that syntem followed 
is, theyliave stood on the defenmx until the enemy fully devel()|)cd his " 
plan of attack, and tiien, at the proper time, assumed the offensive, with 
results that are well known. The first Napoleon reaped his greatest 
success by following this system. Austerlitz is a brilliant example of .vustciiitz. 
a battle fought on this plan. In 1870, the French stood on the defen- is7(i. 
she — contrary both to their nature and traditions — and were beaten. 

In 1878-79, ihe Turks also stood on tiic d<fenme, and they in turn tiu- tuiks, it^is- 
were beaten. 

Of course in all these cases there were certain causes which contribu- ((.nciusioii. 
ted to the choice of the defensive, other than the advantages supposed to 
be inherent in it; but still, confining the mind t<3 the simple question 
of improved weapons, it is somewhat singular that the side which as- 
sumed the presumably stronger system — the defensive — was invariably 
beaten. 

35. Before entering into the subject of the tactics to be followed by riobicm con- 
infantry holding a defensive position, it is proposed to make a sim- ^' 
pie calculation illustrative of the relative powers of the breech and 
muzzle-loading rifles on the defence. Let us suppose a force of two 
hundred infantry manning the interior crest of a redoubt. With the 
present breech-loading rifled musket this number of men can deliver 
eight thousand shots in four minutes, allowing six seconds per shot for 
loading, adjusting sight, and aiming. This number of shots can be de- 
livered while the enemy is passing over a distance of about six hun- 
dred yards — limit of effective fire of the muzzle loading smooth-bore 
musket — at the double time, and without any halt or delay, and under 
the most favorable conditions of ground. The same number of men, 
armed with the muzzle-loader, can deliver one thousand two hundred 
shots — allowing three shots in tw^o minutes — under the same condi- 
tions. 

Supposing that one shot in twenty -five is effective, we will have three conclusion. 
hundred and twenty men hit in the first instance, and forty-eight in the 
second. Then remembering that the breech-loader will prove fatal at 
three times the effective range of the muzzle-loader, and some idea may 
be formed of the great superiority of the former arm, especially when 
employed in positions where the distances had been previously meas- 
ured and marked on the ground. We can thus see good reasons for 
the open order indicated for troops acting on the offensive, and are also 
enabled to form an idea of the tactics that should be follo^ved by the 
defence. 

36. This change in the conditions of infantry fire has reversed the 
relative defensive value of ground. Formerly ground that most 



168 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Effect of change 
of fire on the de- 
fensive properties 
of ground. 



Places requiring 
most defenders. 



(Home.) 
Power conferred 
by improved 
aims. 



Advantages 
claimed for the 
defence. 



Eesult of an an- 
alysis of the first 
supposed advan- 
tage. 



Of the second. 



The third a posi 
tive advantage. 



abounded in cover was regarded as very strong, while the reverse was 
held of ground that was level, open, and easily approached. Now, 
the latter requires but comparatively few. men to hold it, for no troops 
could live to cross it under a heavy musketry and artillery fire. The 
former is now the place that requires most defenders, for it is the 
locality where the opposing troops can find that cover so essential to 
protect them from the heavy fire of troops in position and protected 
from return fire by the works that forces on the* defensive now invar- 
iably shelter themselves behind. 

37. "The power that improved arms have given to the defence is 
that of keeping the attackers for a longer time under a heavy fire than 
formerly ; it is also stated that the defenders derive much advantage 
from the following causes: 

"a. Their fire is delivered by men in position, who can take a bet- 
ter and more correct aim. 

" b. That the force acting on the defensive may be better covered 
and protected than that acting on the offensive, suffer less loss, and 
consequently be cooler and less excited. 

" c. That the ground may be better studied by the defensive than 
by the attacking force, and not only can advantage be thus taken of 
its conformation, but also additional force may be obtained by remov- 
ing men from where they are of no use to important places, 

38. "If, however, these advantages, or supposed advantages, be 
analyzed, they will be found to have hardly the importance that they 
at first sight appear to possess. With reference to the first, it must not 
be forgotten that the assailants move rapidly and by rushes of alternate 
fractions, which tends to disconcert the aim of the defenders, who are 
ever firing at a running target, while the attackers are firing at a fixed 
target; therefore the superiority of the defence in this case does not 
seem to be very great. 

" With reference to the second it appears that the concentration of 
fire on one spot so demoralizes a defender that he can be neither cool 
nor calm. The fire of the attacker is always convergent, that of the 
defender divergent.* Further, the advance of troops takes them away 
from the dead and wounded, who are left behind. The defenders must 
remain in one place, and the dead and wounded can with difficulty be 
removed, hence the morale of the defenders will suffer most. 

"With reference to the third, there can be no doubt that the defence 
will benefit greatly from its superiority in this respect ; and it is not 



*The comparison between a siege and an attack here liolds good, the assailants working 
on a wider front, direct their whole fire on one portion of the defender's position, their fire 
is thus convergent ; if the defender replies, his fire must be diverge.it 



AND THEIR AITLICATION IN MODERN WARI AHK. 100 

only to its fire, but the power to briii^^ that lire to bear on proper 
places, that the defender owes his superiority. 

39. "It would appear that for the correct holdiiit? of a defensive Arrangements tor 
position, arrangements should be made to bring a lioavy artillery and sive position. 
infantry tire on the attackers at the very beginning of the action, and 

to hold a few powerful reserves in hand, to attack and drive out any 
troops that may obtain a lodgment within the general line. 

"The assailant to have a reasonable hope of success must be superior Manner of em- 
at the point where the attack is made. Now to counteract this su- servesr' 
periority there must be on the side of the defence large reserves kept 
ready in hand to be moved the moment the attacker's project is devel- 
oped, and sufficiently near to be brought up in time to drive the enemy 
back; not merely to check his advance after he has penetrated the 
position. Such reserves must be in the hands of the generals com- control of the re- 
manding the divisions and corps, rather than those of the general-in- 
chief, and hence it follows that these bodies should each form their 
own reserve. 

40. "On the defensive it mav fairlv be questioned if a deploved Useoftheextend- 

. . . J 1. . ed line on the de- 

line IS now requisite. The breech-loader enables an extended line to fensive. 
deliver more fire now than a ch)sed line in former days. It will per- 
haps be wiser, therefore, to keep a large portion of the first line until 
the attack has developed itself, and then to use it in thickening the 
line of skirmishers where most threatened. Such a method gives 
much additional power to the men who see thems-elves supported by 
those behind, and who feel that they are not left alone to cope with the 
attackers. The sudden increase of the defender's fire, by a large re- Effect of a sudden 
enforcement of the supports, has a powerful effect in checking the 
enemy's advance. 

"It appears, from the testimony of all continental writers, to be the Voiiey firing. 
experience of recent war, that volley firing cannot be used, and that ■; '■■ 
independent firing, which enables each man to judge his own time and 
aim, is far more eflfective. 

41. "It would appear, therefore, that in holding a defensive posi- General system of 
tion, the skirmishing line in front should be supported exactly as in at^tack.*^ ^'°^' 
the attack, and this all the more so, as in most defensive positions, the 

supports which feed the front line may be much closer than in the at- 
tack. In occupying any defensive position, small bodies of troops of 
all arms should be told off at favorable places to make an advance on 
the enemy and check his movement. Such a force advancing a short 
distance from the main position disconcerts the assailant, compels him 
to direct his fire on the new opponent, relieving the actual defenders 
from fire, and enables them to act with renewed vigor. For this pur- 

22 



170 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Use made of small purpose Small posts in front of a position are of great value, but 
po3 s. ^^^^ should not be surrendered or evacuated at the first attack, they 

should be firmly held, and to do this they must be supported from the 

rear. 
Places avoided by 42. "There is a tendency on the part of the assailants to avoid the 

the assailants. . ... 

centre of the defender's position as being that where usually the fire is 

heaviest, and to turn off to the flanks, and to cover their advance by 
seeking out places unswept or only partly swept by fire. Such move- 
Advantage taken ments must leave gaps in their line, and these gaps, if not filled up 

by the defence. » ^ . , - 

from the supports at once are the very points favorable for the de- 
fenders to attack, and by so doing threaten the assailant's advance on 
the flanks. But in making such forward movements, the greatest care 
is requisite that the main position be not lost, and hence arises 
Position of sup- another necessitv for reserves. Generallv, both supports and main 

ports and re- ' ,..,.* -, . , . 

serves. body may be much nearer the skirmishing, or firing line, than when 

attacking. The only thing is to place them so that they shall escape 
fire as much as })ossible; but especially in the defence it must be re- 
membered a small reserve that arrives when it is wanted, is infinitely 
Use of detached superior to a Strong one that arrives too late. Earh' deployment and 
in e'ar^iy stages^ of ^ long uiarch over ground, in extended order, exhausts an assailant; 
the defender should therefore seek to make the attacker deploy as soon 
as possible. But it is questionable if this should not be rather done by 
bodies of cavalry and artillery, pushed well out to the front, and sup- 
ported by infantry, who, using the containing power of the breech- 
loader, will make the attacker deploy; rather than by long shots from 
the main positions which are not very eflficacious, and mark the posi- 
tion held, better perhaps than anything else.* 
(Scherff.) " 'The basis of a pure defence should be to fight the attack only at 

Theory of the de- ... , • n -, , m t. i i 

fensive. the distance where its fire produces the greatest effects. But though 

this is so, it is requisite to profit by the extreme range of arms and by 
the aid of small detachments entrusted to selected officers, to keep up 
a fire on the general advance of the enemy. The first line [skinnishing 
or firing line) will seek, by means of the most rapid fire, to keep the last 
halt of the enemy's skirmishers or that preceding the assault, as far off 
as possible. All the intensity, all the power of the fire, will be devel- 
oped against the real assault for three hundred to four hundred paces. 
The defence should be convinced, that despite its fire, it may become 
necessary to nsethe bayonet, and that this resort is less dangerous than 
a retreat.' " 

43. The defensive-offensive, " All defensive action which aims at a 



♦The effttct of artillery firo is threo times a.s gr«at at 2,20n yards as it is at .•},.'}<J0 yard.s. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 171 

decisive result is composed of two elements; resistance and counter- ,., («t:herrt.; 

*■ Kleiiieiits of a de- 

attack, cisive defence. 

"The defensive-offensive aims at the same end as does the offens-ive, but Aim. 
in a different manner. 

"Whilst the latter begins by shattering the enemy's powers of resis- Mode of a.tiou. 
tance so as next to destroy his capacity for fighting, the former at- 
tempts to obtain the same result by previously breaking the enemy's 
powers of attack. 

"The defensive holds it to be easier to break the power of attack than How the defence 
that of resistance, and therefore begins by only warding off the enemy's cisive.**^ 
blows; but if it desires to smash its adversary, it is obliged at length 
to make use of its own powers of offence, in place of those of defence 
which have hitherto been called into play. 

44. Principles of the pasdve defence. " 1. The passive defence must, in Must act with a 
order to reserve as much force as possible for the decisive offensive re- 
turn, endeavor to perform with a minimum of strength the double task 
of shattering the enemy and holding the position. 

"2. Whilst the choice of position has much to do with the success- Effect of theposi- 
ful performance of this task, the mode of occupying it will also mater- 
ially affect the result. 

"The troops employed in the passive defence should be concentrated Manner of piac- 

,* ., !•!• 11 f 1 ' • ing the troops. 

at points previously recognized and indicated as keys of the position, 
unity of command being preserved at each of these points, whilst the 
intervening space should only be observed. 

"3. The principle of the line-formation will govern the disposition Formation of the 
of the troops at each point occupied, i. e., as many rifles as possible will 
be brought into action in first line. 

" One man to a pace in this line of skirmishers will best meet this strength of skir- 

,,,.. iii- if>i' 1 mishers and sup- 

demand, and a line oi supports half as strong as the first line, and ap- ports. 

proaching as close as practicable to it will be sufficient, as it is as- 
sumed that both lines are well under cover. 

" Upon these two bodies, forming together the first line of the defence, Duty of these 
and which should also invariably be under one commander, devolves 
the task of shattering the assailant's power of attack. 

"4. So as under all circumstances to be able to hold a position Necessity of a re- 
once occupied, this first line needs a reserve (main-body), varying in ' 
strength, according to circumstances, from equal to down to one-third 
or one-fourth of its own numbers; this reserve serving passively to gar- 
rison a reduit or to furnish active support, under one and the same, or 
under separate command, according to which part it plays, but never 
more than from three hundred to four hundred paces in rear. 

" 5. Unity of command in the direction of depth is desirable a.s long mand. 



172 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Necessity of st 
Olid and'thiid- 
lines. 



Ready ahvays to 
take the orteii- 
sive. 

Fire opened at 
effective range. 



Action of detach- 
ed parties. 



Action of the fir 
line. 



Use of the bay- 
onet. 



An extended 
order must be 
adopted, 



Power of concen- 
trating fire pre- 
served. 



Intermixture of 
skirmishers and 
supports. 



as the reserve is visible from the position of the first line, whilst in the 
direction of width its extent depends upon the unity of the work in 
hand, which again chiefly depends upon the nature of the ground. 

"6. The value and necessity of a second line of battle are much 
more evident for a defensive than for an attacking force; but its 
strength, and the manner in which it is drawn up and handled, depend 
entirely on the nature of the ground, according to which it will come 
into action either as an 'inner' or 'outer' reserve, for the latter of 
which offices a third line of battle will often become necessary when the 
numbers are large ; and its operations will be conducted almost entirely 
on the principles of the offensive return (the more so, the larger the 
dimensions of the forces engaged), even when it does not of itself at- 
tempt to produce a decisive result. 

" Above all, an infusion of the offensive element should never be 
wanting in the passive defence even in the smallest particulars. 

" 7. It should be a principle of the passive defence to open fire on the 
enemy only when he comes within the most effective range. 

"All the same it will be necessary to take advantage of the extreme 
range of the arm by detaching small parties to fire, under the control 
of their officers, on the enemy's general line of approach, as far as it is 
known. 

"The first line will by a lively fire, and eventually by rapid inde- 
pendent firing, keep the enemy's skirmishers at as great a distance as 
possible when they are taking up their ground previous to the assault, 
for the defence will be best served by their being hindered fronl estab- 
lisliing themselves firmly at this moment. Every fire-arm should be 
brought into play to the fullest extent against the actual assault at 
from four hundred to three hundred paces. 

"The defenders must be convinced that it may be necessary, after 
all, to have recourse to the bayonet, and that this would be less dan- 
gerous to them than to give way. 

"8. From tHe very nature of the work, a defensive action can only 
be carried through in extended order, to adopt which, from the very 
first, both supports and reserves may easily be forced. 

"Still even with troops thus extended, the power of concentrating 
fire must be preserved, although it will rarely now be able to take the 
form of a volley. 

"The intermixture of skirmishers with supports will, for the defence 
as for the attack, be generally the only form of re-enforcement possible, 
although exceptions to this rule may occur in the earlier stages of the 
fight, exceptions always to be made use of. 

45. The stage of counter-attach . " The ])rinciples which present them- 



AND THKIK Al'I'LICATIOX IX MODKllN WARFAUK. 173 

selves to us as a consequence of this study of the second stage of the 
defensive-offensive are pretty much as foUovvs : 

•' L The defensive-offensive must carefully separate tlie troops in- inops divided 

,,-, f t n i' 111- '"^'^ '"'*^ bodies. 

tended for the two purposes ot deience and counter-attack ; allotting to 
the former as far as possible a minimum of force, if the position be 
favorable. 

"2. The strong main bodv is intended to deal the counter-stroke vviien to make 

• II ) /I 1 • 1 • 1 • tlie couiiler- 

best ot all on the enemy s nank just as lie is advancing to storm the aui\ck. 
position; otherwise, at least as soon as possible after the assailant has 
forced his way in; only as an exceptional case, when the assailant 
makes gross mistakes or shows timidity, should the counter-attack be 
made before the fire of the defence has had its full effect. 

"3. The counter-attack as an act of offence is governed entirely, chaiactei of tiie 
both as to form and execution, by the same principles which regulate '^ 
the attack, that is to say, it should be quick, concentrated, and ener- 
getic. 

''4. Tlie position chosen for the body' of troops intended toi make Nature of the 
the counter-attack, is one of the most difficult as well as the most ini- soiled.'" 
portant problems which a commander has to solve. Being entirely de- 
pendent on circumstances for time and place, the offensive return can 
only produce a decisive result if made at the right moment. This 
consideration must guide the commander in selecting a position, and 
also in deciding upon the further dispositions and orders which are 
certain to be required. The only principle which can be laid down is 
to keep the troops concealed under cover, if possible behind a flank. 

" 5. The combination of defence and counter-attack, and the neces- iiequiie.i acom- 
sary transition from one to the other are of such direct and decisive er aTd good""" 
consequences to the defensive-offensive, that this form of action is only to '°"p^" 
be recommended if the commander be thoroughly competent and the 
troops extremely fit to manoeuvre." 

CAVALRY. 

40. The use of cavalry for grand charges in mass, as illustrated by Modem use of 
the battles of Napoleon, is mm passed. To attack with -cavalry, troops ' ' - " 
in good condition and armed with the modern weapon, would be a use- 
less sacrifice; still, circumstances might arise, when this sacrifice 
.should be made in order to avoid a greater, or to accomplivsh a certain 
result which could not be otherwise obtained. 

At Mars-la-Tour, August 10, 1870, the German cavalry charged the Action of German 

T-. , . .' . 1 1 1 1 1 •! ' ■• cavalrv at Mars- 

rrench infantry in order to check the latter until re-enforcements la-Toiir. 
could come up. This object was gained, but at a great sacrifice ; it 
could be gained in no other way. The German infantry engaged was 
inferior in number to the French, was greatly exhausted, and its 



174 



PKINOIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



(Home.) 
Action of cavalry 
on the battle- 
field. 



Kea.sons for the 
restricted action 
of cavalrv on the 
battle-field. 



Difilculties to 
contend against. 



Best manner of 
attacking with 
cavalrv. 



Necessity of a 
reserve. 



Manner of meet- 
ing a charge. 



ammunition was giving out. Time must be gained to allow the Ger- 
man re-enforcements to reach the field and deploy. The cavalry 
charge accomplished this object, and victory was rendered possible by 
their efforts. 

47. "It appears that the action of cavalry on an actual battle-field 
must now be generally limited to watching the flanks, checking the 
action of the hostile cavalry, attacking broken and repulsed infantry. 
There are, however, many instances when an able cavalry leader can 
seize opportunities to use his arm with great effect. Such opportuni- 
ties do not often occur, but when they do, the success achieved will 
generally be very great." 

The reason for this restricted action of cavalry will readily be per- 
ceived when the great increase of range and rapidity of fire of the 
modern arm, both of the infantry and artillery, is considered. The 
dangerous zone of infantry fire is from three to four times a.** wide as 
formerly, while the rapidity of fire is almost infinitely greater. The 
same may be said to a great extent of artillery fire. Cavalry requir- 
ing open, level ground for its movements, it labors under great disad- 
vantages ; for these are the conditions most favorable for artillery and 
infantry fire. 

48. Cavalry in the field requires more care than the other arms and 
is less easily handled. Its efficiency is dependent upon the condition 
of the horses; it requires ground favorable for its action ; it becomes 
dispersed readily, and is hard to hold in hand. 

An attack of cavalry on infantry should, if possible, be made upon 
the flanks; in combats of cavalry against cavalrv, front and flank at- 
tacks combined will usually offer the best chances of success. 

49. A reserve is a very important feature with cavalry ; for, what- 
ever the success gained by the first line it soon becomes disorganized, 
and then the side which can bring fresh troops into the action will 
usually win. Success to be lasting should be promptly followed up; 
cavalry is weak immediately after a successful attack, its horses are 
blown, it becomes scattered, and in the confusion orders are seldom 
heard or heeded. Under such circumstances the attack should be fol- 
lowed up by a reserve of fresh cavalry, or better still by infantry, or 
the results will be but temporary. The enemy's broken troops would 
soon be able to rally under the protection of the reserves and again 
show a firm front. 

Cavalry should never await a charge at a halt; when it is found that 
the enemy is about to charge, your cavalry should at once charge to 
meet him. 

50. When cavalry is obliged to charge over unknown ground the 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. I/O 

line should be preceded at some distance by a lew horsemen to give Nee(«.sity of re- 
warning when an obstacle is met. JSeglect ot this precaution has tre- vauce of cavalry. 
quently led to disaster. 

" At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Murat made a grand cavalry (Soady.) 

. , ^ ' . ' , * , . , Murat at Leipsic, 

charge on the allied centre, capturing twenty-six guns; he earned i8i3. 
everything before him until he reached the village of Gulden Gossa, 
in the vici)iity of which the ground had not been reconnoitred, and the 
nature of which could not be seen from a distance. At this place the 
French were suddenly checked by a great hollow, full of trees, build- 
ings, and ponds. The allied infantry, favored by this cover, opened a 
destructive lire upon them, and the Kui-sian cavalry suddenly charg- 
ing them in flank, they were driven back with great loss, leaving 
twenty of the guns they had captured." 

51. The true uses of cavalry are the following : to watch the enemy True u.-ses of cav- 
and gain information of his numbers, position, and movements; to pro- 
tect the formation of the infantry by charging when first the army 
oomes into the presence of the enemy, holding him in check until the 
infantry is well in position and can act; to charge troops that have 
been repulsed in an attack, to follow them up and reap every advan- 
tage from the success gained ; or the reverse, to cover such troops until 
they can reform and hold their own against a counter-attack of the 
enemy ; to furnish the means of protecting the front, rear, and flanks of 
an army, guarding it from surprises, gaining information which will 
lead to its success, and preventing the enemy from obtaining know^ledge 
of its movements; to charge the guns of an isolated battery when the 
latter is not provided with the requisite infantry supports, operating 
for this purpose by the flanks. 

" Recent events have shown that the duties of cavalrv, not only as (Home.) 

' . ", Conclusions 

covering the advance of an army, as outposts or reconnoiterers, but drawn from re- 
also on the actual field of battle, are perhaps more brilliant than ever. 
True it is that the qualities and knowledge now required of cavalry 
are different from what they were, or to put it more correctly, the Qualities now re- 
same qualities and a great deal more besides are needed. Quickness, 
coolness, and gallantry are now as always requisite in a cavalry soldier. 
But more still is needed, knowledge of country, knowledge of what the 
requirements of the troops are, power of observation and description, 
ability to seize instinctively the object of the commander-in-chief, a 
certain acquaintance with engineering, all these are now necessities 
for a cavalry officer. His sphere is greatly enlarged, and to fill it 
properly his military knowledge must be far more extensive than that 
involved in leading a squadron and keeping it effective, all important 
as the latter is, as the ba.<»is of everything else. Far from doing awav 



176 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF AVAR 



(Boguslawski.) 
German cavalry 
ill the war of " 



Use as advanced 
and rear-guard, 
outposts, pickets 
etc. 



with cavalry, modern events have clearly shown that there is no arm 
of the service from the correct management of which the army can 
reap more benefit. If its action be paralyzed, from any cause, there is 
none the want of which will be more severely felt." 

'' Even before crossing the frontier the cavalry divisions in the cen- 
tre of the army were pushed to the front. * * * 

" Their mission was above all to pursue and keep in contact with the 
enemy. They threw forward strong detachments which everywhere 
forced the enemy back, and sought to discover the direction of his 
march or his new position. If they found the way clear before them, 
they sent on officers' patrols, with orders to push forward at any risk 
until they came upon the foe. These parties were despatched in all 
directions, and performed their duties generally with equal ability and 
determination. It is they who spread the fear of ' les Prussiens' many 
miles in front of the army corps' advance-guards; to them cities like 
Nancy opened their gates without an attempt at resistance; and if 
here and there a cavalry patrol some days' march in advance of the 
division was dispersed or cut off, one or two horsemen generally made 
their way back to give intelligence Avhich was what was wanted. * * 

'^Requisitions and foraging excursions were made to great distances, 
magazines were destroyed, railways and roads rendered impassable, 
telegraph wires cut, in one word, the communications of the French 
army rendered insecure. * * * 

"As an additional result of the use to which our cavalry was put, 
we may mention the perfect security and tranquillity enjoyed by our 
army corps on the march and in camp, in rear of the cavalry divis- 
ions pushed forward half or a whole day's march to the front. The 
army corps had not, as a rule, to trouble themselves with outpost duty 
but only to provide for the immediate security of the bivouac or can- 
tonment. The infantry was therefore relieved of much hard work, 
being in great measure exempt from the wearisome and harassing 
picket duty. The cavalry divisions were kept in advance as long as 
possible, and were often only withdrawn at the moment we advanced 
to the attack on the day of battle, if the ground appeared too unfavor- 
able for horses. Before Sedan our cavalry divisions were close to the 
enemy, and prevented him from getting certain intelligence of our 
movements. Under cover of these same divisions the operation of 
surrounding the French was partly accomplished; and the German 
commanders would hardly have got information at the right time of 
Mac Mahon's departure for Rheims and Chalons, had our cavalry 
masses not been pushed far to the front. •■ 

*'In the tiresome campaign on the Loire the cavalry divisions lay 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKRN WAUFARK. 1 / / 

for weeks in front of tlie enemy, so as to assure some rest to llie infan- Tii.- (■iiinpiiij;!! ..n 
try much exliausted by the numerous sanguinary fights. * 

"Thus the cavalry covered the army corps in rear of it. made re- 
quisitions, harassed and reconnoitred the enemy. In these respects it 
rendered great services to the army, services whicli far surpassed its 
performances on the field of battle. 

"The activity of our cavalry divisions was also displayed in the 
complete manner in which they performed the out{)ost duty and cov- 
ered the corps behind them (in doing this they were in the position of 
strong axivance-guards pusiied far forward); again, in keeping the 
country in subjecti(Mi by small detached parties; lastly, by threatening 
the enemy's flanks." 

During the Russian campaign in Turkey, in 1877-78, the cavalry did Russo-Xurkish 
not take part in any of the great battles. It was uf-ed in raids, and in 
cutting railroads and telegraph lines. It performed most difficult ser- 
vices in (iourko's first expedition over the Balkans, successfully cov- 
ering his retreat before a force three times superior to his own. It 
fought on foot on several occasions during the expedition. 

52. Cavalry should always be posted on ground w,here it can oper- Kuie for posting 
ate freely and be protected from the enemy's fire as much as possible. 

A large proportion of cavalrv should be held in reserve, as it is thus importance of a 

, . Till 1 • reserve of cav- 

fresh tor any emergency, it can also be used to great advantage in airy. 
deciding the conflict when the enemy has exhausted all his means; for 
the general who can at this time bring fresh troops into action is sure to 
win and reap the greatest results from his victory. 

The formation of cavalrv for the attack should be in line, as it is Formation of cav- 

' . ,. ' .n 1 • • alrv for attaclc. 

thus less exposed to the sweeping nre of artillery and infantry. 

53. Celerity being one of the main features of good cavalry, its Use of cavalry in 
value in the pursuit is incalculable. It can keep close on the flanks 

and rear of the i-etreating enemy, compelling him to remain constantly 
on the alert; it can take advantage of ever}' opportunity to rush in and 
capture his disorganized forces, operating for this purpose on the 
flanks, where it is less exposed to a direct fire. In the pursuit, cavalry rse of horse- 
usually has associated with it horse-artillery, which, continually 
harassing the flying and disordered er.emy by its demoralizing fire, pre- 
pares the way for the efficient action of the cavalry. 

54. Provided with the breech-loading fire-arm one valuable feature i^se of cavalry as 

, . , .,,.,. , 1 • • mounted infan- 

ot cavalry is the ease with which it may be used as mounted infantry, try. 
Moving with great rapidity to a threatened point it can be dismounted 
and take position to receive the enemy's attack, in this respect being 
nearly the equal of the best infantry; while the facility with which it 
can be deployed and moved, may, by being used at just the time fresh 

28 



178 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART ANT) SCIENCE OF WAR 



(See Swinton.) 
The Shenandoah 
valley, 1864. 



Five Forks, 1S65. 



AprU 1.-st. 



Ai:)ril 6th, 
Sailor's Creek. 



(Home.) 
Question of pro- 
tection for the 
flanks. 



Manner of em- 
ploying cavalry 
in liank attacks. 



Associated with 
horse-artillerv. 



Essentials 
success. 



troops are needed, decide the action in favor of the general sending it 
forward. 

General Sheridan, in his operations in the Shenandoah valley, in 
1864, used his cavalry as a mask, behind which he formed his infantry 
and concealed its movements until it fell with great effect upon the 
enemy's flanks. 

On March 31st, 1865, at Five Forks, having dismounted the cavalry 
and placed it behind temporary breastworks, Sheridan was able to re- 
pulse an attack made by the Confederate infantry ; the cavalry was 
armed with carbines. 

On April 1st his cavalry drove the enemy into their works at Five 
Forks, and held them there until the infantry came up and turned 
their left flank, an operation which resulted in the defeat or capture of 
nearly one-third of General Lee's entire force. 

On April 6th, at Sailor's Creek, General Sheridan, with his cavalry, 
cut Lee's line of retreat and held Ewell's corps in check until the in- 
fantry came up, when the Confederates threw down their arms and 
surrendered. 

Acting thus in a double capacity the cavalry contributed in a great 
measure to the successful termination of the campaign. Moving rap- 
idly as cavalry to intercept the line of retreat, then dismounting and 
acting as infantry to hold the enemy in check until the infantry came 
up, the result did not long remain doubtful. 

55. 'The question of how flanks are to be protected during an at- 
tack in extended order is one that continually crops up, and one to 
which as yet, no satisfactory answer has been given. This weak point 
of the infantry attack is precisely that on which the cavalry should 
fasten, and it is that where knowledge of ground, quickness and de- 
cision will continually afford to young officers in command of small 
bodies, an opportunity of performing brilliant feats. The action of 
cavalry supported by horse-artillery on the flanks of an army will be 
of the greatest importance by extending the line occupied by the 
troops on the defensive, the enemy, if he attempts a flank movement, 
must consequently be thrown further off, and compelled to make a 
longer march. And the action of a powerful cavalry supported by ar- 
tillery on the head of the columns moving to a flank will at all times 
delay their progress, and give time for the army acting on the defen- 
sive to manoeuvre. But to work cavalry and horse-artillery In this 
manner it is requisite that they should be boldly used, and advantage 
taken of the rapidity of their movement, they must not be kept close 
to or hanging on the infantry for support, but must act boldly, seek to 
find out the enemv's flank movement, and once those movements have 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN JIOUKRN WARKARE. 179 

declared themselves, the cavalry must act on the head of his columns; 
whenever troops move to outflank an enemy in position they must al- 
ways move in long columns, for they attack to a flank and not to their 
front. Hence, the front being narrow, they themselves may be over- 
lapped and taken on the flanks. 

56. "No army that is able to manoeuvre, and the cavalry of which cavalry protec- 
is properly posted, and does its duty, should ever, under any circum- '°" " anaimy. 
stances, be surprised bv a flank attack. The position of cavalry should Position of the 

, n ^ I • 1 1111 i>*i cavalrv of an 

be on the flanks; that is to say, there should be no mass oi cavalry on army on the 
the roads, following or leading the army, but the whole country should 
be filled with horsemen, working on a broad front, pushing on at all 
times, if checked simply halting, while those on the right and left turn 
whatever stops the advance. In the rear of those feelers must be the 
supports on which they retire, and again in rear the main bodies. All 
information from a wide front is brought into the main bodies, there 
collated, tabulated, and telegraphed back to the directing head in rear. 
Thus the cavalry of an army resembles more than anything else the 
feelers of some insect, pushed out in front, and conveying impressions 
to the animal, which guide its movements. To accomplish this duty Training of the 
thoroughly and completely the cavalry soldier must be trained as an 
individual, not merely as a unit of a large mass. His individual 
knowledge and ability must be continually improved and strengthened 
while at the same time his power of acting as a fraction in large 
masses should be kept steadily in view. Thus, the cavalry soldier re- 
quires to be all he has ever been, together with a great deal more he 
has hitherto not been. 

"There are few things more remarkable than the contrast of the contrast between 

T-iii-r>' ii'i li- -11 French and Prus- 

rrench and Frussian cavalry during the recent war; the former guided sian cavalry, 
entirely by old rules and ideas, the latter guided not only by new ideas 
suitable to altered circumstances, but with those ideas carefully based 
on the old customs. 

57. " ' For one moment the Prussian staff lost our track in the plains (The p>encii cav- 
of Champaigne, because we suddenly changed our plans. But they Action oTthe 
quickly found us again by means of their cavalry, which never lost the ^"^^'^"^ ^^""^ ''*• 
track, and marched on our flank, spreading out a curtain behind 

which their army worked. When he arrived at Chene Populeux, the 
enemy was thirty miles behind his cavalry; as we advanced we met 
groups of five or six horsemen who retired slowly after examining 
our arrangements and informing those who followed them. If 
we wished to pursue, each fraction fell back on a support ca- 
pable of resisting us and keeping us from penetrating the cur- 
tain. This service was so well performed by the Prussian cavalry. 



180 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

that Ave marched, so to speak, within a net which enclosed us in its 
meshes.' 
French and Ger- 58. " The gallant charges made bv the French cavalrv against the 

man cavalrv -r, , . , i i i " t i i ' - i 

charges in the Jrrussian intantrv when the latter were not disordered were pertectly 
useless and effected nothing, although the fact that the German cavalry 
did succeed on one occasion shows that the successful attack of cavalry 
against breech-loaders and rifled artillery, although exceedingly dan- 
gerous, is by no means impossible. 

Necessity of ihp ''On the 16th of August, the French armv was seeking to retreat on 

cavalrv charge at . . . , -^ . . . , 

Mars-ia-Touf. \ erdun trom 3letz, a small portion of the rrussian intantrv only was 

up on ihe south of the Verdun road, and it became a matter of the 

utmost necessity to pin the French to the ground and keep them there 

until the remainder of the Prussian army could come up." 

(Bogusiawski.^ "The French first line was extended into a long line of skirmishers. 

The German cav- ........ ^ i i • i , • . - • n n 

airy charge at •"" Several brigades charging on various points at lull gallop 

and with the most reckless bravery, overwhelmed the first line; then 
coining upon the supports broke several battalions, rode through sev- 
eral batteries, were at length repultsed by the masses which they en- 
countered further on, and, being attacked by French cavalry, retired 
under a fearful fire. * ^ * The French, surprised by the impetu- 
ous onset of the German squadrons, paused in their advance, time 
was gained; the German re-enforcements, which eventually decided 
the victory, came into line. ■■' * * The attack had a great effect 
on the fate of the day. Our cavalry sacrificed a third, some regiments, 
indeed, half their men, to bring the French to a stand-.«till. But here 
lies the difference between ttiis charge and the great cavalry attacks of 
former days, that the latter themselves decided the victoi'y." 
(Home.) 59. "The duties of cavalrv in the field ma v be divided into two 

Duties of cavalry _ " . _ 

in the field divid- classes. These duties, although similar, are sufBcientlv distinct to pro- 

fed into two , ,. . . 

cia-sses. duce a real division. 

" 1st. The duties uf the cavalry attached to a division of the army. 

'*2nd. The duties of the cavalry division. 

Duties of the di- '* In the Prussian army a regiment of cavalry is attached to each 

cava ry. ^jj^j^j^j^j^ jj^g duties of this cavalrv are to cover the head of the 

division, examine the country, provide small parties to look out for the 

enemy in various directions, feel for and communicate with troops 

marching on roads parallel to that its own division is marching on, 

keep up the communication with troops in front and rear, and thus 

link the component portions of the army-corps together, and, lastly, to 

provide orderlies and escorts. 

Duties of the cav- "The duties of the cavalrv division are similar, but on a far larger 

alrv division. , ■ i , i ' • i • i • i 

scale; it has to keep the army acquainted wrrs every movement ot the 



AND THKIK APPLICATION IN MODKKN WAUFAKi:. 181 

enemy, to harass him and conceal the movements on their own side by 
keeping a strong cnrtain of posts constantly in advance, so that the 
enemy shall know nothing of what goes on within that curtain, to con- 
nect the various army-corps moving together, and keep each informed 
of the action of the othei-." 

ARTILLERY. 

60. "The introduction of rifled artillery and breech-loading arms „. tHouie.) 

*^^ htieotot improve- 

has caused considerable modifications in the action of artillery in the meins on mtii- 

'' leiv ill tlie field. 

field. These modifications are based partly on the nature of the in- 
fantry fighting, partly on the peculiarity of the rifled gun itself. 

" It is undoubtedly true that rifled artillery is far more powerful in Uitied and 

1 rt' 1 ,1 ill ■!-> . snioolli-bore 

accuracy and eiiect at long ranges than smooth-bore guns. But at guns. 
short ranges it is very questionable if such advantages exist, and this 
is all the more the case that at short ranges theefiect of rifles on artil- 
lery is now very greatly increased. 

61. "With smooth-bore guns, accuracy of laving at short ranges service of 

. 1 11 "i •! ' J. 1 smooth-bore and 

was hardly required, the gun even badly laid was sure to produce a riHed guns. 
good effect. With rifle projectiles this is not the case; to produce the 
full effects of a rifled artillery, careful attention is at all times re- 
quired, and this attention can hardly be given at short ranges, when 
the gunners are suffering much from infantry fire. 

"Two things follow from this: 1st. That if the full value of rifled Artillery sooner 

.,, . "^ , , , . . . , in action than 

artillery is to be brought out, it must come into action much sooner formerly. • 
than formerly, it must continue in action much longer. 2nd. That it 
must move about far less than formerly. Mobility is an essential for Mustreiuain 
good artillery, as it is for all arms, but it is-the power to move rapidly 
when required, not continual movement, that is necessary. Artillery 
Avhen moving is useless, suffers injury, and does no good. Breech- 
loaders have enabled infantry to advance firing if required. Such is 
not the case with artillery, which can only tire when halted. 

62. "If the problem of the proper use of artillery on the field of bat- Proper use of ar- 

, , • 1 1 . 1 . 1 ' . i . p i" • • tillerv on the 

tie be considered, it becomes at once apparent that its chief function is battle-field. 

to pave the way for an attack. It may be accepted as an axiom that 

the success of an infantry attack, on a body of infantry favorably 

posted, is, with anything like equal numbers, very doubtful. The why its empioy- 

, ,* 1 , - . . * , , mentis neces- 

position taken up by troops on the defensive is sure to be always more sary. 
or less difl[icult of approach, and there are sure to be houses, walls, 
farm-yards, villages, used as points of support; in such places, or be- 
hind even the smallest shelter-trench, or in rifle-pits, an enemy usually 
suffers but little from the fire of attacking infantry, and at the same 
time can inflict loss all the more that he is sheltered and preserves 
coolness and can use his weapons deliberately. 



182 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OK WAR 



For what purpose 
employed. 



(Bo^uslawski.) 
Employment of 
artillerv in the 
war of 1870-71. 



Gravelotte and 
Sedan. 



Artillery exposed 
to infantry fire. 



Artillery begins 
the fight. 



Experience of 
186(1. 



Artillery fire pre- 
cedes an assault. 



(Boguslawski.) 
Action of artillery 
in 1870-71. 



(Home. ) 
Demoralizing 
ett'ect of a cross- 
fire. 



"It is then the province of artillery to drive the defenders out of 
such places, and shake their morale by a heavy concentrated fire, which 
will enable the infantry to advance to the attack." 

"If it was wished to open the battle in earnest, no time was lost in 
deploying a strong force of artillery, which generally took post in a 
connected line at the distance of from two thousand to three thousand 
paces, endeavoring by its fire to cover the deployment of the main 
body and to shake the enemy. The division artillery and the greatest 
part of the corps artillery of the army corps engaged, were usually em- 
ployed for this purpose. * * *" 

"The German artillery was employed on the largest scale in this 
manner at Gravelotte and at Sedan. Long lines of guns kept up a 
fearful fire upon the French positions, shattered their formations, and 
silenced their batteries." 

63. One of the most important facts gained from the experience 
of recent wars is that artillery fire cannot be maintained against in- 
fantry fire at a much less distance than one thousand yards. When 
therefore, in action, artillery is subjected to infantry fire within this 
distance, and at the same time the cannoneers are not hidden from 
the enemy's view by the natural features of the ground, or other- 
wise protected from his fire, it must be withdrawn beyond that 
range, or it will soon be destitute of gunners and means of moving or 
fighting. 

In action artillery usually begins the fight by opening fire to cover 
the deployment, formation, and advance of the infantry. The ex- 
perience gained from the war of 1866 shows that artillery was of great 
importance for supporting and covering the movements of other 
troops. 

64. A point in the enemy's line having been selected for assault, the 
tire of the artillery is directed upon it to keep down the fire of the 
enemy, throw him into confusion, and thus prepare the way for the 
successful advance of the infantry. 

"The infantry on both sides did the chief part of the fighting, not- 
withstanding the vigorous action of the artillery. This time also (as 
in 1866) there was no question of a battle decided by artillery. Al- 
most always an advance of infantry gave the finishing stroke, and this 
advance might often have been delayed with advantage until the artil- 
lery had prepared the way even more than it did." 

"There is nothing which tends to produce so great a moral eflect as 
a heavy cross-fire of artillery. The best troops in the world get shaken 
and demoralized by such fire. Loop-holed houses or walls rapidly be- 
come untenable, and the shells search out the trenches or rifle-pits. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN iMODERN WAltKAKE. 183 

The effect of a given number of guns placed so as to bring a converg- 
ing fire on a portion of the defender's position is very much greater 
than if they merely brought a direct fire. A direct fire may be more 
or less guaided against, but a cross-fire on a position produces the 
moral eflfect of an attack both on a flank and in front. 

" There are therefore two general rules for the use of artillery ; it Hii1<'« •<>!• tiie use 

* , , . ofaitillerv. 

must act in hirge bodies, and must seek to bring a converging fire on 
the point aimed at." 

65. In nearly all modern armies it is usual to have a chief of artil- V.K*^ chiet of ar- 

"^ ^ ^ tilleiy. 

lery who commands the artillery corps, and also controls a certain 
proportion of the guns attached to the different corps and divisions. 
In this way the artillery, being under the control of one head, can be 
used to great advantage, especially at the decisive stage of a battle, 
when a preponderance on one side or the other usually decides the 
victory. 

In order to regulate the artillery to attain the best results, the chief 
should know the plans of the commanding general, and be acquainted 
with all the contemplated movements of the army. The time and 
place of concentration of the artillery for its greatest efforts should be 
determined by the commanding general, for he alone is primarily re- 
sponsible for success or disaster. 

'* It is essentiallv requisite that unity of action should be preserved , (Home.) 

^ •' ^ ^ Importance of 

amongst batteries of artillery, and that they should act together, in unity of action. 
bodies which have some cohesion, and are under some definite com- 
mand. If this is not carefully observed, much of the advantage of 
massing artillery is lost. * * * 

"On a field of battle every effort should be made to get large num- 
bers of batteries into line under one command, especially during the 
earlier stages. These masses of artillery acting in concert with one 
another, will, by the very might of their fire, crush what is opposed to 
them, and the various points to be so attacked should be selected in 
the order of their importance." 

66. Artillery is used in connection with the other arms in the pur- Artillery for the 

fi.'^iici ... 1 , pursuit and re- 

sult of a broken and defeated enemy ; it is also used to protect the rear treat. 

of an army on the retreat, its long range compelling the pursuing col- 
umns to halt and deploy, when time is gained for the safe withdrawal 
of the other arms. 

In offensive operations the object to be attained is to throw the Useof artillery in 

f ' y m p 1 • r- ^ ' y • offensive and de- 

enemy into contusion and lessen the effect of his fire; and as m this case fensive opera- 

the infantry fire of the defence is most to be dreaded, the artillery fire 

should mainly be directed against it, to prepare the way for the attack 

of the infantry. On the other hand, in defensive operations the artil- 



184 



PRINCIPLKS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



(HomeJ 
This rule not to be 
Rtiictlv followed. 



lerv should be used to silence the assailant's artillery fire, for it is suj)- 
posed that the infantry of the defence is perfectly able to cope with 
that of the enemy, and to hold him in check. 

"Although the attacker's artillery must be one of the chief objects 
aimed at by the defender's artillery, yet it is erroneous to suppose that 
the advancing infantry should be neglected. One of the objects of the 
defenders is to compel an early deployment ; this can be best managed 
by a fire on the attacker's infantry, thereby compelling him to deploy 
from heavy masses to an open formation, and this is such an impor- 
tant object with the defender, that small detachments of all arms 
should be used for this purpose. The artillery of the defenders 
actually in position should therefore direct their fire on the infantry, 
the moment it is within range sufficient to allow an efficacious fire. 
But it should also watch the moment any battery or brigade of bat- 
teries attempt to move to the front, and endeavor to crush it when 
limbering up, moving, or unlimbering. It should rarely fire at the 
skirmishing line, but rather at the supports and main body." 

67. The essential requisites of artillery are precision, well-trained 
cannoneers, and mobility. Field-batteries are best suited to act with 
infantry, to move with it and to support it. The pieces should be 
light so they can be moved readily. Horse-artillery, on account of its 
great mobility, is peculiarly adapted to accompany cavalry. 

The formation of artillery in action is usually in three lines: 1st. 
The line of pieces. 2nd. Line of limbers ; which should be at a con- 
venient distance in rear of the first line for the supply of ammunition, 
and also sheltered as much as possible from the enemy's fire. 3rd. Line 
of caissons; well to the rear, screened from the enemy's view and pro- 
tected from his fire. 
(Home.^ 68. " Artillerv fire is far more effective when it is calmlv delivered, 

Necessity of a ' , * 

good position for when everv shot is carefullv made to tell, than bv hurried or wild 

artillerv. . , ' ■ , * 

shooting. To shoot calmly, there must be a certain amount of security, 
and hence the actual position occupied by the guns is one of the 
greatest importance. A common error is to place guns on the most 
commanding positions, such positions are often unsuitable, as not only 
are the guns better seen, but often cannot themselves see the ground in 
front of the battery, and consequently lose the benefit of their low 
trajectory. 
Simports for ar- (59. "Artillery have been usually supported by special escorts told 
off to the various batteries, composed of either cavalry or infantry; on 
the actual battle-field, and indeed in geiieral, it may be questioned if 
such esOorts are really requisite. The true escort for artillerv would 
appear to be the troops it is tactically acting with. * The 



Requisites of ar- 
tillerv. 



Use of horsc- 
artilleiv. 



Formation of ar- 
tillerv ill action. 



AND THEIR AIPLICATION IN MODERN WAinWRE. 185 

position of artillery, owing to its great range, will generally be suffi- 
ciently near to the second line to enable it to receive effective support 
from it. A few active, well mounted, intelligent men attached to a 
battery as a portion of its establishment, who could watch the front 
and flanks, look into hollows and unseen ground, and bring back an 
intelligible and trustworthy account of what is in front, would appear 
to be all that is really required. * "' * 

"The practice of sending artillery well to the front, which has be- 
come a necessity at present, appears to render the escort system still 
more undesirable, as it will frequently happen that a mass of artillery 
will be up, and in action, with such a meagre force of cavalry and in- 
fantry to support it as would entirely forbid escorts. * * 

"When artillerv appeared on the field of battle in small numbers, Escorts fonnerh 

' I'll I'll! necessary. 

and short range guns only existed, such escorts v/ere decidedly re- 
quisite, but now that the effective range and accuracy of weapons has 
been largely increased, and the projiortion of artillery nearly doubled, 
it appears that these escorts, except in special cases, are not requisite. 

70. " It is evident that artillery must, on the march, move very near ro.sition of artii- 
the head of the column, for nothing causes greater confusion or delay maich. 

than the attempt to pass troops up from the rear of a long column to 
the front; artillery being required early in the action must be placed 
where it can be got at. To have long trains of guns in reserve if they 
exercise no influence on the battle-field, is worse than useless. The 
evils of the system of having guns in reserve is shown bv the fact that Mistakes of the 

, „ , ^ n -r. • 'i • French at St. 

the very moment the French troops at St. Frivat were being crushed Privat. 
by the Prussian artillery, there were French guns in reserve which 
never came into action at all. To place guns in reserve is voluntarily 
to deprive oneself of a most powerful auxiliary at the very moment its 
aid is most urgently needed. 

71. "The effective range of field-artillery mav be taken as from two Artillery at dif- 

, 111 1 1 1 c * T 1 , fereiit distances. 

thousand to three thousand paces. At the former distance and up to 
two thousand five hundred paces, its effect is very considerable; beyond 
that range, unless in special states of the weather, or under peculiar 
circumstances, the effects of the shot cannot be detected, and it be- 
comes consequently impovssible to correct the gun. Down to eight 
hundred yards the action of artillery is very destructive, within that 
distance its effect may be considered to diminish, and within that dis- 
tance the effect of the breech-loading rifle begins to get very formid- 
able, consequently the effective fire of artillery may be said to begin 
just at the range that musketry becomes wild. Hence, it should Jbe 
borne in mind that artillery should rarely or never come within one 
thousand to one thousand two hundred yards of infantry, and con- 

24 



186 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

versely, infantry should not be allowed to come within that distance 
of guns, except in special cases, when it may be judged requisite to 
sacrifice the guns to the necessity of checking the enemy's advance. 
Manner of mass- "When a mass of artillery is deployed it will be well to have the 

ing artillery. . . iT,- i,.. 

batteries not in one great line, but, so far as the ground admits, in 
echelons of two or three batteries, so as to allow troops to pass through 
if requisite." 
Position for tie 72. Artillery on the defensive should be placed to command all the 

artillery of the , , , . ,, ,,1 , . , . 

defence". approaches to the weak points, as well as all the ground within 

effective range; it should not interfere with the movements of the 
troops it is intended to support; positions with sheltered places in front 
from Avhich the enemy's infantry may obtain an effective fire on the 
gunners should be avoided; when the batteries are so placed that they 
can obtain a cross-fire on the ground over w^hich the enemy must ad- 
vance to the attack, the effect of their fire will be greatly increased. 

Effect of increas- The long ranges now obtainable admit of the batteries being placed 
at much greater distances apart than formerly, and still have an ef- 
fective cross-fire over the ground in front. 

Ground unfavor- Positions which are unfavorable for the enemy's artillery fire should 

able for the _ '..'., 

enemy's fire. be Selected when practicable. When the ground immediately in front 
of the battery is soft or marshy, is cut up by shallow ditches, or is 
plowed ground, the effects of the enemy's artillery fire will be greatly 

Points to be lessened. After a battery has been placed in position and it is pos- 
sible to do so, the distances to prominent points on the ground over 
which the enemy must advance should be measured and noted; the 
guns should then be masked from the enemy's view and arrangements 
made to protect the gunners. 

Moderate heights Heights with dp gentle slope towards the enemy — about one in one 

ffons!^ ^ ^°^' hundred — and which break more abruptly to the rear, are favorable 

positions for artillery; they give commanding positions for the guns, 

and afford facilities for concealing and protecting them when plac^ 

just behind the crest. 

(Home.) " The moment a battery takes up a defensive position its commander 

commander on ' must ask himself: Where is the enemy most likely to place his guns 

a ving position. gj,g^9 ^^^ ^^ ^^ advances, where will he place them next? Having 
answered these questions, he must at once measure his range and care- 
fully study the problem before him, which is to place the attacking 
guns hors de combat Artillery on the offensive should, on the contrary, 
while striving to keep up as accurate a fire as possible, fire more rap- 
idly, its object being to overwhelm a certain place with projectiles 

The crisis of the prior to the infantry attack. During the crisis of the action the artil- 
lery fire should be directed on the attacking columns, this principle 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WAUFAKE. 187 

has no exception, unless some of the attacking batteries are doing 
much harm to the defenders, when they may be fired at also." 

73. At the opening of an engagement the artillery, by directing its The iissaihint's 

. , • • -111- 1 artillery ai the 

fire upon several points of the enemy s position, misleads him as Jo the opening ot a bat- 

true point of attack; prevents him from massing his troops at the 

proper place; covers the movements and formations of the other arms 

as they prepare for the attack; then massed at the proper moment it 

scatters and demoralizes the enemy's troops at the point of attack, 

thus preparing the way for the action of the infantry and cavalry. 

Napoleon said: "He who is capable to bring suddenly and unknown 

to the enemy, upon the most important points, an unexpected number 

of guns, is certain of success." 

74. One noticeable feature of modern battle-fields is the great extent Divisional and 

. . corps artillery. 

of the line of battle as compared with those battles fought before the 
introduction of the breech-loader; the consequence is that corps and 
divisions have to act more independently than formerly, when the 
whole battle-field was under the eye and control of the commander-in- 
chief. Each corps and division should therefore be provided with its 
own artillery; ?ix batteries at least being assigned to each division, 
and six battel ies being taken to form the corps artillery. 

75. The effect produced by artillery fire is more moral than real ; on Effect of artillery 

■ . rr 4. * 1 !• • T* • Hi.' *U' more moral than 

raw troops its eiiects are very demoralizing. It is well to impress this real. 
fact upon the minds of the soldiers, as it may do much towards render- 
ing them steady and less liable to disorder when under artillery fire. 

At the battle of Gravelotte the Prussian troops assailed the French oraveiotte i870- 
position, and their losses from the efTects of artillery fire were only six 
per cent, of the total number killed and wounded; while the infantry 
bullet was the cause of over ninety per cent, of their loss. 

76. ■'«. The batteries approach to within really eflfective range (Bogusiawsid.) 

, - , ' , , , , Employment of 

(two tliousand to three thousand paces) oi the enemy, and do not blaze artillery, istu-ti. 
away at enormous distances. 

"6. They engage in sufficient force in advance-guard actions. 

"c. They concentrate into masses and caimonade the enemy's posi- 
tion, preparing the way for the infantry which follows. 

"fZ. They have got rid of the prejudice that the loss of guns must 
be avoided at any price. 

"We see the deployment of great masses with unity of command. Employment of 

masses. 

The placing and forming of such lines of guns are amongst the most 
difficult things in the tactics of the three arms. What difficulties are 
often presented by the ground, and how seldom have commanding 
officers the time to reconnoitre it thoroughly before ordering up their 
batteries! The question is not only to take position, but also to choose 



18S PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

one whence the enemy can be effectively cannonaded. They must 
further provide for the possible advance of the line either in echelon 
or by batteries, and lastly for a retreat. If, however, artillery wishes 
to cover effectively the advance and deployment of the main body of 
infantry, and to render their attack possible in the shortest time, it 
will often find it necessary to go very much to the front, and p)erhap3 
to come into action very badly protected by the other arms against an 
attack of the enemy. Great boldness and self-reliance are required 
for this. ^ * «■ 

The German ar- "The German artillery formed its lines with ease. One recognized 
the fruit, of long, hard study on the part of the officer, combined with the 
experience gained in 1866. -s $ * 

"The German batteries * * * form their line, and open their 
crushing fire. After allowing this a short time to work, and one had 
not long to wait for the effect to show itself, the long line broke into 
sections, each of which advanced in turn with marvelous precision to- 
wards the enemy's position. 

At Sedan. '* At Sedan * * ^j ^jjg artillery had surrounded the enemy's 

position on one side before the infantry came up. * * * The 
French, who endeavored to advance their infantry against those masses 
of artillery at different points, were brought to a stand-still over and 
over again, generally at about two thousand paces. * "^ ^■ 

Manner of ?up- "Whenever the infantry had taken a position and wished to push on 

pmrtingtheinfan- £^.^1^^^, it found itself soon Supported by the artillery, which, unlike 
some batteries in 1866, was not shy of venturing under rifle-fire, so as 
to be ready to take part in the fight at the right moment. * ■' * 
When on the defensive, the German artillery in like manner acted 
upon the principles of massing guns as much as possible, and of not 
firing at too long ranges." 

ENGINEERS. 

fHome.) 77. "The introduction of modern weapons has caused the de«:elop- 

veiopmeut of ment of tactics to take a peculiar direction, and has produced changes 
in the action of the various arms of the service, but nowhere are the 
changes more marked than in the art of the engineer. 
First effects of im- "Looking at the subject generally, we find that one of the first con- 
arms. sequences of the development of fire-arms at the end of the sixteenth 
and beginning of the seventeenth centuries, was a large increase of the 
offensive power of arms, a reduction of defensive armour; and follow- 
ing from this a large increase of field-works. A history of war at this 
period would be the history of entrenchments, one army seizing a posi- 
tion, entrenching and holding it, the other watching it and afraid to 
attack. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 189 

"The increase in roads, the opening up of the country, and the iniiueiice of Na- 
greatly increased size of armies under Napoleon, united to his peculiar 
strategy, the suddenness of action with which he sought to overcome 
an enemy, and the great development which the offensive received, all 
tended to the disuse of field-works and entrenchments. 

"Although the rapidity of Napoleon's marches tended to develop Brnnches de- 
other branches of the engineer's art, that of bridging and that of the 
pioneer, to a far greater extent than had previously been known, yet 
Napoleon was clearly alive to the evils produced by the neglect of 
field-works. 

78. "The history of this centurv shows that field-fortification, when Teachings of the 

•^ ,* . histoiv of thia 

it has been judiciously used, has invariably produced the greatest re- century. 

suits, and these results were produced by the application of the same 

ideas, viz., the use of field-works to cover the front of a large extended 

position, one considerably larger than the troops could hold in line of 

battle, the flanks being protected and the communications for suppliCvS ^ 

being open to the rear. 

"The celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are an instance of this. The lines of 
The English army with its flanks resting on the Tagus and the sea, oc- 
cupied with about fifty thousand men a line of some twenty-five miles 
in length; it had its internal communications perfectly open, its sup- 
plies were brought up by the sea and the French general could do 
nothing; he was unable to outflank the lines, turn or attack them. 
They were so strong that any attack in front would have failed ; the 
defenders could not be starved out, and unless they were regularly at- 
tacked by siege works there was no means of dealing with them. 
From them lines the tide of conquest of the French armies first began to recede. 

"Many years later the same thing happened at Sebastopol. The Sebastopoi. 
Russians liolding a long straight line of weak field-works with their 
communications open, actually advanced from their works, threw up 
fresh trenches and works, and almost besieged the allies in their posi- 
tions. Both these cases were brilliant examples of what field-works 
properly adapted to tactics can produce. 

"There were great opportunities in the blockades of Paris and Metz Pari»and Metz. 
for the tactics displayed by the Russians to be repeated ; and it is no 
exaggeration to say that had the garrison of Paris been composed of 
good troops it might really have dug itself out of Paris and through 
the German lines. 

79. "It appears that at the present day the necessity of making Flank attacks 
flank attacks has given a fresh importance to field-works. When field-works. 
speaking of this subject previously, the ease with which an army hav- 
ing its flank threatened can change front and attack was pointed out, 



190 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

and it was further pointed out that to prevent such a change of front, 
an attack in front as well as on the flank was needed. Now, is it not 
possible to check any attempted change of front by the construction of 
field-works? The Americans in the civil war made a very extensive 
use of entrenchments for this purpose ; they covered their front, and 
then moved round to a flank." 
Field-works dm- As vSoon as it was definitely learned with what severe losses front at- 

ing the civil war, . . , ^ 

1861-65. tacks, even when successful, mufst be uniformly accompanied, and as 

soon as the true value of temporary field-works on the field of battle 
was perceived, the further military history of' the civil war is but a 
narrative of manoeuvres whose objei^t was to gain the flanks of the 
enemy's position, and force him to abandon it by threatening his comr 

chanceiiorsviiie, municatious. On the field of Chancellorsville General Lee held the 
whole northern army in check with but a fraction of his ioros, while 
Jackson made the celebrated flank march already explained. 

The Virginia General Grant's campaign in Virginia Avas one successive series of 

6.5. ° ' flank marches to force General Lee to abandon his lines of works, 

which direct assault always failed to carry. 

The Atlanta cam- General Sherman in his Atlanta campaign earlv oerceived the ad- 

paign, 1664-65. . i o . ^ 

vantages of the flanking system, and followed it much more tena- 
ciously than General Grant, for he made but very few direct assaults, 
all of which failed of their object with severe losses. 
Extent to which The svstcui of tcmporarv works on the field of battle was carried to 

the system was ' , "^ . .. ii- i - 

carried. a greater extent during our civil war than during any war before or 

since. The troops on each side soon learned to cover themselves at 
every opportunity, and this was the first duty performed when a halt 
for any length of time was made by armies in actual contact; in fact, 
on many occasions breast-works were constructed to cover the army as 
it advanced. 

80. "The whole spirit of modern war is to reduce everything to 
calculation, to leave nothing to chance, to provide for and foresee all 
possible combinations, whether arising from moral causes, such as 
panics amongst the men, or from actual physical causes, such a.s.the 
enemy's fire, or the configuration of the ground ; whatever then in- 
creases the security of certain places or their defensive power, is of the 
highest importance. : ).;i.f ■ ? 

Two classes of en- gl. "The duties of the engineers in the field mav be divided" into 

gineerinw duties ° 

in the field. tWO claSSes : . ^ 

"1. The duties of making, repairing, or destroying communica- 
tions, including, in the word communication, roads, bridges, railways, 
and telegraphs. These may be classed together as pioneer duties. 

"2. The preparation of positions for attack or defence, which w 



(Home.) 
In modern war 
all is foreseen 
and calculated 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 191 

the higher duty of the military engineer, and wliere the art of fortification 
must be considered entirely in a tactical point of view. 

"With reference to the first class of duties, the men and means must Necessity of hay- 

ins 6ii<>'iii8f rs 

be invariably present when required. The engineers should march with tiTe advanc- 
with the advanced-guard, and must be sufficiently supplied with tools 
and materials. 

"It is the second class of duties, or those of the militarv enqimer as a tactical relation 

, . , 1 , . , , . . ^ , , between field- 

distinguished from the pioneer where the tactical relation ot field-works works and the 
to the other arms is fully developed. * * The mere fact of field- 

works being constructed is far too often considered as limiting the 
action of the troops to a strict defensive; viewed in such a light, en- 
trenchments are useless, if not hurtful, and hence arises the absolute 
necessity of viewing all such works in their tactical relation to troops. 

82. " In almost every case in war six or seven hours may be calcu- Time required to 
lated on to put a position in a state of defence, and if the engineers and a stafe of delence! 
tools are where they should be, this period is ample; in six hours 

works of a very powerful nature may be constructed which will efiec- 

tually support an army. It is generally allowed that an entrench- comparative § 

. , , 111 m 1 • value of troops 

ment occupied by two hundred men oiiers as much resistance as a and entrench- 
battalion'- not so covered, and that the labor of one thousand men six 
hours on the position occupied by a division is equivalent to the re- 
enforcement of a brigade. 

83. "The pioneer duties of the Prussian army were admirably per- Mars-ia-Tour, 
formed and the true spirit of field-engineering was in many cases The Prussian 
seized; one remarkable instance was at Mars-la-Tour, — early in the P'""^^' 
day the Prussians gained possession of Vionville, on the Verdun road; 

the instant the infantry got in, two companies of engineers supplied 
with six wagons of tools were pushed on ; they were charged by a regi- 
ment of French hussars and lost some of the w^agons and a section of 
one of the companies, but the remainder got into the village, and so 
strengthened it that all the attempts to retake it failed. And although 
at the close of the day the Prussian right and left wings were forced 
back by tlie French, yet the village of Vionville, forming the apex of 
the Prussian position, was never lost, and effectually barred the road 
to Verdun. Here fortification was used correctly; it confirmed and 
established the success of the infantry, and secured the object for which 
the Prussians struggled so hard." 

SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM RECENT WARS. 

84. " Infantry is the arm which carries on the fight throughout, (Bogusiawski.) 

•' . ^ Infantry in the 

and finally decides the battle. In the war of 1866 we saw the infantry war of isM. 

*Aboul onp thousand nit^n. 



192 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

on one side armed in such a superior manner to the other side as by 
Tactics of the two that alone to have a great advantage. The tactics of the two in- 

infantiies. r.i.rr^i ii- t m 

lantries dittered so greatly that it was not difncult to recognize the 
main points of dissimilarity. The Austrian infantry pursued a sys- 
tem of offensive tactics, and truly a very faulty one, opposed a,s it was 
to the needle-gun — to wit, that of the direct shock of masses with the 
bayonet. Prussian tactics were also essentially offensive, but before 
the attack a full use was made of accurate and rapid tire; or, resum- 
ing the offensive, they crushed the charging masses of the enemy by 
the heavy fire of skirmishers, or by the rapid file-fire of troops in 
close order. 

Formations. " Moreover, the Prussians showed incontestably greater dexterity 

* in skirmishing and in taking advantage of the ground. Their for- 
mations were mostly in company-columns with swarms of skirmishers; 
whilst the Austrians made use of double companies or battalion 

1870. masses. It was otherwise in 1870. On both sides was found the 

Similarity of the i i i • c • • i • 

tactics. breech-loader, and both infantries were almost equally expert in skir- 

"* misbing. The French had certainly a rifle superior to that of the 

Prussians, but this superiority was in a far different degree to that 
of the Prussian needle-gun over the Austrian muzzle-loader. Al- 
though taught on different principles and fighting in different for- 
mations, the French and German infantry in their sharp engagements 
did not present nearly the same vstriking difference of tactics as was 
displayed by the contending armies in the Austrian campaign, and 
the similar armament of both parties of itself impressed a greater 
stamp of similarity upon their styles of fighting than was the case in 
Austrian masses 1866. There the Austrian infantry opposed the power of physical 
siirmishers. ^ ' ' force to the idea of individual self-reliance which was embodied in 
the Prussian tactics — or, to use merely military language, masses in 
close order succumbed to skirmishers and to the action of subordinate 
officers; the bayonet gave away to the fire-arm. Jn the French war, 
as a general rule, the infantry on both sides fought in extended 
order. ^ ^ ^^ 
i!<70. 85, "The French fire was at times so murderous that it was impos- 

short rangers. ^' siblc to bring up detachments in close order near, that is to say, within 
one hundred or one hundred and fifty poces of the skirmishers, or to 
keep them in close order if they were there. There was, therefore, 
the choice of either keeping further back, or of extending your sup- 
port. The latter course was followed all the more frequently because 
the line of skirmishers soon required strengthening in different part.s, 
and gaps caused by the enemy's fire required filling up. In broken 
ground affording more cover,' it was often po.«!sible to bring the sup- 



AND THI5IR APPLICATION IN MODERN WAUFAKi:. lOP) 

ports nearer to the skirmisher.s, but in moving up they t'reipiently 
scattered in consequence of the necessarily cautious nature of their 
advance, partly extending and joining the skirmishers. What con- Difficulties of 
tributed to this was, that it was very difficult for officers to keep their sk^mrjh ii"'ie. 
men together, because the noise of a close conflict between breech- 
loader and breech-loader often so drowns the sound of the human 
voice that a great part of the men cannot hear the word of command, 
and the officer can only influence by his example and conduct; and 
this leads him also to the front, even up to the line of skirmishers. 

86. "The main idea apparent in the German tactics of 1870 was: Flank attncks. 
A front attack is difficult, let us try the flanks. In the 

greatest battles of the war, those of Gravelotte and Sedan, the turning (Jiaveiutto and 

- - - i c 1 1 I • tSedaii . 

tactics came prominently forward. '• At hedan the turning 

movement was complete. 

"The losses of the tenth German division at Worth prove what a Loss at Worth. 
serious matter it is to make a direct attack against the breech-loader. 
They amounted to about four thousand men. 

"It was of course necessary to make vigorous attacks on some Front attacks stiii 
points of the French position, so as to take off their attention from ' 

the circular enclosing movement of the Germans. * ••• "••• Although 
they (the Germans) were frequently obliged to make front attacks, 
the principle of the turning movement always asserted itself. In any weak attacks 
case, however, a direct infantry attack should always have been under- donbtfviK*^^^^'' 
taken in sufficient force. But this was too often not the case, so that 
weaker forces exposed themselves to suffer great losses in long-con- 
tinued doubtful conflicts, gaining at the same time but little ground. 

87. "On the defensive the shooting-tactics of the Germans consisted Defensive shoot- 
simply in firing at short range, a practice which always had the best Germans. 
results. The main position selected was generally strongly occupied 

In first line. It was rightly judged that a strong development of fire 
at the commencement of an action was necessary and advisable. 
Separate strong masses in reserve, not a great many little reserves, Reserves. 
were formed. If there was ^sufficient time, the position was divided 
into sections and prepared for defence as well as possible. On the Artillery. 
approach of the enemy, the artillery was at once deployed into a 
connected line. The cavalry, having at first been pushed forward to cavairy. 
chiick the enemy's advance, was then withdrawn behind the line of 
defence. * * ^■" 

"The French ■•■ opened their musketrv fire at verv long French shooting- 

* * , tactics. 

ranges, from one thousand to one thousand four hundred paces. It is 
true tliat even at this distance we had men killed and wounded. The 



194 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Deployment of 
the German in- 
fantry. 



Rnmniary of the 
battle tactics of 
1870-71. 



Use of sk 
mishers. 



Intermingling of 
troops. • 



Effect of artillery 
fire. 



Floing. 
St. Privat. 



advance of the German infantry was never once checked in this way. 
Our infantry generally extended at least one * Zug' ' per company at 
once. This was, however, rarely sufficient when we came within 
effectual range of the Chassepot, about five hundred paces. When at 
about four hundred paces from the French skirmishers, our men were 
obliged to seek cover, or if it was level ground, to lie down and to 
answer the fire, for which purpose the skirmishers were usually re- 
enforced by another 'Zug' per company, if this had not already been 
done. * * * 

88. "To sum up the characteristic points of the infantry battle- 
tactics of 1870-71, it will be necessary in doing so to mention in the 
first place what we did not see. That is to say, no volleys in battle ; 
no, or at least very few, attacks by troops in close order; if, however, 
a compact body ever did attack, it was always a small one, never 
amounting to a battalion column. But we did see — 

" Great deployments of skirmishers on both sides; long-continued 
gradually advancing musketry fights, often rolling backwards and 
forwards ; at last, the flank of one party turned, or else one side ex- 
hausted; the other side pressing on in consequence, or a rush of dense 
clouds of skirmishers who endeavor at any price to dislodge their 
opponents; not forgetful that, in case of failure and retreat, they are 
dead men. 

"On both sides great dispersion; intermingling of troops, particul- 
arly in broken ground; hence the leader's control diminished. 

" With the Germans — more steadiness, and the habit of reserving 
their fire. 

"With the French — more hurry, and the habit of firing at long 
ranges. 

" However great the effect of artillery, hoAvever enormous the loss 
of the French by our shells, there was still no example of a really 
great result being due specially to artillery. Even the plateau of 
Floing, which was cannonaded from all sides, had to be stormed by 
infantry. And the same may be said of St. Privat. Single villages 
were set fire to by shells * * ■•• and were in consequence evacuated 
by the French, but it cannot be said of such places that they were 
of primary importance. Almost always it was found necessary at 
last to wrest these positions from the enemy by means of infantry. 



L'se of the cavalry 
on the march. 



89. 



In the forward marches of the German armies and of in- 



dependent corps we remark an advance-guard of all arms with cavalry 



'\ division of the company, which was dpplovod :i=! -ikirmi-ilier- 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 195 

at the head, even in broken ground. If tliey come on the enemy, a 
larger bodv of cavalry was often brought to the front to reconnoitre. 
The infantry of the advance-guard was usually kept further back than 
in 1866. 

90. "To sum up the chief points remarkable in the tactics em- 
ployed in 1870, we remark on the (jerman side : 

"a. The attack is directed on the enemy's flank, an assault on the Kii.nk attack". 
centre following this, sooner or later. 

"6. In most cases, very powerful artillery lire to prepare the way. is.- oi iiu- a.itii- 
"^. Extensive employment of skirmishers. .sk-inni.siier.s. 

"r/. Cavalry action restricted. cavalry. 

" On the defensive, the Germans show generallv skilful choice of «Jeriiiaiis ,.u .i»- 

, . * • ti.'iisivc. 

ground, concentration of artillery, and a proper system of firing. 

*' On the French side : 

"a. A strict defensive, maintained against flank attacks. .-mict (iett■lI^^ivo. 

" b. Isolated counter-attacks without sufficient result. counttr -attacks. 

"c. Likewise very strong swarms of skirmishers. skimiisiior.s. 

"f/. Want of combination and superior direction in the employ- .vrtiiieiy. 
ment of artillery. 

*'e. The cavalry behaves very well where it comes into play, but (avahy. 
acts as if there was no such thing as a breech-loader. 

"On the offensive: in the first period, gallant, impetuous advances Fienoh on tiu- 
of great swarms of skirmishers, who shoot too much, and thus retard 
their own movements, often opening fire at absurd distances. 

"In the second period of the war: bad officers and inability to ^ocoiuipiriod. 
manoeuvre; hence attacks unskilfully made and soon checked. ■■■ '•' * 

"We mav infer that the chief problem which the tactician has to chief problem of 

'■ ^ tlie tactician. 

solve in the present day is how to attack in the best form and manner; 
also how to train his infantry, the arm upon which he must depend for 
the assault, so completely, that its success will be facilitated, both by 
its formation for attack, and by the way in which it is handled in 
action." 

91. "The two direct front assaults made by SkobelefF's troops, at ^ ((ireene.) 
Plevna, September 11th, and in rear of Shipka, January 8th, were con- shipka, 1877-78. 
ducted in the following manner: 

"The troops were formed under shelter, between two thousand and Rn.ssiau forma- 
three thousand yards from the Turkish lines, in battalion masses 
(double column of half companies on the centre). In beginning the 
action the rifle company of each battalion was sent forward as a thin 
line of skirmishers, and one platoon (quarter company), in column of 
half platoon behind the line, at at a distance of not more than fifty 
paces, and constantly replacing its lo.sses. 



196 PRINCIPI-ES OK THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

"About two hundred paces behind the skirmishers came in the first 
battalion, which moved forward in line, not touching elbows, but with 
intervals of about two paces, (or less) between the men — a strong 
skirmish line in fact— each company having three-fourths its strength 
in line, and one-fourth just behind it, in half platoon column, to re- 
place its losses. The men moved forward preserving a general align- 
ment, but each man taking advantage of any shelter that lay in his 
path, and firing from behind it, and then moving forward again. 
Another battalion followed in precisely the same order, and at a dis- 
tance of about three hundred paces, so that the men could feel that 
there were supports coming behind them. 

Eeserves. "The remaining battalion of the regiment was held in hand by the 

division commander until the fight developed itself, and it could be 
seen where the most resistance was met, whether the enemy was bring- 
ing any troops on the flanks, etc., the battalion was then directed on 
the point where it was most needed. The regiments on either side 
were sent forward in the same manner. Meanwhile the reserve regi- 
ment of the division, always under the control of the division com- 
mander was kept under shelter as near as possible to the line; as the 
troops already engaged, which had now merged into two lines (and at 
points where the resistance was greatest into one), began to move 
slowly, to waver, the reserve regiment or a portion of it was sent for- 
ward rapidly to the point where the fighting was hottest. "••■ "'•' 

Battle of Gorni- "At the battle of Gorni-Dub:iik, October 24th, eighteen thousand 
Russians attacked four thousand Turks f.-ccupying a redoubt of small 
profile with an outlying lunette and a few trenches. The artillery 
cannonade lasted only from nine to ten a. m. The infantry was 
formed on three sides of the redoubt, in two lines of company columns 
and a reserve. It moved forward to the assault in thi^order, preceded 
by a line of skirmishers. The lunette and trenches were carried, but 
the men could not reach the redoubt; they lay down in the ditch of 
the road and under other slight shelter, at distances varying from only 
one hundred to four hundred paces from the redoubt, and remained 
there, keeping up their fire whenever the defenders were visible. Dur- 
ing the afternoon a second disjointed attack was made without success. 
Finally, about dark, a simultaneous rush was made from three sides, 
which gained possession of the work. The Turks had inflicted on the 
Russians a loss nearly equal to the total strength of iheir own force, 
and had themselves lost about thirty-five per cent. 

92. " The instances which have been given are the principal as- 

Piincipie of the saults in the first half of the War ; they present many points 

lion^for assauu. of resemblance. In nearly every case the troops were drawn up in two 



AND TTIKIR APPLICATION IN MODKKN WAPvKAUK. 197 

lines of company columns and a rtv^erve. The skirniissliers were sent 
forward, the tirst line followed at one hundred and fifty or two hun- 
dred paces distance, and then the second line. In no instance, how- 
ever, does it appear that there was more than one line of skirmishers; 
behind them the troops marched with dogged bravery, in solid line of 
two ranks, shoulder to shoulder, or in company columns with platoon 
fronts, far inside the line of rapid eflfective fire; and they continued jr^^;*/"/"'^''"" '*^- 
this march until the fire caused a break in their lines and a retreat, or 
until they reached the work after enoimous losses, and held it as the 
result of a hand-to-hand fight. The s^kirmish line was so small in 
comparison with the main force that it really amounted to nothing, 
and the attack was in fact made in solid line. The attack and the 
forward movement were net distinguished. Tiiis dffedive formation 
was the principal cause of the heavy losses. 

93. "We next observe that, when attacks were made on two or combined attacks 

• 1 i_- II i- 11 -1 .not simulta- 

more sides of a work, they were frequently made not simultaneously, neous. 
but one after the other; so that the defenders were able to move from 
one side of their work to another and repulse the attacks in detail. 
We often notice that the reserve was eften sent forward, not just before 
the line began to waver, but after it was already in retreat. The 
effect of these dispositions was the same as if the attack had been 
made with only a portion of the force instead of the whole, since the 
new attack had to gain all over again what had been gained (and lost) 
in the first. 

94. "In the latter part of the war, (and also in Skobelefif's attack at Faults not re- 
Plevna on September 11th), these faults, which experience had demon- 
strated, were not repeated. In all of Gourko's operations, during and 

after the passage of the Balkans, there was no instance in which a 

fortified position was assaulted in front; having a superiority of force. Flank attacks. 

he threatened the enemy's front (occupied their attention with the fire 

of a skirmish line, with strong supports posted in the nearest shelter), 

and turned their flanks, compelling their retreat — the tactics in short 

of Sherman's Atlanta campaign." 

^ x; i-i ;;; * * 

THE THREE ARMS IN COMBINATION. 

95. "The commander of a force of the three arms acting independ- (Shaw.) 
ently, should have the clearest possible conception of the general ob- essarvtotliecom- 
jects which it is intended he should carry out, in order that when he o"TheVhree^ai"ms! 
comes in contact with the enemy he may form a correct decision as to 

whether he should attack or act on the defensive. 

96. "Should his position and means at command be such as to Attack usually 
allow of either course being pursued, the preference should generally 



198 



PRINCIPLKS OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



The offensive to 
be assumed at the 
proper time. 



Three modes of 
attack. 



Frontal attack de- 
ftiied. 



Objections to thi 
mode of attack. 



When feasible. 



Front and flank 
attack. 



Attack upon both 
flanks combined 
Avith a front at- 
tack. 



Choice of flank foi 
attack in small 
engasrements. 



be given to the attack, in order to secure the undoubted moral advan- 
tages which attend this course of action. 

"But if the nature of his po.sition and resources necessitate his as- 
suming the defensive, he should seize upon the first favorable oppor- 
tunity of turning the defence into the attack. 

THE THREE ARMS IX ATTACK. 

97. "In ofiensive tactics we may consider three general modes of 
attack, one of which the commander of a combined force must select, 
as the most suitable for his purpose. 

" 1. Frontal attack^ which would mean a direct advance upon the 
whole of the enemy's line or position. 

" As a general rule, this form of attack is unadvisable, as even in 
case of success, the result is not decisive; the enemy's line of retreat 
being unassailed, he simply falls back to a position more to the rear. 
There may, however, be situations when the nature of the ground pre- 
vents any other mode of operation, or where the frontal attack may be 
made u.se of to feel the enemy and ascertain his exact dispositions, in^ 
preparation for a concentrated attack upon one of his weak points, as 
soon as they are discovered. 

"2. Combined (iWick upon, front and flank. 1:\ this case the enemy 
is attacked in front at the same time that a portion of the force is 
directed at one of the flanks. An attack upon the flanks by itself un- 
accompanied by a front attack is not advisable, except in the case of 
small detachments acting against one another, or unless the attack can 
be effected by surprise, in which case the enemy is unable to meet it in 
time by a change of front. Were a strong force in position attacked 
solely on the flank, it would quickly form up its reserves to a new 
front, the troops of the original front coming up in support. For a 
flank attack therefore to succeed, it must, as a general rule, be accom- 
panied by a frontal attack, suflficient to hold the enemy to his original 
position. 

" An attack upon both flanks combined with a frontal attack can 
only be attempted under circumstances of great superiority of num- 
bers, without which it would become a most dangerous operation, 
enabling the enemy to give the counter-stroke at a weak point of a 
straggling line and beat the assailants in detail by cutting their force 
into two. 

"In small engagements where the numbers are inconsiderable the 
flank attack may be made alone. In such cases a consideration may 
arise as to which flank it may be most desirable to attack, where one 
presents cover for concealing the movement, and the other, though 
offering no cover, is nearest to the enemy's line of retreat, whicli might 



AND THEIR ATPMCATION IN MODKRX WAUKAKK. 199 

thus perhaps be cut oft". Surprise being here the element most essen- 
tial to success, as carrying with it the greatest moral effect, the flank 
should certainly be chosen which affords the means of approaching un- 
observed, even though the result of action in this quarter may not be 
so decisive as it would be in the other. 

"Should the attack be of greater dimensions, the element of sur- in large engnge- 
prise, and consequently the question of a covered approach, become of 
less importance. Here an attack upon the flank nearest the enemy's 
line of retreat would give best results, as being more decisive, so that, 
other considerations being outweighed, this course of action would 
probably be adopted. The moral effect of threatening the enemy's 
communications would also in this case count for something. 

"Sometimes the movement against a flank should constitute the real When the flunk 

, , , . , /T> . I • • 1 attack becomes 

attack, that against the front being only sufhciently maintained to theieai .att.ick. 
hold the enemy in position, and prevent his concentration on the 
threatened flank. Here the frontal attack has all the advantages of 
the defence together with the moral advantages of an expected diver- 
sion to be caused by the flank attack. The nature of the ground would 
influence the adoption of this mode of attack, but in any case it would 
be prudent not to follow it unless the attacking commander, if unsuc- 
cessful,, could still cover his line of retreat in falling back, or unless, 
as may happen on occasion, he could still afford to retreat in a new 
direction and abandon altogether his old line of operations. 

"3. Concentrated attack upon a weak point, to break through the ffncontiaied at- 
enemy's line or force his position. 

"This mode of attack, if the most difficult of execution, is undoubt- Natum of the 

11 • s- 1 , . . , 1 . 1 , • operation. 

edly in case of success the most decisive, the enemy being broken into 
fractions which can subsequently be beaten in detail. The enemy's 
line of retreat may also thus be arrived at, and his communications 
cut before he can recover himself. The attack must, however, always 
be made with force sufficient to resist a counter enveloping attack on 
the part of the enemy, which might otherwise be disastrous in its re- 
sults. The increased range of modern guns and rifles has made this 
attack more hazardous than ever, for a concentrated fire-action can 
now be brought to bear on the assailant, not only from all parts of the 
defence in*ljis immediate front, but in most cases from either flank as 
well. Unless therefore the ground covers the movement in a great de- 
gree it should not be attempted. 

"In addition to the above primary modes of attack, a turning move- a turning move 
ment may also be considered. This might be looked upon as almost a 
form of flank attack were it not that it differs from it in some essential 
particulars. The turning movement is more often a menace than an 



200 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Nature of the 
first operation. 



Employment of 
cavalry and 
horse-artillerv. 



Strength of the 
turning force. 



Depends upon 
line of retreat. 



Xot suited to a 
small force. 



Nature of the 
.second case. 



utlnck, for it threatens the enemy's line of retreat so as to force him to 
change front or shift his position before he enters into combat. The 
manoeuvre differs also from a flank attack inasmuch a.s it removes the 
scene of combat from the position held by the enemy, while the flank 
attack takes place on one of the flanks of the position itself. 

"The turning movement may be made, either with a portion of the 
force at command, or with its whole strength. 

"In the first case, the conditions should render it improbable, if not 
impossible, that the enemy could act offensively in turn upon each 
fraction of the divided force. Otherwise the separate movement should 
not be attempted, as it must end in disaster. 

"When the ground permits, or is favorable, cavalry and horse-artil- 
lery are specially suited to the turning movement. They should there- 
fore nearly always form a portion and sometimes the whole of the 
troops employed in the service, both because they can by rapid ad- 
vance produce the moral effect of surprise, and because they can more 
easily avoid destruction by a superior force. 

"The relative proportion of the force detached, in such case, upon 
the turning movement, to that retained for the frontal attack, can only 
be decided by the circumstances, 

"If the line of retreat of the assailants must necessarily be preserved 
in rear of the main body the latter must keep the largest amount of 
force; if the retreat can be made equally well to the flank, the strongest 
force may be detached for the turning movement.* 

"It is evident this mode of attack, by which a portion of the force 
is detached from the main body, is not generally suitable for minor 
operations; there may be occasions, however, where a small force may 
with great advantage detach its cavalry and horse-artillery to threaten 
the adversary's communications. * 

"In the second case, if the turning movement be made with the 
whole force at command, it is clear that the former line of retreat 
must be abandoned altogether, or else there should be such complete 
probability of success that the line may for the moment be laid open 
to the enemy, for the sake of concentrating the whole force in the at- 
tempt to turn his position. 



*ln either case it is very desirable that the detached commander should have considerable 
latitude afforded to him in the instructions he receives from the commander of the troops. 
These instructions should be to the effect that a certain result is to be. if possible, attained, 
and should also contain all information necessary to enable the detached force to act in gen- 
eral concert with the main body. But precise orders which may be rendered impossible of 
execution would only tend in all probability to mar the enterprise. To give such would be 
to fall into an error which has been freely laid to the charge of both English and French 
generals at various epochs. The Germans are said to be free from it. The Russian opera- 
tions in Asia during the late war showed conspicuously, on different occasions, both the 
fault and the avoidance of it. 



AND THKIK AITLICATION IN MODKRN WAKFAKK. 201 

FIRST STAGK OF THE ATTACK. 

98. "The above general principles being clearly understood, the fast- oi a smiiii 
commander of a small force of the three arms should have no diffi- 
culty in preparing hia plan of attack and issuing his orders, upon re- 
ceiving reports of the strength and dispositions of the enemy, and of 
tlie nature of the ground upon which he must act. 

"In ordinarv cases when small forces are engaged, the cavalry re- Kecoiinaisunce 

. . . . "^ . . ' required. 

connoitrers in advance will bring in sufhcient information for the pur- 
pose; but if tile enemy should be covered by advanced troops, it may 
be necessary to make a special reconnaissance, sometimes supported by 
guns, in order to arrive at a knowledge of his strength and intentions. 

"With large forces this would probably be carried out by the ad- ^^'''"Vi^'gf '"'H*" 

^ r ./ . made bv the ad- 

vanced-guard, the artillery of which, re-enforced where necessary vanced-'uard. 
from the main body, would take up what may be called a preliminary 
artiUei'ii position, and open tire at long range to cover the advance of the 
troo[)s employed in the reconnyissance. 

"The information required being obtained, the commander would or ieis ifssned. 
issue his orders. In the case of very small operations or of a sudden 
rencontre with the enemy these would be given verbally ; under other 
conditions orders should, if possible, be written. 

"Should the force, as it probably would, consist of detachments (general and 

. special ordeia. 

under various commanders, it would be necessary that there should be 
a (jeneral order for all, and also a special order addressed to each 
commander where separate action is required. 

"The general order should be clear, precise, and complete, and as Nature of the 

. ,. . , , . .„ . X gt^neral order. 

short as strict compliance with these requirements will permit. It 
should contain : 

"1. The conditions or circumstances of the intended action, with Conditions set 

' forth. 

what is known of the enemy. 

"2. The mode of action determined upon, and how to be undertaken ; Mode of action 

^ ' , laid down. 

thus, for instance, to attack the enemy when he is touched on in direct 
advance, or, to attack the wiiole, or a certain part, of a })osition. 

"3. The strength, composition, and general division of the attack- Division of the 

. , , , , . , . • attaelung force. 

ing force, with names of commanders; this may be given more in 
detail in the margin of the order if thought necessary. 

"4. The preliminary positions to be taken up bv each distinct part Po^^itions, etc., 

. . ' ^ * pointed out. 

of the force with their directions of attack. 

"5. The hours at which these ptnsitions are to be assumed, and at Time stated. 
which the forward movement or attack is to be commenced. 

"6. The position where the commander of the troops will be found Position of the 

^ commander 

during the action, to which all references or reports are to be made stated. 



202 



PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIE^X"E OF WAR 



In tlie case of 
larsie force. 



Position of the 
hospitals, etc. 



Extent of the 
(iider. 



Nature of the 
speci:\l orders. 



Rule for appor- 
tioning receive: 



The reconnais- 
sance pushed for- 
ward. 



Care exercised. 



Action of the ar- 
tillery. 



"These clauses would be sufficient for a small force, but, in opera- 
tions of greater magnitude, it would be necessary to add : 

"7. The positions of the ambulance and field-hospitals, and the 
order of march of the trains of the various columns. 

"It must be understood that the dispositions of the troops thus in- 
dicated are only intended for the first phases of the engagement, for, 
until the enemy's counter-plans are developed, the final movements 
wliich depend thereon cannot be defined. 

"The special orders addressed to separate commanders .should con- 
tain nothing that may tie their hands too much in matters of detail. 
As a rule, they should be told the thing to do, not the manner of 
doing it, and within certain safe liaiits, to be named, they should be 
allowed free action. 

"In apportioning the reserves for the different arms, the commander 
of a combined force may accept the following as main principle, 
modifying its application according to the special conditions of the 
case. The various amus require reserves in exact proportion to their 
respective liability to fall into confusion during action. Therefore 
a reserve is most necessary for cavalry, next for infantry, especially 
when attacking, and hardly at all for artillery which has no shock 
action. But although a reserve of guns may not be required, the ar- 
tillery should certainly have reserves of men, hor.-es, and ammuni- 
tion. With such aid the guns can be withdrawn from action in one 
part of the field, and sent rapidly to another as required. 

"During the progress of the earlier arrangements for the engage- 
ment, whicli may be said to constitute the first stage, and if no affair 
of advanced troops has taken place, the reconnaissance of the enemy 
and ground would be kept up by the cavalry, whose preliminary re- 
ports have enabled the commander to decide up:)n his first course 
of action. Great care should be taken that there is no confusion in 
forwarding the reports of the patrols, and that their leaders clearly 
understand where they are to send them. The position of the com- 
mander of the troops, as mentioned in the 'orders,' should therefore 
be impressed upon each patrol leader, whose duty it will be to see 
that every man sent back with a message distinctly understands where 
he is to deliver it. 

SECOND STAGE OF THE ATTACK. 

99. "The reconnoitring would be continued into the second stage, 
which would commence by the opening of fire by the artillery from 
its first position for attack. Should a preliminary position have been 
assumed by the artillery, it would probably have been under the cir- 
cumstances above shown, or else necessitated by the opening of the 



AND THEfR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARK. 208 

defender's tire at long range upon the heads of the advancing col- 
umns, in ground where they could not obtain shelter; in which case 
the advanced guns would at once have taken post to open fire in 
reply. 

"In either case, on the dispositions for infantry attack being made, The first princi- 
this preliminary position would be quickly abandoned, and the guns tton! ' ^'^'^'"*'' 
moved on to the Jir si priucipal artillery poi^ition. In its selection it must 
be remembered that the first part of the engifgement has for its object 
the more complete discovery of the enemy's plans and strength, as 
well as to cause him as much loss as possible from the moment he can 
be brought under fire. The guns, accompanied by the necessary sup- 
ports, should therefore be pushed well to the front, and come into 
action at a point selected with due regard to the direction of infantry 
attack, so far as known at the time, and at a range of from one thous- 
and eight hundred to one thousand three hundred yards from the 
enemy's general position. The place chosen ought not to be such that 
the advance of the attacking infantry will soon mask the fire of the 
guns, and if the ground and the general form of the action permit, a 
position to a flank will be usually preferable. The artillery need 
only be protected by cavalry or a small force of infantry on its ex- 
posed flank. The especial danger to be feared would be the un- 
observed approach of the enemy's skirmishers or marksmen within 
effective range. 

"In the case of large forces, the guns would probably be massed in Reserves of artii- 
one or two strong batteries. No reserves need be kept back under 
ordinary conditions, but all the available guns, deducting any re- 
quired for a flanking movement, should be quickly brought into simul- 
taneous action. 

" The object being to cover the advance and deployment of the An artillery duel 
infantry, and to draw the fire of opposing batteries it follows that a °p^"®^- 
sort of artillery duel will open and continue the engagement, until 
the attacking infantry comes up to effective rifle range of the enemy's 
position, and the third stage of the action is entered upon. 

THIRD STAGE OF THE ATTACK. 

100. "The tactics of the infantry would now, with a view to forcing infantry in ex- 
the enemy to show his dispositions clearly, be directed to covering 
much ground with as few men as possible in extended order, the main 
bulk of the force being kept in small columns. If, however, there 
are important points in advance of the position, which it appears 
desirable to possess, they must be rapidly attacked by the infantry, 
without any preliminary demonstration of force. 

"If any high ground, in the course of the advance, comes within 



Position of the 
commander. 



Not to leave the 
j)ost announced. 



204 PRINCin.ES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Use made of higii reacli, from which the enemy's dispositions can be seen, it should be 
immediately occupied by the assailants, even thoiigh not in the direct 
line of attack. In default of high ground, which is not always to be 
found, a church tower, a high -roofed house, or even a tree, may be 
turned into a post of observation, by an officer. 
ifiirbv'*'circum- " ^*^ ^^^ ^^^ original dispositions for attack may be probably followed 
stance.?: without much deviation; but once the action can be said to have 

commenced, circumstances often compel the commander of the troops 
to change his operations. 

" For the purpose. of watching the phases of the combat, the position 
which the commander should assume during the engagement ought, if 
possible, be on an eminence, from whence he can perceive the principal 
portion of the ground over which the troops are to work. 

''He should not quit this post (duly announced in the 'order') with- 
out exceptionally good reasons, and if he is obliged to do so, an officer 
should be left behind to direct all reports or messengers to the new 
station of the commander. These injunctions are of much importance, 
as nothing could be more demoralizing, during an engagement, than 
to see officers and orderlies galloping about wildly to look for the com- 
mander and asking everyone where he is to be found. 

On the orders "The Orders which are necessarilv transmitted during an action bv 

transmitted diir- , I . 

ingan engage- the Commander of the troops, are of much importance, and should be 
given with great care. They should, if possible, be in general har- 
mony with the original plan of attack, although certain modifications 
may become necessary. They should not descend to details which are 
better left to commanders of corp|, nor should the commander of the 
troops interfere in the execution of his orders, further than to assure 
himself that they are carried out. He should be satisfied on this 
point by means of constant reports and communications which must 
be kept up, without interruption during the action, between him and 
the commanders of separate corps and detachments. When the reports 
cannot be sent by an officer, they should be written, and in such case 
be numbered and dated with the exact hour and minute of despatch. 
Above all other matters it is most important that the commander of 
the troops should be immediately informed, when circumstances render 
it impossible for a subordinate commander to carry out the orders or 
instructions, as the failure to execute these may necessitate modifica- 
tions and fresh orders to replace the former ones. 

Facts determined " Jly the end of the third stage it mav be presumed that the enemv 

at end of third ' . .* . . * 

stage. has been forced to show his hand sufficiently for the purposes required 

of determining the best metht)d of finally attacking him, and the com- 



ANDTHKIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARKAUL:. 205 

maiider's main dispositions are eitiier directed to be carried out in their 
original design or else modified to suit new ascertained conditions. 

"The artillery, which up to this time has continued from its first A<_tif"> "t Hh- m 

• ' '^ lillerv diiniijiflK 

position to suf»port the general advance, by endeavoring to silence the Htagt". 
enemy's guns and to draw off his fire from the infantry, is now directed 
to concentrate its fire upon the intended point of attack in order to 
prepare the way for the infantry assault. The m6ral effect of this fire 
upon the defenders will probably be very great, even if the physical 
eflfect upon troops partly behind cover of ground and obstacles be com- 
paratively trifling. 

"Whenever the ground will admit, the infantry are supported on Action of tiie 
the flanks by cavalry, which advances under cover in small columns, 
with strong supports close at hand, losing no opportunity of attacking 
any advanced troops of the enemy and warding off adverse attacks in 
return. The very fact of the cavalry occasionally showing itself on 
the flanks, gives confidence to the attacking infantry, and demoralizes 
the defenders, especially if they are themselves deficient or weak in 
that arm. 

FOURTH STAGE OP" THE ATTACK. 

101. "The fourth stage is now commenced, by the infantry being commenwinent 
finally launched at the selected points of attack, and it comprises the stage! 
■whole of the real action up to the moment which immediately pre- 
cedes final success or failure. 

"The infantry here plays the principal part. It is fairly committed importance of, 

, . , ", . " . , . , . 1 • 1 I'll" J^"^' manner of 

to the fight, and having received its last impulse in the desired direc- handling, the i«- 
tion from the commander of the force, no power can alter or recall it, ' •• 
for good, during the remainder of the engagement. Its development 
of fire-action should rapidly increase as it nears the point of attack, 
for upon its weight of fire depends its success. 

"The cavalrv on the flanks should be now on the watch, not only to Actionof the cav- 
protect the infantry flanks of its own troops extended in the advance, 
but also to seize opportunities of approaching unseen the flanks of the 
opposing infantry or artillery, and of throwing them into disorder or 
demoralizing them, if not inflicting serious injury. If repulsed and in when repulsed. 
its turn disordered, it must rally under the protection of the other 
arms, and again return to exercise similar functions. But cavalry at 
this stage can only play a minor part, unless the ground be more than 
usually favorable to its action; with the exception, therefore, of strong its position. 
supports to the cavalry acting on the flanks, the remainder of this arm 
would still be kept in reserve, but not so far to the rear that it could 
not be brought up quickly if required to make a diversion or demon- 
stration on either flank. 



206 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

The artillery: its "The artillery, which during the former stages, has been of first im- 

importaiice. ' e • ^ ' n • 

portance on account oi its long range, now tails into the second place. 
The circumstances of the case must determine, whether it shall keep 
up its tire on the enemy's guns to relieve its own infantry, or whether 
Its action. it shall fire on the enemy's troops. As the rule to be followed, is, that 

it shall fire on that arm of the enemy which is for the time the most 
important, the enemy's infantry will, in all probability, be now the ob- 
ject. In either case, a moment may arrive during this stage, when a 
second position more in advance is necessary for the guns, on account of 
their fire becoming masked by their own advancing infantry. If a por- 
tion or the whole of the guns can, in such case, be advanced rapidly and 
placed in a good position (especially on a flank, whence they can add 
The necessity of a their own fire to that of the advancing troops, which are at the moment 
position. ■ absorbing the whole attention of the defending infantry), the proxim- 
ity to the enemy's line, of this second princi pal art illen/ position, must not 
be too much limited by ordinary rules o.f caution. When the attack 
and defence are nearly matched, it is clear that the addition of a close 
artillery fire on either side may turn the scale, and compensate by de- 
Liinit tothenum- cisive succcss for any loss sustained. As this close action of guns may 
vanced. ' in casc of repulsc lead to confusion, it would perhaps be advisable that 
the whole of the available artillery should not take up this second ad- 
vanced position, but that a portion be held in reserve, massed in a 
favorable position, and kept in action all the time in support of the 
advanced battery. 
Handling of the "During this stage such portions of the reserves of the other arms 
are brought up as required, and any concerted flank attack carried out 
along with the frontal movem^it. 

FIFTH STAGE OF THE ATTACK. 

Issue of this stage 102. " The fifth stage is generally a success or a complete defeat, 
but possibly may result in an intermediate issue between the two — a 
retrograde movement fighting; a retreat, in fact, in good order on the 
part of the assailants to the original position from which they had 
advanced. 

Reserves ordered "This Stage comiuenccs bv the final reserves which the commander 

"^' thinks fit to engage being ordered up. 

Employment of "In great actious, a decisive blow might now, under favoring con- 
'"' ditions, be given by the reserve cavalry; but in smaller affairs such 

as we are at pre.sent considering, this force would not come into play 
until the moment of pursuit or retreat. 

Infantry, sup- " The Tcservcs of infantry are thrown upon the decisive points, sup- 

fevy^, thrown ' ported by the massed fire of the whole of the artillery. But little dis- 

p^i^its.^'^'^'^*^ tance of ground or interval of time should be allowed between the sue 



AND 'IHKIIl A riM. RATION IN MODKRN WAKFAKK. 207 

cessive attacks of freshly brought-np infantry. The fatal error of al- 
lowing a front line to be beaten back before a succeeding one arrives 
should be guarded against, and troops should be pushed on in rapid 
succession to carry out the forward movement, and to replace the 
enormous losses attendant in modern warfare upon a frontal assault; 
above all things, to keep up the morale of tlie attacking troops, by 
preventing a decided check in the advance at this critical moment. 

"If the attack is successful and the enemy retires, either before the The attaoic suc- 
demoralizing influence of the last steady advance, or broken by actual 
assault, the position he occupied is quickly assumed by the artillery 
and a heavy fire brought to bear on the retreating troops. 

'' The reserve cavalry, which by this time has all been brought up The reserve cav- 
from the rear, and probably posted on the weaker flank, is now'^'^' 
launched in pursuit accompanied by horse-artillery, the superior mo- 
bility of both rendering their use peculiarly well suited to this service. 

"The commander of the troops would move forward from his The commander 

. . , , -111"* 'h*-' tiofps. 

station, and take his post upon the position lately occupied by the 
enemy, for further direction of the movements. 

"The infantry meantime would recover from its first confusion, re- infantry aids in 
form its ranks broken by the assault, and then furnish from its freshest 
troops, in all probability the reserves, a force to aid in the pursuit. 

"The field-batteries will also push forward and harass the enemy Disposition made 
with their fire, when he gets out of range of the position or becomes teries. 
masked in his retreat by the interposing troops in pursuit. 

"If, on the other hand, the final assault of the position has been when the assault 
unsuccessful, the attacking force must retire, covered, in open ground 
by the cavalry and artillery, in close ground by the least disorganized 
portion of the infantry supported by the artillery. The latter arm importance of the 
now plays an important part. It must run every risk to enable the '^'" ^''^' 
retreat to be safely efiected, until a rear-guard can be organized to 
protect the movement. Witli this view, the first position where a 
stand can be made close to the field of action must be taken up by the 
freshest of the infantry, and the guns must be posted in such manner, 
as not only to support the infantry, but further^ to cover all the nec- 
essary dispositions for conducting the retreat in good order. 

THE THREE ARMS IN DEFENCE. 

103. "Should a commander of a force of the three arms decide to a suitable posi- 

1 ^1 1 i- • 1 , 1 1 1 1 • . • 1 1 tion first chosen. 

Stand on the defensive, he should take up the position most suitable 
for his purpose without delay, as the superiority to be attained by 
this course of action must result in great measure from the advantages 
attendant upon choice of ground. 

"A good position should be such, from a tactical point of view, that 



208 



rRINCrPLKS OF THE ART AND SCIEN'CK OF WAR 



Elements of a 
good position. 



The front and 
flanks. 



The extent of 
front. 



Five men per 
vard of front. 



Action of the 
commander. 



The preliniinai 
arrangements. 



the different arms could be dispcsed for defence in the manner most 
suitable to their action, and that there should be facilities for con- 
cealing their strength, composition, and posts from the view of the 
enemy, and of preserving them more or less from his direct tire during 
the attack. 

"It is also of the highest importance that the front of any position 
selected for defence should be clear for view and fire, as should also 
be the flanks, unless they rest on impassable obstacles. 

"Whatever may be ihe natural strength of a position its value as a 
point of shelter for passive defence, or as a point of temporary resist- 
ance for active defence, depends much upon the number and quality 
of troops whicli are to defend it. The extent of the position should 
not be disproportionate to the strength of the defenders, for, if too 
much ground is occupied, j)art or whole of the front must be weak, 
and if too little ground is occupied, the troops, being crowded, suffer 
greater loss under fire, while facility of manoeuvring is impeded. 

" By a rough rule it may be calculated that for each yard of front to 
be defended five men will be required, including all arms and reserves. 

"The commander of the troops may thus in practice determine ap- 
proximately what extent of position he should occupy, by knowing 
the strength of his force. If the position which appears to him best 
to hold, is not nnsuited for his strength, he may occupy its full extent. 
If his force would thus be too much scattered, he must restrict the 
length of his line, defending only that portion of the position which 
presents the greatest natural advantages of ground, and which there- 
fore, by its iDl)ssession, will best enable him to carry out the purpose 
of his defensive action. ^ 

FIRST STAGE OF THE DEFENCE. 

104. "Should the force be large and covered by advanced troops, 
the preliminary proceedings will probably involve an affair of out- 
posts, from which the commander will be enabled to judge of the force 
and intentions of the enemy. In minor operations his front would 
also be covered by small reconnoitring parties, from whose reports he 
would arrive at the conclusions necessary for arranging tlie defence. 
When the enemy is reported to be advancing, the commander, should 
the ground admit it, would probably employ his artillery or part of it 
in an advanced position, in order to cover the reconnaissance and en- 
able it to be more active and daring, and to force the enemy to declare 
his intentions at an early period. In this forward position the guns 
would act much as in the preliminary position of the attack, and 
would in a similar manner be protected either by cavalry or infantry 
on the exposed flank. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKKN WARFARK. 209 

"When they have to retire it would usually be by a liank, ami under 
cover of the fire of the guns of the main position so far as already 
placed. 

"During the early part of this stage the commander would no ivunts covered in 
doubt be able to complete his preliminary plans for defence, and would 
issue his orders thereon much in the same manner as if for attack. 
The mode of operations indicated in the Fecond clause of the orders 
would probably be, in this case, to await the enemy in a certain posi- 
tion, and there to engage him with such and such intentions. In the 
fourth clause, the points to be defensively occupied by each fraction of 
the force would be detailed, and also the relative positions of each 
portion of the reserves. 

"The first stasre of the defence which has commenced with the re- what tie first 

"\ . , , • stage comprises. 

connaiiJsance of the enemy, would thus comprise the selection and oc- 
cupation of the position by the defenders, as well as the advanced 
action, if any, of the artillery, already alluded to. 

"Upon the selection of the ground most suitable for the artillery of importance and 

, , influence of the 

the main position, will in great measure depend the exact trace ot the artillery. 
fighting line for the infantry, and there is vsome difficulty in approach- 
ing this part of the subject in detail, the position for the guns so much 
depending upon the circumstances of each case, and more especially 
upon the configuration of the ground. 

" The guns of the position should, however, if possible, be so placed Placing the artii- 
as to bring the enemy's columns under fire at long range, and hence 
they ought to command every distant approach. They should also be 
able to pour a concentrated fire upon the probable positions which will 
be assumed by the attacking artillery, and be stationed so as to sweep 
the ground in front of the position from the earliest to the latest 
moment of attack. The defence of the flanks in the case of large 
forces must be specially provided for. 

" Tt would therefore appear, that, unless the ground is peculiarly When placed on 
favorable for posting guns in flanking positions, where without being 
exposed to enfilade they can bring a cross-fire to bear upon the main 
attack, and a flanking one to protect the immediate front, the required 
conditions can only be fulfilled by the guns being placed in the front 
line, and preferably at the salients, should an irregular contour mark in frontline. 
the front of the position. 

"The general distribution of the infantry would probably be in Distribution of 
three lines; the first or fighting line of defence, the special supports, 
and the reserves. 

"If time for hasty fortification is permitted, some sort of entrench- rue of entrench- 
ment should be always prepared for the batteries, as even a low par- '"^" "' 



210 



PRINCrPLKS OF THK ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 



Shelter-trenches 
for infantry. 



When occupied. 



Artillery to be 
secured against 
enemy's skir- 
mishers. 



When the troops 
move into posi- 



apet of earth gives protection to the gunners. Great care should, 
however, be taken that the newly broken earth is concealed or covered 
in such manner from the enemy's view, that it shall not serve, as it 
has often fatally done, as a mark for their artillery more distinct than 
would otherwise be presented by the guns alone. 

"Shelter-trenches may also be prepared for the infantiy in the fight- 
ing and supporting lines. * ■"'■ * 

" Neither the places prepared for the batteries nor the shelter- 
trenches should be occupied by guns or troops till the proper moment 
for action arrives; 

"In making these arrangement.^, it is of the utmost importance to 
seciire the artillery of the main position against the fire of the enemy's 
advanced skirmishers or marksmen; and, with this view, the batteries 
ouglvt to he covered in their immediate front by a line of extended 
riflemen, placed either in trenches or pits or behind natural cover, at 
a distance of from four hundred to live hundred yards in advance of 
the guns which they defend. If the battery is on a flank, this protec- 
tion should also be extended for a similar distance to the flank. The 
infantrv thus posted would remain as long as possible in position, 
and only retire when, at the final stage, they are driven back by the 
overwhelming advance of the assailants. Besides their principal 
function, of keeping off" the enemy's skirmishers from too early ap- 
proach to the batteries of the defence, thev«=e advanced infantry could 
often bring an irritating fire to bear upon the attacking artillery at its 
first principal position, and perhaps serve to prevent the guns from ap- 
proaching to the most lelling ranges. This possible action would of 
course depend much upon the features of the ground. Sometimes the 
protecting duty of the infantry in advance of the defender's batteries 
would be rendered unnecessary, by one or more advanced posts being 
held in front of the position. 

"The general trace of the positions having been sketched out, the en- 
trenchments, if any, executed, and all dispositions completed, the 
troops would be held back under cover, in such order as to be readily 
moved up to their posts at the proper moment. The artillery would 
first take post, but not too soon. No advantage can be gained by the 
guns of the main position opening fire upon small and scattered ad- 
vanced detachments of the enemy, and tlie position of the batteries of 
the defence would be thereby prematurely disclosed to no purpose. 
When the heads of the enemy's columns can be discerned and are 
within range, so that they can be forced to deploy by fire being opened 
upon them, the guns should move into position. The infantry, with 
the exception of the skirmishers in front of the guns, or detachments 



AND THEIR Al'PI.lCATION IN MODERN AVArJTARE. 211 

holding advanced posts, should not be brought up from under their 
cover in rear of the position. They can do no good at this juncture in 
the front line, and their moral tone will be much better preserved by 
their being saved from the efifects of the preliminary artillery fire. 

"It is impossible to lay down any rule for the exact position of the Position of the 
artillery of reserve. High ground near the exposed flank, provided serve. 
facility of movement therefrom in case of necessity is presented. by its 
features, would often be suitable. The guns should, however, in any 
case be well up to the front, so as to lose no advantage of range from 
the commencement of their fire. A position in rear which entails, not 
only a sacrifice of some hundreds of yards range, but the necei-sity of 
firing over the heads of the defending infantry, greatly to their dis- 
comfort and demoralization, does not appear to present commensurate 
advantages of safety to the guns. It is evident that artillery so placed 
would be comparatively useless during the later stages of the defence, 
when once the attacking infantry has advanced so close that the fire 
of the retired batteries would be masked by the ground, or by the de- 
fending infantry lining the position. 

"Guns so placed might be useful in defending an iimer line, or for objections to a 

,,,. T«'ii •• e 1 retired position. 

supporting a counter-stroke delivered inside the position after the as- 
sault has been made, but their action would be lost almost altogether 
during the period immediately preceding the final attack of the posi- 
tion. 

"The previous knowledare of ranges and distances, possible to the ar- Advantage of 

:,,, , ,... knowledge of the 

tillery ot tlie defence, presents a great advantage; but it circumstances ranges. 
have not permitted the gunners to ascertain them during the prelim- 
inary arrangements, by aid of range-finders or other means, the earliest 
portion of the artillery action must be utilized to obtain correct esti- 
mates of the ranges to all important points, by means of trial shots. 

"There are certain points or portions of all positions, the possession Tactical points of 

, , . , , . .It the position. 

of which would assure the assailant the greatest tactical advantages. 
In many cases also the conformation of the ground appears to limit 
the movements of an enemy to certain lines of operation. 

"The defence should therefore occupy these parts of the position in Their occupation 
force, with supports in close proximity, while still preserving the gen- ' 
eral line. Under the second condition, the force should be prepared to 
resist advance by rapid re-enforcements at any of the possible points 
of approach. 

"The reserves of the third line should be placed so as to be avail- Position of re- 

iii- !• 1 I'll . ^ 1 1111 serves of third 

able for strengthening the most likely points of attack, and to be able line. 
to protect the line of retreat. 



The infantry, 



212 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

Cavalry and " Most of the cavalrv, and some liorse-artillery, if it can be spared, 

Avitii the ipseive. would be placed with the reserves. Sometimes a portion of this force 
is placed in the second line for the purpose of joining in forward move- 
ments and Hank attacks upon the assailants, or of covering the retreat 
of the troops engaged in these counter-attacks if unsuccessful. 

SECOND STAGE OF THE DEFENCE. 

Employment 01 105. "The second stage generally commences with the opening of 

theaitilleiv. ,. , , , . , * • .• , • • , , , 

lire at long range from the mam batteries ot the position, upon the heads 
of the enemy's columns, which have already been similarly treated 
by the guns in the advanced preliminary position. The object of this 
lire is to force the enemy's infantry to quit its order of march and de- 
ploy. The attacking artillery will probably now reply from its first 
principal position, and as the artillery of the attack is at this time the 
- most important arm it must be answered by the guns of the defence. 
In this artillery duel the defenders should have the advantage, as 
knowing accurately the ranges to the various points which must be oc- 
cupied by the enemy in his advance, and as being moreover entrenched 
Avhile the assailants are comparatively exposed. 

"During the second stage the infantry of the defence are brought up 
into position and open long-range lire (from one thousand to seven 
hundred yards) upon the advancing enemy with more or less effect. 

THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE. 

detlncS th'is^^*'' ^^^- " ^" *^® ^'^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ advance to effective rifle range of the 
stage. attacking infantry has forced the defence to show more clearly the 

positions of its troops, and the enemy commences his dispositions for 
the real attack, the direction of which it is now the object of the de- 
fending commander to discover, by every means in his power. As the 
supports and reserves of the assailing infantry come clearly into view, 
they should receive the concentrated fire of part of the artillery of the 
defence. 

FOURTH STAGE OF THE DEFENCE. 

Manner of meet- jQ?. " In the fourth Stage the real point menaced bv the attack be- 
ing the assailant. ® ^ - ^ 

ing made clearly apparent, the commander re-enforces it to meet the 
assailants with a superior fire, and the artillery of the defence is di- 
rected at the opposing infantry, which now has become the principal 
arm in the attack. Should a counter-attack be projected it takes 
place during this stage, unless it is to be delayed until after the as- 
sault. Resistance to a flank movemei^t of the attacking troops would 
alvso now have to be made. In the case of a counter-stroke being de- 
livered by the defence, part of the cavalry and horse-artillery might 
be employed in support of it. Cavalry also should generally move 
forward on the flanks at this part of the action to seek for opportuni- 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 213 

ties of throwing the flanks of the attacking infantry into disorder, or 
of taking guns too rashly advanced. 

FIFTH STAGE OF THE DEFENCE. 

108. "The fifth or last stage comprises the final repulse of the at- ^^''t' ti>i-^ stn<j<! 
tack upon the position, or the defenders' enforced retreat therefrom. 
In either case pursuit by the victors may ensue. Immediately before The artillery. 
and during the final advance or assault every gun of the defence should 
concentrate its fire upon the attacking infantry, in order to check their 
advance, and should the assailants retire the guns must continue to 
fire upon them, until masked by the interposing troops sent forward in 
pursuit. 

"Should the defenders, on the other hand, be forced to fall back. Action of the de- 

, , 1 1 1 • .• ^ ^ T fenders if forced 

guns must cover the movement and enable the infantry to disengage back. 
itself. In an open country the cavalry of the defence, (the reserve of 
that arm being probably quite fresh) would, with the aid of horse- 
artillery, assist in checking the pursuit; in a close country the service 
would be undertaken by infantry and artillery; in a varied country 
the dutv would be shared bv all three arms." 



214 PKINCIPLES OF THE AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAll 



CHAPTER XTV. 

CAUSES WHICH ha\t: influenxed modern warfare. 
1. Among the causes which have had most influence upon recent 
campaigns and modern battle-fields, are the following: 

a. Improvements in fire-arms and ammunition. 

b. Railroads. 

c. The electric telegraph. 

d. Shelter-trenches. 

improvements in fire-arms and AMMLTNITION. 

Rifling and 2. The first improvement of anv consequence in fire-arms was 

breech- loadi.ig. ^ a 

rifling, which greatly increased their range, accuracy and penetration. 
The introduction of the breech-loading system then followed, which 
vastly increased the rapidity of fire. 
Effect of rifling The svstcm of rifling was first applied to small-arms, and as the 

small arms. ,' , . . . , . 

result ot this improvement was to increase their effective range trom 
three to five times what it was before, the relative importance of artil- 
lery on the field of Ifattle was reduced; and it is readily seen that 
unless the power of the latter could be increased in the same propor- 
tion, it would continue to occupy an inferior place. The successful 
application of this same principle to field-guns then followed, which 
to a great extent restored to them their former importance. 
(Von Scheiff.;) "The fact that in 1859 the Austrian* rifle did not hold its own 

Campaign of 1859. . , , , .,,.,, -r- , .,, , 

against the smooth-bore with which the rrench were still mostly 
armed, was accounted for by the action of the French rifled cannon." 
Results of these 3. The effect of these improvements has been to modify tactics, 
the principles of strategy remaining the same. Lines of battle have 
to be formed at much greater distances from the enemy than formerly, 
they are also much more extended. Campaigns and battles are shorter, 
more quickly decided, and more decisive. Wars are reduced in length ; 
theatres of war are consequently more limited, and the sufferings pro- 
duced by wars are lessened. The effects of war are not so disastrous. 

♦The true reason for Austria's failure in all her wars ha^s already bee i given, viz., tl.e 
inferiority of her infantrr. 



improvements. 



AND THEIR ArPLICATION IN' MODKRX \VAU1AI:K. 21') 

In the war between Prussiii and Austria, in 186G, active operations The Austro-iMu.^- 
in the field were commenced about June loth, and the preliminaries """ 
of peace were signed July 2t)th, the same year. The war was decided 
by one battle, that of Kciniggratz. fought July 3rd. The Austrians 
were armed with the muzzle-loader, the Prussians with the breech- 
loader. 

War was declared between France and Germany on Julv loth, 1870; The F,anco-Pius- 

' ' siaii Will- of 1870- 

Paris capitulated on January 28th, 1871. The war was finished in a "i- 
campaign of six months. 

The order for the advance of the Russian armv across the Turkish tiio Kusso-Tuik- 

ish war, 1S77-78. 

frontier was promulgated April 24th, 1877, and an armistice, prelim- 
inary to the i)eace which speedily followed, was agreed upon January 
31st, 1878. 

4. Troops will require shelter as soon as thev come within eflective Ke«uitsof thone- 

'■ ' . - . '. cessity of shelter- 

range of the enemy ; battles will therefore be fought on fields where i»g troops. 

this can be readily obtained. Open country and large plains will be 
avoided ; broken country where shelter can be obtained will be sought 
for. Direct attacks will entail heavy losses and will rarely be suc- 
cessfully carried out; turning movements will be depended upon to de- 
cide the issue. Campaigns and battles will rarely be successful with 
inferior forces; the rapid concentration of superior forces on important 
points will generally win. 

The question of the supply of ammunition on the battle-field be- Supply of ammu- 

, . ' I'll 1 iiitioii and th<? eii- 

comes oi vast importance; the entrenching-tool may become an ad- trenching-tooi. 
junct to success. 

RAILROADS. 

5. " Railways have of late years increased to such an extent as to {Von scheiien- 
beof considerably higher importance than roads in a military point of Relative import- 

(. , . • J • • J • i. • J- i- nnce of railways 

View tor certain periods in a campaign and in certain directions, and roads. 
Roads are still of greater importance in all operations carried out near 
the enemy; but for the concentration of armies, for the rapid move- 
ments of troops from one theatre of operations to another, for all 
movements from the rear of an army in the broadest acceptation of 
the term, for the transport of every kind of materiel and supply, rail- 
ways rank higher than roads in importance." 

6. Whatever facilitates the movements of armies during a war, or 
aids their supply, will be an important factor to the successful ter- 
mination of the w^ar. 

Railroads facilitate the concentration and movements of troops, and Railroads aid mii- 

-., ,.,. 11 If p itarv operations. 

admit of supplies being collected from a great extent of country, conse- 
quently they will have a marked influence on future wars, as they have 
had in the past. 



21G 



principj.es ok the art and science of war 



Aidcoiicentiati 
of troops. 



Campaign of IStiJ 



The Austro-Prns 
sian war, 1866. 



Campaign ii 
Italy, 18.yj. 



Advantages to 
Oii'ensive. 



Aidof railroads t( 
the defensive. 



Effect on strag- 
gling. 



Movements of 
Hooker's corps. 



Use of railroads 
for an army oper- 
ating in an 
enemv'scountrv. 



7. Formerly many months were required to concentrate the troops 
which were to form an army, and as many more were frequently 
necessary to place the army in the theatre of active military opera- 
tions. By the use of railroads this may now all be accomplished in 
as many days. Ten hours will now carry a whole division as far as 
ten days formerly would. When it is considered that bad weather 
will rarely interfere with the working of a railroad, and that the same 
cause may entirely stop operations when the troops are obliged to 
march, the influence of railroads on military movements will be more 
fully appreciated. 

In 1864, the Germans rapidly collected a very superior force against 
the Danes, and ended the war almost as soon as it can be told. 

In 186(5, the Prussians, in twelve days, concentrated over two hun- 
dred thousand men and the appropriate number of liorses and guns on 
the Bohemian frontier, and in a very short time their opponents, the 
Austrian?, were ready to sue for peace. 

In 1859, the French army was taken from France into Italy in eight 
days. 

Such are some of the advantages to the oflensive resulting from the 
use of railroads. These campaigns were shortened by the facility and 
rapidity with which the troops, supplies, ammunition, etc., were trans- 
ported to the seat of war. It is evident that these advantages will be 
greatly multiplied as the number of available lines of railroads is in- 
creased. 

On the defensive, railroads, especially if parallel to the line of de- 
fence, may be used to advantage to post strong detachments to watch 
all the points of the frontier threatened by the enemy; then, when the 
latter has developed his point of attack, to again rapidly concentrate 
the troops to meet him. If the army is defeated, all available re- 
enforcements may be hurried to its aid. 

8. When troops are moved by rail even forced marches do not pro- 
duce stragglers; the number of effectives is therefore increased. The 
same number can be depended upon after a movement of several hun- 
dred miles as were available before its commencement. 

During our civil war, and after the battle of Chickamauga, twenty- 
three thousand men, (Hooker's corps), Avere moved from Virginia to 
Alabama — a distance of one thousand one hundred and ninety-two 
miles — in seven days. It would have required, under the most favor- 
able circumstances, eighty days to have marched this distance. 

9. For the movement of troops through an enemy's country rail- 
roads cannot be depended upon to any great extent, owing to the 
facility with which they can be destroyed or temporarily damaged by 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKKN WAllKAliK. Ill 

the enemy. By their use the fractions ol' an army might he separated 
and disaster follow. They are, however, invaluable for supply; for, 
even if the enemy has destroyed them as he retired, they can be readily 
repaired by the army as it advances, and be used for the transporta- 
tion of supplies and re-enforcements. The value of these means of 
supply is evident when we consider the use made of the railroads from 
Louisville to Nashville and Chattanooga by General Sherman during 
his Atlanta campaign, 

''The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as (siieiman's Me- 
niuch as, if not more so, than in time of peace. The Atlanta cam- u.se of railways 
paign would simply have been impossible without the use of the rail- campaif^n."" '^ 
roads from Louisville to Nashville — one hundred and eighty-five 
miles — from Nashville to Chattanooga — one hundred and fifty-one 
miles — and from Chattanooga to Atlanta — one hundred and thirty- 
five miles. Every mile of this 'single track' was so delicate, that one 
man could in a minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains 
usually carried along the tools and means to repair such a break. 
~" That single stem of railroad, four hundred and seventy- 
three miles long, supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and 
thirty-five thousand animals for the period of one hundred and ninety- 
six days. To have delivered regularly that amount of food and forage 
by ordinary wagons would have required thirty-six thousand eight 
hundred wagons of six mules each, allowing each wagon to have 
hauled two tons twenty miles a day, a simple impossibility in roads 
such as then existed in that region of country. Therefore, I reiterate 
that the Atlanta campaign was an impossibility without these rail- 
roads; and only then, because we had the men and means to maintain 
and defend them, in addition to what were necessary to overcome the 
enemy," 

10. This subject of railways is considered to be of such importance Railway drills. 
in military operations that some European nations have gone so far as 

to provide platforms for loading cars with troops and materiel, and also 
prescribe a railway drill. The troops are exercised in getting on and 
of!' the cars, loading animals, supplies, etc. 

THE ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH. 

11. The electric telegraph influences military operations by aiding inflnencf on mii- 
the rapid communication of orders and the prompt transmission of 



or in- 



uy operatioi 



telligence. By its aid the commander-in-chief may be informed about 
what is taking place along his whole front at any one time; he is thus 
enabled to make his dispositions more intelligently, as he can order 
the movements of his troops necessary to meet all contingencies. A 
movement which might be proper under certain circumstance or when 

'2H 



218 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

he knew only what was transpiring at a certain point, might be highly 
injudicious or even lead to disastrous results when he became ac- 
quainted with certain other facts or occurrences at different points 
of the line. Movements of the enemy which might be accomplished 
before information could reach the commanding general by the ordi- 
nary methods of communication on the battle-field, might, by the use 
of the field-telegraph, be provided for and successfully combatted. 

Aids combiiifd 12. The telegraph aids combined attacks by keeping the general 
informed at every moment of the movements of the different fractions 
of the army, and thus enables one head to direct the manoeuvres of 
both columns, rendering simultaneous action possible. 

Marches made It savcs the labor and fatigue incident to the unnecessarv marches 

upon false iiitor- . , . ° ^ ^ ' 

mation. which are frequently undertaken upon false information: they can be 

stopped at once, or at any stage of their execution, and other dis- 
positions made. 

Necessity on the Time, always ouc of the most important factors in militarv move- 
modern lield of 1 * 1 1 1 n 1 1 1 • \ 
promptly trans- mcnts, on the modern battle-field more than ever enters into the con- 
siderations which influence the final result, on account of the great 
rapidity with which events culminate and follow each other. Con- 
sequently the necessity of promptly forwarding orders and informa- 
tion cannot be. over-estimated. Troops may be sent at just the right 
moment to decide the struggle. Equally important may be a system 
of signals. 
(Gen. Sherman.) 13. "The valuc of the magnetic telegraph in war cannot be ex- 

Valueofthemag- . ® ,® ^ , . , 

netic telegraph, aggerated, as was illustrated by the perfect concert of action between 
the armies in Virginia and in Georgia in 1864. Hardly a day inter- 
vened when General Grant did not know the exact state of facts with 
me, more than fifteen hundred miles off, as the wires ran." 
(Pium.j " During the operations at Spottsylvania, and on the North Anna, at 

graph in the civil Cold Harbor, in the march from Cold Harbor to City Point, and in 
the battles in front of Petersburg in June, the field-telegraph lines 
were worked with great success, and invaluable aid was thus rendered 
to the government. General Grant and General Meade were kept in 
almost constant communication with each other and with the different 
corps of the army. The field-telegraph lines have Avorked many 
times in the face of the enemy, exposed to fire, without shelter, have 
been kept up day and night whenever required, etc. 

Use of the tele- " 111 all wars of this and future ages, the electric telegraph will be 
greatly used. It must be remembered that a telegraph operator can 
with a small pocket instrument tap the wires anywhere, and learn the 
messages passing along them. A few such men living concealed with- 
in the enemv's territorv could obtain more news than dozens of ordi- 



graph in future. 



AND THEIR APPLICATION IN MODKKN WAUFARK. 219 

nary spies. Immediately before or during an action an enemy may 
be deceived to any extent by means of such men ; messages can be 
sent ordering him to concentrate upon wrong points, or by giving him 
wrong information you may induce him to move as you wish. The 
telegraph was used in all these ways during the American war between 
North and South." 

FIELD-WORKS AND SHELTER-TRENCHES. 

14. One of the most important facts developed by the introduction Fact developed 

, , .„ Ill I 1 1 . 1 . t ' ^• bv recent wars. 

of the ritie and the breech-loader is the necessity oi providing some 
means by which troops can be sheltered from their fire. 

"Their (shelter-trenches) first and great use was at Sebastopol : in (Greene.) 

. ., , ./,,,.! , ^ ' ■ The use of shel- 

our civil war they attained a development hitherto unknown, not only ter-trenches. 

important points like Wasliington, Richmond, Vicksburg, etc., being 

converted into great intrenched camps, capable of sustaining long 

sieges, but also every bivouac in the presence of the enemy being 

fortified by a shelter-trench of some kind; in the Prussian wars of 

1866 and 1870 they were also used, though not to so great an extent; 

but in the late war in Turkev the combination of trench and breech- i» the Rnsso- 

• 11 <•' ' t 1 y ^ • Turkish war. 

loader attained such a perfection, that the whole campaign may be 
said to have consisted — tactically — of the attack and defence of more 
or less hastily fortified positions. The Russians began the campaign 
relying on their bayonets and despising the spade. The Turks, on 
the other hand, had an evident pride in their fortifications and a full 
appreciation from the beginning, of their value. * * * 

"The Russians refused to employ the spade until its lessons had Lesson learned 
been forced upon them by a very rude experience of the murderous 
fire of the modern breech-loader from behind trenches. One side 
erred by excessive prudence and its bad effect upon the morals of the 
men, and the other by recklessness and its attendant slaughter. ■' * * 
The cases in wliich the Russian troops under General Wilhelminof 
received an attack of the Turks in hastily made trenches and repulsed 
it with volley-firing, inflicting a loss ten times greater than their own, 
have been fully described. '•' "•=• * These trenches were mere scretch- 
ings, about a foot deep and twice as wide, the loose earth being thrown 
up in front; and they are striking examples of what steady troops, 
armed with breech-loaders, can accomplish behind a rude fortifica- 
tion. * * * 

"When the investment of Plevna was begun a large number of Plevna, 
spades and shovels were, of course, sent forward from Russia and Rou- 
mania and distributed to the troops. *" * "-•• After the surrender 
of Plevna General SkobelefF ordered the men in his division to keep 
these spades and shovels and carry them on their persons, * * * 



220 PKFNCIPLES OF THE ART AN1> SCIKNCE OF WAK 

they were heavy, they were uncomfortable, they were in every way 
inconvenient, but each man had learned by hard experience to feel 
that his individual life depended upon his musket and his spade — and 
he took good care to lose neither the one nor the other. * * *- 
Lessons of these "We may look then to see every nation. adopting in time of peace 
some half-measure, such as the short-handled small spade, the trowel- 
bayonet, etc., but it is more than probable that the next great war on 
this continent, or in Europe, will bring about the same practical ex- 
perience as in the one in Turkey, viz., that all personal inconvenience 
must be sacrificed to the vital necessity of having the most efficient 
intrenching-tools, i. e. a common pick and a big spade, and that, once 
convinced of their great value, the troops will carry them most cheer- 
fully." 
(Gen. Wright.) "The attack on Petersburg of nearly two divisions, against a picket 
burg. ^ ^' line covered by a simple trench and parapet, cost us in killed and 

1864-60. wounded a number equal perhaps to the entire force of the enemy 

opposed to us," 



AND THEIK AITMCVTION IN MODKKN WARF ARK. 221 



CHAPTER XV. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

1. WJien we consider the great successes achieved by the Germans in The (iprmnn 
their last two wars — with the Austrians in 1866, and with the French 

in 1870-71 — we naturally conclude that there must be some peculiarity 
in their system of military training which has contributed to this 
success. 

An examination of their system will disclose the fact that in the Pchoois in the 

^ . 1 . 1 I T j! 1' • 1 • • German service. 

(merman service a high standard oi professional attainments is re- 
quired on the part of officers of all grades. The privates are fitted for 
their duty by a three years' tour of practical service with tlie colors. 
Schools are provided for the sons of non-commissioned officers and 
privates of both branches of the service — army and navy — as well as 
for non-commissioned officers themselves. Schools of various kinds 
are also provided for the purpose of educating those persons w4io are 
intended for commissioned officers. 

"The perfection of the German military system lies less in the mill- ^^^^ u-^nderl 
tary organization than in the exactness with which men of every fheir system per- 
grade, in every branch of service, are trained for the efficient perform- 
ance of their duties." 

The German service undoubtedly stands to-day far ahead of any r.esnitofa 
other service as regards professional attainments, and the system of ing. ° 
army organization is fully the equal of that of any other country. 
Consequently, when the army takes the field for active service, it will 
probably have great advantages in every respect over its adversary. 

2. The profession of the soldier, like all others, requires thorough a thorough 

• • 1 • 11 • 1 •! 1 j! knowledge en- 

training and an exact knowledge of all its details to make one perfect hances of success. 

in it; and without doubt, that nation which most clearly approaches 

the standard of excellence in the art of war, will have the best chances 

of success when other nations are encountered on tlie field of battle. 



PRIXCIFLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF AVAR 



Requirements for 
success. 



(Home. > 
The importance 
of education and 
its influence. 



Power conferred 
by education, 
training and di.-- 
cipline. 



The skirmish 
drill to be thor- 
oughly taught. 



To approach this ."Standard a good system oi military training should 
be established, and thorough instruction in drill and tactics should be 
given. 

To attain the first object good schools are necessary where the prin- 
ciples of the military art may be taught both practically and theo- 
retically. 

In the second ca.>se, not only should the movements specified in the 
tactics be perfectly mastered, but the tactics in use on the field of 
battle should receive especial attention. 

.''In war we often find the most extraordinary instances of the vic- 
tory of small bodies of men over large forces, produced by moral 
causes. The most numerous army is by no means the most likely to 
conquer, but that which is the most highly endowed with moral and 
physical qualities and the best trained and disciplined. * * ^ 

" If a leader desires to obtain great exertions from those under his 
orders, he must seek to work on and excite their feelings, he must care- 
fully watch against any sudden or unexpected action of the enemy, 
and be careful that nothing shakes the men's confidence in themselves. 
The object of the leader of bodies of men, whether great or small, 
should be to inspire those under his command with the greatest moral 
force before an action, to preserve that moral power during the action, 
and to seek to demoralize the enemy. 

"There is nothing that tends to raise the moral power of an army 
more than education; the consciousness of possessing superior knowl- 
edge adds greatly to the power of an army. Many Asiatic races far 
exceed Europeai^ in their contempt for death, but they are invariably 
defeated by the moral power that superior education, civilization, train- 
ing and discipline give. Men who are accustomed to obey their super- 
iors, look to them in danger and take their ideas from them by a kind 
of sympathy. If a leader be firm, clear-headed, and understands what 
he is about, he will from the mere fact of there being danger, be more 
readily obeyed; but if he is vacillating, uncertain in his action, and 
appears to doubt and hesitate in the presence of danger, his men will 
mistrust and disobey him. -^ •=* If men learn to respect, follow, 

and trust a leader, in whose knowledge of his profession they have 
confidence, they will from that very intercourse learn to doubt and dis- 
trust one who is ignorant of his duty; and no matter how personally 
they may like him, will never obey his orders as completely as his in 
whose knowledge they confide." 

3. The extended or skirmishing order now practiced in battle 
should be made perfectly familiar to the officers and men; they should 
be made to understand that it is the only manner of fighting which can 



AND THEIR APPIJCATION IN MODERN WARFARE, 223 

now be successfully employed; they should be exercised in it on all 
varieties of ground, and particularly on broken or wooded tracts. 
They should be taught on this drill to obey the orders given by all 
officers near them, and not to depend exclusively on their own; for, 
owing to the intermingling of different commands and the great extent 
of the line of battle, their own officers may not always be at hand to 
meet emergencies as they arise. 

"But although men must be taught to manoeuvre, it is essential that , (Home.) 

* » ' Importance of 

manoeuvre-tactics, important as they are, should not be raised above fig'»*'''g tactics. 
their proper value, but that fighting-tactics should be practiced, and 
studied, and carefully thought over by ofHcers. * * * The differ- 
ent kinds of formation in which troops can advance best over diflferent 
kinds of ground, can only be thought out by officers who keep their 
minds continually bent on the subject, and who in default of real ex- 
perience endeavor to realize the power of the arms in use and the effect 
of ground in modifying that power. By such thought and by study 
alone can the really difficult art of handling troops under fire be ac- 
quired. Tactics are often defined to be and generally considered in- 
ferior to strategy, but for one man who really requires to practice 
strategy five hundred are needed who can handle troops. The general Responsibility for 
but gives the order to attack; the serious responsibility of making the method of attack, 
dispositions for attack, fixing and modifying the formation of the 
troops to suit the ground, so that they shall suffer as little as possible, 
rests, and must rest, with the field and company officers; and when it 
is remembered that neglecting to change from a close to an extended 
formation at the right moment may cost the lives of many men, the 
necessity for careful painstaking study really becomes a solemn duty, 
and a duty that the more it is studied the more difficult it appears to 
be. It cannot be too often stated that there is great danger of officers 
being induced to consider that now-a-days anything in the shape of 
drill is sufficient if the men only can shoot. The drill-book may be 
made very simple by leaving out three-fourths of it. But doing so Books are but 
will not render the soldiers', much less the officers' duties the easier, ^"' ®^' 
and it is important that those who advocate sweeping reductions in 
the size of the drill-book, and imagine that when the officer or soldier 
has mastered what it contained between its covers, his education will 
be complete, should remember that the great difficulty is, the drill- 
book, whatever its size, now, far less than ever, can be taken as a rule; 
it is merely a guide, which points out the general direction. A knowl- 
edge of drill, and the power of adjusting the formation of troops to 
ground, is at the present day more requisite and more difficult than 
ever it was, and this fact should be recognized; and met by a thorough 



224 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR 

practical training, on the part of the company officers, to adapt not 

only the formation of companies, but also of small bodies of men to the 

ground worked over. * * 

Effect of improv- "Improved arms, far from reducing the labor of the infantrv officer 
ed arms. .... . . . " 

and giving him more time to kindred branches of the military art, 

have really increased it a hundred-fold, and converted what at one 
time might perhaps have been termed machine-like action, into what 
at the present day most certainly requires study, and ability of no 
mean order." * * 
i"ai\'^H'^- '?^*'"" 4. In this changed manner of fighting everything depends upon the 
ed! ■ exertions put forth by the individual soldier, and not as formerly upon 

the action of the mass. To develop this individual action to the 
greatest extent a high order.of intelligence is absolutely necessary, for 
the soldier must accustom himself to decide certain questions which 
were formerly decided for him. He should know for example when 
to reserve his fire and Avhen to deliver it so as to produce its maximum 
of effect; when to take advantage of cover, and when to leave it; at 
what moment he should put forth his greatest efforts, which properly 
and timely developed usually decide the result. All these qualities 
will follow from a proper system of instruction and the proper practi- 
cal application of the knowledge thus gained on the drill ground. 
(Home.) ■ "It cannot be too often repeated that the training of the soldier, if 

training of a the fuU advantage of modern arms is to be obtained, must be of a far 

higher character ■ . , i i • i i i* i i 11 

than formerly. higher character than it has ever before been, not only must he be 
able to move and act with others, so that if requisite the full force of 
a large body in perfect order, acting under one will, may be brought 
to bear on one point, but he must have confidence in his own individ- 
ual action. ; To be able to attain these necessary qualifications, not 
only must the man originally have an elementary education, without 
wliich he cannot grasp what he has subsequently to learn, but he must 
be carefully trained to use his own powers of mind and body. Here 
lies the main difference- produced by giving to the soldier improved 
weapons; to use them properly the man himself must be improved." 

5. We will probably now have but few instances of grand results 
obtained with inferior numbers as exemplified in the campaigns of 
Napoleon, Frederick the Great, and others, because the old formation 
in battle was well adapted to the purposes of men of genius like them; 
their troops being massed could be held well in hand and then 
lau'iched fj'th at just the proper time to produce the greatest result. 
The line of battle was then so contracted that the" commander could 
supervist! the whole field and control the dispositions of his entire 
command. Now these direct attacks will rarelv be successful unless 



AND TJIKIR APPLICATION IN MODERN WARFARE. 225 

attended with great losses, consequently flank attacks must be de- 
pended upon, and as strong front demonstrations must be made in 
order to hold the enemy in position until the flank attack is developed, 
superior numbers on the field of battle will, as a rule, be necessary to 
success. The line of battle required to accomplish this turning move- E.xtended linfs 

* . renime great iii- 

ment will necessarily ]bc very much extended, consequently less under teiligence too....- 

• 1 • c 1 1 • / n- • 'ii ti'ol them. 

the direction of the commander-in-chief, and this state of affairs will 
require great excellence on the part of the subordinate commanders to 
exercise the judgment required to properly support the movement, and 
the same principle extended will require intelligence in the lower 
grades, even down to the private in the ranks. 

The genius of the commander will be exerted before the battle in JJ^aSlde?*^ *'"''''""' 
manoeuvring for position, in order to force his adversary into the most 
unfavorable position possible — or in the province of strategy — and on 
the field of battle in determining the points of the enemy's line which 
can be most successfully attacked, and the proper time to put forth 
the greatest efforts, usually after the flank or turning movement has 
begun to produce its effect on the enemy, 

6. "It is requisite that if the full advantages of armies carefully otficersThouUi h* 
trained in peace are desired bv the state that maintains them, oflScers expert in siii 

^ ^ ' _ ^ ' ^ branches. 

must know more than their own special arm of the service; and this 
is perhaps more essential for officers of those arms of the service 
(cavalry, artillery, and engineers) which are auxiliaries to the main 
force — infantry — than for infantry officers themselves. And this is 
all the more requisite now, when the power breech-loaders have given 
to infantry is considered. 

"However desirable it is that officsrs should know more than their <^>tie ann oiiniK.i 

undertake tht- 

own branch of the service, and should understand the nature and duties of ih.- 

.... . . other. 

action of other arms, yet it is a mischievous error for any arm of the 
service to seek to undertake the duties of others, 

"A correct tactical action is one in which the powers and peculiar- Outies of various 

' -^ arms not intcr- 

ities of each arm of the service shall be developed to attain one object, changeable. 
A general looks on the different arms as instruments for attaining his 
object, precisely as a carpenter regards his tools; but no good carpenter 
would use his chisel as a saw, or his mallet as a hammer. Therefore, 
although officers must know and understand something of the duties 
of the various branches of the army, any attempt to make these 
branches interchangeable, to make artillery work as cavalr}', infantry 
as artillery or engineers, is to use a thing for a purpose it is not in- 
tended for, at all times a slow and costly operation, producing a 
minimum amount of result with a maximum expenditure. In armies, 
infantry undoubtedly takes the lead, and to its action that of the 

29 



226 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

other arms must be subordinated. An intimate knowledge of in- 
fantry tactics consequently becomes most essential for officers of the 
Action ..f:\H arms auxiliary arms — cavalry, artillery, and engineers — it being their duty 
thaTyVthe^inian- to aid and facilitate the action of the infantry, and they must seek, 
"^' not what is most advantageous and best viewed from a cavalry, artil- 

lery, or engineer point of view, but what is best viewed from an 
infantry point of view." 



ERRATA. 

Page 15, sixteenth line from top, for "marking," read "masking." 
Page 87, marginal note to 3rd case, for "guard," read "ground." 
]»age P20, par. 24, after " Mars-la-Tour," add "see Fig. 4." 
Page 121, fifth line from bottom, after "five," for "guns,'* read 
batteries." 

l*age IHG, eleventh line from top, after "centre" omit "of the." 
Page 180, last line, for "Fig. 11," read "Fig. 2." 
Page 217, last line, for "circumstance," read "circumstances." 



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UBRARY OF CONGg^^^ 

■iiilittiif, 
021 183 137 6 




